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PREFACE 
Trotskyism has been neglected by historians excavating those 
ever more popular quarries the 1930s and 1940s. Their disinterest is 
my main case for devoting a full-length thesis to Trotskyist activity 
before 1949. It may be objected that Trotskyism was unimportant 
throughout my chosen period. But while it was certainly no major 
influence before 1949, even in the restricted area of the labour 
movement during that time, Trotskyism maintained activity and 
conditioned in part the behaviour of other movements and individuals 
who are thought fit subjects for historical enquiry. There is 
therefore a job of recovery to be done in order to establish whom 
Trotskyism affected and why. Yet there is, simultaneously, a larger 
question to pose: if Trotskyism was unimportant throughout, why was 
this so? There is no iron law of labour movements which inevitably 
permits communist parties to eclipse Trotskyism. In a number of 
metropolitan countries Trotsky received early and significant support 
from noted communist leaders. Since this did not happen in Britain 
where the communists themselves never gathered mass support, the 
historian must ask why. It is also necessary to allow for those 
occasions when Trotskyism passed out of the shadows into the floodlights: 
these moments have also been skipped, for the most part, by historians, 
and need to be put in their proper setting within the labour history 
of the time. 
My claim to have undertaken original work rests chiefly on 
the lack of secondary material on the subject. The main lines of 
development of the Trotskyist movement laid down in this thesis I have 
derived from c8ntemporary manuscripts and published material, and from 
conversations with participants. Invariably my investigation took me 
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from a working knowledge of labour movement history into uncharted 
waters. Sometimes I floundered and occasionally I was misled by red 
herrings: at all events I had to make my own charts and I hope they 
will help others. Yet I do not seek to give the impression that 
there has been no secondary work at all. How do I relate to what has 
been written? The last five years have seen a spurt of scholarly 
interest in the non-communist left of the labour movement. Two theses 
on the I. L. P. have been written which span a period similar to that of 
this thesis and discuss Trotskyist influence on the party. 
I 
At the 
end of 1979 a thesis by John Archer was completed covering Trotskyist 
movements between 1931 and 1937.2 Since I had at that time a first 
draft of my own thesis, I did not, on the advice of my supervisor, read 
Archer's work. There has also been written a shorter bibliographical 
thesis on the Trotskyist press by Alison Penn which is a useful tool 
although it lacks absolute authority. 
Published work which discusses British Trotskyism in whole or 
part falls into two categories. There are the articles written by 
Brian Pearce under a variety of pseudonyms some twenty years ago, 
several of which have now been republished. 
4 
Pearce always went to 
the sources and unearthed many forgotten episodes or facets of better- 
known events. Hugo Dewar's Communist Politics in Britain (1976) is 
I P. J. Thwaites, 'The Independent Labour Party, 1938-50', (University 
of London Ph. D. thesis, 1976); G. Littlejohns, 'The Decline of the 
Independent Labour Party', (University of Nottingham M. Phil. thesis, 
1979). 
2 J. Archer, 'Trotskyism in Britain : 1931-19371, (Polytechnic of 
Central London Ph. D. thesis, 1979). 
3 A. M. R. Penn, 'A Bibliography of the British Trotskyist Press', 
(University of Warwick M. A. thesis, 1979). 
4 See M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essays on the History of Communism 
in Britain (1975). 
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broader though less sure in content but only marginally concerned with 
the Trotskyists. Reg. Groves has published his recollections as 
The Balham Group (1974), an invaluable memoir which yet leaves much 
unsaid. Harry Wicks has also written briefly of the early years of 
Trotskyism. I Wartime and the controversy over Military Policy (q. v. ) 
have stimulated interesting articles in the socialist press. 
2 Finally 
there have been accounts of the post-war controversies within the 
Fourth International arising from European economic recovery. 
3 
Consigned to the not recommended category must be those 
squibs written by political activists in order to cancel out the past 
or to justify the present: I have responded to these by seeking to 
establish fact and demolish myth but they are mentioned in my 
bibliography. 
It seems to me that the history of Trotskyism in Britain has 
a natural periodicity. There was no organised movement in the 1920s. 
The years to 1938 when the Fourth International was launched were in 
Britain years of survival and sectarianism. Toeholds were established 
but conditions were most unfavourable for the gathering of support. 
From 1938 to 1944 there was a contradictory development as the official 
British Section of the Fourth International splintered repeatedly and 
finally ceased to be a coherent political force, while an unofficial 
group, regarded as a pariah by official Trotskyist opinion, built the 
strongest position yet for the movement in Britain drawing to it some 
who were disaffected and others who were new. The process was thus 
I H. Wicks, 'British Trotskyism in the Thirties', International, 
Vol. 1, no. 4 (1971), 26-32. 
2 W. Hunter, 'Marxists in the Second World War', Labour Review (Dec. 
1958), 139-46; B. Farnborough (B. Pearce) 'Mar-xists in the Second 
World War', Labour Review (April-May 1959); D. Parkin, 'British 
Trotskyists and the Class Struggle in World War 21, Trotskyism 
Today (March 1978), 27-30. 
3 Notably P. Jenkins, Where Trotskyism Got Lost (1979). 
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simultaneously one of fission and fusion. 1944 to 1949 were years 
when the Revolutionary Communist Party declined as its perspectives 
collided with reviving capitalism and it was progressively debilitated 
by internal disputes. Just as in the 1930s, but now for quite opposite 
reasons, there were no major industrial conflicts and this absence 
blighted Trotskyism's prospects. My argument is that the major 
influences on the British working class were established at the 
beginning of the 1930s while Trotskyism was still incipient. Only the 
peculiar political conjuncture induced by the war permitted Trotskyist 
growth. The end of the war brought a return to traditional political 
loyalties, the objects of which had not yet been tested to the full. 
There was simply no room for a strong Trotskyist organisation and all 
the characteristics accurately or unfairly imputed to it were 
secondary in effect to the brutal centripetal tendencies of the British 
labour =vement. 
f 
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A NOTE ON REFERENCES 
In the footnotes to the text I have tried to redu6e details 
in references to the minimum consistent with precision. Where 
possible details of references are given in full in the bibliography. 
There are no references to works published after 1979 at which date 
the first draft of the thesis was complete. 
In the footnotes and in the bibliography the following 
abbreviations occur: 
B. S. S. L. H. Bulletin of the Society for the Study 
of Labour History 
Inprecorr International Press Correspondence 
J. C. H. Journal of Contemporary History 
J. S. L. H. S. Journal of the Scottish Labour History Society 
P. Q. Political Quarterly 
Unless otherwise stated in the bibliography, the place of 
publication is London. 
INTRODUCTION 
I. 1,., 
I TROTSKY AND THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT IN THE 1920S 
The failure of Trotskyism to establish-a presence in the 
1920s is to be bxplained partly by reference to the character of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain and partly by the quality of British 
Marxism itself. Lack of interest in theory and the absence of 
intellectuals who would make major contributions to Marxist thought 
had already separated Britain from the Continent before 1914.1 
Detachment from ideological controversy was carried over into the infant 
C. P. G. B., whose formation had been the subject of historical debate. 
2 
Respect for Trotsky as a revolutionary leader spanned the labour 
movement spectrum at the start of the decade. By the end it had 
narrowed to liberal and independent socialist intellectuals. The 
Communist Party, which had promoted him enthusiastically up to the middle 
1920s turned, with the Comintern, away from him. For the Labour Party, 
twice in government, he was too revolutionary. Trotsky had support 
against both parties, but no organised following. The low level of 
Party life, incomprehension at the debate within the Russian Party and 
the Comintern, a lack of intellectuals among the membership, 
3 
all might 
be urged as reasons why the Communist Party produced no Trotskyist 
opposition for nearly ten years. The Party observed the line from 
Moscow until the late 1920s when a combination of Comintern pressure 
and a rank and file revolt precipitated a leadership purge. Support 
for Trotsky came from outside the Party, from people who had stayed 
I The link between Continental Marxism and actual revolutionary 
movements is discussed by P. Anderson,. Considerations on Western 
Marxism, (1979), 1-21. 
2 W. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain, (1969), presents 
the launchirýg of-the C. P. G. B. as an unnatural distortion. R. Challinor 
interprets the decline of the C. P. G. B. from 1920 through the decay or 
removal of its S. L. P. cadre: The Origins of British Bolshevism, (1977), 215-77. 
3 N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, (1959), 22. 
2. 
aloof from the attempt to build a Bolshevik Party in Britain or who had 
taken part and then left as individuals. 
I In neither case were they the 
people to organise a movement. Until 1930 Trotsky was left in Britain 
only with admirers. 
No one in Britain in 1923 grasped the significance of the clash 
between the Left Opposition and the Russian Communist Party which burst 
into the open that year. In other countries there were fierce disputes 
within the Communist Parties over the critique advanced by the Opposition 
in its platform. 
2 
In Britain this did not occur. 
_ 
Lenin's death in 
January 1924 physically removed from Russia an influence neutralised for 
some time. Since the battle between the Party leadership and the Left 
Opposition continued, pressure began to build up for national parties to 
I None of the most eminent of those who left during the early 1920s 
attempted to justify themselves at any length. Their views on the 
C. P. G. B. have to be gleaned en passant from articles in The Plebs 
and elsewhere. There was thus no domestic critique of the C. P. G. B. 
from within the Marxist tradition which might, as news of Trotsky's 
figýt-in Russia became known, have become connected with the 
International Left Opposition. Marxism outside the C. P. G. B. 
receives masterly treatment from S. Macintyre, 'Marxism in Britain, 
1917-1933', (Cambridge D. Phil., 1976). 
2 The German, Polish and French Parties - all mass organisations - all 
came out for Trotsky before the Fifth (1924) Congress of the 
Comintern, (J. Braunthal, History of the International, 2,1914-1943, 
(trans. 1967), 295,296n). Leading figures who rallied to him now 
or later in the 1920s included Warski (twice General Secretary of the 
Polish Party), Cannon, an American leader, Nin, a founder and leading 
figure of the Spanish Party, and Bordiga, the Italian maximalist. 
In France, where the Party was initially stronger than the Socialists, 
Loriot and Souvarine, and Monatte and Rosmer from the Unions, all 
supported the Opposition, (F. Borkenau, World Communism, (Michigan 
1962), 261-2). In Italy, Gramsci from jail criticised the Russians' 
preoccupation with domestic questions, (F. Claudin, The Communist 
Movement, (1975), 116-7). Togliatti and Thorez, each destined for 
the General Secretaryship of a major party, privately approved the 
Critique of the Draft Programme of the Comintern (1928), 
(I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky : 1921-1929, (1959), 
444). There is a useful summary of expulsions from the world's 
Communist Parties for Trotskyism in The Third International after 
Lenin, (1973), 282. 
3. 
declare themselves. The British Communist press, like the bourgeois 
press, was at first content to report. 
I This was, after all, not the 
first instance of debate within the. Russian Party. Inprecorro 
originating from Moscow, mirrored developments there more closely and, 
moreover, without a timelag. Trotsky's views on the New Course-were 
printed as well as those of Stalin and Zinoviev, 
2 but Trotsky's 
progressive isolation would soon be apparent. 'Trotskyism' as an 
identifiable phenomenon was categorised as such by April 1924o 
3 
But the Comintern journal Communist International ran no campaign against 
Trotsky until the broad offensive after the General Strike, and he himself 
was still a contributor. 
4 
However, British representatives at the Fifth 
I Labour Monthly (Feb. 1924), Communist Review (Feb. 1924). This last 
is seen by a critic as a 'fair presentation', B. Pearce, 'Early Years 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain', in M. Woodhouse and 
B. Pearce, (eds. ), Essays on the History of Communism in Britain 
(1975), 173-4. Publication of these articles has been attributed to 
partial apprehension by the C. P. G. B. of what was happening in 
Russia, (L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party. Its origin 
and development until 1929, (1966), 92-3). 
2 Inprecorr, Vol. 4, no. 12, (Jan. 1924), 83-94. Macfarlane comments 
that Labour Monthly for March 1924 gave a Trotsky reply to Stalin's 
accui-a; t-ions of factionalism 'with obvious approval' (op. cit., 92). 
3 Communist Review in that month ran the resolution of the thirteenth 
annual conference of the C. P. S. U. condemning factional activity by 
the Opposition and classifying 'Trotskyism' as a petty-bourgeois 
deviation. But the same journal could carry articles by Trotsky 
('Gorki on Lenin - Trotsky on Gorki', (Dec. 1924), 381-6) and others 
which praised him: 
He himself is a magnificent exponent of the conclusion 
to which he comes, namely that we must not wait for a 
bureaucratic "introduction" of the new order from on 
high, but must try and find in our every day conditions, 
the embryo forms and movements of the new order amidst 
the lumber of the old. 
('Trotsky on Culture', Communist Review, (Nov. 1924), 355).. In each 
case, however, the theme of the article tended not to be of immediate 
political import. 
4 'The Philistine discourseth on the Revolutionary', Communist 
International, (July 1924). 
4. 
Comintern Congress in July 1924 endorsed the condemnation of Trotsky's 
attitude by the C. P. S. U. although no discussion in the C. P. G. B. had 
yet taken place. 
I 
In November 1924 a definite lead was given in Inprecorr 
as Russian and foreign communists began to react to Trotsky's 
The Lessons of October. 
2A 
sequence of rubbishing articles was begun 
3 
which lasted until 6 February 1925. Trotsky's introduction to The 
Lessons of October only appeared after three months. No reader of 
Inprecorr could possibly doubt, after such a sustained onslaught, that 
this was more than an ordinary policy difference. The British Party 
reacted swiftly to the debates at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. 
On 30 November, a party councýl approved the stand on Trotsky adopted 
there and in the C. P. S. U. 
4 
Within a week Tom Bell had published the 
I L. J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 93. 
2 Ostensibly an autopsy on the bungled German insurrection of 1923, 
The Lessons of October developed the argument to embrace the role 
of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1917. 
3 The sequence began with 'How one should not write the History of 
October', a reprint from Pravda, and continued with contributions 
by Kuusinen, Bukharin, Stalin, kykov, Kamenev, Krupskaya and 
Sokolnikov. From abroad, V. Kolarov, (Bulgaria), the German 
Communist Youth C. C., and Bela Kun joined in. Even Brandler and 
Thalheimer, now in disgrace, attacked Trotsky but a corrective 
article by Ottomar Geschke was attached to their views. 
4 J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britaing Vol. 2. 
The General Strike 1925-1926, (1969), 327. 
5. 
first authentic British article against Trotskyism. 
I Yet at this 
point the party leaders had not read The Lessons of October 
2 
and that 
certainly meant that the membership, in general, had not read it either. 
One exception was Arthur Reade, member of the London District 
Committee and business manager of Labour Monthly, who read German and 
had access to Comintern documents. He knew Trotsky's views and 
expounded them at classes he gave to the Battersea Young Communist 
League. 3 He and several of these young communists attended the Party's 
London aggregate meeting of 17 January 1925 to hear Andrew Rothstein 
and other speakers. When J. T. Murphy put down a resolution endorsing 
the Party's condemnation of The Lessons of October, Reade moved an 
amendment from the London District Committee supporting the Opposition 
and regretting the haste with which the Party Council had taken a 
'The Truth About Trotsky', Workers Weekly, 5 December 1924. Bell 
recalled the Trotsky had criticised Party elder statesmen as early 
as December 1923 and claimed: 
needless to say the ideas of Comrade Trotsky found 
ready support from the bureaucrats and Nep-men .... 
He produced no evidence to support this assertion, however, nor did 
he show why this should be so from an exposition of Trotsky's views. 
But he emphasised that the British Party was in line with the 
C. P. S. U. endorsement of Comintern policy on Germany and Bulgaria and 
warned against splits. 
2 L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party, 92-3. Macfarlane 
argues that the swift British endorsement of the Soviet line pre- 
empted a purge. A purge was taking place in the Parti Communiste 
Francais at this time (A. Treint, 'The Bolshevising Party Conference 
of the C. P. of France', Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 17,240). Treint, 
who was to align himself with Trotsky in 19V, crowed that Trotsky 
had been ousted from his early popularity in France. 
3 Arthur E. E. Reade was an Oxford student rusticated at the end of the 
war for his political activities, (Interview with Harry Wicks, 
30 November 1979). 
6. k.. - 
stand. 
I He was defeated with ten or fifteen votes in support. 
2 
But an attempt was made to delay the vote until the case for both 
sides had been put and this fell by only 81 votes to 65.3 The 
meaning of thesR votes seems to be not an endorsement of Trotsky's 
views by a minority of London communists, but a fairly widespread 
feeling that party leaders had been too eager to put themselves on 
record. England could join the triumphant list of couiitries where 
Trotskyism was completely isolated, 
4 but it was the manner rather 
than the ideas of the leaders which had occasioned protest. Yet 
Rothstein's article of a week later suggests by its title more 
alarm among the party leaders after the aggregate than before. 
5 
This aggregate meeting of the London District membership of the 
CPGB joins with the District Party Committee in regretting the 
hasty vote of the Party Council in condemning Comrade Trotsky 
without full information: and this meeting at the same 
takes the opportunity to express the. London membership's emphatic 
support both of the left wing's minority fight in the Russian Party 
against bureaucracy, and equally of the Comintern's struggle 
against right wing divergencies from Leninism in the French, 
Bulgarian and German sections (quoted in H. Wicks, 'British 
Trotskyism in the Thirties', International, Vol. 1, no. 4, 
(1971), 27). 
2 Workers Weekly for 17 January 1925 gives Reade 10 votes out of 300. 
Reade claimed 15 out of 200, (J. Klugmann, History of the Communist 
Party, 2,327). 
3 J. D. Young and W. Kendall, 'The Rise of British Trotskyism', The 
New Leader, 7 May 1960 
4 'Trotskyism completely isolated in the C. P. of Russia and in the 
Comintern', (Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 7,22 January 1925,75). 
5 C. M. Roebuck (Andrew Rothstein), 'Trotskyism -A Peril to the Party', 
Workers Weekly, 23 January 1925. 
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The introduction to The Lessons of October was published 
on 26 February 1925.1 By then, however, the attack on Trotskyism 
had broadened out and stretched back in time. 
2 Bell published 
Trotsky's 15 Jaquary letter to the central committee of the Russian 
Party with a preamble arguing that its rejection proved the Party to 
be still a Bolshevik one. 
3 He and Gallacher attended the extended 
plenum. of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, 
which met from 21 March to 6 April. They took no part in the debate 
on theoretical matters, but in the eleventh session, devoted to 
Trotskyism, Bell followed Treint and Neumann in a speech composed 
entirely. of slogans. 
4 
The British delegates supported a motion calling 
for a drive against deviations to be conducted by all parties. Back in 
Britain Reade had been suspended from the London District Committee of 
the Party following the January aggregate. He appealed, but was turned 
down by the Party Executive on 26 April. 
5 Some time after this he 
left the Party and the country. 
6 Perhaps the first British Trotskyist 
had departed, apparently making little impression. The Seventh Party 
I It appeared, without comment, in Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 16,209-26. 
2 Bukharin savaged Trotsky's most distinctive theoretical contribution 
and asked, 
'Is it not clear that this "permanent" question 
of a "permanent" theory is the "permanent" 
contradiction between Trotskyism. and Leninism? ' 
('The Theory of Permanent Revolution', Communist Review, (Feb. 1925), 
381-94. ) 
3 'Trotsky and the Party', Communist Review, (March 1925), 446-56. 
Trotsky's letter appears with the C. P. S. U. Central Committee reply. 
4 'Discussion on the Question of Trotsky', Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 37 
(23 April 1925), 485-6. 
5 J. Klugmann, History of the Communist PartX, ' 2,327n. 
6 In 1929 Reade was back in politics, now as Labour prospective 
Parliamentary Candidate for North Berks. That-year he clashed with 
Arthur Henderson at Party Conference overN. E. C. vetting of election 
addresses, (LPCR, (1929), 242). Reade later left the Labour Party to 
become a Parliamentary Candidate in Bristol for Oswald Mosley's New 
Party. (Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 November 1979. ) 
8. 
Congress of the C. P. G. B. met at the end of May, and Bell implemented the 
E. C. C. I. decision by moving a motion agreeing with the Russian Party 
Central Committee in its estimate of Trotskyism and the measures taken 
against it. 
I There was now published The Errors of Trotskyism by 
Bukharin and'Kamenev, a reply to The Lessons of October, with an 
English edition introduction by J. T. Murphy. 
2 
It has been suggested 
that, even at this late dýte, the British Party leaders had seen only 
a summary of Trotsky's book 
3 
and indeed this was what was published 
with The Errors of Trotskyism. 
There would be no support for Trotsky from Party leaders 
when he was out of step with Moscow, though for more than a year he was 
to remain a legitimate figure with the British Party. With a minor 
manifestation of Trotskyism in the C. P. G. B. dispelled, support for the 
Opposition leader now appeared outside the Party. 
4 
The response to 
Lenin (1925) illustrated the point well. Reviewers in the Party press 
tended to regret Trotsky's loss of form. 
5 
Communists writing in 
I J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party, Vol. 2,327. The motion 
was identical with that passed at the London aggregate and received 
unanimous support, (L. J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 140). 
2 See C. M. Roebuck, 'Leninism and Trotskyism', Sunday Worker, 
31 May 1925, a review of The , 
Errors of Trotskyism, for an early 
attempt to depict Trotsky's principles as a discrete philosophy 
distinguished by its views on the peasantry and the Party. 
3 L. J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 140. 
4 The suppression of Lenin's Will was known to M. Phillips Price, a 
former M. P. and Party member, who dealt even-handedly with the 
struggle in Moscow, ('A Lion at Bay', The Plebs, (June 1925), 238-41). 
Price may have heard about the Will from Max Eastman, (see below), 
but he may not have known that it condemned Stalin, (D. Caute, The 
Fellow Travellers (1973), 86). 
5 T. A. Jackson believed that Trotsky overdramatised and was lost 
without Lenin, (Sunday Worker, 5 April 1925); A. MacManus thought 
Lenin lacked Trotsky's 'usual brilliance' and was 'quite his 
weakest piece of work'. Trotsky ought, he suggested, to publish a 
real book on Lenin, not just fragments, (Communist Review, May 1925, 
35-41). 
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non-party publications were hostile. The ex-coamunist 
M. Phillips Price was friendly, 
2 
and Frank Horrabin was able to enjoy 
3 himself over communist inconsistency. This divergence was important 
now and later. Many of the independent Marxists around The Plebs met 
Max Eastman 
4 
during his 1924 stay in Britain following a twenty one 
months spell in Russia. Eastman had met Trotsky in Russia and witnessed 
the debate around Opposition criticism of the Party programme, details 
of which he must have passed on. In the spring of 1925 he'published 
Sinne Lenin n4AA-5 
Though formally disowned by Trotsky, Eastman offered a 
detailed account of the clash within the Russian Party during the last 
two years - the only one available. He analysed Lenin's suppressed 
Will, with its celebrated member by member assessment of the C. P. S. U. 
Central Committee. He reproduced a passage on Trotsky from 
Lunacharsky's Revolutionary Silhouettes. It was a definite and radical 
challenge to the prevailing version of recent events in Russia. 
6 
I M. Dobb, 'Lenin and Trotsky', The Plebs (May 1925), 184-91; 
W. N. Ewer, who worked closely with the communists and wrote 
frequently for Labour Monthly was spiteful in the Daily Herald and 
wrote in Labour Monthly of 'The Twilight of Trotsky'. 
2 Lansbury's Labour WeeklX, 4 April 1925. 
3 He pointed out that part of the poorly received Lenin had been 
published by Labour Monthly the previous year! TB--. Pearce, 'Early 
Years of the Communist Party of Great Britain', in M. Woodhouse and 
B. Pearce (eds. ), Essays on the History of Communism in Britain, 
(1975), 175). 
4 An American journalist, formerly an editor of The Liberator, and an 
early member of the C. P. U. S. A. For Eastman's tionship with 
Trotsky, whom he persuaded to allow him to write his autobiography, 
see D. Caute, The Fellow Travellers, (1973), 22. S. Macintyre 
discusses Eastman's links with The Plebs in 'Marxism in Britain, 
1917-33'. 
5 Published by the Labour Publishing Company. 
6 It was not Trotsky's account however. Eastman believed that he had 
failed to take the opportunity to lead Russia after Lenin's. illness. 
He anticipated later writers with his view that Trotsky 'had no 
idea of political manoeuvring. He has nothing but a complete 
incapacity for it' (17). 
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The Communist Party was accustomed to speaking with authority about 
the Soviet Union. Eastman could be the butt of unqualified attacks. 
For tactical reasons Trotsky had disowned the book 
I 
and Party 
reviewers in Brttain therefore took the line of separating author from 
subject. Arthur MacManus bracketed Eastman with Party renegades Price 
and Levy. 'Under the guise of defenders of Tro , 
tskyl they were all 
attacking the Russian Party. 
2 
Jackson predicted that Trot sky would be 
furious at the way his name had been used. 
3 Palme Dutt ridiculed the 
book. 4 The Party went to some lengths to separate Eastman from Trotsky 
which suggests considerable embarrassment. 5 The belief that Eastman's 
account might be true and Trotsky deserving of sympathy surfaces only 
in the non-party press. 
6 
Support from outside the Party was a mixed 
blessing when it was offered by lapsed members. Nor did it provide 
any profound analysis of what had taken place in Russia: Postgate, 
for example, expressed the wish that the two factions might speedily 
be united and win success for the revolution. 
7A journal like 
The Plebs might be an alternate outlet for news, but was not likely to 
I Of necessity during the factional struggle, I. Deutscher, 
The Prophet Unarmed, (1959), 201-2 and n. 
2 'Since Lenin Died. More facts and fiction. (A Review of the latest 
Menshevik Diatribe)', Communist Review (May 1925), 35-41. 
3 'Poor Trotsky', The Sunday Worker, 10 May 1925. 
4 Labour Monthly, (June 1925). See also 'Since Eastman Lies', 
Workers' Weekly, 8 May 1925. 
5 The Sunday Worker 
, 
considered Trotsky's first disavowal to justify 
front page treatment on 10 May 1925. On 31 May it ran Eastman's 
complaint at the treatment he had received in the communist press 
with Jackson's defensive note. Trotsky's second, less aubiguous 
denial appeared in full on 19 July. 
6 R. Postgate, another-ex-communist, defended'Trotsky on the personal 
level but failed to see any deeper significance in Russian events$ 
My Trotsky Fell', Lansbury's Labour Weekly, 2 May 1925). 
M. Phillips Price drew on Eastman and reports now becoming available 
from Russia, CA Lion at Bay', The Plebs, June 1925). 
7 Eastman's emphasis in his book on Trotsky's personality had allowed 
MacManus to advise him to pay less attention to the psyche and more 
to the revolution. 
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provide fundamental criticism of the kind Trotsky himself had offered 
in The New Course. He was defended as a revolutionary hero, not as a 
theoretician, 
Ia 
point sometimes overlooked. 
2 
The communist press 
continued its attempts to clarify the status of Eastman's book well 
into the summer. 
3 
After the controversy died, 
4 
the British Party 
seems to have been uncertain about Trotsky's status. He could still be 
reviewed 
5 but articles published were not on immediate issues. 
6 It was 
only his decision to devote his next important book to Britain which 
I R. Postgate and J. Horrabin, 'Trotsky's "Comrades"', The Plebs, 
(July 1925), 286-8. See also Gallacher's reply in August. 
2 See for example R. Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism 
(1977), 273 
3 'In the International : Comrade Trotsky's Declaration with regard to 
Eastman's Book : Since Lenin's Death' (sic), Inprecorr, Vol. 5, 
no. 60,30 July 1925,833-4; 'Final Text of Trotsky's letter on 
Eastman's book : Since Lenin Died'. Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 68, 
3 September 1925,1004-6. Eastman replied to his critic 
,s 
in 
Lansbury's Labour Weekly for 29 August 1925 and rounded off the 
discussion with a well-written article in Plebs ('A Response to 
Trotsky', (Oct. 1925), 393-8) in which he attempted to explain 
Trotsky's disclaimers. 
4 In 1926 Eastman published two further books, Leon Trotsky : The 
Portrait of a Youth, (reviewed in The Plebs (September 1926), 
343-4), and Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution, a refutation 
of dialectical materialism which should have ended once and for all 
the belief that he was a Trotskyist, (S. Macintyre, 'Marxism in 
Britain, 1917-33', 105-6). In 1928 however he had gathered round 
him a tiny group of Trotsky. sympathisers simultaneously with the 
emergence of a Left Opposition within the C. P. U. S. A. See C. A. Myers, 
The Prophet's Army. Trotskyists in, America, 1928-1941, (Westport, 
Conn., 1977). 
5 Charles Ashleigh discussed Literature and Revolution, ('Purges for 
the Highbrow', Sunday Worker, Nov. 1925) ' 
6 'The Spirit of Moscow' (Sunday orker, 2; June 1925) which appeared 
at the beginning of China's revolutionary phase; 'The struggle for 
the Quality of Production', Inprecorr, Vol. 5, no. 81, (19 November 
1925), 1235-6; 'Towards Socialism or Capitalism? The Language of 
Figure', I, Labour Monthly, (Nov. 1925), 659 
* -66, and 
II, Labour 
Monthly, (Dec. 1925), 736-48. This last was the first introductory 
section of a work already published in Russia. Later sections, 
criticising Bukharin, were omitted without acknowledgment by Labour 
Monthly, (B. Pearce, 'Early Years of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain', M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, op. cit., 176). Trotsky's 
writings never appeared in the journal after this, though he was to 
be anathematized many times. 
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brought him again to the attention of the communist press. 
Though certain subjects were taboo, 
I 
Britain was not one of 
them. Where is', Britain Going ,a sparkling polemic against British 
labour and trade union leaders and their gradualist philosophy was 
published in February 1926. It was published not by the Party but by 
2 
George Allen and Unwin who attached a preface by Brailsford. 
Where is Britain Going? was very much part of Trotsky's case against 
Comintern policy. It appeared during a phase of the struggle in 
Russia between the Joint Opposition and Stalin and Bukharin. It did not 
handle roughly the British Party's support for left wing figures on the 
T. U. C. General Council, but Trotsky later wrote: 
The book was aimed essentially at the official 
conception of the Politbureau, with its hope of 
an evolution to the left by the British General 
Council, and of a gradual and painless penetration 
of communism into the ranks of the British Labour 
Party and Trade Unions. 
3 
1 The history of the revolution was one. John Reed's Ten DaXs That 
Shook the World, with its accurate portrait of 1917 and a 
commendatory preface by Lenin, was suppressed shortly after it 
appeared in February 1926. Those with copies were confronted by 
footnotes correcting Reed's account and referring them to 
The Errors of Trotskyism, (J. Braunthal, History of the International: 
1914-1943 (Trans. 1967), 244n). 
2 See below. The first (Moscow) edition is dated May 1925. In 
September 1925 the book had appeared in the United States as Whither 
England In October 1926 the C. P. G. B. brought out its own edition 
in which it dropped Brailsford's introduction and replaced it by 
Trotsky's own for the second German edition (dated 6'May 1926). 
For the diluting effect this had see B. Pearce, 'The Early Years of 
the Communist Party of Great Britain', in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, 
op. cit., 176-7. 
3 My Life, (New York, 1970), 527. 
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It has been suggested that the British Party did not 
understand the book. 
I No other communist had written anything as 
relevant for the year of the General Strike, however, and it was well 
enough suited tq 
% 
the party mood after May for a second edition to be 
published. Trotsky confronted the entire working class leadership, 
left and right. His critics were the party's critics, and he wrote as 
a party member. The C. P. G. B. could only rally to him. 
Where is Britain Going? scattered its shot so widely as to 
stimulate many of its victims into print. Norman Angell was provoked 
into writing a full length book to show 'the futility of revolution' .2 
For MacDonald, Trotsky was a pamphleteer not an historian, a devotee 
of theories not a slave to facts; he had concocted 'an oriental riot 
of fancy regarding facts and eventd. Brailsford in his introduction 
to the first edition, had observed that the imprisoned C. P. G. B. leaders 
had been sentenced for the opinions expressed in the book. While 
allowing Trotsky force of argument, Brailsford did not believe his 
Russian approach would convince. Russell 
4 
allowed that Trotsky was 
'remarkably well-informed' on the politics of the British Labour 
movement, but considered that he was advocating an English revolution 
for Russian advantage. Lansbury 
5 
gave much support to Trotsky while 
defending himself. Transport Workers' leader Robert Williams, a 
former Labour Party Chairman, and yet another former communist, had been 
I H. Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain, (1976), 65. 
2 Must Britain Travel the Moscow Road? (1926). Angell claimed his 
book had been 'a thumping success"r-in publishing terms, (Af ter All 
(1951), 268). 
3 'Trotsky on Great. -Britain', The Nation, 10 March 1926. 
4 'Trotsky on our Sins', The New Leader,, 26 February 1926. 
5 'Trotsky', Lansbury'S Labour Weekly, 27 February 1926. 
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pilloried by Trotsky in the book for having 'ratted'. Like Lansbury 
he had both to defend himself against Trotsky and to defend Trotsky 
against his critics. 
I Cleverly he pointed out that the charge of 
renegacy presentgd by Trotsky against him was advanced against Trotsky 
himself by the Russian leadership two years before. He recalled the 
persecution of Trotsky and the suppression of Lenin's will: 
'.... those in charge of the machine were so afraid of the 
criticism of one who had rendered more service to the 
revolution than all of them combined that they deliberately 
; 
uppressed it. ' 
The non-communist reviewers generally took the line that 
Trotsky did not understand the peculiarities of the English. 
Communist reviewers believed they detected another common factor in 
these reactions: hostility to the proletarian revolution. 
2 
Through the reviews of MacDonald and, especially, of 
Williams, the fact of Trotsky's downfall was kept to the fore in the 
labour movement press. The Communists, with their front rank leaders 
in jail and their attention on the imminent expiry of the coal subsidy 
'The Gospel According to Trotsky', Labour Magazine, (March 1926). 
The Daily Herald reviewed the book on 10 February. All these 
reviews appear in. G. Novack (ed. ) Leon Trotsky on Britain (N. Y. 1973). 
2 T. A. Jackson: 'The Retreat Before Moscow', The Workers' Weekly. 
William Paul defended Trotsky against Angell and other critics unable 
to handle his 'unanswerable case', insisting that the course of the 
General Strike had confirmed Trotsky's estimate of ruling class 
intentions. Trotsky would not have approved of Paul's argument 
that gradualness comes after revolution and not before, evidence 
for which was the gradual building of a communist basis in Russia! 
CWhere Angell Dares to Tread', Sunday Worker, 18 July 1926). 
When he reviewed Towards Socialism or Capitalism?, Paul directly 
imputed this idea to. Trotsky himself, ('The Path to Socialism', 
Sunday Worker, 8 August 1926). The last reply to Angell came 
curiously late in the year when J. T. Murphy studiously avoided 
taking a position on Trotsky's book. ('An Angel's Dilemma', 
Communist International, (30 November 1926), 22-3). Much water had 
flowed beneath the bridge by then. 
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showed no public awareness of Trotsky's deeper purpose. 
I His book 
was a welcome friend at a critical time as Palme Dutt strongly 
underlined: 
'A challenge may safely be issued to the critics to name a 
single book by a single English author or politician, 
bourgeois or labour leader, which is as close to the 
2 
essentials of the English situation as Trotsky's book' . 
Dutt was not prepared to allow the critics a single point, 
not even disavowing Trotsky's claim that the Liberal election victory 
of 1905 was partially a result of shock waves from the Russian 
Revolution of that year. Indeed, he continued, 
The English working class has cause to be grateful to 
Trotsky for his book; and to hope that he will not 
stay his hand at this short sketch, but will carry 
forward his work of interpretation, polemic and 
elucidation, and elaborate his analysis further which 
is so much needed in England. 
'The Party Press gave the volume high grades for brilliance and 
apparently could not fault it ideologically', A. Calhoun, The United 
Front : The T. U. C. and the Russians, 1923-1928, (Cambridge 1975), 
170. When T. A. Jackson reviewed Bukharin's Historical Materialism, 
he felt unable to do so without defending Trotsky against all 
critics, and notably Brailsford, ('Historical Materialism', 
Communist Review, (May 1926), 39-47). It is worth noting that the 
official history steers the reader through the party's experience 
of the General Strike without mentioning Trotsky's book once, 
(J. Klugmann, History of the Communist Party, Vol. 1, (1969). 
2 R. P. Dutt, 'Trotsky and his English Critics', Labour Monthly, 
(April 1926), 223-4. 
3 loc. cit., 241. 
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. It may be that the British party leaders were mostly dense 
in matters of theory. They had, moreover, no public guidance from 
Moscow, where it had first been published, as to the attitude they 
should adopt to,, Trotsky's book. Trotsky's polemic could only assist 
those more astute party leaders who were later to gain control of the 
party. The authority of Dutt and Labour Monthly was growing and both 
must have influenced the reading of Party members. It soon became 
impossible to quote Trotsky as an authority, but that did not prevent 
borrowing from the theoretical arsenal of one who had been cruelly 
vindicated by events. 
International developments soon impelled Stalin to decisive 
moves against the Joint Opposition in Russia. Repercussions in the 
C. P. G. B. could not fail to follow. The British crisis of 1926 was 
merely the current event on which Trotsky was honing his polemical 
scalpel to a fine sharpness. He returned to the subject several times 
in an independent way during the General Strike. He pressed'especially 
for severance of the trade union connections established through the 
The previous year Dutt had written: 
'Thus the Left Trade Union leaders occupy at present the 
position, not only of leaders of the workers in the 
immediate crisis but also of the spokesmen of the working 
class elements in the Labour Party - it might almost be 
said, an alternative political leadership. ' 
('The Capitalist offensive in Britain', Inprecorr, Vol. 5, 
no. 62 (6 Aug - 1925), 856). 
This was the very thesis against which Trotsky fought. After the 
General Strike, however, Dutt reverted to a position to the left of 
the leadership. He repeated Trotsky's later criticisms without 
acknowledgment, (L. J. MacFarlane, op. cit., 157). In this period he 
gained the loyalty of younger party members who , like Reg. Groves, 
were to become Trotskyists. See for example Groves's retrospective 
of Dutt's role in 1924-8, (The Red Flag, Aug. 1934). 
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Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee established in 1923. Under the 
title 'Problems of the British Labour Movement' some of Trotsky's 
later thinking appeared in the communist press. 
I It was'a sterilised 
Trotsky that was allowed into English, free of uncompromising 
references to the left members of the TUC General Council, with whom 
the Soviets retained a connection until 1927. 
In July 1926 Stalin spoke of the British party as being one 
of the best sections of the Communist International. 
2 He made it quite 
clear, however, that his commendation did not derive its inspiration 
from the party's influence. It continued to, gain members through 1926, 
even approaching 11,000, but then shrank. 
3 Yet Britain had held the 
attention of the entire Communist International during 1926 and the 
setback of the General Strike had to have repercussions* In Russia 
Bukharin and Stalin increased their power, while measures were taken 
rapidly against the Joint Opposition. Criticism of Trotsky grew 
more strident. Those who had access to Inprecorr could follow the new 
Comintern leaders' orchestrated attack. Articles in it were intended 
'for the widest possible publicity'. Dead disputes with Lenin were 
resurrected. Opposition prophecies of doom were refuted by reference 
to the greater size and more proletarian composition of the party. 
The Joint Opposition was deemed to be a Social-Democratic deviation, a 
theoretic consensus with Ottd Bauer. Communist International, no 
longer Zinoviev's organ, analysed the clash in the U. S. S. R., and 
attacked Trotsky by implication through Zinoviev and 
I Four chapters under this heading appeared in Russia. One of them 
was published in Britain, (Communist International, ns, no. 22,1926, 
19-41). 
2 'The General Strike in Britain', Inprecorr, Vol'. 6, no. 50, 
(I July 1926), 816. 
3 H. Pelling, The British Communist Part , (1975), 192. 
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Kamenev. I Readers of Communist Review were treated to Bukharin's 
lengthy ireatment of the Opposition platform between September and 
December. 'The actual words of the Opposition leaders were available 
2 
to British communists only through Inprecorr. Dire warnings were 
attached that 'Field Marshall Trotsky wanted 'to lead the opposition 
of all countries' and that the dissidents must choose between Lenin 
and Otto Bauer. 
'Problems of the British Labour Ifovement' had been allowed 
to surface in the English pond, but the C. P. G. B. was anxious there 
should be no misunderstanding about where it stood, 
3 
On 9 August 
the political bureau adopted a resolution on the 'Discussion in the 
C. P. S. U. 14 which rejected Trotsky's call to sever the Anglo-Russian 
5 
Committee and condemned 'Problems of the British Labour Movement' . 
It was still possible to discuss Opposition ideas, 
6 (those that were 
I J. Sten, 'Leninism or Trotskyism', Communist International, 
(30 Oct. 1926), 5-9. Attacks on the Opposition became frequent in 
the journal at this time. 
2 Extracts from the speeches of Zinoviev and Trotsky to the plenum of 
the enlarged E. C. C. I. in December were printed. See 'A New attack 
of the Opposition' and 'After Zinoviev, also Trotsky', Inprecorr, 
Vol. 6, no. 87,16 December 1926,1501-2. 
3 It had already complained to the E. C. C. I. about Trotsky's hostility 
towards it, (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed, 223n and 269n). 
4 Workers Weekly, 13 August 1926. 
5 Yet amid all this, the last ungrudging reference to Trotsky's role 
in 1917 appeared. Barret Robertson, 'The Life of a Red', 
Sunday Worker, 15 August 1926. 
6 In 1926 or 1927 members were invited locally to approve the 
condemnation of the Russian Opposition by the C. P. S. U. and the E. C. C. I. 
Stewart Purkisand Billy Williams, future Balham group members, 
abstained or opposed the leadership on the Russian economic 
question in their St. Pancras branch. Reg. Groves himself abstained 
on the Russian economy and voted against the official resolution on 
China at a West London area aggregate (Reg. Groves6 The Balham 
Group, (1974), 16). 'No-one',, Groves records, Ishowed any surprise or 
concern over our attitude'. 
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known), but the leading figures in Russia had little time left as 
party members. And in Britain even Opposition views on economics 
could be disregarded no longer. 
I 
. After,, 1926 it took a determined party member to discover 
details of the much abused platform of the Joint opposition. 
Communist International carried no articles by opposition leaders 
during 1927, but kept its readers informed about their successive 
downgrading. Tom Bell reported to Communist Review on the fifteenth 
conference of the C. P. S. U. but, while he witnessed the debate on 
Trotskyism and Trotsky's own speech in it, he passed little on. 
2 Those 
who read. Inprecorr would know that the opposition platform was a major 
preoccupation of the conference. Bell had spoken in the debate on the 
Opposition, but he was unwilling or unable to subject its ideas to any 
theoretical analysis. He condemned its factiousness and disloyalty 
however, and went on to reassure the Russian comrades: 
Though our experience with oppositions is very limited 
(probably our time will come when we too shall have to deal 
with serious political oppositions) nevertheless, our 
experience, limited as it is, justifies our complete 
identity with the measures taken by the Party of the 
U. S. S. R. to deal with its opposition. 
3 
Since there is little evidence to indicate any profound 
grasp among British communists of the Opposition platform, Bell's 
support for Stalin rested on a narrow base. Smith, a colleague, 
attempted to shore him up with some purely British complaints of 
I See Maurice Dobb's hostile review of Towards Capitalism or 
Socialism?, (Plebs, Oct. 1926). 
2 '15th Party Conference of the C. P. of the Soviet Union'. 
Communist Review, (Jan. 1927), 428-34. 
3 Inprecorr, Vol. 7, no. 2, (6 Jan. 1927), 16ý. 
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substance. He objected to-Trotsky referring to the British Party 
as a brake on the revolution and complained that Lansbury, Plebs, 
and other Lefts were using Trotsky's call for'the exposure of 
left reformism:., 
this group of liquidators, of renegade Communists, 
of Left elements in the labour movement, seize with joy 
on every attack which Trotsky makes upon the leaders of 
the Party and of the Communist International. 
Comrade Trotsky's policy is objectively helping 
these liquidators, while the article to which I referred 
was of direct assistance to them. 
I 
The climax of the clash in the C. P. S. U. was ill-reported in the 
British communist press: only publicity from outside forced the party 
to deal with . 
it in any detail. Trotsky's own speech to the 
conference, and indeed Smith's, was reported verbatim only in Inprecorr. 
What was more, the performance of the more left wing members of the 
TUC General Council during the'General Strike could only nurture 
doubts which Trotsky was free to nourish. The pride of the British 
party was punctured. C. P. G, B. membership continued to grow after the 
General Strike but apparently went into a consistent decline from 
Autumn 1926 2 which was not reversed until 1930. Factors in this 
I Inprecorr: Vol. 7, no. 4 (12 Jan. 1927). Smith was presumably 
referring to 'Problems of the British Labour Movement'. Some years 
later Bell himself repeated the allegation that Trotsky called the 
C. P. G. B. 1i brake on the revolution'(The British Communist Party: 
A short history, (1937)). In fact no such expression occurs in-the 
original or published versions of the article, though Trotsky's main 
argument was the need for the utmost implacability on the party's 
part in its dealings with left reformism, and he did warn that 
development of the party might lag behind development of the 
revolution. 
2 Official figures of party membership, derived from a variety of 
sources, are given in H. Pelling, The British Communist Party. 
A historical profile, (1975), 192-3. 
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decline were the effectiveness of Labour Party action against the 
National Left-Wing Movement, a natural depression following the 
failure of the General Strike and growing sectarianism on the part of 
the Party itself. There were some in the Party who leaned towards 
S 
intransigence, but their influence was increased by pressure from 
Moscow which was displeased with lack of progress in Britain and at 
loggerheads with C. P. G. B', leaders over the colonial question. 
Malcontents lacked the strength to displace the Party leadership at the 
January 1929 Party congress, but this was accomplished with Russian 
support at a special congress in December, 
2 
The staggered passage into what became known as the 
'Third Period', (following the years of revolution and then 
stabilisation), was accompanied in Britain by increased vigilance 
against Trotskyism. The honour of proposing Trotsky's expulsion from 
the E. C. C. I. 'in September 1927 fell to a British communist, J. To Murphy, 
3 
I Ironically J. R. Campbell, at the Tenth Party Congress of January 
1929, warned the party delegation to the Comintern that their stand 
on the colonial question was receiving support from Trotsky, 
(L. J. Macfarlane, op. cit., 209). 
2 The detailed course of events can be followed in L. J. Macfarlane 
op. cit., 177-274. See also H. Pelling, op. cit., 36-53. Work is 
proceeding on the third volume of the official history of the 
C. P. G. B. which will cover this period. See also F. Borkenau, 
. 
World Communism, (Michigan, 1962), 334. 
3 See 'Expulsion of Comrades Trotsky and Vuyovitch from the E. C. of the 
C. I. ', Inprecorr, VoL 7, no. 56,6 Oct. 1927,1250-1 and I. Deutscher, 
The Prophet Unarmed, 359-61. J. T. Murphy's own account is to be 
found in New Horizon, (1932), 274-7. Murphy was to part with the 
C. P. G. B. in 1932 and was even to be loosely bracketed with Trotsky 
by communist leaders. But though no longer a party member he did not 
revise his views on Trotsky and continued to admire Stalin. See his 
Stalin (1944). 
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Murphy's own Sheffield District telegraphed Moscow endorsing 
disciplinary measures against the Opposition leaders and called for 
action to further the struggle against war. 
I 
The Russian leaders were 
pleased and notpd that the British party was innocent of Oppositionisme 
2 
When British delegates attended the Moscow conference of the Friends 
of the Soviet Union a fortnight after Trotsky's expulsion f. rom the 
C. P. S. U., they took the initiative in moving a resolution, (passed with 
one opposed), approving the measures taken against him for trying to set 
up a second party. Indeed they went further, and demanded Imore severe 
measures j. 
3 
Inprecorr was deluged with anti-Opposition articles: 
'Trotskyism' was assuredly the issue of the hour. The British Party 
ventured into the field of theory. Jackson, who had written of Trotsky 
with such awe two years earlier, now discovered that the Opposition 
leader's views on the danger of reaction were diametrically misplaced. 
It was, concluded Jackson, Trotsky himself, with Zinoviev, who 
represented the danger of Menshevism and Thermidor. 
4 
His colleague 
Gallacher developed the theme for an international audience. 'In 
Britain every rotten reactionary, every reformist trickster, looks with 
hope to the Opposition"5 which statement he wise ly left without 
explanatory footnotes, since Smith had been complaining the previous 
month that Trotsky handled the Left too harshly. Gallacher's claim 
that'every attack on the party by the Trotskyists was hailed with 
I Inprecorr, Vol. 7, no. 57, (13 Oct. 1927), 1272. 
2 'The "Victories" of the Opposition a "World Scale"', Inprecorr,. 
Vol. 7, no, 58, (20 Oct. 1927), 1287-8. 
3 Inprecorr, Vol. 7, no. 66, (24 Nov. 1927), 1485. 
4 'Must Thermidor came in Russia? ', The Communist, (Dec. 1927), 262-9. 
5 'The Opposition - the Hope of the British Imperialists', Inprecorr, 
Vol. 7, no. 68, (1 Dec. 1927), 1534. 
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delight in the war mongering press of Britain! would have proved equally 
hard to sustain. 
There were still traces of interest in Trotsky - pictures on 
walls, enthusiastic delegates to the. Y. C. L. congress of 1928.1 ý They added 
up to little. The parties had been warned that the exclusion of 
Trotskyism from the C. P. S. U. must of course, also result in 'the end 
2 
of Trotskyism in the Comintern' . Rust reassured the international that 
Trotskyism had no following among 'the active conscious sections of the 
workers', 
3 
which verdict was confirmed. 
4 
Yet the new broad definition of 
Trotskyismýobscurely commingling with reaction, is to be gathered from 
his affirmation that the British Party had 'tremendous duties' in the 
fight against it, especially since the Baldwin government led the 
Anti-Soviet bloc. 5 Stalin's praise for the party gains in significance 
when the glassy smoothness of the British Party is compared to turmoil 
elsewhere. 
I M. McCarthy, Generation in Revolt (1953), 101,121-2. 
2 Communist International, (I Feb. 1928), 52. 
3 A. B. 'The International Countenance of Trotskyism', Inprecorr, Vol. 8, 
no. 9, (23 Feb. 1928), 196. 
4 Britain is not among the countries cured of the bacillus in 
'Trotskyism. Latest attack on the Comintern', Communist International, 
I March 1928,106-111. 
5 Yet the Comintern, in its debate at the Sixth World Congress, did not 
see fit to mention Trotskyism in the debate on the English question, 
(Inprecorr, Vol. 8, no. 10 (25 Feb. 1928), 222,249-54. 
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The Communist press ground on about Trotskyism. throughout 
1928 and into 1929. Publicly it now presented Trotskyism as a non- 
communist current, supported by reaction and used (consciously or 
unconsciously) against the U. S. S. R. Original Opposition documents were 
rare. They were not being printed in Britain, and were only just 
becoming available in English through the efforts of American 
communists sympathetic to Trotsky. The only exception, (and this 
partial because of. Inprecorr's small print run), was the last letter of 
Adolf Joffe with its celebrated final words to Trotsky proclaiming that 
he had always had the better of the argument politically. But this was 
forced on the communists by publication in the Western press, and 
issued with a gloss. 
2 
Periodically, the Communist press would carry 
further material against the Opposition. 
3 
The stimulus would 
invariably be external, as when Rothstein took the opportunity 
provided by Eastman's The Real Situation in Russia to reduce to rubble 
the Opposition documents of recent years. 
4 
The C. P. G. B. had survived 
the twenties relatively intact by making the right noises, but its hour 
was approaching. Manuilsky wondered; 
How does it happen that all the fundamental problems of the 
Communist International fail to stir our fraternal British 
Party? It is not that the British Communist Party does not 
pass resolutions or take a stand upon all important questions. 
No, this cannot be said. Nevertheless, one does not feel any 
profound organic connection with all the problems of the world 
I J. P. Cannon, History of American Trotskyism,. (New York 1973). 
2 J. Yaroslavsky, 'The Letter of A. Joffe' and 'The Philosophy of 
Decadence', (Inprecorr, Vol. 8, no. 3,19 Jan. 1928,81-6). 
3 In (1928) the party published a pamphlet under the title 
Where is Trotsky GoLa? 
4 'The Real Situation in Russia', Communist Review, (April 1929), 
200-212. 
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Labour Movement. All these problems have the appearance 
of being forcibly injected into the activities of the 
British Communist Party. 
I 
* .****** 
Trotsky intruded once more into British politics in the 1920s, 
this time over an issue which would not alienate the liberal 
intelligentsia but draw them towards him. He had arrived in enforced 
exile in Turkey in February 1929 and shortly began to cast around for 
a visa. The possibility of British asylum for him-was first raised in 
the Comm ns under the Tories that same month. 
2 He told the press that 
his favoured place of exile would be Cermany but Britain did appeal 
since it offered a chance to revist the British Museum. 
3 He 
professed puzzlement that the subject of a visa for him should bring 
the House (of Commons) down in laughter. 
Before the second Labour Government was formed, Trotsky 
received several celebrities of the left in Prinkipo. Cynthia Mosley 
was one of them. She admired him greatly, though her esteem was not 
reciprocated. 
5 Sidney and Beatrice Webb called on him in May 1929. 
They were not impressed by his arguments and disputed that the Labour 
Government was obliged to offer him asylum. 
6 
I Inprecorr, Vol. 9, (1929), 1140, quoted by Pelling, op. cit., 45. 
2 1. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast. Trotsky : 1929-1940, (1963), 
17-21, gives an account of Trotsky's quest for a visa during 1929. 
See also My Life (New York 1970), 574-8, (14 March 1929). 
3 'Interview By The Daily Telegraph' (14 March 1929) Writings 
Supplement (1929-33), 13-15. 
4 'Interview By The Daily Express' (16 March 1929) Writings 
Supplement (1929-33), 66. 
5 J. Bellamy and J. Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol. 5,158. 
6 M. Cole, Beatrice Webb (1945). Deutscher dates the visit in April, 
but My Lfe gives early May. 
n,! Versity 
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The return of Labour to office in May 1929 provided an 
opportunity for Trotsky to cash his cheque of goodwill - or at least to 
discover the extent of his credit. Two fairly sustained efforts were 
made to secure asylum for him in Britain, one in the early, the other in 
the dying days of the Labour Government. Those who favoured his entry 
included Emrys Hughes who compared his case with that of Marx, and many 
I. L. P*. branches, who wrote to their Head Office urging his ad=ss3. on. 
Perhaps in response the Party invited him to deliver a lecture at its 
party school. 
2 
Trotsky requested a visa of the British Consul in 
Constantinople and then, in early June, cabled MacDonald. He later 
wrote to Beatrice Webb and Snowden, and telegraphed Lansbury. 
3 
To the 
public he declared that he hoped, given asylum, to supervise the 
publication of his books in England and to pursue (social) scientific 
work. 
4 
What was more he had a special interest in seeing if 'the 
difficulties created by private ownership can be surmounted through 
the medium of democracy'. Democracy which planned to overlap the 
greatest obstacles, he observed, could hardly begin by denying the 
democratic right of asylum. 
5 
An impressive list of celebrities of 
radical England-spoke up for Trotsky's right of asylum, but the Webbs, 
(Sidney was now a minister), were crucial exceptions. Beatrice Webb 
wrote that those who preached the extension of revolution would always 
be excluded from the countries in view. As Caute remarks 
6 
she thus 
I C. Holmes, 'Trotsky and Britain. The 'closed' file', B. S. S. L. H., 
(Autumn 1979), 33. Hughes continued to be interested in securing 
a British visa for Trotsky years later, even suggesting that he . 
should be given exile on a Scottish island (Forward, 25 April 1934). 
2 My Life, 574. The invitation was sent on June 5. 
3 1. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 17. 
4 On 15 July 1929 he repeated his claim to be motivated only by personal 
considerations in a letter to The Daily Herald, (Writings: Supplement 
(1929-33), 195). 
5 'Why I Want To Come To London' (11 June 1929), Writings: Suppliment 
(1929-33), 153). 
6 The Fellow Travellers, 204. For contemporary comment, see 
Manchester Guardian, 19 July,. Da±ly Herald, 22 July, 25 July, 1929. 
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indicated her ability to miss the whole purpose of asylum. She also 
showed ingratitude for her reception by Trotsky when he was in and she 
was out. Of the major British papers, only the Manchester Guardian 
(which was to bL-friend him over the years) and the Observer supported 
his claim. The Times believed his presence in Constantinople a ruse 
by arrangement with Stalin to screen revolutionary activity in Germany. 
2 
Other rumours abounded. There was a general disinclination to take at 
face value Trotsky's protestations that his interest in British asylum 
was exclusively personal. 
Magdeleine Paz had been am ng the 280 signatories of a 
January 1926 complaint to the Comintern about dictatorship in the 
P. C. F' 3 Later, her group Coutre le'Courant, was an early vehicle for 
the ideas of the Left Opposition in France. She now became the central 
organiser of a campaign to win Trotsky a British visa, and she it was 
who put to the government the strict conditions which Trotsky was 
prepared to observe, if admitted. 
4 
Clynes hesitated under the pressure 
I I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 20. 
2 My Life (New York 1970), 568. 
3 D. Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960, 
(1964), 91. Caute traces the emergence of French Trotskyism 
on pp 89-92. 
4 After 1929 Trotsky broke with Magdeleine Paz. He allowed her 
grudging credit for acting on his behalf over the English visa and 
for her part in securing the release of Victor Serge from the Soviet 
Union. He viewed Paz and her husband, however, as mere liberals, 
(Trotsky to Serge, 29 April 1936 and 19 May 1936, Writings: 
Supplement (1934-40 , 660,. 665). 
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and then in July 1929 came out against a visa for Trotsky. The 
government seems to have feared that his entry would provide 
difficulties for them, found his ideology distasteful, and worried as 
to whether, once in Britain, he might be difficult to expel. 
I 
Clynes 
suffered 'a chorus of frantic personal abuse' but he had no wish to 
jeopardise his relations with Russia and stood firm. Later he was to 
find solace for his rectitude in the verdict of the Trials. 
2 
There was another attempt to raise the matter in the House 
in November 1929, but the second sustained effort to secure entry for 
Trotsky occurred in the spring of 1931. Ivor Montagu, 
3 
who had met 
Trotsky in Prinkipo, employed George Lansbury as an intermediary to 
Clynes. One request was that Trotsky be allowed to change boats at 
an English port en route for Norway. 
4 
It is now clear that it was 
certain Labour ministers, rather than - as might have been expected - 
the Liberal Party, which barred Trotsky. Samuel, (who was related to 
Montagu), intervened repeatedly, as did Lloyd George himself. Keynes, 
I C. Holmes, loc. cit., 33. 
2 J. R. Clynes, Memoirs, 1924-1937, (1937), 116. 
3 Ivor Montagu (1904- ) had, as a young man, admired Trotsky. Later 
he was baffled by the dispute between him and the Soviet leaders, 
(The Youngest Son (1970), 192,339); in this, his autobiography 
Montagu omits any reference to his part in the asylum episode or to 
the visit he paid to Trotsky at Prinkipo in 1931. In view of 
letters from Trotsky, now published, it seems likely that Montagu 
was the British Communist, later famous for his orthodoxy, whose 
correspondence with Trotsky Deutscher described as a 'thick pile' 
of friendly letters, though he claims his correspondence was not 
extensive, (C. Holmes, loc. cit., 37n). 
4 C. Holmes, loc. cit., 36. 
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Scott, Bennett and Garvin all urged the government to reconsider its 
decision. It is noteworthy that there was stronger support from 
Labour intellectuals at this time than there was to be later over the 
Moscow Trials. %Laski protested to the government. Shaw wrote 
Clynes a lengthy letter, 
I 
and joined with Wells in composing two 
statements against barring Trotsky's entry. Ellen Wilkinson added 
her name. But there was no success in this classic liberal issue. 
MacDonald, Clynes and Henderson overrode Lansbury's protests in 
Cabinet. 2 Possibly they were still smarting from the treatment they had 
received in Where Is Britain Going? With only minority support, they 
may have felt their parliamentary position at risk. There might also 
have been a sense of insecurity in the labour movement. An astute 
cartoon by David Low in the Manchester Guardian depicted a supplicant 
Trotsky having the door shut in his face by the determined Clynes. 
'But I am an old friend of the House', protests the exile. IYes, 
that's why?, comes the reply. 
No Trotskyist movement emerged in Britain before 1930 due to 
meagre awareness of, and involvement in, the Russian and Comintern 
debates by communists and, perhaps, the small size of the C. P. G. B. 
Party leaders dealt uncertainly with Trotsky as an individual and as a 
theoretician unless they first received guidance from Moscow. The 
Where Is Britain Going? episode occurred because of lack of this 
guidance and also because nobody in Britain, and perhaps elsewhere, was 
equipped to give the C. P. G. B. such a boost. Trotsky's standing in 
Britain, which was high at mid-1926, collapsed*abruptly as a direct 
result of the new drive against Trotskyism in the Comintern. 
I Quoted at length in I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, op. cit., 
17-18. 
2 ibid. j 20n. 
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I Outside the Party, reactions to Trotsky separate into three 
groups. The Labour and Trade Union leaders had a conventional fear of 
him and their experience in 1926 and even in 1929 gave them no 
encouragement tbat he had changed from his days of power in 1917-23. 
The ex-communists admired him as a revolutionary hero and writer, but 
had no firmer grasp of the issues at stake in his decline than had the 
C. P. G. B. They had themselves left the Party for various reasons and 
had no following they could convert to 'Trotskyism' had they even 
wished to do so. Liberal and Socialist intellectuals also admired 
Trotsky. - but they had always rejected Bolshevism. Some of them, like 
the Labour and Trade Union leaders, had crossed swords with Trotsky in 
the past. Had the Communist P4rty of Great Britain recruited them in 
significant numbers 
I it is conceivable they might have backed Trotsky. 
Certainly they might have forced the theoretical issues. As it was 
they rallied strongly to him as an exile seeking a visa, far more 
strongly than they would in the middle of the 1930s when he was a more 
remote figure, communist influence more pervasive, and the world a more 
threatening place. 
There were a number of British journals which, like The 
Plebs, stood for independent Marxism, but they had no distinct world 
view. Throughout the 1920s Trotsky and the Oppositionists were at work 
developing their world view without any British contribution. A semi- 
finished product was available by the time some British communists 
finally came over to Trotsky in the next decade. At the same time, 
because there was no British Trotskyism there was no alternative view 
available when the crisis finally arrived for the C.?. G. B. Party 
members had a choice of the leaders who had not done well to date or 
I M. Johnstone, 'The Communist Party in the 1920s', New Left Review, 
Vo -Vol-. * 41, (1967), 47-63. 
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new leaders with Russian backing. Falling membership rolls indicate 
their choice. A Trotskyist current might have been able to win support 
for ending the blurred boundary between communism and the Labour left, 
without retrjeatipg into a sectarian steadfast. But no via media was 
advanced with authority in Britain, and it is difficult to conceive of 
avowed Trotskyists surviving as party members any more easily after 
1926 than they did in 1932. Even the old leadership had made short work 
of Arthur Reade. In the end the weaknesses of the C. P. G. B. must provide 
the main explanation as to why a following for Trotsky emerged later in 
Britain than almost anywhere else. 
0 
PART ONE 
(1929 - 1938) 
32. 
ORGANISED TROTSKYISM TO THE FORMATION OF 
THE BRITISH SECTION (1929 - NOVEMBER 1931 
An organised Trotskyist group emerged in Britain late in 1931 
stimulated by dissatisfaction with communist performance and growing 
awareness of Trotsky's critique. The British Section of the Left 
Opposition emerged from the Communist Party, although there were others 
in Britain interested in Trotsky's ideas. It crystallized relatively 
late, without great impact, and conditioned by the_Communist Party 
from which it sprang. 
******* 
The first meeting of the International Left Opposition 
gathered in Paris on 6 April 1930 without British participation. 
I Later 
in the year, however, Trotsky wrote of the 'very promising ties estab- 
2 lished with Britain' . In 1930 and 1931 the embryonic International had 
contact with three dissatisfied groups on the British left. 
The first group included independent Marxists who were 
dissatisfied with the C. P. G. B. Among these was Dick Beech, 
3 
with whom 
American Trotskyists corresponded as early as 1930. Beech knew a 
I This meeting, known as the preliminary conference of the I. L. O., 
elected a provisional International Secretariat and agreed to 
establish an International Bulletin. Representatives from France, 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Hungary, the United States, 
Czechoslovakia and a French Jewish Group attended. Groups in Russia, 
China, Austria, Mexico, Argentina and Greece endorsed the steps 
taken. (L. Trotsky, 'A Big Step Forward. Unification of the Left 
Opposition. ', April 1930, Writings 1930,187-90,419-20n. ) There is 
a critical discussion of the early I. L. O. in I, Deutscher, 
The Prophet outcast, 57-60. 
2 'How the I. L. O. is Doing', (1930), Writings ': 1930,304 
3 Dick Beech was a former Wobbly who had in 1920 accompanied the 
British delegation to the first congress of the Comintern. He ran a 
book society which, inter alia, circulated Trotskyist material. He 
had contributed articles to the Militant of the Communist League of 
America. Beech corresponded with Trotsky up to the end of 1931 
, and helped the Trotskyist movement subsequently from time to time. He 
later became president of the Chemical Workers Union. ' 
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number of leading Continental communists who had come over to the 
Opposition. These acquaintances he shared with Jack Tanner, 
I 
also 
formerly a party member. Others who were known to the Opposition 
included the ph9tographer Clare Sheridan, then a close friend of 
, Ivor Montagu, Flower, a Daily Telegraph journalist, 
2 
and 
Ellen Wilkinson. 3 Pierre Naville, leader of one of the two French 
Opposition factions visited Britain in 1930 for talks with Beech. 
4 
Beech, Tanner and Wilkinson all were trade unionists who had 
been Communist Party members. Ivor Montagu, who had remained a 
communist, but was not a trade unionist, had friendly relations with 
Trotsky at least up to the end of 1931,5 when he was seen as 'a very 
good comrade'. Also within the C. P. G. B. in 1931 were the, middle class 
Freda Utley and the working class Margaret McCarthy, both of whom had 
witnessed in Russia the effect of the rout of the Left Opposition and 
silently favoured Trotsky's views. 
6 
These names, or some of them, 
might have added lustre to'the Opposition, but none of them joined it. 
I Jack Tanner was a foundation member of the C. P. G. B., national 
committee member of the A. E. U., and a leading spokesman of the 
Minority Movement in the 1920s. He left the Communist Party and rose 
as a right wing spokesman to the presidency of his union. 
2 Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979. 
3 Trotsky gave Shachtman a letter of introduction to her the following 
year. (L. Trotsky, 'To Help ýn Britain', 9 Nov. 1931, Writings 
Supplement (1929-33), 99) 
4 Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979. 
5 Trotsky sounded him out about a new edition of Where is Britain 
Going? in that year. L. Trotsky to Shachtman, -r-To Help in Britain', 
Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 9 Nov. 1931,99. 
6 Both women watched the demotions and dismissals for political 
reasons which took place in Russia with incomprehension, a legacy 
perhaps of the lack of knowledge in the C. Y. G. B. of the debate in the 
Russian Party. Freda Utley might have openly joined Trotsky in 1931 
but was dissuaded by Bertrand Russell, with whom she was staying. 
(F. Utley, Lost Illusions, (1949), 11,57-8; M. McCarthy, 
Ceneration in Revolt, (1953), passim. ) 
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The second cluster of contacts consisted of those in the 
I. L. P. and outside it, who had not been in the Communist Party and 
thought revolutionary politics had to make a new start. Sometime in 1929 
and 1930, the Marxist League was formed, an independent revolutionary 
propaganda group. It was not large. Its leading figures were Frank 
Ridley, 1 Chandu Ram 2 and Hugo Dewar, 
3 
the organi$er of the League. The 
League, as such, stayed independent of all parties and spent its time 
selling literature and holding open air meetings in Hyde Park, Tottenham 
Court Road and elsewhere. 
4 In 1930 and 1931 it had contact with the 
Trotskyist Communist League of America. The C. L. A., to which Trotsky 
looked to help stimulate a British Opposition, invited Ridley to send 
reports to The Militant. The League sold this paper, together with 
American Trotskyist pamphlets, at its public activities. 
In 1931 Ridley and Ram expounded the view that events were 
moving to a crisis in Britain. The National Government was the first 
stage of British fascism, which a reformist I. L. P. (still within the 
Labour Party) and a sectarian C. P. G. B. were inadequate to resist. 'It is 
socialism or starvation, communism or chaos', argued Ridley. 
5 
There was 
little role for trade unions, since there was no scope for reform. 
6 
What was needed was a new party and a new (Fourth) International. 
I F. A. Ridley (1897- ) was a writer, secularist and historian who 
had left the I. L. P. in 1930. 
2 Chandu Ram (d. 1932) was an Indian law student and member of the 
London branch of the Indian National Congress. 
3 Hugo Dewar ( -ý-1980) joined the I. L. P. around 1929. 
4 R. Stephenson (ed. ), The Early Years of the British Left Opposition 
(1979). 
5 F. A. Ridley, 'A Communist Party - The Problem of the Revolution in 
England', The Militant (N. Y. ), 31 Oct. 1931, quoted in R. Stephenson$ 
op. cit. 
6 'Therefore, when capitalism reaches that stage of decay when no 
further reforms are possible - and that stage is here now (witness 
the coalmining industry) - the "raison d'etre" of trade unionism is 
gone. The end of trade unions as known at present is-within sight', 
(D. E. W. (Dr. Worrall? ), 'Trade Unions and Revolution', The New Man, 
I Jan. 1932,5). 
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In Autumn 1931, Ridley and Ram formulated theses on Britain. The 
country was at a transitional stage between democracy and fascism, 
ruled now by an 'antiparliamentaryl government. Trade unions were 
'imperialist organizations', doomed to disappear now that the era of 
superprofits had gone. The Comintern should be entirely rejected, and 
with. it the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
I 
Trotsky was unimpressed. He expected an Opposition current 
to develop from within the C. P. G. B. When it did it would stand on the 
shoulders of Bolshevik experience. Ridley and Ram-advanced theses for 
a Fourth International but they had made no struggle against Stalinist 
control of the Communist Party. 
'It would be very sad if the critical members of the official 
British Communist Party would imagine that the opinions of 
Ridley and Ram represent the opinions of the Left Opposition. 12 
It would not do to declare the historical role of the Labour 
Party and the trade unions at an end. Nor was it possible to abstain 
even from a weakened couimunist party. 
If the few hundred Left Oppositionists-remain on the 
sidelines they will become transformed into a powerlessp 
lamentable sect. If, however, they participate in the 
internal ideological struggle of the party of which they 
remain an integral part despite all expulsions, they 
will win an enormous influence in the proletarian 
kernel of the party. 
3 
I The theses perished with other of Ridley's papers during the blitz, 
but Trotsky quotes from them in his reply, 'Tasks of the Left 
Opposition in Britain and India', 7 November 1931, Writings 
(1930-31), 337-43. For factual data on the Marxist League, see 
A. Richardson, Some Notes for a Bibliography of British Trotskyism, 
dupl. (1979? ), no pag. 
2 'Tasks of the Left Opposition in Britain and India. Some uncritical 
remarks on unsuccessful theses', .7 Nov. 1931,, Writings (1930-31), 342. 
3 ibid., 342. 
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Trotsky was speaking here of Germany, but he believed that in 
Britain also the Opposition would have to earn support by fighting 
false Comintern policies from within. An opposition which emerged that 
way would be more firm than one which drew facile, abstract conclusionst 
however willing it might be to engage in correspondence. 
I Ram 
expounded his and Ridley's views at an Autumn meeting of the 
International Secretariat in Paris, 2 but found no support there or 
among the American Trotskyists. 
Trotsky participated in a discussion in Turkey at'which 
Marxist League ideas were aired. 
3 
The call to launch a Fourth 
International was not being made only in Britain. 
4 
And the belief that 
the situation was at crisis point reflected the views not of isolated 
individuals alone, but also of the C. P. G. B., whose influence Trotsky 
believed he detected. 5 Those communists who were questioning this 
very exaggeration of the prospects for fascism by their party were 
disturbed at the views of Ridley and Ram and were reassured by 
I L. Trotsky, 'Better to seek the Solid', 30 Nov. 1931, Writings 
Supplement (1929-33), 101-2. 
2 Held in or before October 1931. (A. Glotzer to R. Groves, 
27 Oct. 1931. ) Here and on other occasions Ram used the pseudonym 
'Aggravaila' or 'Aggar Wala'. 
3 A. Glotzer to R. Groves, 27 Oct. 1931. Minutes were forwarded to 
all English contacts of the I. L. O. 
4.1. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 43-4. 
5 L. Trotsky to M. Shachtman, 'What Is Fascism? ', 15 Nov. 1931, 
Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 99-101. In 1929 the C. P. G. B. 
adopted a resolution that social fascism (i. e. the Labour government) 
was preparing the way for fascism, that the crisis was sharpening, 
and that 'militancy and solidarity'similar to the great days of the 
General Strike are being displayed'. Stimulated by the protracted 
social crisis in Germany, Trotsky was at this time developing his 
analysis of the conditions under which fascism-might grow. In 
England, Fascism was not ruled out, but would grow only with 
difficulty because of the social weight of the country's proletariat. 
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the Americans. 
'It was the unanimous decision of the International 
Secretariat that at present there is not an organisation 
in Englandýzhat represents the International Left 
Opposition nor its International Secretariat. 
" 
This was thumbs down for the Marxist League. Hugo Dewar 
withdrew, dissenting from its view of trade unions 
2 
and prepared in 
practice to undertake the struggle Trotsky proposed. He joined the 
I. L. P. in Clapham, and then moved to the Tooting local of the C. P. G. B. 
3 
The Marxist League continued in being, and on I January 1932 launched 
4 
a short-lived journal, The New Man. Ridley later rejected the Fourth 
International when the International Left Opposition decided to 
IA Glotzer to R. Groves, 27 Oct. 1931. 'Several fundamental 
questions', Glotzer told Groves, divided the I. S. from the 
Marxist League and 'the other groups in England'. Arne Swabeck 
conceded Groves's complaints about Ridley's article in The 
Militant, (A. Swabeck to R. Groves, 6 Nov. 1931) 1 and told him that 
the C. L. A. had been compelled to excise from Ridley's article the 
view that the 1931 general election was the last Britain would have, 
(A. Swabeck to R. Groves, 24 Nov. 1931). 
2 H. Dewar to P. Thwaites, 24 Sept. 1975, lent to author by 
Mr. Thwaites. 
3 R. Groves, The Balham Group, (1974), 61. 
4 A. M. R. Penn, ('A Bibliography of the British Trotskyist Press', 
University of Warwick M. A., 1979,22), was unable to locate any copies 
of The New Man., But Vol. 1, no. 1,1 Jan. 1932 has survived and is 
located in the Watson collection of the University of Stirling. It 
was intended to publish the journal, which had eight pages, 
fortnightly. This issue contains articles by Ridley, D. E. W., 
[Dr. Worrall? ] and 'Caius Gracchus'. It continued the catastrophic 
theses of the League and offered to., provide-lead. ership pf a 
revolutionary character, but made no call for a Fourth International. 
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launch it. 
******* 
It was from disgruntled members of the C. P. G. B. that the 
British Section,,, of the Left Opposition was finally to be launched. Any 
dissatisfaction these future, Trotskyists felt before 1930 however, was 
with the C. P, G. B. as it was before the eleventh (special) party congress 
of November-December 1929, at which leadership was transferred to a new 
more intransigent group. 
2 
3 
The Opposition was a London affair. Reg. Groves, 
Stewart Purkis 
4 
and Billy Williams 
5 had read Where'Is Britain Going? 
and The Lessons of October before the General Strike. They worked 
together as members of the Clearing House Branch of the Railway 
Clerks Association in Poplar and were part of the-influx of new 
recruits into the Communist Party immediately after the General Strikee 
6 
I See Below. 
2 'One or two individuals were already moving towards an Oppositional 
position by 1929', writes Hugo Dewar, (Communist Politics in 
Britain, (1976), 150). Reg. Groves only appeared as a critic of 
the group now controlling the party in February 1930, however, 
though the London membership did have some independence of the 
Comintern supporters. (R. Groves, op. cit., 21-2; H. Wicks, 
loc. cit., 27-8. ) 
3 Reg. Groves, (1908- ) joined the I. L. P. as a youth in 1924. 
4 (1885-1969) 
5 E. S. 'Billy' Williams, (d. 1963). 
6 R. Groves, op. cit., 12-16. 
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By 1929 Groves and Purkis had worked their way up to the 
London District Committee, Groves serving as Assistant Organizer for 
most of 1929. Groves was a young turk pushing the party towards the 
new line being urged by the Comintern, though he was the only C. P. G. B. 
member invited to the Lenin School who refused io go. He had rejected 
the T. G. W. U. as a company union, and called for the political levy not 
to be paid in the G. M. W. U. 
I He urged an end to the told method' and 
2 
called for a new leadership on the eve of the special congress. 
Purkis wrote for the party press in industrial matters, 
3 
and was active 
with Williams in the St. Pancras local. 
Henry Sara, (1886-1953), the same age as Purkis, was 
moderately well known in the party. He was a former S. L. P. member and 
wartime conscientious-objector, who had not joined the C. P. G. B. at its 
foundation, but came into it following-a trip to Russia. 
4 He gave 
lantern lectures on his tour, 
5 had a taste, like Groves, for nineteenth 
I "'Mondisd'and our Industrial Party'. Communist Review, (July 1929), 
409-14. 
2 Like Murphy,, he demanded a struggle against the 'Right danger', 
('Our Party and the. New Period', Communist Review, -(Nov. 1929), 604-9). 
Groves was also corresponding with Dutt, (op. cit., 23). The interest 
Groves was to show in working class history was already in evidence 
in his Labour Monthly articles on Chartism. 
3 He contributed to, Labour Monthly on railway and Minority Movement 
problems on occasions in 1929 and 1930. He also obscurely challenged 
Dutt's interpretation of the 1929 general election result, (Workers' 
Weekly, 23 Nov. 1929). He was expelled from the R. C. A. for 
political activities and was joint editor, with Billy Williams, of 
The Jogger, a cyclostyled rank and file party bulletin. 
4 For Henry Sara see R. Groves, op. cit., 19-20; R. Challinor, The 
Origins of British Bolshevism (1977), 142. 
5 Sunday Worker, 11 Oct. 1925. 
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century history and, uniquely among the future founder members of the 
British Section, he had participated in theoretical discussions in the 
party press. 
I He wrote with independent convictions, authority and, 
2 
occasionally, an academic air. In 1929, he stood as parliamentary 
candidate in the General Election for Tottenham South, an area where 
he was well known. 
The fifth key personality from the early cadre of British 
3 Trotskyism. was Harry Wicks, another railwayman, ý who had first 
encountered Opposition ideas at Y. C. L. classes in Battersea given by 
Arthur Reade and attended the aggregate of 17 January 1925. Wicks was 
part of the strong organization which the C. P. G. B. had built in 
Battersea in the 1920s, at the apex of which stood Shapurji Saklatvala 
a communist Member of Parliament. In 1927 Wicks, unlike Groves, 
accepted an invitation to join the Lenin School in Moscow. 
4 He stayed 
there until 1930, attended the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 
1928 and witnessed the final rout of the Opposition. He also met George 
Weston*, a West London craftsman who backed Trotsky. Wicks returned 
in 1930 to find the C. P. G. B. isolated and its Battersea base in ruins, 
I See 'The Class War', Communist Review, (April 1926), 538-42. In 
1927 Sara attended the Hankow conference of the C. C. C. P. in company 
with Tom Mann, on whose friendship he would still be able to call 
after breaking with C. P. G. B., (H. Sara to C. A. Smith, 14 Sept. 1937, 
Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/l/27). 
2 Compare his 'Further Jottings on R. W. Postgatel, (The Communist, 
(May 1928), 290-6) with Harold Heslop's attempt the previous month to 
dismember the eclectic ex-communist. 
3 Harry Wicks (1907- ) joined the party in 1921 with most of the 
Daily Herald League and helped form the Battersea Y. C. L., and joined 
its national executive in 1926. (R. Groves, op. cit., 34-5). 
4 R. Groves (op. cit., 19) argues the Lenin School had a harmful effect. 
A contrary view is put by S. Macintyre in 'Marxism in Britain, 1917 - 
1933', 44. 
5 This created a strong impression. Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 
1979. 
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In 1930 the separate dissatisfaction of these five with the 
party became evident. Early in the year, Groves presented a series of 
complaints on the style and content of The Daily Worker launched on 
I January. I He, ýegan to contribute an information column, 'Workers 
Notebook', but editing of this caused disagreements as well. 
2 Links 
between Groves and Purkis were reinforced through this clash 
3 
and also 
through an abortive attempt-by Groves-to join the Marx-Engels Ifistitute 
that summer. 
4 Meanwhile Sara, and to a lesser extent Purkis, clashed 
with the official line over two issues of theory. It was the year of 
Bukharin's ouster from the presidency of the Comintern, Sara, not 
intimidated, supported Bukharin's views on the effects of imperialism on 
I He proposed that the paper be reduced in size, that its articles be 
more educational, that more argument and less stridency be apparent 
in its pages. He was told in reply that reference resources were 
weak and that it was the application of policy, not policy itself, 
that was at fault. (R. Groves to Secretariat, 26 Feb. 1930; 
Daily Worker editorial board to Groves, 24 March 1930). 
2 He resented alteration of his text without consultation and 
threatened to suspend the column. (R. Groves to Secretariat, 
22 April, 14 May, 30 May 1930). The Secretariat supported the 
Editorial Board in seeking a full text that it could defend, 
(W. Rust to Groves, I June 1930; Secretariat to Groves (4), 
8 July 1930). 
3 Purkis had backed him against editorial changes, (Secretariat to 
Groves, 8 July 1930). 
Groves requested of David Riazanov, director of the Institute and 
biographer of Marx and Engels, paid work in London on its behalf. 
Riazanov countered with the offer of a post with the English 
Cabinet of the Institute in Moscow. Groves accepted but was barred 
by the British Party. "(D. Riazanov to Groves, 30 March 1930; - 
R. Groves to Riazanov, 13 April 1930; draft by S. Purkis of letter 
to Riazanov explaining the block, Warwick M. S. S. ). Later 
Jane DeGras filled a vacancy at the Institute, (Interview with 
Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). 
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competition at home and claimed, moreover, that Lenin endorsed them. 
' 
Purkis was implicated in passing, in the conflict between the party and 
Freda Utley over whether the working class of its own effort might 
achieve socialisp consciousness. 
2 Groves and Sara, members of the 
party agitprop committee, were by 1931 beginning like J. T. Murphy, 
another committee member, to make systematic criticisms of the party. 
3 
Years later, Stuart Purkis recalled 'we came together in 1930, 
brought together by agreement on the need for propaganda for the United 
4 Front' . The marrying of disparate discontents 
into a Trotskyist 
critique occurred during 1931. Groves and Sara had seen the American 
Militant in London radical bookshops 
5 
and read Trotsky's Autobiography, 
I He carried the controversy on Bukharin from The Daily Worker into the 
theoretical press. See his review of The Economic Theory of the 
Leisure Class, (Communist Review,, (Feb. 1930) 84-8) for which he was 
criticisýd-by Rathbone and the Politbureau. For a discussion of 
C. P. G. B. reactions to Bukharin's disgracet see S. Macintyre, op. cit., 
179-80 
2 'The Theoretician of "Left" sectarianism and Spontaneity', 
Communist Review, (Jan. 1931), 11-19. Groves relates the views of 
Utley and Purkis in The Balham Group, 30-1. For a discussion of 
Utley's views and the impact on the party of the late availability in 
English of Lenin's What Is To Be Done? (1902), see N. Wood, 
Communism and British Intellectuals, (1959), - 167-71 and S. Macintyre, 
op. cit.,, passim. 
3 Interview with Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979. 
4 The Red Flago (Jan. 1937). 
5 R. Groves, op. cit., 48, explains that he saw Militant and Labor 
Action for the first. time at Henderson's bookshop in March 1931. 
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My Life (1930). Trotskyls' article 'Germany : the key to the 
international situation" had also been widely noted, the first 
English presentation of his case for a United Front of the mass 
parties of the qerman workers against fascism. By 1931 the Communist 
League of America had behind it three years experience in running an 
Opposition group against a more ferocious Communist Party than the 
British one, but in a more open political situation. 
2 One of its 
responsibilities was to stimulate the creation of a sister group in 
Britain. When Groves contacted it about the regulgrity of supplies of 
Militant to Britain a correspondence began in which the C. L. A. tried to 
capitalise on its opportunity, 
3 
For the Americans, Arne Swabeck 
4 
argued forcefully for the 
establishment of an Opposition group within the C. P. G. B. which would 
5 
advance Trotsky's critique of Comintern prolicy. Groves was not 
convinced that discontent with the C. P. G. B. necessarily implied an 
alignment with Trotsky. Swabeck sought a fraction within the C. P. G. B. 
where a cadre might be built. around criticism of the party line. 
I Twentieth Century, (May 1931). 
2 J. P. Cannon and M. Spector led about 100 communists out of the 
C. P. U. S. A. 6f Joy Lovestone in late 1928, to which were added some 
intellectuals influenced by Max Eastman. The catalyst in the 
political evolution of Cannon and Spector from critics to 
Oppositionists had been the smuggling out of the Sixth World Congress, 
which they attended as delegates, of Trotsky's critique of The Draft 
Programme of the Comintern. (J. P. Cannons The History of Amdrican 
Trotskyism, (New York 1972), for the early C. L. A. see J. A. Robbins, 
The Birth of American Trotskyism, 1927-1929, (U. S. A., 1973), 
C. A. Myers, The Prophet's Army. Trotskyists in America, 1928-1941, 
(Westport, Conn., 1977),, 27-38) 
3 R. Groves, op. cit., 46-7. 
4 Arne Swabeck was a founder member of the C. P. U. S. A. who became 
secretary of the C. L. A. in 1932 and was a delegate to the Paris 
conference of the I. L. O. in Paris, February 1933. 
5 A. Swabeck, 'To Our English Comrades', (n. d., 1931? ). 
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'Is it the desire of the Left Opposition to make any split? We 
believe we must say decidedly: No'. 
' To the British, who had not, in 
any case, lassimilated the litany of organised Trotskyism 
2 
the 
prospects for making this critique and staying party members, appeared 
farless auspicious. 
The British view diverged from that pressed upon them by the 
C. L. A. Groves and the others appear in 1930-2 as guardians of the new 
line proposed by the Comintern and its supporters at the special congress. 
They had played no part in the development of the I. L. O. critique. 
3 
Unlike the C. L. A., they held that the party should not control the 
Minority Movement and that professional revolutionaries should not run 
the party. In the next year, they were to counterpose factory work to 
trade union work and thus make a mistake the C. L. A. had been careful 
to avoid. 
4 Following the August crisis, Groves foresaw a new 1926. 
He proposed Councils of Action and preparation for a new General Strike, 
fearful that the Left, as in that year, would again make the running 
I A. Swabeck, ibid. 
2 S. Macintyre, op. cit., 238. 
3 In 1934 Groves wrote of the part he and oth er London militants had 
played in attacking the pre-1929 party leadership. 
They did so partly out of revolt against the previous 
policy with its merging of the Communist Party in the 
loose Labour Left and partly because the struggle 
begun by the London membership against bureaucracy in 
the party was taken up by the Comintern and used by itj 
as part of its war with the party's own Right Wing. It 
must also be remembered that we know nothing of the 
struggle going on within the C. L. and nothing of the 
policy of the Left Opposition. 
Reg. Groves, (Our Attitude to the Labour Party, (draft), 
Warwick M. S. S. -, -2-5-. 
4 J. A. Robbins, op. cit., 76. 
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in view of the failure of the Daily Worker to make the party's role 
clear. 
I 
The critics were now an identifiable entity, The 'Balham 
Group' existed from some time in the later months of 1931,2 though most 
of its members had been working in South-West London before that. From 
the end of 1930, Wicks, now returned to Battersea, was cooperating, with 
them. Faced with the economies programme of the National Government, 
the, Balham, Group approached local I. L. P. ers, notably the Clapham 
branch, for joint resistance activities. This was a limited local united 
front and one tangible gain was Hugo Dewar, who split with the Marxist 
League and, effectively, followed Trotsky's advice by coming over to the 
Tooting Communist local from the Clapham I. L. P. 
In the Autumn of 1931,, the Americans began to force the pace. 
They had noted that these South London communists, for all their 
reservations, were more solid in their support than the other British 
contacts. The proposal for a C. L. A. leader to visit England for a 
lengthy spell had been under discussion earlier in the year. 
3 
In 
September Swabeck called on Groves to begin a definite group in 
Britain, albeit cautiously, and proposed a gathering of all C. L. A. 
I R. Groves to the Secretariat, 25 Aug. 1931; Daily Worker to 
Groves, 27 Aug. 1931; R. Groves to Editorial Board of Daily Worker 
26 Aug. 1931, (Warwick M. S. S. ). The party secretariat refused to 
publish his letters, feeling that 'the opening of a party discussion 
at the present moment is in no way desirable'. The assumption 
underlying Groves's argument seems to be that economic developments 
would stimulate militant movements which Councils of Action would 
harness, a concept the party, perhaps influenced now by What Is To 
Be Done , increasingly rejected, (S. Macintyre, 'The Balham Group', 
Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists,, B. R. 8-10). 
2 Members included Reg. and Daisy Groves, Cyril Whiting, 
Maurice Siumonds, Bill Pyne, Isabel Mussi, Steve Dowdall and 
Nell Dowdalli a number of whom had been in the party for some time, 
(R. Groves, The Balham Group, (1974), passim). 
3 L. Trotsky to Shachtman, 'Will Help New Publishing House', 4 April 
1931, Writings : Supplement (1929-33),, 78-9. 
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contacts to meet Albert Glotzer, who was about to visit Britain. 
Glotzer, 2 in fact., went first to Turkey, where he met Trotsky, and 
wrote again to Groves. In October another letter from America promised 
3 
that Max Shachtifian also would visit Britain. 
In November a meeting was convened in the flat of Flower at 
4 
which Groves, Sara, Purkis and Wicks agreed to establish a British 
Section of the Left Opposition. 
5 
Shachtman urged the need for someone 
to be sacrificed in order to dramatize the existence of the groupo but 
both Americans argued against a split. There was unease at Shachtman's 
suggestion, but agreement on the need to restore inner party democracy, 
reduce Russian influence and return to basic principles. It was later 
asserted that the Americans' anxiety to establish a group overrode the 
achievement of political unity, that organisational steps were taken, 
I A. Swabeck to Grovesq 29 Sept. 1931t Warwick M. S. S. 
2 Albert Glotzer (1908- ) was a youth leader of the C. L. A. 
3 A. Swabeck to Groves, 26 Oct. 1931, Warwick M. S. S. 
4 H. Wicks, 'British Trotskyism in the Thirties International, No. 1, 
(1976). Groves, op. cit., 49, writes that Billy7i-lliams was present. 
Also in attendance may have been Weston (alias Morris), who had been 
with Wicks in Moscow and not allowed back into the party on his 
return to Britain, (Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). 
5 Though the Section seems not to have been recognised as. such until the 
New Year, (R. Groves, (op. cit., 49)). 
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but that the group remained a circle of friends. 
The plan was for Shachtman to visit Montagu, Ellen Wilkinson 
and perhaps others. 
2 Nothing tangible emerged from this. 
* 
A British 
Section constructed more widely from those with whom Trotsky and 
others were in contact, might have been a very impressive body indeed. 
3 
What actually crystallized was a tiny body which, like the young 
C. P. G. B. was entirely working class and had only made a limited critique 
of Comintern theory. 
It is arguable that the Balham Group was a product mainly of 
domestic discontents. The prime movers were fairly well known to each 
other, they had a common industrial background, and many were 
concentrated in South London. Inevitably they were a group held 
I 
together by personal as well as political ties. The political ties 
centred on dissatisfaction with the performance of the C. P. G. B., first 
before the imposition of the new line at Leeds and after. But the 
Balham Group reacted to the impasse of the C. P. G. B. in its own way. By 
1931, it is argued, it was closer to the ýclass -against class' line than 
'The foundation meeting of the British Group was lamentably 
unconcerned with politics. It was marked by a vigorous determination 
to get an L. O. group set up in Britain at all costs, and also by the 
absence of any attempt to ensure political unity on the basis of an 
L. O. platform. ' Statement From Members of the 1931-1933 Committee 
of the British Group of the Left Opposition, 18 April 1933,1, 
Warwick M. S. S. 
2 L. Trotsky to Shachtman, 'To Help in Britain', 9 Nov* 0 1931, Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 99. Montagu had to be contacted 
discreetly, Trotsky advised, in view of his job connections with 
Russia. 
The closed section of Trotsky's archive was opened to the public*on 
I January 1980. Folders 165-75 of the archive contain documents and 
correspondence on Britain (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 530). 
Attempts to elicit any information about their contents before that 
date failed, though it is likely that they contain further information 
on Trotsky's British contacts at this time. 
48. 
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the party itself. 
1 It rejected the catastrophism. of Ridley and Ram, 
as had the C. L. A., yet it shared the belief that communist growth was 
imminent. But just as communist theory had in the C. P. G. B. of the 
1920s largely b4en imposed from without, the new Oppositionists them- 
selves were confronted with a mass of doctrine which they were ' 
expected to digest. Some of it, like the argument for the United 
Front, appealed at once, and those parts of Trotsky's critique, of 
which the Group were aware, acted as a yeast on its development. 
Balham's interests in Trotyskyism. were not abnormal 
2 but the 
immediate future was to reveal a mutual lack of confidence between it 
and the international movement. 
I S. Macintyre, 'The Balham, Group', Bulletin of the Conference of 
Socialist Economists, B. R. 8-10. A good example is Groves's 
insistence, during the dispute over 'Workers' Notebook', that the 
Congress would be incapable of carrying forward the struggle in 
India against the British, the very view advanced by the Comintern 
against the old Guard in 1928. 
2 J. Jupp, 'The Leftin Britaid, (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of 
London, 1956), 2290 
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THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION 
(NOVEMBER 1931 - DECEMBER 1933). 
In theý two years after the formation of the British Section, 
the Trotskyists made modest progress. Six months aggressive-presentation 
of their views led to their expulsion in the summer of 1932. This 
event had only a limited impact on the C. P. G. B. though the Trotskyists 
had a cadre within the I. L. P. For a year and a half they functioned 
independently of parties but with an I. L. P. fraction. At the end of 
. 1933, however, the organization split over the tactical issue of 
whether or not to commit itself entirely to entering the I. L. Pe 
******* 
In 1932 the C. P. G. B. began efforts to break out of its 
sectarian enclave. Under Comintern guidance the 'January resolution' 
was drawn up rejecting the excesses of the previous year which, 
supposedly, arose from misapplication of the line. The Balham Group 
challenged the resolution on two points: its thesis that trade unions 
might be transformed into instruments of class struggle, and the 
absence of any guidance for work on Germany and the Far East. 
I Balham 
did not reject trade union work, but it believed the principal emphasis 
ought to lie on an approach to the shop floor. The unwisdom of making 
this its main charge was illustrated by coverage of the disagreement 
in the Daily Worker, 2 and the tone of comme*nts by communist leaders. 
I The Balham Group to the Secretariat, I April 1932. 
2 'The Vital Importance of our Work in Trade Unions', Daily Worker, 
14 April 1932. 
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It was in vain for Balham to protest that its objection was to the 
belief that unions might be transformed into instruments. of class 
12 
struggle. It was equally naive to cite Dutt and Lozovsky in support. 
The party repliqd that Balham's line was sectarian and hindering the 
work of the Minority Movement, and that it was not, in any case, 
carrying out'factory work. 
3 
It was also relatively easy to put the 
record straight both about Dutt and Lozovsky; 
4 
with the passing of 
time the Balham Group began to be presented as an ultra-left faction 
which first deviated by its hostility to trade unions. 
5 
Far more efficacious would have been a drive on the United 
Front, Trotsky's main preoccupation of these years. The criticisms 
that Wicks, Groves and Sara were making of the leadership might have 
obtained a stronger echo had they hit at this weakest point. In May 
the first issue of The Communist, published not without misgivings, 
6 
I 'The machinery remains cumbersome, reformist in structure, and useless 
for the waging of struggle under the new conditions. ' (Balham Group 
to Secretariat, 12 May 1932j Warwick M. S. S. )* 
2 Groves continued to admire Dutt for some years, and the Balham Group 
had called, not for a new communist leadership but for the 
introduction of new elements into the leadership, (Balham Group to 
Secretariat, I April 1932, Warwick M. S. S. ). The illusion that some 
leading communists might back the Opposition took a long time to die, 
(see below). 
3 The Daily Worker, 14 April, 27 May 1932. 
4 ibid., 9,10 June 1932. 
5 ibid., 7,10 June. See also J. Shields, 'Economic Struggles and 
the Drive Into The Trade Unions', Communist'Review (Dec. 1932), 572- 
3. But Purkis, who had been condemned the previous year for holding 
local industrial work in disdain, was still covering affairs in the 
R. C. A. for the Daily Worker on 30 May. 
6 R. Groves, op. cit., 58-9. This was the first public statement that 
the Left Opposition existed in Britain. Trotsky was to congratulate 
the British on such an lexpllently hectographed' product, and indeed 
the typing and reproduction are superb. 
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sensibly played to their strong suit by leading with Trotsky's 1931 
article, 'Germany : the key to the international situation'. But 
while calls were made for a discussion on the January resolution, and 
for the conveniRg of the party congress, it was its trade union 
appraisal which identified the Balham group. 
Sharp attacks on the leadership by Groves, Wicks and Sara 
at aggregates in Battersea on 20 April and 30 May, together with the 
publication of The Communist as the journal of the British Section of 
the Left Opposition, inevitably brought down the wrath of the party 
apparatus. Sara, who had a separate dispute with the Daily Worker,. 
11. 
Groves and Wicks were all condemned, by the Battersea political committee 
of the party for underestimation of the party's role, defeatism, 
social democratic practices and'unjustifiable and unsubstantiated 
attacks on the leadership'. 
2 They continued as party members, however, 
pursuing unusual cooperation with the local-I. L. P. and gathering an 
anti-war movement in South-West London which had genuine support. 
Parting of the ways with the C. P. G. B., may have been delayed by the 
party decision to close the discussion on the January resolution, 
notified on 24 June. 
It was the war issue which finally brought matters. to a head. 
Balham had criticized the Comintern drive for the World Congress'Against 
War which was to be held in Amsterdam later in 1932 with strong support 
I He had been charged with spreading 'pacif ist stuf fIf or his view 
that the paper had overestimated the prospect of war, (Secretariat 
to Sara, 13 April 1932; H. Sara to Secretariat, 16,23 April 1932, 
Warwick M. S. S. ). 
2 R. W. Robson (London District Organizer, C. P11G. B. ) to Sara, 31 May, 
13 June 1932; H. Sara to Robson, 7 June 1932 (Warwick M. S, S. ). 
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from non-party intellectuals. In South West London, Balham was 
advancing a strong Leninist line. Trotsky was arguing that unity with 
writers such as Henri Barbusse implied pacifist concessions and that 
this approach &ýas a substitute for a working class united front. 
Pollitt and leading party members had seen The Communist and on 
I 
17 August they confronted Groves, Wicks and Sara, demanding of the first 
two that they submit to discipline. They would not commit themselves 
and were expelled. 
2 
When a majority of the Balham Group refused to 
disown Groves, it was liquidated and surviving members left in a 
party branch covering the Battersea and Wandsworth area. Hugo Dewar 
was expelled soon after for his defence of the Balham line at his 
Tooting local. Stuart Purkis, who identified himself with Balham and 
The Communist was also expelled. 
3 
Twelve members of the dissolved 
Balham Group circulated a statement as widely as they could setting 
down what had happened, 
4 
but the repercussions were limited. The only 
I His case against the congress is set out in 'The Coming Congress 
against War', 13 June 1932, and 'Declaration to the Antiwar 
Congress at Amsterdam', 25 July 1932, (Writings, 1932,113-7,148-55). 
2200 delegates attended the Amsterdam Congress. Ten were Trotskyists 
but none of these were British, (D. Caute, op. cit., 107). 
2 R. Groves, op. cit., 66-9. Sara was suspended on 17 August, the 
same dayanticipating expulsion, he wrote for The Plebs an article 
defending Trotsky's role in 1917 which J. P. M. Millar attempted to 
advertise in the Daily Worker. Sara was expelled a few days later. 
(J. Robson to Sara, 17 Aug. 1932; J. P. M. Millar to Sara, 3 Sept. 
1932; H. Sara, 'Trotsky and the Russian Revolution', The Plebs, 
(Sept. 1932), 196-8. ) 
3 His letter of affirmation to Harry Pollitt is given in full in 
R. Groves, op. cit., 86-90. See also L. Trotsky to Groves, 'After 
The British Expulsions', 6 Sept. 1932, Writings : Supplement 
(1929-33), 149, for comment on Purkis's estimate of Dutt, Pollitt and 
Burns as 'men of outstanding gifts'. 
4 To Our Comrades in The Communist Party From the "Liquidated" Balham 
Group, given in full in R. Groves, op. cit., 81-5. 
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leader who departed around this time was J. T. Murphy and he left over 
an entirely unrelated issue, though attempts were made to construct a 
link. I The second issue of The Communist appeared in September and the 
group set about, puilding itself up. 
The Balham Group found itself outside the party, with less 
than a dozen supporters. It was classified as a Trotskyist faction 
but it had a strong foot in the camp of the 'third period'. 
2 
'It was 
critici'sed by the Americans for its trade union stand, 
3 but Trotsky 
L. Trotsky to Groves, 27 May 1932, (Warwick M. S. S. ). See also the 
Daily Worker for 10 May 1932 where the political bureau alleged, 
'Murphy has left the line of the International and moved towards the 
camp of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists, who have always denied 
the possibility of building up socialism in one country and continue 
to assert thaf the Soviet Union is an integral part of the world 
capitalist economy'. Shortly afterwards the theme was developed by 
Idris Cox, (17 May), the Scottish District Committee of the Party 
(18 May) and Hasleden (19 May). See also W. Joss 'The Expulsion of 
J. T. Murphy and its Lessons', Communist Review, (June 1932), 298-301. 
For Murphy's own case for trade credits and democracy within the 
party see 'Why I Left the Communist Party', Forward, 20 May 
1932, where he condemned 'the unthinking automatic way in which the 
party regime operates and churns out its approval of resolutions - 
a process against which I have constantly fought'. Ironically, it 
had been Murphy who moved the expulsion of Trotsky from the Comintern 
five years earlier. 
The other leading figure who might have been connected with 
Balham. was Bell, an irregular attender at Group meetings, who had 
been deposed with the Old Guard in 1929. (R. Groves, op. cit., 52). 
However Bell made a hostile reference to the emergence of Trotskyism 
with the Group in The British Communist Party. A Short History, 
(1937), 150. 
2 Groves's call for the introduction of new elements into the 
leadership (Balham Group to Secretariat, I April 1932, Warwick M. S. S. ) 
repeated the call he had made on the eve of the eleventh congress in 
1929. 
3 M. Shachtman to Groves, 17 August 1932. Shachtman warned Groves 
against falling into an 'ultra-leftist pit', arguing that the 
International Left Opposition's view of trade unions was unchanged 
from that advanced by the first four congresses of the Comintern. 
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approved its intention, after the expulsion, to continue to project 
itself as a communist faction. 
I It was to emerge that the British 
and Trotsky had a different understanding of what this meant. 
2 
The Communist rqmained the voice of the party members in exile. It 
even declared its interest to be confined only to those prepared to 
join the party. 
3 Trotsky wanted the British to go as communists into 
the wider labour movement. The Balham Group sought to restore the 
Communist Party to health. 
This was particularly so up to the time of the Twelfth 
Congress of the C. P. G. B. in November 1932. Phance convened this 
gathering in the Battersea Town Hall, heartland of so many of these 
4 first Trotskyists. They made a writren intervention, but not & verbM one, 
5 
and were denounced from the platform by Pollitt. The absence of a 
I L. Trotsky to Groves, 'After the Expulsion', (6 Sept. 1932), 
Writings : Supplement, (1929-33), 149. 
2 On 27 May 1932, Trotsky had invited Groves to set down his views on 
the left of the I. L. P., now about to force disaffiliation from the 
Labour Party. Now, (6 September, above) he called for the devotion 
of 'a great and growing part' of Balham's forces to a speedy 
intervention in the mass organizations. 
3 The Communist, (Sept. 1932), 1 
4 Leaflets were distributed from the Left Opposition and from the 
Balham Group, and slogans painted on nearby walls. The Communist was. 
sold. But it was thought wise for the Opposition delegates in the 
Hall not to speak. (Groves) to A. Graham (Chicago),. 7 Jan. 1933. 
5 Unlike others Pollitt did not link Murphy and Balham. Their 
defections were the removal of 'poisonous elements', right and left. 
The Balhamites had the full Trotskyist line, he stated: socialism 
could not be built in one country; united fronts should be made 
with Social Democratic leaders; factory councils and committees 
should be built and unions ignored; and war could be prevented only 
in alliance with those helping war preparations. Pollitt made it 
clear that he know of Balham's French and American contacts and 
alleged, 'if they wanted to raise genuine bona fide political 
questions in the ordinary way of communist discussion on a footing 
which was up and above board it would have been allowed'. 
f 
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significant response left little room for illusions about a fight back, 
I 
although the tone of some distributed literature suggested illusions 
were still nourished at least in the breast of Groves. 
2 
The Communist 
3 
reflected that torpor in the C. P. G. B. was created by the physical 
absence of opposition, right (defined as Horner and Hannington)9 and 
left. It added that sluggishness also arose from the resolving of 
disagreements by references to decisions of the Comintern as expounded 
by the Party Central Committee. -This was an anticipation, in microcosm, 
of Trotsky's argument for breaking with the German Communist Party when 
4 it did not analyse its own failure to prevent Hitler taking power, but 
not of the conclusion he drew. 
What impact did the emergence of an open Trotskyist group 
have? The unavoidable answer is very little. The extent of communist 
attacks may reflect insecurity of the C. P. G. B. leaders at this time, 
however small the secession. Factors bearing on the reception the 
Balham Group received included the timing of the expulsions 
5 
and the 
I The Congress was 'the most docile in the history of the party', 
(Groves) to Graham, 7 Jan 1933. 
2 'We were told that we were ', quibbling'. Yet the party discussion has 
revealed acute differences within the leadership on this question, 
and has found R. P. Dutt defending a view very similar to ours', 
An Appeal to Congress Delegates from the Balham Group, reprinted in 
R. Groves, op. cit., 92. 
3 In its issue for January 1933. 
4 'Only one valid objection to this writing off the K. P. D. -M. U. could 
have been raised at the time: perhaps the party will save everything 
if, under the influence of the terrible defeat, it clearly and 
sharply changes its policy and regime, beginning with an open and 
honest admission of its own mistakes ....... On the contrary, the last sparks of critical thought has been stifled', ('The Fourth of 
August', Writings : 1932-33,260). 
5 Groves argues that the party leaders had to clear up Trotskyism before 
a party congress could be convened, and points out that pre-congress 
discussions were opened on the Monday following the expulsions, 
(op. cit., 69). Wicks reverses this order of events, (loc. cit., 29). 
A more general argument must be the timelag of four years between 
Britain and the U. S. A., and even longer between Britain and France, 
bringing a British following for Trotsky at a time when his wider 
reputation was in decline. 
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issue'over which they took-place. This may explain in part'the 
?- disparity of Trotskyism in Britain and abroad. A consideration that 
must also be weighed is the phase of its fortunes the C. P, G, B. had sunk 
to by 1932. Thq, expulsions caused no crisis within it and were barely 
noticed elsewhere. 
2 
The turn of the year saw the British Section building up its 
independent activity. Most promising was the South-West London Anti- 
War Committee, where, theýBalham Group was represented through trade 
union and Co-op Party members and had even been unintentionally 
complimented by Robson, the local C. P. G. B. organiser. 
3 
Even at this 
point h6wever, a conflict was evident between those who still looked 
towards actively reforming the C. P. G. B., an approach reflected in 
Purkis's, Open Letter to Harry Pollitt, and those who followed the 
I tactics of the Balham Group in more complete opposition to the party. 
I It has been suggested that the C. P. G. B. was anxious to prevent 
Trotsky's critique of Germany becoming known (B. Pearce, 'British 
Communist History', M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, (eds. ) Essays on 
the History of Communism, 138-9). In 1932 and 1933 criticisms of 
Trotsky's views were published by the party: A. Thaelmann, 
'On our'Strategy and Tactics in the Struggle against Fascismll 
Labour Monthly, (Sept. 1932), 583-90; R. F. Andrews (A. Rothstein), 
'The German Situation', Labour Monthly, (April 1933), 252-6. 
2 Emrys Hughes, editor of the Glasgow Forward, first acknowledged the 
existence of organised Trotskyism at the time of the appearance of 
The Red Flag. He greeted it under: the-, ti , tle 'Another Sect', 
but wrote: 
I .... if the Red Flag could eradicate Stalinism 
from the 
working-class movement in Britain it would please many more than the 
adherents of the "International Left Opposition". 
(Forward, 9 May 1933) 
At the time of the expulsions however, Hughes argued that Trotsky had 
exaggerated Stalin's policy setbacks and regretted that the two had 
not worked together, (Forward, 16 April, 2 and 9 July 1932). 
3 (Groves) to Graham, 7 January 1933. For the anti war campaign of 
the Balham Group at this time, in conjunction with the I. L. P., see 
R. Groves, op. cit., 72-6. 
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At this time the Opposition numbered less than thirty, all of them in 
London. It had about a dozen contacts. About half the membership of 
the former Balham Group was within it and this was still the main base 
of activity. Ithad established an existence, though a regular press 
only came with this New Year. 
I Yet it was hampered by a semi-legal 
existence which created a dispute over future tactics. 
Politically, the Opposition had begun the task of making 
available in Britain Trotsky's own writings, notably on Gemanyl the 
issue of the hour. ý But this did not yet imply the integration of the 
British within the International Left Opposition. Wicks was present at 
the informal international gathering convened in Copenhagen during 
Trotsky's lecture visit to the city in November 1932. Groves attended 
two days of the international pre-conference held in Paris on 
4-8 February 1933. Neither visit led to a satisfactory discussion about 
the problems the British now faced. 
21 
These problems centred on the intimidating disparity between 
the agenda set for itself by Trotskyism in Britain, and the forces 
available to it. This was to cause a severe tactical dispute which 
would in the end destroy the group. At the beginning of 1933 there were 
within the British Section not only the former members of the Balham 
Group and their associates, but also members of the I, L. P. who 
supported Trotsky's policy. 
I The January 1933 issue of The Communist was only the third to appear 
in eight months, but it now came out monthly. In May The Red Flag. 
British Trotskyism's first printed paper was to appear. 
2 Purkis criticised Wicks for not presenting accurately differing 
British views on how to approach the future, *(For Discussion, 
8,6 July 1933). For Wicks's involvement at Copenhagen, see Writings: 
1932,405-6n and, Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 390, and 
I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 181-7. Groves recollection of 
the pre-conference is to be found in The Balham Group, (1974), 74-5. 
The pre-conference wished to hold a discussion about Britain but was 
constrained by the absence of written documents. Despite plans to 
convene a more representative gathering in July 1933 no conference 
was held until 1936. 
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These I. L. P. Trotskyists traced their provenance to the 
Marxist League and to the formation in 1930 of a faction within the 
I. L. P. which sought to disaffiliate it from the Labour Party and make 
it a revolutionqry organisation. This faction, the Revolutionary 
Policy Committee, later became dominated by fellow travellers of the 
C. P. G. B. At this time however, it was dissatisfied with the 
communists and open in its views. Its leading members were aware of 
the ideas of Heinrich Brandler, former general secretary of the K. P. D. 
deposed after that party's failure to seize power in 1923, and also of 
the critique developed by Trotsky and the Left Opposition. Early 
members included Bert and May Matlow, Ernie Patterson and Sid Kemp. 
Harry Wi-cks had attended R. P. C. conferences, 
I 
which of course had only 
a semi-legal character. In 1931, Patterson and Kemp were, as members 
of the Clapham I. L. P., working with Reg. Groves and the Balham Group 
in local campaigns against imperialist war. 
2 
Disaffiliationist pressure actually led to the calling of an 
I. L. P. conference to discuss the matter in November 1931, but it was 
cancelled in the belief that the secession of MacDonald, and the 
holding of the general election, might impel Labour to the left. 
3 At 
a meeting of the Party's National Administrative Council that month 
Feumer Brockway urged careful choice of the time for a split and the 
issue over which to break. 
4 In the months to come his phrase Ia clean 
I Interview with author, 30 Nov. 1979. 
2 R. Groves, op. cit., 60-2. 
3 R. Dowse, Left in the Centre, (1966), 178. There weresome grounds 
for this hope. In October Herbert Morrison,. reqently in , 
the Cabinet, 
had written 'Labour must move to the Left in the true sense of the 
term - to the real socialist left. Not the spurious left policy of 
handing out public money under the impression that we are achieving 
a redistribution of wealth under the capitalist system. That is one 
of the illusions of reformism'. quoted in B. Donaghue and T. Jones, 
Herbert Morrison, Portrait of a Politician, (1973). 183. 
4 R. Dowse, op. cit., 179. 
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break' was to dramatize a widespread feeling in the party that it 
must cut itself completely free of Labour if it was ever to make 
progress, 
I 
The April 1932 Conference of the Party did not pull out 
but brought to týhe fore the essentially secondary issue of Labour 
Party Standing Orders which were inhibiting I. L. P. M. P. s from 
pursuing I. L. P. - as distinct from Labour Party - policy. A special 
conference of July 1932 resolved to come out, 
2 
and'the I. L. P. set 
about cutting itself off not only from the Labour Party but, from the 
labour movement in suicidally sectarian fashion. 
Disaffiliation occurred over the relatively unimportant 
issue of the obligation of I. L. P. M. P. s to observe Labour Party Standing 
Orders. It was also exceedingly ill-timed, since it occurred when the 
Labour Party was surrendering itself to just the kind of maximalist 
programme so many I. L. P. members favoured. Instead of leading to the 
erection of a mass socialist base$ the 'clean break' was an almost 
total disaster. 
3 
Those R. P. C. members who looked kindly upon Trotsky's 
I Later Brockway wrote that he was 'not greatly excited over the 
disaffiliation issue' and placed first emphasis on the development 
of revolutionary policy, (Inside the Left, (1942), 239-40). 
2 The hand of the R. P. C. can be discerned continuously in the events 
leading to disaffiliation, and much care should be taken over the 
suggestion that the loss of Clydeside I. L. P. votes to the C. P. G. B. 
in the November municipal elections was an influential factor. 
(See J. Foster, 'The Industrial Politics of the Communist Party', 
B. S. S. L. H., (Spring 1979), 57). 
3 653 branches at the July conference were reduced to 450 by November. 
One third of the Yorkshire branches and 128 of those in-Scotland 
were lost. London however lost only one of its 89 branches and 
formed. most'of the new ones. (R. Dowse, op. cit., 185). London 
was the centre of the R. P. C. 
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programme favoured it however as did the opposition leader himself. 
It was felt that the I. L. P. might be won for revolution, but only 
if it 
freed himself from the reformist embrace. This belief on the part of 
Trotsky and someof the opposition was to become increasingly 
important in 1933. 
Complex differences developed within the British Opposition 
during this year. Although there were now I. L. P. members within, its 
ranks, these debates were conducted largely by theýex-communist cadre. 
Were the members of ýhe Opposition to coptent themselves with publishing 
the views of Trotsky or were they aiming moreýambitiously to build up 
I a new organisation? If the second, what were the tactical means, to 
this end? Wicks and Weston (Morris) 
2 
seem to have favoured the view 
that the aim was to build up an'Opposition group, perhaps through work 
in the C. P. G. B. Purkis favoured advocating a critical but positive 
platform in communist circles. Critics of this second view saw it as 
merely a propaganda exercise. 
I The following year Trotsky wrote, 
'True, one can object that the I. L. P. just recently broke 
away from the Labour Party*, and that we evaluated this as 
a step forward. That is absolutely correct! And of 
course we are by no means suggesting now that the I. L. P. 
go back into the Labour Party and submit to its discipline. 
Such a policy would be a complete betrayal of the 
revolutionary tasks facing the British proletariat. ' 
'After the British Municipal Elections', 14 Nov. 1933, Writings: 
Supplement (1929-33), 323-4. 
Trotsky did add however that the I. L. P. having established a separate 
identity, must turn towards the Labour Party and trade unions or 
disappear. 
2 Weston had not been a founder member of the British Section but had 
joined by the summer of 1933. 
3 For Discussion, 6,20 July 1933. Purkis believed Wicks to have 
presented the differences this way at the-Copenhagen gathering of 
November 1932. He believed that there were three positions within 
the League: that work should be confined to the C. P. G. B. (this he 
thought was held only tentatively); that work should centre on 
agressive presentation of Opposition material, and the recruitment of 
Oppositionists to the C. P. G. B.; that the main task was to build a 
new organization which involved work within the C. P. G. B. (For 
Discussion, 6 July 1933). 
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Should the British Section try and rival the C. P. G. B. in all 
spheres of activity? 
I 
This was a utopian aim for such a tiny group, 
even faced by a weakened Communist Party. Less ambitiously it could 
use its press tQ, expound a revolutionary alternative to C. P. G. B. 
policy which might guide communists. Would that mean ceasing to 
publish Trotsky's articles plus material on Cermany and historical 
issues? 2 Davis, Purkis, Wicks and Williams came together to propose 
that the Opposition's main tasks were to publish essential I. L. O. 0- 
documents, train cadres in opposition theory, organize opposition work 
in the C. P. G. B. and project general 'Bolshevik-Leninist"propaganda at 
the mass organizations. 
3 
Typically of the discussions of this time, 
the authors blurred their priorities. 
4 
Mixed in with this confusion was unease at the slant Groves, 
effectively the leader of the Opposition, gave to its work. His critics 
thought he made the wrong criticisms of communist policy and attacked 
5 
its leaders too strongly. The composition of the executive changed 
I An anonymous document, Mass Work, (3 Feb, 1933) sugges"Isuch a 
course. 
2 An anonymous resolution of the time suggests devoting The Communist 
regularly to England and agitational articles, establishing the 
nuclei of firm Opposition groups, contacting the 'Left Wing Youth" 
and preparing a pamphlet setting down the views of the Left 
Opposition. It proposed deadlines for the appearance of The Red Flag, 
The Communist and bulletins. 
3 Statement From Members of the 1931-33 Committee of the British Group 
of the Left Opposition, 18 April 1933,1. No evidence as to the 
identity of H. Davis has been located. 
4 An example of this is that an experiment issue of The Red Flag was 
produced probably in October or November 1932. Swabeck, when 
he saw 
it expressed disquiet that publication of this together with 
The Communist might tend to 'diffuse the energies of a small group'. 
(A. Swabeck to Groves and Sara, 29 Nov. 1932', Warwick M. S. S. ) 
5 The manifesto Even now they blunder, (Spring 1933), a collection of 
compr6mising quotations from C. P. G. B. leaders, was*thought to have 
neglected to provide an explanation of the united front and therefore 
to be anti-party in content. 
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twice in the early months of 1933, first to increase Groves's 
influence and then to reduce it. 
I Part of the problem was that the 
group had continued to function informally since its establishment and 
proper conferen, ces had not been convened. On--18 June. a. gathering was held, 
(called variously a members' meeting and a conference)s which had 
before it an ambitiously detailed constitution 
2 
and a national 
committee resolution specifying the group's main tasks as: clarifying 
ideas and holding regular conferences; a continuous intensive 
campaign on the C. P. G. B.,; paying attention to the left wing youth and 
especially the Y. C. L.; selling a minimum 1000 Red Flags; publishing 
. The 
Communist when necessary; participating more fully in the I. L. O. 
The National Committee had followed Trotsky when the 
Opposition leader called for a radical reappraisal following Hitler's 
seizure of power. 
3 Trotsky advised that summer that if the Comintern 
failed to conduct an honest inquest on such a serious defeat it was 
moribund. He concluded that it was time to prepare a new international. 
The N. C. presented this view to the League with an individual gloss. 
It suggested that a discredited K. P. D. leadership could not be 
entrusted with organizing illegal work under Nazism, that ruin of the 
U. S. S. R. or Comintern collapse would signify the need for a new 
international. Trotsky had gone further by arguing that the time to 
I Davis et. al., loc. cit. 
2 This constitution, several pages long, put a ceiling of 20 on local 
membership, though this would have represented half the national 
figure; it proposed a developed distinct structure, though there 
were no members outside London; and it"recalled recent experience 
in the C. P. G. B. with its devotion of a whole article, (Article VII) 
to 'Organisational Democracy Safeguards', (For Discussion, 
6 June 1933). 
3 Trotsky's thinking can be followed in the 
Party? ', I and II, '(March 1933), Writings 
'The Collapse of the K. P. D. and the Tasks 
(9April 1933), Writings (1932-33), 189-97. 
of a complete break with the Comintern ani 
that year. 
- D. or New articles 'K; PO 
(1932-33), 137-40 and 
of the Opposition', 
He returned to the subject 
d its sections severai times 
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rebuild had arrived already. With few exceptions however, the British 
Section seems to have accepted this turn, 
I 
recognising explicitly 
that a new party was needed in Britain. 
The British Section celebrated May Day 1933 with the first 
printed Trotskyist newspaper the country had produced, The Red Flag, 
2 
It did not normally report the work of the British Section. It was-a 
propaganda vehicle, aimed at a revolutionary audience. The stress'on 
Trotsky's articles on Germany and (later)'Austria reflected the 
interests of the International Left Opposition, though from July 
unsigned British articles begin to appear. 
3 In the first three months 
of publication sales of The Red Flag advanced from more than 900 to 
nearly 1250. Sales, which had been divided 3: 1 in London's, favour 
were now more healthily distributed in the ratio of 7: 5.4 In the 
autumn however, The Red Flag entered a decline, 
5 
perhaps as-a 
casualty of the factional struggle. 
I The members were invited to submit statements on the proposition that 
a new party was necessary in Germany. Only the Battersea group and 
Purkis demurred. For the statements of the National Committee and 
Purkis see For Discussion, 24 May 1933, n. p. 
2 Number One, Vol I, Sub-titled, 'Monthly Organ of the British Section, 
International ýeft Opposition'. In June '(Bolshevik-Leninists)l 
was added to the sub-title. 
3 In May The Red Flag carried Trotsky's 'The German Workers Will Rise 
Again - Stalinism Never! ' on its centre pages, and in the June issue 
'It is now the turn of Austria! '. July brought a domestic 
contribution on the differences of Biockway and Pollitt over foreign 
policy, but also carried Trotsky's 'A Letter on the Work of the 
British Section' and 'The Problems of the Soviet Regime'. One minor 
coup was the eliciting of a reply from Tom Mann to an open letter in 
The Red Flag for September 1933 calling on him to speak out for 
Chen Du Siu, a C. C. C. P. leader who backed Trotsky and was now in 'a 
Nationalist jail (The Red Flag, (Oct. -Nov. 1933)). 
4 For Discussion, 28 Aug. 1933, n. p. The July'Red Flag carried an 
impressive list of nine bookshops where it was on sale. 
5 October's issue appeared, late, as a joint issue with November. 
December's issue did not appear at all. 
F 
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In its short life the British Section of the Left Opposition 
achieved four publications which aspired to regularity, The Communist 
continued despite the appearance of The Red Flag, though there was 
discussion about, retaining it for occasional needs. 
' 
For Discussion, 
the internal bulletin, appeared in sixteen issues up to 24 October 
1933.2 The League had also undertaken in August 1932, to supply Trotsky 
with clippings from the British press and in the autumn of 1933, it 
offered these to members as an information service under the title 
3 Excerpts and Summaries. While a successful press was clearly essential, 
there was a tendency that such a small group might overreach itself. 
4 
******* 
The life of the British Section of the Left Opposition was 
dominated, during the six months following the June members' meeting, 
by a radical shift in international policy and the implications of 
this for its tactics in Britain. From July 1933 Trotsky was urging 
the sections of the I. L. O. to follow closely the evolution of new 
parties; # which had in Western Europe split from social-democracy to 
the left. 
5 
I The ninth issue of The Communist appeared on 6 January 1934, after 
the split in the Communist League, leading with Trotsky's article 
'A Letter*to an I. L; P. member'. It is thought that circulation of 
The Communist reached 4-500, (A. Penn, op. cit., 86). 
2 Sub-titled 'Internal Bulletin - British Section - International Left 
Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists)'. Some of these were double issues. 
3 For Discussion-,; -28---Aug. 1933. After numbers I and 20 (September and 
October 1933) no more seem to have appeared despite the promise of 
No. 3 'early in November'. 
4 An August statement of the'N. C. called for the raising of a E50 
press fund. Late that month the League was considering further 
expenditure to produce The Communist. It al'So planned to publish a 
translation from the German by D. D. Harber of Oskar Fischer's 
Leninism Versus Stalinism, a compilation. of quotations. 
5 In 'The Left Socialist Organizations and Our Tasks', (15 June 1933), 
Writings : 1932-33 
,, 
274-8, Trotsky analysed such parties as the 
German S. A. P. and the British I. L. P. as centrists moving to the left 
and predicted that some Oppositionists would refuse to take them 
seriously. 
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He next argued that the Comintern, generally, was beyond revival and 
that the orientation towards reforming it must be abandoned. 
I The 
National Committee of the British Section supported Trotsky's views 
but interpreted. *, them to prescribe independence without forseeing the 
full tactical implications they carried. 
2 The late development of 
Trotskyism in Britain-scarcely left it time to learn the old , 
perspective before it adjusted to the new. 
The British example of a 'Left Socialist Organisation' 
was the I. L. P. Groves was alive to developments within it but when 
called on to produce a guiding document proposed no special emphasis. 
3 
Calls for greater emphasis on the I. L. P. came from Graham 
4 
and the 
Translators' Group of the British Section. 
5 From abroad Trotsky and 
I See 'It is Necessary to Build Communist Parties and an International 
Anew', (15 July 1933) 1 Writings : 1932-33,304-11. 
The article was 
published in For Discussion (12 Aug. 1933). 
2 In a statement dated 9 September 1933 the National Committee declared 
its intention to go further along the path of 'independent action'$ 
with the perspective of a new party. The Section now styled itself 
Communist League, a terminological change made also by the 
International Left opposition, (see For Discussion, 27 Sept. 1933). 
First public evidence of this was The Red Flag for Oct. - Nov. 1933. 
3 The national committee of 20 June 1933 instructed Groves to draw up 
a document on the I. L. P. His response noted that revulsion from 
the C. P. G. B. had led some I. L. P. ers to make a doomed attempt to turn 
their party a revolutionary one. He proposed special opposition 
material dealing with both parties, the formation of fractions 
within the R. P. C. andlother I. L. P. units' and joint activities with 
the I. L. P. where possible. ('our Attitude Towards the I. L. P. ', 
(6 July 1933), For Discussion, 20 July 1933). A special committee 
of the British Section was established to watch the I. L. P. 
4 W. Graham, 'Statement to the N. C. re the Resolution of 23 June on 
the I. L. P. 1, (11 July 1933), For Discussion, 20 July 1933. Graham 
had been a member of the Hackney local of the C. P. G. B. for fourt , 
een 
months to June 1933 when he was expelled for anti-party work and 
association with the Balham Group, (Red Flag, July 1933). Graham 
singled out the R. P. C. as that part of the I. L. P. deserving of 
special attention. 
5 'The New Content of the Slogan "Reform of the C. P. G. B. "', 3 July 
1933, For Discussion,, (3 Aug. 1933). It seems likely that 
D. D. Harber (q. v. ) was a member of this group. 
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the I. L. O. began to exert pressure on the British to take up urgently 
work within the I. L. P. They were in closer and closer contact with it 
on the international plane and sought to group it with-those other 
Left Socialist pýLrties who were prepared to work for a Fourth 
International. The Declaration of Four was to be the link between the 
open work of the I. L. O. and the more covert activities of its British 
members. 
I 
,, On 19 August 1933 a plenum of the I. L. O. ýunanimously - 
resolved that its British Section should enter the I, L. P. Trotsky 
began at once to press the point in private correspondence 
2 
and devoted 
public space to discussing the fate of the party. 
3 The I. L. P, sent 
delegates to the conference of Left Socialist Organisations held in 
Paris on 28 August, but did not adhere to the Declaration of Four. 
4 
I Trotsky noted in August that Inprecorr was already attacking the 
I. L. P. for its association with expelled Trotskyists. 
2 He told J. P. Cannon (and also Shachtman) the I. L. P. was a young 
party led by I. -a-few old men' which had executed 'an enormous shift 
towards a revolutionary position'. The more established Americans 
had to help the British concretize their already good connections 
with the party. ('The I. L. P. and the British Section'; 22 Aug. 1933, 
Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 276-7) To Jacob Walcher of-the ' 
S. A. P. he wrote linking I. L. P. hesitation over aligning itself with 
the Fourth International to its domestic fate. Entry of the-British 
Section would create urgently needed pressure, he argued. 'A few 
more months of vacillation and there will be nothifig left of the 
I. L. P. but a memory'. ("As It Is" and "As It Should Be", 
26 Aug. 1933, Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 283. ) 
3 His thrust was at the I. L. P. conception of the united front (with the 
C. P. G. B. ) and what he considered its vagueness on international issues. 
CWhither the Independent Labour Party? ', 28 Aug. 1933, published 
in The Red Flag for Oct. - Nov. 1933. ) 
4 The Declaration of Four, signed by the Independent Socialist Party 
(O. S. P. ) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party, (both of Holland), 
the Socialist Workers Party (S. A. P. ) of Germany, and the 
International Left Opposition called for revolutionary forces to 
build a new international. The I. L. P. never signed it, but the 
British Section published it as The New International :a document 
of the Paris Conference, (Warwick M. S. S. /15/3/l/15). For Trotsky's 
high expectations of the Declaration of Four, see 'A Discussion 
with Pierre Rambert', Writings : 
-Suppleme; 
ýt-(1929-33), 287-8. 
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Yet Trotsky met John Paton and C. A. Smith the next day and gained a 
favourable impression of Smith! Time was to show that the I. L. 09 
was not in fact, homogeneous in regarding an I. L. P. turn for the 
British Section, and the Declaration of Four as auspicious tactics. 
This had implications for the development of debate within the British 
Section, but the I. S. pressure was unrelenting, Its case was that the 
Section must faceno. t a declining C. P. G. B. but the I. L. P. , that it must 
help the I. L. P; to become 'the revolutionary lever influencing the 
masses of the Labour Party and of the trade unionsl., There was a 
detailed difference between Trotsky's view and that of the I. S., which 
had formulated its own by amending an original proposal from Trotsky 
I They travelled to meet Trotsky at Royan after the conclusion of the 
Left Socialist conference. Maxton, another I. L. P. delegate, had 
originally intended to make the trip but had to return home. Smith's 
account of the interview was published in The New Leader, 
13. Oct. 1933. The circumstances of the meeting between Trotsky and 
the I. L. P. leaders were to be recalled for forensic purposes by the 
Trotsky Defence Committee at the time of the Moscow Trials, 
(The New Leader, 9 April 1937). It has been suggested that 
Jennie Lee was also of the party, (I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 
263). Smith was the I. L. P. leader who most impressed Trotsky, 
('From A Letter of L. D. 1,3 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933). 
2 Witte, leader of the Archio-Marxists of Greece and secretary of the 
I. L. O. was despatched to inform the British of the I. S. proposal 
but appears to have communicated instead his own misgivings. 
('Comrade Witte's Violations of Bolshevik Organizational Principles', 
28 Sept. 1933, Writings : Supplement (1929-33), 308-11. ) 
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himself, but the general argument was the same. 
I On 5 September the 
I. S. repeated its plea, arguing that the'race with the co=unists would 
fall to the swiftest and that a prolonged dispute would be a luxury. 
The i4ýunction 'our comrades must actually enter the I. L. P. 
and give full effort to building up the revolutionary element in this 
party 
2 did not meet with clear assent in Britain. Initially there 
was a failure to communicate clearly, due to a lack of direct contact. 
3 
As it became clear that the Communist League - as the British Section 
was known from late August 1933 - was faced with a firm proposal, it 
began to define its own tactical position in response. Publicly it 
recorded its interest in the I. L. P. but did not elaborate a detailed 
programme for transforming it into a revolutionary party. 
4 Privately 
I The distinction was that the I. S., lead by Bauer its other secretary, 
believed two members should stay outside the I. L. P. and publicly 
maintain an independent press. Trotsky thought an external presence 
would lead to charges of factionalism being levelled by the I. L. P. 
Suspending publication would avoid an occasion for expulsion. 
('From a letter of L. D. 1,3 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 27 Sept. 
1933. In 
, 
Writings : 1933-1934,71, this appears a-sTHow to 
Influence the I. L. P. 1). TrotTky seems to have weighed the consider- 
ation that the articles published by the British would still be 
available in the American Militant. 
2 L. Trotsky, 'To Jacob Walcher On the Declaration of Four', 21 Aug. 
1933, Writings : Supplement_(1929-33), 275. 
3 In Trotsky's correspondence there is mention of proposed discussion 
on the I. L. P. with a delegate from 'the English Section' (ibid., 
275). But the I. L. O. plenum had already been held and this may be a 
careless referenqe to the impending yisit of Smith and Paton. If so, 
then Trotsky had met no C. L. members since Wicks attended the 
Copenhagen gathering'of late 1932. This may have made it easier for 
Witte to give the impression that joining the I. L. P. was a proposal 
of individuals not a firm directive and even, as Trotsky believed, to 
put the British into opposition, ('Comrade Witte's Violations of 
Bolshevik Organizational Principles', 28 Sept. 1933). 
4 It was argued that the I. L. P. could staunch losses of membership on 
its right and its left, but only by standing for a Marxist policy. 
Abstract proclamations would prove no more efficacious for it then 
they had for the C. P. G. B., (The Red Flag, Sept. 1933 ). * 
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it interpreted the I. S. proposal as further support for a 
perspective of achieving independence. 
' In its reply the National 
Committee of the Communist League challenged the impression the I. L. P. 
had created abrgad, dismissed the specific I. S. proposal for an 
outside presence, and suggested that apparent surrender of Bolshevik- 
Leninist principles to the I. L. P. 'would deal a serious ýIow at the 
prestige of'the Opposition'. 
' 
11 , entry was a major preoccupation. of. 
Trotsky's during 
September 1933 when he made four separate contributions to the 
3 discussion, combining public argument with private cajolery. His 
case to the I. L. P. was that it must now break with Stalinism just as 
the Opposition had, but after a decade of struggle. 
4 He first 
I The arguments of Trotsky and those of the I, S. were held to be 
'irrefutable' by the C. L. National Committee on 12 September 
CStatement of the National Committee upon the Question of New 
Parties and a New International', For Discussion, (27 Sept. 1933)). 
2 'Our Relations With The I. L. P. 1,5 Sept. 1933, For Discussion, 
27 Oct. 1933. 
3 -'How to Influence the I. L. P. ', (3 Sept. ); 'The I. L. P. and the New 
International', (4 Sept. ); 'Principled Considerations on Entry', 
(16 Sept. ); 'The Fate of the British Section', (25 Sept. ). See 
Writings : (1933-34), 71-8,84-7,100. A further minor confusion 
was introduced into the debate when Trotsky wrote 'Principled 
Considerations on Entry' over the pseudonym G. Courov. It seems 
clear from For Discussion that the C. L. was unaware that Gourov 
and Trotsky were one. 
4 C. A. Smith's account of his interview with Trotsky appeared, latep 
in The New Leader for 13 October 1933. Trotsky advised Smith that 
the I. L. P. must retain its independence at all costs until it had 
become revolutionary which meant a transition 'from an empirical 
--to a theoretical basis' and, concretely, recognition that formation 
of the Fourth International was the task of the hour. In December 
Sara and other C. L. leaders were to allege that Trotsky, following 
his meeting with Smith, looked to the I. L. P. rather than the C. L. 
Though he later disclaimed it, he seems to have entertained some 
hopes of at least a section of the I. L. P. leadership. * 
I 
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anticipated the objections of the C. L. Independence, he suggested, must 
be striven towards but could not always be immediately achieved and 
there was, moreover, a desperate need to act swiftly to forestall 
Stalinist penetration of the'I. Lý*P. The Bolshevik-Leninists, he 
later urged, would be the conduit for Marxism into the I. L. P., the 
only means whereby that party's further disintegration might be 
prevented, On 2 October 1933 he applied further public 
2 
and private 
3 
pressure. He analysed the position in the British labour movement as a 
series of potential levers. The tiny C. L. might shift the larger I. L. P, 
The I. L. P. in turn might move the Labour Party. I, L, P. ers would not 
abandon their party for an organisation forty strong but within its 
hetercgeneous environment the C. L. might have great ef f ect. He handled 
the practical arguments of the National Committee with only limited 
patience and clearly regarded the actual mode of entry into the I. L. P. 
as a secondary question. 
4 Salient points in his case were that 
penetration of the I. L. P. should be for a brief period, aimed at 
recruiting the 'revolutionary kernel' (sometimes called the 
revolutionary majority) of the party, and that, it was a viable 
proposition because the party was factionalised. 
I 'Another couple of months and the I. L. P. will have completely fallen 
between the gear-wheels of the Stalinist bureaucracy and will be 
lost leaving thousands of disappointed workers'. ('Principled 
Considerations on Entry', Writings : 1933-34,86. ) 
2 In a letter to The New Leader Trotsky corrected what he considered 
was a fallacious impression of the Paris Conference of Left Socialist 
Organizations given by C. A. Smith to The Daily Worker, ('To Dispel 
Misunderstandings', 2 Oct. 1933, Writ7i-ngs : 1933-34 
,9 
123-4. ) 
3 When he had received the C. L. letter of 5 September Trotsky replied 
under the title of 'The Lever of a Small Croup' (Writings : 1933-340 
125-6. ) 
4 Trotsky favoured a putýlic approach but considered that however it 
was achieved the C. L., once in the I. L. P., would in practice be a 
faction with common discipline. In practice this was to take some 
time to achieve. 
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The October-November 1933 issue of The Red Flag led with the 
Declaration of Four. 
October also saw factionalism develop within the Communist 
League. It emer4ed that there was a minority on the national, 
committee, which supported Trotsky's view while initially having 
little of its own to add. 
I At a second attempt this minority tried 
to develop a case which centred on the responsibility of the C. L. to 
ensure that the I. L. P. retained its independence (from Stalinism), 
2 
The earlier the disintegration of the I. L. P. the greater the benefit 
to the C. P. G. B. 
3 A battle must therefore be fought, it reasoned, on 
the ground where Trotskyism was strongest - that of principle, Its 
most powerful argument however was a negative one: a challenge to the 
majority to demonstrate where prospects were brighter than in the 
4 
I. L. P. - and the best chance of winning the party lay on the inside. 
When the National Committee repliedl it was clear that they were on 
the defensive. The attempt to marshall concrete alternatives to I. L. P. 
entry served only to reveal how threadbare the case for independence 
I IH. Allen', possibly a pseudonym for an American Trotskyist resident 
in Britain, advanced an argument leaning on the threat from the 
C. P. G. B. and was much impressed that the I. L. P. had broken with 
social democracy before Hitler came to power. ('The Struggle to Win 
the I. L. P. from the control of the centrists', (hand-dated 5 Oct. 
1933), Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/1/50 (1). This document is incomplete). 
2 H. Allen, F. Chalcroft, W. Graham, 'Statement On The I. L. P. ', 12 Oct. 
1933, For Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933. 
3 'The basic strategy of the Stalinists is to rob the I. L. P. of its 
independence as a party in one way or another and to accomplish this 
task at the earliest possible moment, before these'Trotskyist 
objections' have time to become more deeply rooted in the rank and 
file. ' (ibid., Mi. 3) 
4 Chalcroft, one of the authors, recorded his scepticism that the 
whole I. L. P. could be convinced. 
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was. 
I The I. L. P., it was'claimed, was best influenced from the outside, 
nor would its fate be settled in the short term. 
2 The Communist League 
ought to continue with its fingers in several pies and not confine 
itself to the I., L. P. 
3 Finally, either mode of entering the I. L. P. 
would discredit the Communist League. Definite positions on the ' 
National Committee were established at its meeting of 5'October 1933; 
after that it was esseniially a question of the membership delivering 
its verdict. 
*. .****** 
'All the many phases of work which have been possible through our * 
independent organisation would also cease (in addition to losing the 
Red Flag and withdrawing fraction members from the C. P. G. B. - m. U. ) 
and we should become a fraction, a very crippled fraction, -in the 
I. L. P. 1 (H. Sara, R. Groves, H. Dewar and S. Dowdall, 'The Work In, 
And Relation To, The Independent Labour Party', (n. d. ), For 
Discussion, 24 Oct. 1933. ) 
2 The majority believed that the decisive moment was far more likely to 
strike at the 1934 annual conference of the LL. P, at which time the 
Party's National Administrative Council would have to explain the 
deterioration of relations with the C. P. G. B. 
3 It was claimed by the majority that a quarter of the C. L. was still 
working in the C. P. G. B., and that a Scottish contýact, not an I. L. P. 
member, was selling the remarkable number of 300 Red Flags. It 
seems possible that this was Frank Maitland (q. ý. ), then running an 
Edinburgh socialist bookshop. 
4 Jottings of one majority member for the meeting. ýave survived: 
Notes for Discussion of I. L. P. quesiion's at National Committee 
meeting, 5 Oct. 1933, Warwick M. S. S., 15/3/1/49. 
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The decisive membersmeeting was convened in London under the 
chairmanship of Groves on 17 December, with at least three quarters of 
the British Section in attendance. 
I On the proposal of Max Nicholls, 
the meeting endorsed the Declaration of the Four Parties (for the Fourth 
International) and called on the National Committee to detail how this 
might be implemented in Britain. 
2 This decision put the Communist 
League within the movement of the Opposition towards the Fourth 
International; it now had to face the tactical recommendation of most 
of its international comrades. 
The debate opened with speeches by Sara and Graham. 
3 Sara 
moved the rejection of Trotsky's proposal to enter the I. L. P., arguing 
that the Opposition leader valued it more highly than the League 
4 
and 
did not appreciate the technical difficulties of working within it. 
Allen, who formulated the Minority view was only repeating Trotsky's 
I Near the end of the year there were 40-50 members of the Communist 
League (anon., On The I. L. P., n. d., Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/1/18). 
37 members participated E-the final vote on 17 December. The 
meeting supported a proposal from Kaye that the majority and minority 
should both keep minutes. 
2 The way had been prepared for this step by the National Committee 
which had asked each member for his or her views. No reply had been 
received from Williams, in whose residence the League duplicator was 
situated, and he now disappeared from the scenee There was 
controversy at the meeting over the views of Wicks, who had also 
failed to indicate clear support for steering towards the Fourth. 
The meeting know of a report by Witte, joint secretary of the I*C. Lov 
that Wicks aý-d-Fýurkis had both retained contacts with the Third 
International. But Witte was becoming discredited at this time, and 
while Purkis was to withdraw from the League the following year, 
Wicks continued to be a member. For Trotsky's estimate of Witte, 
see tA False Understanding of the New Orientation', 8 Oct. 1933, 
Writings : 1933-34,127-8 
3 W. Graham had been expelled from the Hackney local of the C. P. G. B. 
in June for criticising the party's line on, Cermany. 
4 (Majority) Minutes of Members Meeting, 3 
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opinions. Graham's speech was a frank reply to Sara. I. L, P. members 
would be far more likely to join a Communist League which fought with 
it side by side. He developed the 'split perspective' of working 
within the I. L. ý. in anticipation of a break and rejected in advance 
the compromise proposal of the International Secretariat. Matlow it 
was who advanced the I. S. view that those who agreed on entering the 
I. L. P. should do so and formally repudiate the Communist League. Once 
within the I. L. P. they could make themselves an-organised fraction; 
Wicks, less realistically, urged the transformation of the C, Le into 
an open organised fraction 
2 
which would then join the L. L. P. If the 
I. L. P. refused, he added, -present policy should be continued. 
There was thus four proposals before the membership. Sara 
had backing from Barrett, Hanton, 'Oscar', 
3 
for insisting on 
independence from the I. L. P. The C. L., they argued, and not this 
muddled party, would be the future new revolutionary organization. 
Minority spokesmen included Kirby, 
4 Worrall, Kaye, Nicholls and Harber. 
I (Majority) Minutes, 4-6. 
2 (Minority) Minutes of the Members Meeting, 1. 
3A member of the Translators' group, possibly a foreign Trotskyist. 
4 There is a conflict in the minutes as to whether or not he accepted 
the Minority concept of fractional work. 
5 Dr. Worrall and Max Nicholls were former members of the Marxist 
League. Max Nicholls was a garment worker$ then a member of the 
Hackney local of the C. L. Denzil Dean Harber (1909-1966) went to 
the L. S. E. in the late 1920s and took a degree in Russian Commerce. 
As a boy he taught himself Russian and he joined th C. P. G. B., perhaps 
while at the L. S. E. In 1931 he travelled as interpreter with a 
Canadian journalist on a trip to Russia. He stayed there for three 
months and contemporaries recall his disillusionment on his return. 
He discovered the Russian Bulletin of the Opposition in bookshops 
however, and made contact Zith the Balham Group. (Information kindly 
supplied by Mr. Julien Harber; 'Obituary' I British Birds, 60, (1967), 84-6; interview with Mr. John Archer, (Nov. 1973). 
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4 
who felt that the importance of a continued existence for the 
Communist League was not great. Wicks's proposal, advanced on behalf 
of the Battersea and Chelsea groups of the League, received support 
from Dibden, Temple, Lee Bradley 
I 
and Rowlands. 
2 
They insisted that 
work in the I. L. P. could not be efficacious without an organized 
fraction and differed also from the Minority in disbelieving that the 
party as a whole could be won. 
Sara replied to the debate, restating his view that Trotsky 
undervalued the Communist League 
3 
and that the ex-communist members 
had taken a far larger step than had the I. L. P. members because they 
had split with their party. His speech expressed the disquiet felt 
from the start by the leading cadre about aligning themselves with 
Trotsky. 
Only two votes were cast for Hatlow's compromise amendment, 
all the other 35 delegates voting against. The Battersea-Chelsea 
amendment was also lost, but more narrowly, with 10 in support and 14 
against. The Battersea-Chelsea votes then moved almost entirely behind 
the Majority whose resolution was passed 26: 11.5 
Harber, for the Minority members now declared they were going 
to join the I. L. P., guided by a letter from the Internation Secretariat, 
I Lee Bradley, who like her husband Gerry had been a member of the 
Marxist League, was a member of the Chelsea local of the C. P. G. B. 
expelled earlier in the year. 
2A member of the Hackney group. 
3 Sara alleged that Trotsky thought The Red Flag a mere reprint of the 
American 
, 
Militant, (Minority) Minutes, (8). There is no definite 
evidence for this, but see above. 
4 'Problems of international organisation have'never been L. T. 's strong 
point', (Majority) Minutes, 10. 
5 Three absentee votes included in the Majority total, and two among 
the Minority, (Majority) Minutes, 11. 
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to Groves which had not been published. 
I Groves countered that the 
letter had been read at the N. C. 
2 but Harber then proceeded to read its 
text to the effect that the Minority must be allowed to follow its own 
star, ý% 
By withdrawing from the meeting the Minority made its feelings 
clear. Then with only the Majority voting, Wicks and Lee Bradley were put 
on the National-Committee in place of its Minority members. This 
separation in the voting procedure was the parting of the ways and the 
meeting closed. 
There was a brief time for obituaries. The Majority referred 
to the weighty and decisive3 vote of 17 December. In its view the 
Minority argument that organisational unity could not exist without 
policy agreement, could not be sustained for a tactical quarrel. As 
a general rule majority decisions had to be respected. If they did 
not prevail in the I. L. P. fraction, there would be a split at the first 
disagreement. Prophetically the Majority warned: 
We are aware of the difficulties that many of the sections 
have experienced from weakness on matters of this kind. 
The history of maly opposition sections has been and still 
is one of continual factional struggles and breakways. 
One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly, (Sic) an absence, 
both internationally and nationally, of a leadership which 
has earned the respect of the members. 
I This letter has not been located. 
2 The Minority had, seemingly, withdrawn from the National Committee, 
(Majority) Minutes,, 11. 
3 Draft Statement of the present Position of the Majority and Minority, 
19 Dec. 1933, Warwick M. S. S., 15/3/l/52it 1. 
4 ibid., 1. This view was to be echoed from abroad. 
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The Majority made a final offer: let the Minority enter the 
I. L. P. and make a formal repudiation of the Communist League. It 
could still work under the direction of the National Committee. 
Refusal must mean exclusion from membership. There is no record of 
any attempt to take the offer up. 
So ended the first phase of British Trotskyism. It had been 
a brief marriage of very different experiences. In the end most of 
those who had not been in the C. P. G. B. remained in, or returned top 
the I. L. P. The ex-communists opted for-an open organisation. 
There was also a differential willingness to follow Trotsky's 
advice and that of the International Secretariat. By the end of the 
discussion the Majority were speaking of both in very critical terms. 
They had not participated in the long struggle of the Left Opposition 
against Stalin, and they did not feel' under compulsion of loyalty. 
Did Trotsky himself see more future for the I. L. P. than for the 
Communist League as a revolutionary alternative? His writings 
underpin this accusation to a certain extent. Ironically, none other. 
than Trotsky himself had criticised Stalin for expecting in 1926 a 
mass revolutionary current from left wing members of the General 
Council of the T. U. C. rather than from the C. P. G. B. and Minority 
Movement. The first split had come ominously soon. It occurred over 
an issue which history failed to resolve and was to bedevil Trotskyist 
politics for many years. The Majority's darker predictions were borne 
out. This phase of Trotskyism in Britain has not been well treated. 
'This initial split took place without any thorough discussion 
or preparation, the factional lines running parallel to the 
personal alliances of the various individuals. 
" 
I WIý, Internal Bulletin, [Sept.? 19431, H. P. 0 D. J. H, 0 14 A/80 [H story of British Trotskyism]. 
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i 
But the Communist League spent quite a long' time debating 
whether or not to enter the I. L. P.: indeed Trotsky's complaint was 
that they spent so long that crucial months were allowed to pass while 
the C. P. G. B. buýlt up its influence. As for the second charge, which 
smacks of the folk-lore of the movement, it does seem to be true that 
no one changed sides during the debate, but this seems attributable to 
political alliances. Almost all those who were still or formerly in 
the Communist Party opted for*an independent Leaguet 
I 
while those who 
had been won from nowhere or from the I, L. P, set up the Marxist Group. 
The Communist League was an unconsualmated marriage but it was 
politically and not personally dissolved. 
W. I. L. was also to charge that it was the transition 
from critical circle to real organizing which ruptured the Communist 
League. Without doubt there was an element of posturing in the 
'independence' of Groves et. al., who seem to have hoped for an 
extended period in which they might develop a leisurely critique of 
the C. P. G. B., but such opportunity was unlikely to arise. And it was 
in any case unlikely that they could make an original contribution to 
Opposition thought ten years after Trotsky had written the 
Platform of the Left Opposition. 
Trotsky rebuked Ridley and Ram in 1930 for making a separate 
experiment 'from the Communist Opposition. Yet the Opposition made no 
headway in the C. P. G. B. and was forced out where it surfaced. Progress 
became possible only because the I. L. P. existed, a confused ocean in 
which many exotic revolutionary specie could flourish. Was an error 
committed by discouraging Ridley and Ram? Surely not. The I. L. P. of 
Allen was the exception. Dewar hardly counts in view of the brevity 
of his sojourn in the Party. 
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1930 was not that of 1933., It was two years from its split with the 
Labour Party and did not then see itself as a revolutionary 
organisation. By 1933 the I. L. P. was in transition: to what destina- 
tion turned on t4e strongest political influence . Troýsky foresaw 
working within it only until its fate was resolved. The intervention 
of Trotsky and the I. L. O. had been decisive. Otherwise a minority 
with support short of a third of the Communist League could hardly 
have expected to survive. They had forced the issue at the time of the 
break with the C. P. G. B. and now did so againg though it seems 
implausible to suggest that international influence turned Trotskyism 
onto an unnatural path. 
I 
The work of building a viable British Section 
had scarcely begun when the split took place, reflecting the absence 
of a tradition of joint work among these dissident C.. P. G. B. and I. L. P. 
members and of a shared experience with international Trotskyisms 
I This is, of course, the thesis of W. Kendall in The Revolutionary 
Movement in Britain, 1917-21, (1969), an account of the early years 
of the C. P. G. B. 
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IV THE MARXIST GROUP IN THE I. L. P. (1933-1936) 
Trotskyists were present in the I. L. P. in significant numbers 
for three years,, Those who followed Tr. otsky's advice to join the party 
were the least experienced of his followers in revolutionary activity. 
There was little prospect of converting the whole party into a following 
of the International Left Opposition and the Trotskyists were always 
weaker than the various advocates of joining the C. P. G. B. After two 
years of working within the I. L. P. the Trotskyists ceased to advocate 
critical support for the Labour Party in the belief that the I. L. P. was 
the only truly anti-war party. This hope was falsified and they left 
the I. L. P. as individuals and small groups throughout 1936. 
Ten branches supported the Trotskyist line at the January 1934 
conference of the London I. L. P. This represented the influence of 
thirty members of the secret Bolshevik-Leninist fraction which had been 
established, 
I but not of those C. L. Minority members who were to join 
the I. L. P. 
2A handful of the fraction had some training in the 
Communist Party behind them, but many had known 
'only the I. L. P. 
3 
I A. B. Doncaster et. al. to the International Secretariat, I. C. L. 
[April 7 193ýlj HP,, I)JH 5/2. 
2 See below. H. N. Brailsford thought a hundred Trotskyists had joined 
the party (A. Weisbord to Sara, 22 Oct. 1934, Warwick M. S. S. 
15/3/l/60). This is a not uncommon overestimate of the membership 
of a revolutionary group and may also reflect the extent to which 
I. L. P. ers and Trotskyists shared ideas. 
3 This seems to be true of Max Nicholls (who later moved to Glasgow), 
Bert Matlow, Arthur Cooper, Tony Doncaster, John Archer (knoýnin 
internal documents of the Trotskyist movement as 'Barclay' or 
P. J. B. ) and Hilda Lane. Lane had in June 1932, as Chairman of the 
I. L. P. Women's Committee, led the walk-out from the Labour Women's 
Conference. Harber and Graham had briefly been in the C. P. d. B. 
Allen, and C. L. R. James (q. v. ), whaathey were soon to meet, were 
foreign. 
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The task they faced required great sophistication; they brought to it 
only part of what was in any case one of the weakest and least tested 
national sections of the International Left Opposition. They had to 
pioneer a trail., that the French, Belgians and Americans were to follow 
in the next two years. 
I Nor had they, in Trotsky's view, started well. 
He fretted over the delay which occurred early in the year before there 
was a full entry into the I. L. P. The Minority was holding back because' 
of inhibitions over the continued activity of the Majority under the 
name Communist League. Trotsky urged it notto delay over practical 
considerations, but to repudiate the League and justify its split by 
energetic work in the I, L. P. 
2 It finally took his advice and wrote to 
Brockway to ask if it could join as a group. When this was refused it 
announced the 'liquidation' of the Communist League and those still 
outside the I. L. P. joined as individuals. 
3i 
'Boring from within' a Social Democratic party became known in 
Trotskyist circles as entrism. Before that, following a prolonged 
debate in the middle of which the French Trotskyists entered the 
S. F. I. O., it became known as the 'French turn'. The arguments 
deployed by Trotsky in favour of the French turn in 1934 were all. 
anticipated in his writings proposing entry by the Communist League 
into the I. L. P. It is singular that the official historian of the 
Fourth International should ignore the British experience and speak 
of the French turn being 'subsequently extended' to other countries. 
(P. Frank, The Fourth International, (1979), 51-4. ) 
2 The Minority had written to the I. S. on 5 January and to Trotsky on 
7 January. Trotsky's reply of 23 January indicated that the Minority 
had complained of the continued links between the Majority and the 
International, had criticised an I. S. draft of a declaration 
disclaiming the League, had dismissed the Majority as incorrigible 
and asserted the existence of differences in Britain other than those 
on the merits of joining the I. L. P. Trotsky advised, 
'At this moment you should forget the existence of the majority 
of the section, enter the I. L. P. and develop energetic activity, 
Then all the difficulties will be solved by themselves. ' 
('Differences With The British Minority', Writings : Supplement 
(19347LO), 442-3. ) 
3 The New Leader, 23 March 1934. Brockway reported that former C. L. 
members would be allowed in as members if they respected party policy 
and the I. L. P. constitution. As for the Fourth International, this 
would be discussed at the forthcoming conference, (The New Leader, 
23 March 1934). The C. L. Majority wrote to Brockway that ii still 
existed but no confirmation of this was printed, (Interview with 
R. Groves, 23 April 1980). The statement misled Dowse, (op. cit., 192). 
I 
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interest*in Trotsky had grown after disaffiliation. 
No party leader was ever a Trotskyist, despite accusations from the 
C. P. G. B. But the party did publish and review Trotsky, 
I 
and the 
imprint of his. thought is apparent on Brockway and other leaders. For 
his part, Trotsky used the I. L. P. Is interest in him and the friendly 
relations he had developed with some leaders to put his analysis before 
the party membership. Throughout the presence of the Opposition in the 
I. L. P. his prestige and thought were, arguably, its strongest weaponse 
2 
Trotsky attributed the decline of the I. L. P. after 
disaffiliation, a step he supported, to its decision to face not the 
3 
masses but the C. P. G. B. Being formless itself, represeriting no- distinct 
I It was the I. L. P. which published his Copenhagen lecture on the 
Russian Revolution, albeit with an introduction by Maxton, which 
Trotsky challenged, ('Trotsky on Maxton', The New Leader, 
25 Aug. 1933). See also the interview with him, 'Can Comintern be 
reformed? ' (The New Leader, 13 Oct. 1933). Joseph Kruk, in his 
review of fie History of the Russian Revolution for the I. L. P. 
praised the book's 'studied Marxist objectiveness' and lamented 
Trotsky's exile as 'the greatest of revolutionary tragedies', 
(The New Leader, 8 July 1932,20 Jan.; 1933). 
2 On his return to the editorial chair, Brockway expressed the hope 
that all shades of opinion might flourish in the Independent Labour 
Party, welcomed the discussion on Trotskyism and thought it would 
be a disaster only if a split resulted, (The New Leader, 29 Dec. 
1933). 
3 'Cardinal Questions facing the I. L. P. 1,5 Jan. 1934, Writings 
(1933-34), 186-90. 
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idea, the I. L. P. was certainly in no condition to reform the Comintern. 
He was particularly savage with I. L. P. oscillations between the 
internationals! The I. L. P. should stop seeking a formless unity for 
which there was no political basis. Otherwise it faced extinction. 
Within the I. L. P. communist influence was strong and grew up 
to 1934. The C. P. G. B. sought at first a united frontwith the I. L, P. 
to be. followed by actual unity; 
2 Up to sometime in 1933, the 
Revolutionary Policy Committee, while favouring a united communist 
party, still made criticisms of the communists. 
3 
In the next twelve 
months this began to change. The leaders of the C. P. G. B. were 
I Having broken with the Labour Party, and therefore with the Labour 
and Socialist Internationalq (L. S. I. ), the I. L. P. grouped around 
itself other ex-social democratic parties in the International Labour 
Community, (I. A. G. ), later to be known as the International 
Revolutionary Bureau of Socialist Unity (I. R. B. S. U. ) or London Bureau. 
This was a repetition, on a lower plane, of developments in the early 
1920s, and the Trotskyists, borrowing Lenin's scornful appellation 
of the time, referred to the London Bureau as the 'two and a half' 
international. Trotsky pointed out that through the I. A. G., the 
I. L. P. was aligned with the Norwegian Labour Party, (moving towards 
the Second International) and with the S. A. P. (of Germany) and the 
O. S. P. (of Holland) which were moving towards the Fourth International, 
while in Britain it was holding discussions with the C. P. G. B., i. e. 
the Third International. 
2 C. P. G. B. influence in the I. L. P. had a lengthy provenance. In the 
late 1920s the Young Communist League had hoped to poach Guild of 
Youth members and precipitate that organisation's collapse (W. Rust, 
'The Derby Conference of the I. L. P. Guild of Youth', Inprecorr, 
Vol. 8, no. 31,7 June 1928,579). Five years later Pollitt prodded 
the Y. C. L. along the path which would give its sympathisers a Guild 
majority the following year ('The Tasks of the Congress of the 
Y. C. L. of Great Britain', Inprecorrs Vol. 13, no. 26,14 June 1933, 
584). The C. P. G. B. was uneasy at the R. P. C. slogan of a 'United 
Communist Party' though it sought unity in action. Its treatment of 
the I. L. P. was generally combined with attacks on those who opposed 
this course, whom it portrayed as an amalgam of Right-Wingers and 
Trotskyists. (J. R. Campbell, 'New Opportunist Arguments Against the 
Communist International', Inprecorr, Vol. 13, no. 33,28 July 1933, 
730-1). An extreme of C. P. G. B. worry and distaste for the I. L. P. 
is shown in Gerhard, 'The Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, (Communist International, 
15 March 1932,155-64). 
3 The R. P. C., up to 1933 published a paper entitled Revolt, no copies 
of which have been located. But its relations with the C. P. G. B. as 
late as the York Conference of the I. L. P. may be gauged from the 
fierce criticism it'suffered at that time from Pat Devine, ('Annual 
Conference of the I. L. P. 19 Inprecorr, Vol. 14, no. 24p 20 April 1934, 
614-5). 
fI 
84. 
sensitive to Trotskyist influence in the I. L. P. 
I 
and to a certain 
extent had to engage in a rare debate with it in the party press. 
2 
The most rapid success achieved by the Communists was in the I. L. P. 
Guild of Youth which declared for the Young Communist International at 
3 its Norwich conference in 1934. But it was the party itself which was 
most promising to the C. P. G. B. 
The Revolutionary Policy Committee was to become an outpost 
for the communists. At first, however, it preserved its independence. 
R. P. C. leaders hoped initially that the. I. L. P. would,. outstrip the 
I Pollitt told the Thirteenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I. of 'the 
Trotskyist Group of petty-bourgeois and student elements without 
any mass influence or connections', he had watched at the Derby 
I. L. P. conference of 1933, COn the United Front in Great Britain's 
In2recorr, Vo. 14, no. 5,30 Jan. 1934,129-39). Pollitt's fears 
led him to exaggerate by putting the Trotskyists on a par with the 
N. A. C. and Elijah Sandham's supporters. Gallacher showed that 
criticisms of communist hostility to a united front were beginning 
to hurt when he warned that the inevitabilism of some of his comrades 
was giving openings to 'Trotskyists and other counter-revolutionaries', 
('On the United Front in Great Britain'. Inprecorr. Vol. 14, no. 18 
19 March 1934,463) See also InErecorr, Vol. 14, no. 25,23 April 
1934,646).. 
2 Notably in Controversy, the internal discussion journal launched in 
1933 under the editorship of C. A*. Smith. Controversy began 
publication with a Trotsky article raisinj -C. P. G. B. suspicions that 
it was intended to obstruct. closer-relations between the parties. 
3 On the National Committee there were many opposed to a close 
association with the C. P. G. B., but no Trotskyists. Guilders had met 
young Trotskyists however at a gathering of youth sections of parties 
which had attended the August 1933 Paris conference, convened in 
Laren on 24 Feb. 1934. (For the Laren conference, reconvened in 
*Brussel/'s on 28 Feb., see Writings : Supplement(1934-40 , 893-5) 
Following the Norwich vote, Guild representatives travelled to 
Paris with John McGovern M. P. to meet the delegates of the Young 
Communist International. They were urged to abstain from a 'new 
splitting international' organised by the Trotskyists, indeed, this 
was a condition for joining the Y. C. I, The watchful McGovern 
refused to believe that Trotsky was a counter-revolutionary, (Young 
Workers Advande! (1934), the agreed verbatim report of the Paris 
negotiations of May 5/6 1934). The I. L. P. finally intervened to 
prevent the passage of the Guild into a Y. C. L. merger. 
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C. P. G. B. as the revolutionary party of British Workers, 
I 
and that was 
the motivation behind the drive to disaffiliate from the Labour Party. 
In this period, with several of Trotsky's supporters working within it, 
the R. P. C. was, -. %if anything, nearer to the Right Opposition of 
Heinrich Brandler than to the C. P. G. B. 
3 After the 1933 Derby 
conference of the I. L. P., the R. P. C. began to aim at a united 
communist party. This objective was not shared by the Trotskyists on 
,4 the Committeel four of whom resigned. The R. P. C. faltered, and then 
I 
I Associated with the R. P. C. at this time was Dr, 'C, A. Smith, who had 
met Trotsky, a pacifist who had fought Dulwich and the New Forest, 
the second as one of the last I. L. P. candidates approved by the 
Labour Party. Smith's path was to cross with that of Trotskyism 
many times during the 1930s. Leaders of the R. P. C. were 
C. K. Cullen, (q. v. ) and Jack Gaster, a Jewish solicitor and son of 
a famous rabbi. Brockway worked closely with the Committee for a 
times I. L. P. leaders knew of the R. P. C. machine before disaffilia- 
tion but were inhibited from acting against it by Maxton's 'supreme 
tolerance', (J. Paton, Left Turn, (1936), 392; see also R. Dowse, 
op. cit., 180, though he makes no international parallels and tends 
to treat the R. P. C. as monolithic). 
2 Dr. C. K. . Cullen, an East London doctor and former N. U. W, M, activist, 
elected unopposed as first chairman of the R. P. C. in March 1932, 
wrote of the reference back of an insufficiently revolutionary N. A. C. 
motion at the 1932 annual conference: 
'This was carried by a good majority. No mention of the 
reason for the reference back was made in the Daily Worker. 
Why, I wonder? (Or perhaps I don't. ) 
Can it be that the Daily Worker really does fear that 
the I. L. P. is becoming revolutionary after all? An 
innocent would think that a revolutionary party would welcome 
the accession of another big group to the revolutionary 
movement even if it hadn't reached the 100 per cent purist 
revolutionary outlook on tactics. ' (Daily'Worker, 11 April 1932) 
3 Supporters of Brandler had speedily taken over the S. A. P,, a small 
German party evolving like the I. L. P. away from Social Democracy* 
In the United States, Jay Lovestone, -- ousted from the leadership of 
the C. P. U. S. A. with similar policies to Brandler and Bukharing 
represented for a time, a parallel trend. For the American 
Revolutionary Policy Committeeq see D. Bell, Marxian Socialism in 
the United States, (Princeton 1967)p 164-5, -172,178. 
4 H. Edwards and J. Pawsey, 'The Organic Development of the Marxist 
Grou 1, Marxist Group Bulletin, 4, (April 1935), 3. Edwards, Pawsey 
.pI and Matlow were three of those who resigned, to be drawn increasingly 
towards Trotsky's analysis of the failure of communism in Germany. 
This I. L. P. loyalty was to be an important factor for the future 
of Trotskyism. 
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after Spring 1934 resumed-activity steering closely towards the 
C. P. G. B. It was noticeable that the party's attitude towards the R. P. C. 
underwent a change. 
I In December 1933 it was warning of Trotskyist 
influence in thq R. P. C. 
2 
and it set up phe Affiliation Committee with 
the aim of rallying all those who were steering towards the C. P. G. B. 
3 
After this hopes in the R. P. C. were*renewed and Cullen - plus to a 
4ý lesser extent Jack Gaster - became a direct communist spokesman. 
I In March 1933 Labour Monthly had warned 'the rank and file of the 
I. L. P. must look past Maxton and Caster if they-wish to find the 
true pathl(quoted in R. Dowse', op. cit,, 187)ý The 1935 Derby 
conference saw the C. P. G. B. writing of the R. ý. C. in friendly 
fashion, (R. Bishop, 'The I. L. P. -Conferencel, Inprecorr, Vol. 15, 
no. 18,27 April 1935,479-80). 
2 See remarks of W Rust in 'On the United Front in Great Britain', 
Inprecorr, Vol. ; 4, no. 15,5 March 1934,381-2. 
To this period belong the nominations by Caster of Brockway to 
replace Paton as national secretary of the I. L, P.. and the phase when 
the R. P. C. 'innocently imagined that if it could take over the 
I. L. P. it would supersede the C. P. G. B. as the British Section of the 
Cominternl, (R, Dowse, op. cit., 253; B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left 
in the 1930s, (Cambridge 1977), 79). 
3 The I. L. P. Affiliation Committee arose from communist dissatisfaction 
at R. P. C. inability to answer attacks by I. L. P. party leaders. For 
its manifesto see the Daily Worker, 16 Dec. 1933, and for its policy 
see E. Whalley, 'Towards the I. L. P. Easter Conference-Trends in the 
I. L. P. 1, Labour Monthly, (March 1934), 90-6. The C. P. G. B. seems to 
have hoped that the Derby 1933 conference vote, against an N. A. C. 
recommendation, for I. L. P. - communist cooperation would speedily be 
followed by unity, but this was not an immediate perspective of the 
R. P. C. o(H. Pollitt, loc. cit., 135). 
4 The Marxist League and the R. P. C. were not the only formations which 
attempted to rival the C. P. G. B. from the left while eschewing 
Trotskyism. Richard Rees and J. Middleton 24urry turned the literary 
journal The New Adelphi into an ethical Marxist magazine. From 
1931-2 a debate on communism was held in its pages. Murry resigned 
the editorial chair, joined the I. L. P., campaigned for disaffiliation 
and debated from the left with the C. P. G. B. Among those who assisted 
him was P. A. Ridley, ('Marxism, History and a Fourth International,, 
The New Adelphi, (May 1932), 494-502), who may have seen it as a 
replacement for The New Man. The Daily Worker refused articles from 
Murry. In 1934 Murry left the I. L. P. with Elijah Sandham to form 
the Independent Socialist Party and the political bent of The New 
Adelphi declined from this date. (See: The New Adelphi, passim; 
R. Dowse, Left in the Centre, (1966), 188-9; B. Pimlottp Labour 
and the Left in the 1930s, (Cambridge 1977), 221 - 2). 
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It is impossible to make sense of Trotskyist behaviour 
within the I. L. P. without allowing for the effects of communist policy, 
The I. L. P. as a whole was drawn towards the C. P. G. B. because it appar- 
ently embodied ýhe Russian Revolution a. nd Marxist authority. Close 
cooperation in a united front was another matter and revolts in 
Glasgow, Wales and Lancashire were all traceable to association with 
the communists. The Trotskyists noted this, and some of them were to 
strive to appear, as a loyal opposition within the I. L. P. And some 
I. L. P. leaders, notably Brockway, found Trotsky's thought a useful 
proof that King Street did not possess a monopoly of revolutionary 
wisdom. 
The 1934 conference of the I. L. P. at York was a 
disappointment to the C. P. G. B. and an encouragement to the Trotskyists. 
Trotskyists in the Holborn and Finsbury, South Norwood, Clapham and 
Islington branches all came together after the London divisional 
conference at the beginning of the year and formed a Bolshevik- 
Leninist faction. Th'ey*'called for an organisation which could advance 
a clear revolutionary line as an alternative to that emanating from 
the R. P. C. and the N. A. C. 
I 
It was clear that in the present state of the I. L. P. there 
might be a response to such a stand even from those who did not 
consider themselves Trotskyists. At York, in the debate on 
international affiliation, the communist motion was rejected almost 
four to one and the R. P. C. motion (putting conditions on affiliation 
to the Comintern) by nearly two to one. The Trotskyist motion called 
for direct support for the Fourth International and fell 20: 137. The 
encouragement to be derived from this vote lay in comparing it with 
the thirty four votes cast for direct Comintern affiliation as advanced 
H. Edwards and J. Pawsey, loc. cit., 3. 
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by C. P. G. B. supporters. Moreover, when conference was invited 
expressly to condemn affiliation to the Fourth International. It 
declined to do so by 107: 64. 
I This ý4as an uncomfortable jolt for the C. P. G. B, Among the 
Trotskyists there was some elation. They had been led to believe that 
the I. L. P, must come over to the Fourth International or collapse$ a 
prognosis which determined that entering it must prove a short-term 
, venture. Instead the I. L. P. had vacillated on the Fourth International 
and survived communist encroachment. D. D. Harber concluded that it had 
been wrong to anticipate the party's early demise, that a definite 
field of work remained open for Trotskyists. He counselled setting the 
target of a majority"by the next I. L. P. conference or even forcing an 
extraordinary conference if support grew sufficiently fast. The 
communists, he believed, would now*withdraw. The Bolshevik-Leninists 
ought to support the N. A. C. if it took disciplinary measures against 
communists and after that make the centrist N. A. C. itself the main 
target of criticism. 
2 
Harber deceived himself and others about the possibilities 
in the I. L. P. Communist withdrawal was eighteen months off; so was 
disciplinary action, and when it arrived it was not aimed only at the 
communists. There was also a tension among the Trotskyists as to the 
I Communists had noted little support for Trotskyism in the I. L. P. 
during the winter of 1933-34, (J. Shields, 'The Issue before the 
I. L. P. Conference', Inprecorr, Vol. 14, no. 19,23 March 1934, 
487-9). After York the party concluded that I. L. P. oscillation 
between the two and a half and four internationals had allowed 
some branches to go over openly to Trotskyism. The I. L. P. was 
'becoming a breeding ground for open counter-revolutionaries', 
(P. Devine, 'Annual Conference of the I. L. P. 1, Inprecorr, Vol. 149 
no. 24,20 April 1934,615). 
2 D. D. Harber, The present position in the I. L. P. andý how we should 
react to'it (1934), (Warwick M. S. S. ), 
fI 
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node of organisation they needed to achieve their ambitious end, They 
were able to use single I. L. P. branches as activity and publishing 
centres, and would continue to do so. 
I Should they coalesce in a form 
to which others., who were not Trotskyists, but supported particular 
Bolshevik-Leninist policies might be attracted? The idea seems to have 
been Harber's, 2 and his also was the belief that-within the larger 
organisation the Bolshevik-Leninist fraction should be retained. In 
the Autumn of 1934 the larger organisation was established under the 
name of the Marxist Group-in the I. L. P., and it began to publish a 
bulletin. But Group members were still protagonists, albeit critical 
ones, of the I. L. P. and they continued to sell the eclectic New Leader. 
3 
By this time Trotskyism was a recognised force in the I. L. P. 
It was the protagonist of a policy against war, of a mass united front 
and for the Fourth International-Like the R. P. C., whose principal 
antagonist it was, Trotskyism was strongest in London. Indeed 
Trotskyist influence in the provincial I. L. P. can be seen only from 
1935. In London the paper membership claimed by the Marxist Group, at 
seventy, was in excess'of that of a year earlier, but the active 
membership was not much grown. 
4 It was claimed that no new I. L. P, 
I Action I. L. P., Leon Trotsky on Centrism, (1934); E. Robertson (q. v. ) 
Holborn and Finsbury I. L. P., Conversations with Trotsky, (Nov. 1935); 
Islington I. L. P., L. Trotsky on the I. L. P. Leadership (1936). 
Leaflets were also produced by Trotskyist-controlled branches from 
time to time. 
2 ibid., 3. 
3 When the Islington I. L. P. published the I. C. L. declaration 'France is 
now the key to the situation' (Writings : 1933-34 , 238-44) as ý France's Turn Next! For The Fourth International, it added that a 
new revolutionary party was not necessary since the I. L. P. p on a 
Marxist basis, could play that role. 
4 A. B. Doncaster et., al. to the International Secretariat, LC. L. 
(April 7 1935), HP, DJH 5/2. The comparison is between the positions 
at the time of the 1934 and 1935 winter conferences of the London 
divisional I. L. P. 
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members were recruited to Trotskyism after the C. L. Minority joined the 
party. 
I 
The four London branches under Trotskyist control convened 
a meeting on 3 Tiovember to establish the Marxist Group. Sixty 
I. L. P. ers attended and vowed to transform the I. L. P. into a 
revolutionary party. 
2 This represented a new departure from the 
original aim of accumulating basic cadres. Having committed themselves 
to the I. L. P. however, they had to turn it towards the Labour Party 
and trade unions: at present the I. L. P., under the R. P. C. influence, 
was in their view engaged in 'spasmodic anarchist stunts'. The 
concrete meaning of this lay first in a drive to make the I. L. P. work 
systematically in trade unions, and second, in an attempt to commit 
it to critical electoral support for the Labour Party except where the 
I. L. P. itself had a greater following. Close attention to the trade 
unions was advocated by Bert Matlows 
3 Sid Kemp 4 and Ernie Patterson, 
5 
all members of the Clapham. I. L. P. Bill Duncan of Islington, proposed 
that the I. L. P, 'support social democracy in order to destroy it' in 
I ibid. 
2 J. Graham, 'The Meeting of November 3rd', Bulletin of the Marxist 
Group, 1, (15 Nov. 1934), n. p. 
3 'Towards A Correct Revolutionary Party', ibid. 
4 Kemp$ one of the original Clapham I. L. P. contacts of the Balham Group 
called for the abandonment of the party policy of unofficial 
committees and for the unions instead to organise the unemployed and 
enforce compulsory membership ('Our Work in the Trade Unions', 
Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 2, (1 Dec. 1934), 4). 
5 Patterson, a N. U. D. A. W. member who was to stay with the I. L. P. until 
the end of the decade had, at the York conference, criticised the 
London division stand on trade unions and its failure to involve 
itself in recruitment drives. See also his , article 
'Our Leaders', 
Marxist Group Bulletin, 4, (April 1935), 3* 
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elections, 
I 
though his view was challenged by Max Nicholls who thought 
it possible there would be no more elections. 
2 
At the Winter 1934 London divisional conference of the I. L. P. 
the Marxist Group had behind it sixty or seventy followers, though the 
active n=ber was less. The R. P. C., however, had ceased to be 
amorphous and remained strong in the division. It was powerful enough 
3 to take disciplinary action against six Marxist Group members. The 
two currents clashed on the meaning of the united front ana on other 
issues where the R. P. C. reflected coramunist'policy. 
4 Matlow also 
attacked the division's international resolution as 'loose phrases 
strung together; the stock-in-trade of pseudo revolutionaries'. 
5 
I 'Towards a Correct Electoral Policy', Bulletin of the Marxist Croup$ 
2. s (I Dec. 1934), 2. 
2 'Prepare The Fight Against Fascism's ibid., 6-7. 
3' J. L. Robinson, 'Gasterism Mis-States A Policy's Bulletin of the 
Marxist Group, 3, (Jan. 1935),. 4.5. John Robinson was a member of 
the Finchley and Hendon I. L. P. and the author of the most able 
contributions to the Bulletin. 
4 The party itself discerned R. P. C., Trotskyists and 'others' as the 
recognisable political forces at the conference, The New Leader, 22 
Feb. 1935. The R. P. C. had begun a new drive within -the party, on 
Pollitt's advice, to win it for the Communist International, 
(J. Mahon, Harry Pollitt, (1976), 203). This left it vulnerable to 
enquiries as to why, if it, considered the I. L. P. so imperfect and 
the C. P. G. B. so sound it stayed with the one and not the other, 
(J. L. Robinson, ibid. ). As for the 'others' in London, if they 
voted together they outnumbered either faction and a Hampstead 
resolution outlawing unpfficial groups from holding office fell at 
the divisional conference by only four votes, (The New Leader, 
22 Feb. 1935). 
5 The New Leader, 22 Feb. 1935. 
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Despite the presence at the forefront of the Marxist Croup 
of Matlow, who was at this time close to international thinking, Trotsky 
was not impressed with the progress made. A full entry by the British 
Section in the summer of 1933 would, he thought, have changed the 
I. L. P. As it was he tended not to offer tactical advice to the Marxist 
Group for some time, though he was interested in entrism elsewhere. 
Within the International Communist League debate on tentiism' began to 
shift to a discussion on the fate of the Ligt! e_pommunisýtfor whom 
Trotsky was advocating joining the S. F. I. 0, Trotsky urged that all 
sections actively participate in the debate over the French turng and 
some of his followers took his advice to the point of splitting with 
the movement. No BritisVseem to have attended the crucial extended 
plenum of the I. C. L. convened on 14-16 Octobe5 however; there the 
leadership of the international movement resolved that new parties could 
not be built on abstract formulas but in actual circumstances. These 
included the, emergence of parties breaking free of social democracy 
yet retaining their independence due to the 'total loss' of attraction 
by the Comintern. 
2 
From early 1935 the Marxist Group could have steered a course 
out of the I. L. P. While it had not greatly grown, the party itself was 
I Entry, he told the French, was not a principle but an opportunity. 
Only I. C. L. ideas could*res1st in the S. F. I. O. a disintegration 
which had occurred in the I. L. P. -('The Stalinist And Organic Unity', 19 July 1934, Writings : Supplement (1934-40), 505. ) 
2 'The Present Situation in the Labour Movement and the Tasks of the 
Bolshevik-Leninists', Documents of the Fourth International 
(New York, 1973), 61-2. 
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in decline. I Whatever attractions there were in the I. L. P, were now 
rivalled by developments in the Labour Party whose younger memberso 
like those of the S. F. I. O., were now showing signs of life, The 
communists, whil-e turning the R. P. C. back towards the I. L. P., were 
already paying attention to developments in the Labour League of 
Youth, showing again that flexibility of tacticsý in which they were 
to outstrip the Trotskyists throughout the decade. 
2 Some time early in 
1935 Harber and Kirby slipped out of the I. L. P. and began to work in 
I the League of Youth and the Socialist 
'League. 3 Bu_t the recruitment 
which had taken place in the I. L. P., 
4 
together with the knowledge of 
I One of the interesting features of the first half of the decade is 
the inverse relationship between the I. L. P. membership and that of 
the C. P. G. B. In 1931, its last complete year in the Labour Party$ 
the I. L. P. claimed 21,000 members; in 1932, the year of disaffilia- 
tion, 16,773. By 1935, this figure had shrunk by almost three 
quarters helped by sectarianism towards. the trade unionsp Labour Party 
and Coops., association with the communists and the act of 
disaffiliation itself. The C. P. G. B. on the other hand claimed 2,724 
members in June 1931 and 7,700 in July 1935. Both sets of figures 
are unreliable, but the trend is clear, (R. Dowse, op. cit., 193; 
H. Pelling, op. cit., 192). 
2 Olive Bell had noted in the summer of 1934 that the Labour Party, 
like the I. L. P., was beginning to encounter demands from its youth 
for organisational independence, ('The Leftward Development of the 
British Youth Movement', Inprecorr, Vol. 14, no. 33, (8 June 1934), 
890-1). That winter T. Harvey praised the 'big breakthrough' by 
the League into united front activity, (Inprecorr', Vol. 14, no. 59, 
(24 Nov. 1934), 1590-1). 
3 Two young South African Group members, Sid Frost and Ted Grant, seem 
to have raised the possibility of Labour League of Youth work in 
Spring 1935, but stayed in the I. L. P. Harber and Kirby withdrew 
early in the year, however, though they continued Ln connection with 
their erstwhile comrades of the Marxist Group, (A. B. Doncaster 
et al., to the International Secretariat, I. C. L., rApril? 193; 
1, 
H. P., D. J. H, 5/2). 
4 The most illustrious of those recruited to the Marxist Croup was 
Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901- ), a Trinidadian writer and 
cricketer who came to England in 1932 as a constitutional radical. 
That year, while living at Nelson and playing cricket in the 
Lancashire League, he published chapters of his 
, 
The Life of Captain 
Cipriani as a pamphlet under the title The Case for West-Indian Self 
Government (1932). Neville Cardus offe-re-d-71-ma post as a cricket 
correspondent for The Manchester Guardian, which he kept for some 
years. For James's political evolution see Ivor Oxaal I Black.. Intellectuals Come to Power, (1966), 66-7 passim and Jam-es-T-s own 
collection of essays, The Future in the Present (1979). See also 
Brockway's portrait of James in Inside the Left (1942). 326. 
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Trotsky's lengthy polemic-with party leaders$ was a powerful force 
pulling the Marxist Group back. Some time in the spring of 1935p the 
inner Bolshevik-Leninist fraction dissolved leaving only the Marxist 
Group. I And the Marxist G; 9upIs existence was premissed on the belief 
that the I. L. P. could be convinced of a revolutionary line. 
2 
The Marxist Group issued a call for the like-minded to 
contact'it in anticipation of the Derby conference of the partyl 
3 due 
at Easter 1935. This may have been the means by, which it broke out 
of London for the first time. 
When the national conference convened, the Marxist Group 
launched its most forceful attack so far. In several debates it was 
chief rival to the R. P. C. as a critic of the National Administrative 
Council. Matlow again 
-it 
was who flayed the leadership for its vague 
policy statement on the crisis of capitalism. A full Trotskyist 
critique was set out in a series of amendments from Clapham, Holborn 
and Finsbury, and Finchley and Hendon, which he moved. Supported by 
Robinson and Marzillier (Islington) he clashed with both the N. A. C. and 
Cullen of the R. P. C., in his view that Russia's trading policy tended 
to ease the capitalist crisis. Cullen's speech was more of an attack 
on Matlow than a positive presentation of the amendments of the London 
Division, which the R. P. C. controlledý While neither the R. P. C. nor 
the Marxist Group met with success in this debate, that did not 
I Attempts were made to revive it from time to time, (A. B. Doncaster, 
et. al.., ibid. ). 
2A declaration of belief in this thesis was part of the membersh ip 
form, though the Standing Orders (HP, DJH 5/5, n. d. ) required copies 
of minutes and di7s-cu-s-siron papers'to be sent to the International 
Secretariat. 
3 Bulletin of the Marxist Group, (Jan. 1935). 
4 The New Leader, 26 April 1935. 
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necessarily imply total isolation. 
k%. 
Robertson 
I failed by only one vote 
to carry an editorial board for the New Leader, a proposition which 
must have weakened Brockway's grip. 
But the tireless Matlow found no support from beyond the 
Group when he turned to the 'Method of the I. L. PI. An even longer list 
of amendments moved by him included the name of the East Liverpool 
branch, a first swallow hinting at a summer of'influence outside the 
capital. 
2. Matlow took his stand on the need for systematic trade union 
work, compared with which street recruitment was of no value. Smith 
for the N. A. C. was able to secure the defeat of all amendments with 
the argument that Matlow sought to concentrate on industrial activity 
to the exclusion of all other work. 
As in industrial policy, so on electoral policy, the Marxist 
Group found itself not on the ultra-left but urging the I. L. P. back 
into the labour movement mainstream. Marzillier argued for critical 
support for Labour candidates in the forthcoming election and advanced 
the slogan of a third Labour Goverment. The I. L. P., he suggested, 
would have to go through this struggle with the workers while working 
for disillusionment with 'boss-class democracy'* This was too much for 
I 
an old timer like Joseph Southallp and Robert Smillie of the Guild of 
Youth weighed in for the platform with the observation that critical 
support would mean the I. L. P. sharing responsibility for the failure of 
the next Labour Government. 
'Robertson' (Earle Birney, -1904- ) was a Canadian journalist and 
member of the Canadian Workers Party living in England. 
2 In the debate on the International Statement of the N. A. C., support 
for the Fourth International came from Kingston, another new area. 
0 
I 
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In the 'Danger of War' debate, after Jennie Lee had clashed 
with Jon Kimche over allegations of vagueness in the N. A. C. statement, 
Robertson and Robinson argued the classic Trotskyist analysis of the 
U. S. S. R. Roberison also challenged the long-standing partiality of the 
I. L. P. for a general strike against war, which would noto he declaredp 
be possible without cleaving to a new international. 
The N. A. C. had made no reference to the Fourth International 
in its international statement, a point Matlow seized upon, Caster 
for the R. P, C. observed that a Fourth International was indeed the 
logical end even of the N. A. C. 's present connections with the left 
socialist parties. But the N. A. C. knew where it stoodq and C. A. Smith 
reminded the conference that it was the I. L. P. itself which was the 
principal stumbling block to the Fourth International within the 
London Bureau. I 
The Marxist Group intervention at the ý1935 Derby conference 
of the I. L. P. was a high point of Trotskyist penetration. It had 
managed to deploy its limited strength to best advantage at the 
conference by m6ans of frequent speeches from its few delegates and a 
phalanx of identifiable Trotskyist resolutions on each subject. None 
of its positions was passed by conference, but it had attained status 
almost as a balancing force to the R. P. C. This was Brockway's view: 
2 
it suited him to contrast the 'revolutionary socialist' view with 
communism and Trotskyism, both of which doctrines were supported only 
by factions resembling each other in their call for association of the 
I The New Leader, 26 April 1935. 
2 'Reflections after the I. L. P. Annual Conference', The New Leader, 
3 May. 1935. 
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I. L. P. and the Labour Party. 
I 
The Co=unist Party also weighed up the 
Trotskyists against the R. P. C. While the Trotskyists never secured 
more than ten votes for their block amendmentsp they appeared to the 
communists to beboosted by the leadership of the I. L. P.: 
It is quite clear that a large section of the leadership 
is striving desperately to take the I. L. P. back to 
reactionary reformism, and to this end are prepared to 
make an unprincipled - even if unavowed alliance alliance 
with any elements - even the Trotskyists (s, ic) who will 
aid them in the calumniation of the Soviet Union, the 
Communist International and the C. P. G, B., and in breaking 
off the united front which even in its present limited 
form has already achieved so much in cementing the workers 
in their struggless 
2 
But Derby had also been a successful holding operation for the 
N. A. C. R. P. C. support never passed forty votes against the backing of 
two-thirds of conference for the leadership. Cullen failed in his bid 
to be elected to the N. A. C. For the Marxist Group things were worse 
still: its best vote count was ten. The N. A. C. felt strong enough to 
assert itself in the youth field and it was possible the measures against 
I Brockway at this time easily slipped into that third periodism the 
R. P. C., like the C. P. G. B., had abandoned. The third Labour 
Government might come about, he conceded, but the I. L. P. need not 
help it: 
'One might as welIsay that because Oswald Mosley 
realises that the failure of a Third Labour Government 
will give him his chance, that the British Union of 
Fascists should support the Labour Party at the next 
election! ' (ibid. ) 
2 R. Bishop, 'The I. L. P. Conference', Inprecorro Vol. 15, nos 18, 
(27 April 1935), 479. Bishop complained that the R. P. C. seemed 
abstract theorists because they were, like the Marxist Groups based 
in London. This may have been an attempt to explain why Cullen had 
failed to gain an N. A. C. place in elections at the conference* , 
F 
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factionalism in the party might follow. 
I The Marxist Group line was to 
support measures against the R. P. C. because that body was based outside 
the I. L, P. When Aplin, London Divisional Organiser, charged Cullen, 
Caster and Hawkins with preparing a split, Joe Pawseys editor of the 
Bulletin supported him: 
'We must have no weakness, no hesitation to rid the 
I. L, P. of anti-working class elements* 12 
At this point, in mid-su=er 1935, the Marxist Croup was still 
the clearest advocate within the I. L. P. of a true united front with the 
Labour Party and electoral support, 
3 
though the communist line, and 
t herefore that of the R. P. C. was now changing in that direction too* 
4 
I Maximum membership age of the Guild of Youth was cut to twenty one 
and the Guild subjected to conference decisions. The I. B. R. S. U. 
ended cooperation with the Trotskyists following a sharp polemic 
against it by Trotsky himself, ('Revolutionary Youth. A Break with 
the Trotskyistsli-The New Leader, 30 Aug. 1935). 
2 'Notes of the Month', The Bulletin of the Marxist Group, 5, (June 
1935), 1-2. 
3 F. Marzillier, 'The United Front Tactic of the I. L. P. On The 
Electoral Field', ibid., 4-5. Marzillier argued that the I. L. P. and 
the C. P. C. B. had a futile approach to elections, the former by its 
absentionism, the latter by stressing only the reactionary side of 
the Labour Programme. 
4 At the Seventh Congress, Dimitrov guided the Comintern to the united 
front, recognising that experi7ence - notably in France - was 
pushing it that way. Pollitt did not criticise the change but 
warned that support for Labour in Britain would be different from 
that extended to its first two governments, (Communist International, 
20 Sept. 1935,899). Changes in the Comintern policy had been 
brewing for two years, certainly since the spontaneous coalescence 
of French Socialists and communists against an attempted fascist 
coup in February 1934. For united front policy see F. Claudin, 
From Comintern to Cominform. (1975). who goes so far as to suggest 
on pp 124-5 that the Comintern was not dissolved at the time of the 
Seventh Congress beckuse it was feared the Fourth International 
. might benefit thereby. 
f 
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But instead of following the logic of critical support for Labour into 
transferring its faction to the Labour Party it now adopted a kind of 
I. ý. P. paýriotism and prolonged its stay. 
This pversal was brought about by the crisis after the 
Italo-Abyssinian war and its impact on British politics. The corollary 
of the united front advocated by national communist parties from 1934 
was the Comintern policy of League sanctions against fascist Italy to 
restrain it from a colonial war. This was the line of the C. P. G. B. 
and also, after its 1935 conference, of the Labour Party. But the 
I. L. P. and the Socialist League, while firmly against Mussolini's 
colonial adventure, were conscious of the threat of war, sought to 
advance an independent view and advocated therefore a policy of 
workers'-sanctions against Italy. 
1 
The policy of workers' sanctions-was strongly urged by 
Brockway in The New Leader. When he echoed Lenin's denunciation of the 
League of Nations as a 'thieves kitchen' in which hi would have no partj 
he was advancing a policy with which Trotsky agreed. 
2 The-view of the 
Fourth International was, uniquely, being advanced in Britain with 
authority on the main political question of the day. It was a great 
opportunity for the Marxist Group, strengthened by the confusion into 
which the R. P. C. was thrown. 
3 Within the Croup, the best chance fell 
to C. L. R. James, now chairman of the Finchley I. L. P., the most prominent 
I For Socialist League policy see The Socialist (1936 passim) and 
chapter five, below. 
2 Trotsky had some reservationso for which see 'The I. L. P. and the Fourth 
International: In the middle of the road' I Writings : 1935-36,69. He also later called Brockway's policy a lucky hit. 
3 For Brockway's policy see The New Leader, passim and Inside the Left, 
326. The split in the R. P. C. is described below. 
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black in the party, 
' indeed in British politics. 
I The party promoted 
him to the status of leading spokesman 
2 
and he used his status to 
advocate setting aside the League of Nations report and fighting not 
only Mussolini hut also 'the other robbers and oppressorsFrench and 
British Imperialism' .3 He had a slightly individual approach to the 
issue, 
4 
and this together with his savage handling of communist 
inconsistencies probably increased his appeal to I. L. P. leaders, 
The question of workers' sanctions introduced confusion into 
the R. PiC. and switched the Marxist Group into reverse gear. In the 
R. P. C. Jack Caster broke ranks and came out for Brockway's policy on 
the League of Nations. 
5 The Marxist Croup had resolved on 20 October 
to oppose League sanctions and to call on I. L. P. branches to motivate 
their response to the coming general election by reference to the 
imminence of war. War would destroy workers' freedom, sanctions led to 
war, Labour favoured sanctions and so the progressive features of its 
platform were now defunct: 
I James was at this time writing for The Keys, journal of the League for 
Coloured Peoples and his prestige aý=-ng blacks in Britain carried him 
in 1936 to the editorial chair of International African Opinion, 
journal of the International African Service Bureau, which 
George Padmore had founded. 
2 With Maxton and Brockway he addressed an audience of 1j200 at the 
Memorial Hall in early October and from then on was a popular speaker. 
3 'Is This Worth a War? ', The New Leader, 4 Oct. 1935; 'The Game at 
Geneva', ibid., 18 Oct. 1935. 
4 James thought Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister, had to observe 
League policy, ('The Workers and Sanctions. Why the I. L. P. and the 
communists take an opposite view', The New Leader,, 25 Oct. 1935). 
Litvinov's behaviour was contrasted by James to that of the C. P. G. B. 
which, he claimed, would have supported workeWsanctions a year 
earlier. The I. L. P., he asserted implausibly, would remain true to 
the principles of Lenin. , 
5 B. Matlow, 'A Criticism of the London Division's Statement on the 
Abyssinian Situation', Marxist Bulletin, (Oct. 1935), 4. 
rI 
101. 
'Critical support cannot be implemented in the 
forthcoming election. 
" 
Opposition to ; war, the united front and the Fourth International had 
been the planks,, of the Marxist Group platform. One stand of the I. L. P. 
had sufficed-to overturn them. The Marxist Group argued for I. L, P. ers 
to be-adopted wherever possible in the coming general election, that only 
anti-sanctions Labour candidates should get supporto and indeed that if 
the pro-sanctions party kept control of the Labour Party the I*L. P. 
should oppose all its candidates, demanding a general strike and direct 
recruitment. Workers' sanctions had reversed roles in the I. L. P.: 
the Marxist Group which had advocated I. L. P. - Labour unity against 
R. P. C. - C. P. G. B. sectarianism now found itself a recruiting sergeant 
for the I. L. P. And yet, while the conformity of the workers' sanctions 
policy to Leninist principles cannot be challenged, the gloss put on it 
by the Marxist Group was sheer revolutionary posturing. Labour's 
ability to issue a call for a general strike against war was in doubt: 
how much more-so was that of the I. L. P., which had no trade union 
influence at all? 
The Trotskyists were supposed to have a militantly anti- 
pacifist line. And yet in 1935, and again in 1939, many British 
Trotskyists found themselves effectively endorsing pacifism by their 
argument that policy on war was the touchstone of all policy: 
I B. Matlow, ibid. 
2 The revulsion of Ernest Bevin and other trade union leaders at the 
call for industrial action against war by the largely middle-class 
leadership of the Socialist League was one facet of the reversal 
of Labour's policy at its 1935 annual conference, (see R. Miliband, 
Parlimentary Socialism, (1961), 224-6). 
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'The imminence of war must force us to. concentrate 
our*attack on the L. P. support of a war which will 
sweep away all democratic liberties .......... The 
only basis gor advocating critical support does not 
therefore exist. 
" 
For the Marxist Group the task was how. to build 'our', 
revolutionary party. A special conference of the I. L. P. must be 
convened: it must 4im to fight for power. This of-course was not-., 
I 
entrism, but one hundred per cent commitment to the I. L. P. Trotsky, 
allowing that The New Leader had carried the best articles in the 
labour press on the crisis, advised that there was more to a 
revolutionary party than writing good articles. 
2 There were dissenters 
in Britain too. Robinson charged that the'new Marxist Group policy 
sprang from a misunderstanding of the united front: 
'The I. L. P. can adopt more progressive demands than 
the Labour Party bureaucracy, but this does not 
dispense with the need for a united. front with the 
Labour Party. 3 
Policies for workers were fine but Marxist Group and I. L. P. 
policy cut them off from the workers. These workers did not make a 
distinction between Labour's membership and its leaders. Robertson 
tried to puncture illusions about the I. L. P., pointing out that the 
N. A. C. retained pacifist pretensions such as over the refusal of 
I ý, Elections and the Coming War', loc. cit., 6. 
2 'The I. L. P. and the Fourth International. In the Middle of the Road'. 
18 Sept. 1935i-Writings : 1935-36,64-9. 
3 'The Marxist Group's Third Period', loc. cit., n. p. 
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military service, in its letter to IPL. P. branches of October 20. He 
also put Trotsky's analysis of the I. L. P. position before the party 
membership. 
But Robertson and'Robinson were in a minority. The Group 
drew close to the N. A. C. for six crucial months during which time 
Trotskyist forces in the I. L. P. would have been valuable reinforcements 
for their comrades elsewhere. When five Group members voiced criticisms. 
at an F. S. U. Aeeting, the London division of the I, L, P., 'under R. P. C. 
leadership, suspended them. Matlow was kept off the divisional 
speakers' list. Another member was barred as organiser for a London 
area though nominated by his federation. When the party N. A. C. 
intervened and rescinded the suspension, the Marxist Group triumphantly 
taunted the R. P. C. for disloyalty: 'let them join the party whose 
policy they are trying to carry out - the C. P. G. B. '.. 
This was what now happened: sixty three R. P. C. members 
withdrew to join the C. P. G. B., 
2 demoralised by failure. 3 Other R. P. C. 
1 Writings: 1935-36,69. Robertson visited Trotsky with Ken Johnson, 
another Canadian, in Norway in November 1935. On his return he 
published conversations with Trotsky and Once Again the I. L. P. An 
interview with Leon Trotsky, (Nov. 1935) from his party branch in 
Holborn and Finsbury. The second interview is also reprinted in 
Writings: 1935-36,69-73. 
2 D. McHenry, The Labour Party in Transition, 1931-1938, (1938) quoted 
in S. Hornby, 'Left Wing Pressure Groups in the British Labour Movement, 
1930-1940' (University of Liverpool M. A. -Thesis, 1966,70). 
Gaster and Cullen went on to some prominence in the C. P. G. B., Gaster 
as a member of the London district committee and L. C. C. member for 
Stepney in 1946. Eric Whalley, of the Affiliation Committee was 
killed in Spain 1937. 
3 C. K. Cullen, 'The Revolutionary Policy Committee and the I. L. P. 1, 
Inprecorr, Vol. 15, no. 59, (9 Nov. 1935), 145,147-8, and 'Why We 
Broke With the I. L. P. 1, Labour Monthly, (Nov. 1935), 741-6. Cullen 
blamed the I. L. P. for sCa-nding candidates against Labour, but did 
not recall the identical policy of the C. P. G. B. in 1931. 
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members remained within the I. L. P. but seem to have achieved minimal 
impact.. I The R. P. C. walk out occurred at a special London divisional 
conference of October 26-27. There the Marxist Group scored success 
with the passageof a Holborn motion condemning peace councils and one 
from Clapham attacking Soviet patriotism. ' Generally9 however, decisions 
ofýthe conference were not clear cut, The debate on electoral-policy 
split communists and Trotskyists. Gaster joined Aplin, the chairman'' 
of the London I. L. P, on the Marxist Group platform;, Hilda Lane, who 
supported the Robinson line, voted with Cullen and the R, P. C. for 
critical support. 
2 The Group backed Aplin's nomination for the 
chairman's post and called on the party to r ealise that it, and not the 
C. P. G. B., had the future of the working class in its hands. 
3 Outside 
London, Marxist Group influence in the Liverpool Federation had been 
strong enough to secure a special conference of the Lancashire division. 
Yet against pro tests from Marxist Grouper Reg. Collins of East 
Liverpool, the conference was confined to a-discussion on war. But 
Don James, another Group member successfully seconded an amendment to 
a motion by Hicks of Stockport calling for revolutionary propaganda to 
4 be carried into the army, moved a further amendment urging the need to 
I Twenty three R. P. C. ers remaining in the I. L. P. conferred after the 
withdrawal of the main body and decided to battle on against 
Trotskyism and the 'semi-Trotskyism' of the N. A. C. (Communist Unity, 
Dec. 1935,10). Like Cullen this jump also identified R. P. C. 
failure with the neglect of organisational for political duties. 
2 Marxist Bulletin, 25 Nov. 1935,2. 
3 M. Nicholls, 'The Dis-United Front', ibid., 4. 
4 The amendment was a specific rejection of pacifist refusal to serve. 
Under a party directive all conscriptable members would join the army. 
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prepare for going underground, and called for work for the Fourth 
International. He still failed to carry-the Marxist Group line against 
a divisional council resolution which urged critical support for 
Labour. 2 
C. L. R. James used his prominence over Abyssinia to launch 
himself into domestic issues. -He predicted a mass swing to the left, 
a bourgeoisie'that would act against Parliament and turn to fascism. 
3 
He was patronised by the leadership and Marxist Groupers-could be found 
in a number of provincial areas. 
4 
Yet the secession of the R. P. C. ', far 
from clearing the way for the Group, merely opened the path for the 
N. A. C. to put its own house in order. The annual London divisional 
conference rejected the Marxist Group critique of the London Bureau 
by three to one and passed by almost two to one an instruction to the 
I But the Marxist Group did not feel able to sign the Open Letter for 
the Fourth International, an updated version of the Declaration of 
Four, issued in July 1935. Trotsky proposed that they should instead 
state their policy in a letter to I. L. P. leaders, ('The Open Letter 
and the I. L. P. ', Autumn 1935, Writings :. Supplement (1934-40), 616). 
For the text of the Open Letter, which argued inter alia that a 
Labour victory in the general election would precipitate civil war 
and the consolidation of reaction, see Writings (1935-36 , 16-20. 
2 'Electoral Policy', loc. cit., n. p. 
3 "'Honest" Stanley in a fix', The New Leader, 27 Dec. 1935; 'Baldwin's 
Next Move:, The New Leader, 3 Jan. 1936. Brockway thought James's 
view 'int rjs, -tingý, but gave full publicity to a speaker's tour he 
made of South Wales mining areas. 
4 John and Mary Archer had been in Liverpool, and later in Leeds and 
Durham respectively; John Goffe (1917- ), an ex public school 
boy who had been introduced to the Bloomsbury I. L. P. and Marxist Group 
by Tony Doncaster, now was in Sheffield as a steel industry trainee 
manager. From this base he visited Guild of Youth and party branches 
in Yorkshire. 'Earl Robertson, like James, had spent time in South 
Wales, and Nicholls and Robinson were in Glasgow. 
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N. A. C. to disband all unofficial groups. 
From now until the Keighley conference, due at Easter 1936, 
there was a period of high activity for the Marxist Group. It aimed to 
sustain the revRlutionary line over Abyssinia, which was now under 
attack from some I. L. P. leaders who had remained pacifists. Abroad the 
International Secretariat was faced with a. Marxist Group still in the 
'I. L. P. more than two years after it had been urged in for a short stay. 
The Group's tendency to blur differences with Brockway and some I. L. Ps 
leaders was not shared by Trotsky who, in a series of writings, now, 
again paid close attention to party affairs. 
2 Some I. S. members were 
not as critical of the I. L. P. as Trotsky, however, and there was some 
conflict as he now urged the Group to draw its I. L, P, experiment to 
an end. 
Trotsky's view was that the I. L. P, still did not represent a 
clear alternative. It had split from the Labour Party primarily to 
maintain the independence of its M. P. s; *its critique of Labour's 
right wing leadership was hollow. If valid there was a duty incumbent 
on the I. L. P. to enter the Labour Party and advocate a Marxist 
alternative. As for I. L. P. electoral policy, Trotsky flatly opposed the 
line of the Marxist Group. Eight million Labour voters had not, he 
suggested, seen through Morrison and Clynes as Marxists had and it was 
therefore better to put them in power where their limitations would be 
apparent. I. L. P. policy amounted to a partial boycott of Parliament 
when the party was in no position to overthrow it. Meanwhile it was 
still. flirting with the C. P. G. B., which had all the defects of the 
Labour Party with none of the advantages. 
I The New Leader, 7 Feb. 1936. 
2 'The I. L. P. and the Fourth International', 18 Sept. 1935, Writings: 
(1935-36), 64-9; 'Once Again the I. L. P. ', Nov. 1935, loc. cit. p 69-73; Un the eve of the conference he returned to the subject with 
'Open Letter to an English Comrade', (3 April 1936), Writings: 
(1935-36), 73-5. 
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Trotsky was now'urging close attention to the Labour Party, 
but the situation within the I. S. was now more complex than it had been 
in 1933 when I. L. P. entry had first been mooted. The two I. S. 
secretaries now-ýwere Sveevliet, a Dutch signatory of the Declaration of 
Four, who was to part with it in revulsion from the French turn and 
Schmidt, an S. A. P. leader and former London Bureau comrade of Brockway@ 
Schmidt visited England in January to meet the Marxist Group and other 
Fourth Internationalists and Trotsky watched his dealings with'some 
disquiet. Iý Schmidt advised staying in the I. L. P. for a further period$ 
and for a short time Trotsky did not advocate a break. 
2 For some 
Marxist Groupers, however, there was no point in remaining in the I. L. P. 
and in February they began to withdraw to join Harber in the League of 
Youth. 
Others redoubled their efforts contrasting the Group with 
34 the 'disloyal' R. P. C., and a, drive on the Yorkshire Party led to that 
division's conference rejecting a ban on groups. 
I 'I would like to underline the fact that Schmidt is tied by a long 
friendship to the head of the I. L. P. and that he has perhaps a 
certain uneasiness, not to say mistrust, towards our friends as 
"sectarians". ', ('Schmidt's Trip to England, 19 Jan. 1936, 
-Writings_: Supplement (1934-40), 639)ý. 
2 Trotsky had originally drawn up a plan with Robertson and another to 
issue a manifesto of the Group for signatures prior to a split, 
('The Dutch Section and the International', Writings : 1935-36,41). 
3 1P. J. B. 1 (untitled manuscript), 10 (15? ) Sept. 1935, H. P. 
4 'The R. P. C. disrupted the party not because they were an organised 
group, but because they were under orders from the C. P. G. B. A 
Marxist Grouper is first and foremost a loyal and hardworking 
I. L. P. erl, (J. Goffe) et. al., 'Letter from M. G. members to (I. L. P. ) 
members', 6 March 1936, H. P. 
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Trotsky continued to debate with the I. L. P, ever more sharply. 
He argued the irrelevance of it'considering its relationship with 
Labour, while it failed to build a revolutionary policy. While this 
continued, leadership would pass elsewhere, perhaps by means of the 
Right Wing employing left phaseology. Above all, there was a chance for 
the-Stalinists, the most dangerous. 'radical phasemongers' of all: 
The members of the C. P. G., B9. are now, on their bell, i, es, before 
the Labour Party - but. this makes it all the easier for them 
to crawl inside. 
" 
Once within the Labour Party the communists' revolutionary 
aura would allow them to pose as the left: only a clear and courageous 
I. L. P. policy could prevent it. Trotsky delivered a prescient warning 
about, the critical position of the Labour Leagueof Youth; 'Do not 
only build fractions - seek to enter', he urged. The young were at 
once more easily confused by, yet suspicious of, attempts to drive them 
to a new war. - They would listen more easily to the Fourth International 
if it was there to speak to them. 'The British S ection will recruit its 
first cadres from the 30,000 young workers in the Labour League of 
Youth. 12 
The I. L. P. as a whole should sever its bogus united front with 
the comunists but preserve the right to internal fractions. The 
success or failure of these clearly depended on leadership quality. He 
applauded the purging of communists as a sign that the I. L. P. meant 
business. Until that was sure, such organisational measures might 
equally be used against the Marxist Group. But the main question was 
the international one: if it was honest the I. L. P. would now come out 
in favour of the Fourth before its London Bureau fell apart. 
1 'Once Again the I. L. P. An interview with Leon Trotsky', (Nov. 1935) 
Writings_(1935-36 , 71. 
2 Trotsky also developed the concept of 'illegal work' ini mass organisa- 
tions. 'You do not enter a reactionary trade union and cry "I am a 
re, ýolutionist"', (ibid., 72). 
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On the eve of the Keighley conference, Robertson published 
I 
another article by Trotsky from the Clapham I. L. P. The interview 
carried a strong attack on the London Bureau which Brockway countered. 
Trotsky had concluded that the idea of turning the I. L. P. into a 
revolutionary party 'must now be described as utopian', and was talking - 
ambiguously - of 'an independent perspective for the revolutionary 
3 
party'. His arguments for critical support had convinced at least the.. 
Marxist Group, which called for it. at the Keighley conference, without 
415 
success,, This lead to a series of defeats on the Parliamentary Report 
and on the establishment of fractions in the unions and the Labour 
Party. 
The setpiece conference debate occurred over Abyssinia. 
Brockway had indeed been ploughing a lonely furrow over workers' 
sanctions, and his line in The New Leader had been reversed by the 
National Council. 7 C. L. R. James, the party member most identified with 
this position, moved reference back, arguing that fighting capitalism 
'Open Letter to an English Comrade 1,3 April 1936, Writings (1935-36) , 73-5. The Clapham edition carried the revealing overprint 'For 
Sale to I. L. P. Members Only and Circulation Within the Party'. 
2 'Where Trotsky Goes Wrong', The New Leader, 20 March 1936. 
3 'Remarks For An English Comrade', 8 April 1936, Writings : Supplement 
0934-40) , 653.1 
4A resolution calling for critical support was attacked both by those 
who wanted a Labour Government and those who did not! 
5 Margaret Johns failed to obtain reference back after being rebuked 
by Maxton. 
6 Arthur Ballard it-was-who called for the I. L. P. to 'assist the left- 
ward and moving elements against the reactionary leadership'. 
7 The N. A. C. stuck to a pacifist line and believed workers should take 
no part in the war. 
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at home was not some sort of alternative to this international stand. 
If the working class had taken industrial action to support Abyssinia, 
it must have led immediately to a conflict with the British bosses. 
Brockway justifiýd his line with reference to the Derby decisions, and 
was supported from a far wider constituency than the Marxist Group was 
able to provide. McGovern summed up along neutralist linest but was 
unable to prevent reference back by one vote. It may have been distaste 
'for the Marxist Group which led conferenceýto give to a Lancashire 
resolution endorsing the original New Leader line a bigger majority of 
thirteen. 
, But there was a warning sign when, in the private session, 
Aplin was able to carry overwhelmingly the banning of groups, against 
the opposition of Matlow and Goffe. ýOminously they received no vocal 
support from the floor. 
And the true significance of I. L. P. policy was about to be 
revealed. The following day, Maxton and other party leaders resigned 
their positions because they could not accept the conference decision 
on workers' sanctions. Alarmed, Brockway reopened the vote and this 
time the N. A. C. stance was endorsed by ninety three to thirty nine! 
This was the critical moment. The chief reason for a continued Marxist 
Group presence had vanished. At least one participant believed it 
should have walked out of the I. L. P. there and then. 
I Instead the 
Marxist Group persisted with the debate on the International but found 
little reward. Brockway, unrepentant, spurned a united revolutionary 
international formed from the small groups adhering to Trotsky, which 
would 'from the heights of Oslo, forna new International'. This did 
not prevent Drew, a Hackney delegate, jeering at the N. A. C. 's Bureau as 
0 1 Interview with M. Johns, (Oct. 1973). 
'Trotskyism without a Trotsky', 
1 
but pleas by Matlow and James were 
overridden: conference knew the difference between Drew's accusation 
and the real thing. 
Trotsky,, s reply to Brockway showed him at his most 
vituperative. 
2 
An inability to see. more in the war than a struggle 
between two dictators displayed 'the moral impotence'ý-of pacifism'. 
Butýit was the reversal of the vote which incensed Trotsky most: 
Maxton, 'putting the revolver of an ultimatum at the breast, of the 
conference', was no less dictatorial than Haile Selassie or Mussolini; 
and Brockway's incorrigible centrism was illustrated by the higher 
value he put on Maxton's chairmanship than on a principal policy plank. 
'That', observed Trotsky, 'is the fate of centrism - to consider the 
incidental seriously and the serious thing incidental. ' He concluded 
that the I. L. P. cause was hopeless and that the thirty nine firm 
delegates must seek ways of building a truly revolutionary party*3 
******* 
Disagreements over what was the best next step after Keighley 
shatt. ered. the. Marxist Group. It split three ways: those who thought 
that the I. L. P. phase might usefully be prolonged; those who felt an 
independent organisation might now be launched with success; and those 
who, after Trotsky, believed the time was now ripe for entering the 
Labour Party. 
1 The New Leader, 17 April 1936. 
2 'On Dictators and the Heights of Oslo', Writings: 1935-36,22 April 
1936,75-6. As he remarked, he did not live in Oslo, nor was that 
capital situated on the heights. 
3 ibid. See also 'Our Kinds of Optimism', 27 April 19369 Writings 
Supplement (1934-40), 684-5. 
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Cooper, Pawsey, Ballard and Marzillier advocated the first 
option. Unity was the issue of the hour. ' The turn of the C. P. G. B. 
from sectarian opposition to the united front to unity at any price 
was permitting qitrine and others to use their slogans in order to sell 
an'anti-working class policy. ' It was but a short step to conceding 
communist affiliation to-the Labour Party, argued Cooper et. al.. 
Trotskyism, should oppose C. P. G. B. affiliation to the Labour Party on the 
grounds that it would create a. powerful opportunist front: 
1 
correct 
propaganda about'real unity would expose the communist drift as a 
betrayal. While the Marxist Group itself might eventually desire 
affiliation, it could only be on a principled basis and it would arise 
from present preparations. 
Cooper and his colleagues believed mass work to be the task 
of the hour; their construction of mass work was involvement in the 
unions, factories and co-ops. Trade Unions ranked first in importance, 
and from them would be won the most active Fourth Internationalists. 
Even a short spell in the Labour Party (the only kind; they would 
countenance) was permissible only within this framework. Gains in the 
Labour Party would be directed to the unions, so that a ready basis 
would be prepared for the political split from the Labour Party. The 
one part of the party where the 'Bolshevik-Leninists' were obliged to 
work was the Labour League of Youth. But notwithstanding these- 
ruminations about prospects in the Labour Party, Cooper felt the Group 
must continue in the I. L. P. with a short term split perspective. A 
national campaign should aim at splitting off the best elements from 
the I. L. P. leadership, (Cooper showed prudence-in not filling in any 
'Once inside the Labour Party, it will grow and become a mighty ally of 
the 'Labour Lieutenants of Capitalism'. There it will be a thousand 
times more dangerous and difficult to crushý. ' (Unity and the C. P. 
affiliation to the L. P,., Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/l/14, n. 4. ) 
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names at this point). Failing an intervening crisis, the Group should 
leave at the next I. L. P. conference. As for the 'consolidated' 
Bolshevik-Leninist forces, if there was a chance of returning to the 
Labour Party, it would be impossible to ignore the presence there of 
others claiming to stand for the Fourth International. Cooper, and his 
comrades. stood for the amalgamation of all Bolshevik-Leninists at the 
time of the Marxist Group's rupture with the I, L. P. provided there was 
an agreement on a short-term Labour Party-perspective and adequate,. 
provision for organising mass work. If the Marxist Group chose an 
immediate walk-out from the I. L. P., Cooper proposed an organisational 
break so that tho se who believed I. L. P. work might still be fruitful 
could continue. The rest could join the other Bolshevik-Leninists in 
the Labour Party., Thus was the seed sown in December 1933, beginning 
to sprout weeds. 
There was in fact a laughable disparity between the imposing 
list of tasks drawn up by Cooper and the size - even the potential - of 
the Marxist Group. In one document he proposed the drafting of all 
available forces into the Labour League of Youth, that Marxist Group 
members be the most active I. L. P. ers, the building up of the I. L. P. s 
skeletal fractions in the unions, andq altogether, Sconcentrated, 
ceaseless, wholehearted activity'. It seems unlikely that Marxist Group 
membership exceeded fifty at the time of the Keighley conference: the 
Cooper document gives the impression that he had an audience of 
thousands. 
The second group gathered around C. L. R. James, for whom some 
sort of party position remained open even after Keighley. He was still 
able to write to The New Leader. 
I He was in touch with publishers and 
was to be the first British Trotskyist to make a substantial theoretical 
I 'Fighting for the Abyssinian Emperor', a letter of JU'ly 1936. 
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contribution. But James's energies had been sparked by the I. L. P. line 
on Abyssinia: now, as Trotsky had, observed, the serious was trivial. 
Without an anti-imperialist stance the I. L. P. was a meaningless arena. 
Yet the Labour Party was more repellent still. 
A document of this period 
I has survived, which may have 
expressed James's own views. It analysed the Communist and Labour 
Parties and found the only movements of note among the, I. L, P. left and 
the Labourlie-igfie, of Youth., 'Of political groupings-the,, I, L. P, alone 
moves towards a correct revolutionary line, ' The author conjured up - 
the fantasy of expulsions from the Labour Party, with the victims moving 
towards the I. L. P. - the reverse of what was actually happening. In the 
Labour Party, Trotskyists. ('theor6tically equipped workers') would be 
used by the bureaucracy against the communists. Rather than, repeat 
there the experience of being used by Maxton it was better to stay aloof. 
The author proposed no single party commitment but Fourth International 
Groups which would bisect partisan boundaries. This grandiose 
perspective flowed from a gross overstatement of Marxist Group strength. 
The author believed it was one-third of the active London I. L. P. 
membership. and an important influence in the North-West. He reeled off 
an impressive list of branches that the I. L. P. could not afford to lose: 
this in turn meant that the Marxist Group could do anything it liked. 
Such a struggle could not be waged in the Labour Party, the officialdom 
of which was much more entrenched. Objections to joining it were: 
that unlike the French socialist party it was at a low level of 
political life; that the fight within it would be on organisational 
and not political grounds; that Group members-would become embroiled 
in routine non-political activity; that Labour Party work easily led 
to neglect of the unions; that the Group would be too weak to prevent 
I Bolshevik-Leninists and the I. L. P.. Warwick M. S, S. 15/4/l/7. n. d. 
115. 
a mass exodus of the best militants from Labour - the cream might pass 
the group by; that Labour Party entry would be misunderstood by the 
'leftward masses' as a move to the right or dishonest; finally, that 
membership could easily lead to opportunisms along which road Groves 
and Harber were considered to be travelling already, 
These were objections in principle to membership of the 
Labour Party: - they would apply at any time. 'The whole drift of Trotsky's 
argument in the thirties was that this sort, of ideological baggage was 
too crushing a burden to be carried by the-small groups who followed 
him. A sense of proportion waý entirely absent. Who were these 
'leftward masses' who would misconstrue a move to the Labour Party by 
the Marxist Group? 
-Certainly 
not the I. L. P., now shrunk to a fifth of 
its former*size. Nor the C. P. G. B. whose members were opposed to 
Trotskyism wherever it surfaced. And the Labour Party 'masses' would 
surely not be repelled because Trotskyists joined their party; it 
marked a step towards them, not away. Indeed it was the right wing, 
not the left, who sought to keep revolutionaries out. 
A lingering love for the I. L. P. pervaded these lines. Their 
author proposed a split at the next conference, in the event that the 
party failed to adopt a minimum programme. Leaving the I. L. P. intact, 
he argued, would be to permit the continued existence of a dangerous 
rump. Abandoning a smashed I. L. P. would mean carrying a large body of 
sympathisers. 
The third strand of the rope comprised those who were for 
entering the Labour Party, and joining Harber who was already there. 
They had the inestimable advantage of support from Trotsky himself, 
who ridiculed any 'independent' posturing. The Marxist Group was so 
tiny that its policies were barely noticeable in any case. 'A few 
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hundred comrades is not a-revolutionary party. 
" 
Their job was to 
oppose reformism within. the mass parties. Debating whether or not to 
support communist affiliation was an irrelevant luxury while one was 
isolated from týe mass party. And the mass party was the Labour Party. 
Clinging to the I. L. P. was ridiculous. Its best members would leave in 
any case, and the time spent on them might be passed more profitably 
2 
-with 
the hundreds of potential Labour Party recruits. 'We are' 
observed Trotsky, 'too generous with out timel. 
Trotsky advised the group to pick'an issue that would have a 
wide impact and break with the I. L. P. on that. Not the dispute over 
fraction rights in the party but 'a political issue comprehensible to 
the broad mass of workers': the commital of it to the Fourth 
International thesis perhaps, or even I. L. P. affiliation to the 
Labour Party. 
Trotsky impatiently flicked aside any hairsplitting about 
methods of joining the Labour Party. Whether as a faction or as 
individuals the important thing waq to get in. Once there the 
Bolshevik-Leninists would establish themselves by their attacks on 
centrism, not by their critique of the leadership. That, like raising 
the banner of the Fourth International, could wait until their footing 
in the Labour Party was more sure. 
Of course, re-entry into the Labour Party brought again to 
the surface relations with others aligning themselves to the Fourth 
International. Trotsky stood for unity. He urged that every effort be 
made to merge with Groves and Dewar in order to utilize the Red Flag, 
now appearing again after an eighteen month silence. Resistance to 
'Interview by Collins', Summer 1936, Writings : 1935-36,, 76. 
2 'In any event, the suggestion of a time limit such as the next 
annual conference of the I. L. P. in April is incomprehensible to me. 
The European situation is developing so rapidly that history will 
not wait for the I. L. P. conference. ', ibid. 
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unity by Groves and Dewar vould'result in their members joining the 
Marxist Group, now in the Labour Party. Failure to obtain access to 
the Red Flag might mean a new Marxist Group paper in the Labour Party, 
or the launching%of a 'Lenin Club' independent of all parties which 
would also have a paper. But again, in the case of the Lenin Clubs 
Trotsky insisted that it must be an organisation for all Bolshevik-' 
Leninists. 
Harber and C. L. R. James attended a conference of the I. C. L. 
I 
I12- on July 29-31 1936 at 'Geneva with two observers. Conference 
discussed Britain and concluded that the existence of three groups was 
a luxury since no"apparent political divergencies' divided theme 
3 
Geneva was not neutral on the tactical issue however. It passed a 
resolution regretting the absence of the Marxist League, and its failure 
to submit a political statement, and insisted that the Marxist Group 
once and for all transfer its interests from the I. L. P. to the Labour 
Party and the League of Youth. The I. L. P., declared the resolution. was 
not a good base from which to conduct the trade union work prop6sdd by 
Cooper, and it set up an inpenetrable barrier between the Bolshevik- 
Leninists and the mass youth movement: 'It is necessary to understand 
not only when it is fruitful for the revolutionary Marxist to enter a 
I This conference, like that of 1938, was held in a Paris suburb. For 
security reasons the venue was referred to as 'Geneva'. 
2 The Marxist League was invited, but failed to attend 'for material 
I reasons , Harber would have participated in the Youth conference 
with which the main conference concluded on I August, and at which 
a report from England was given. The Youth conference adopted the 
F. I. Youth theses and elected a new Youth Bureau of nine. 
3 None of the three groups was allowed to-be the British Section, yet 
all three stood for the Fourth International. Conference only devoted 
a small amount of its time to Britain. For the main theses and 
resolutions of the conference, see Documents of the Fourth 
International, (New York, 1973), 84-152. 
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reformist or centrist organisation, but also when it is imperative that 
they leave it and implant their movement and ideas in other milieu'. 
A surprising concession was made in the resolution to the 
Marxist Group which was virtually invited to launch a journal, The 
Fourth Internationalp 
1 
the reception'of which by the I. L. Pe would 
speedily convince them to leave. But a caveat was attached even here 
in the form of a warning of the dangers of the Group, being without a 
clear perspective for so long. 
Back in the I. L. P. a party plebiscite had confirmed the 
second_decision of Keighley an workers' sanctions. This drew a definite 
ceiling on the growth potential of the Marxist Group. Within the Group 
support was growing for pulling out. 
2_ Passage of the Geneva resolution 
and the pace of events in Britain led to, the first national meeting of 
British Bolshevik-Leninists being convened for 11 October. 
3 The day 
before, a Marxist Group gathering met to debate further its internal 
differences. At the Marxist Group meeting, C. L, R* James proposed that 
all Bolshevik-Leninists should join in one independent central 
organisation. Since this would still be small, ýfaction work would be 
undertaken, but loyalty would be to the centre for whose sake recruit- 
ment would be made. This centre would issue the independent journal 
1 This was to appear as Fight!, with 'For the Fourth. International' 
beneath the masthead. See below. 
2 Leigh Davis and Starkey Jackson argued for a majority of the Group to 
enter the Labour Party, Socialist League and League of Youth, leaving 
a small independent organisation outside. Within the Labour Party 
all Bolshevik-Leninists ought to fuse, publish a paper and set the 
objective of a short term split. (The Role and Tasks of the British 
Bolshevik-Leninists , (Sept. 1936), H. 
P., D. J. H. 5/3). For awareness 
that the wisest step would have been a split a 11 Geneva$ see Anon., 
Towards a New Revolutionary Party, FSept. 193N , HP, DJH 5/1. 
This author argued for a full and open conference to turn all 
Trotskyists towards the Labour Party. 
3 That weekend the Marxist Group, in collaboration with the other 
Trotskyist factions launched Fight For the Fourth International 
in response to the invitation of the Geneva conference. - The first 
issue of this newspaper sold 1,800 copies. 
f 
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of the Fourth International. 
I 
Cooper and his allies'claimed an equal commitment to 
unification. Unlike James they set their tactical proposals in a 
political perspQctive. -It was a pre-; war period and, moreover, one in 
which the proletariat had regained its confidence internationally. 
The Bolshevik-Leninists' task was therefore to wield a mass influence 
with minimum restraint on speech and action. Militancy was at present 
expressed largely on the industrial plane; its political reflection 
was pale, except in the Labour, League of Youth, which loffers great 
opportunities for the Bolshevik-Leninist group to gain the leadership'. 
The Socialist League was a petit-bourgeois trend in which the 
Trotskyist position need be stated no more, The C. P. G. B. was prepared 
'to crawl still further' towards the union bureaucracy to achieve 
Labour Party affiliation. The I. L. P. appeared revolutionary by 
comparison with the Labour and Communist Parties, but was disintegrating 
organisationally and drifting towards political futility: there was a 
danger that its membership would; by stages, be stampeded into the 
popular front. Here was the kernel of the Cooper case. He believed 
the I. L. P. was a hindrance to the development of Trotskyism, but its 
decline did not necessarily mean extinction. Simply pulling out might 
allow the best elements to rally round the leadership leaving a 
potentially dangerous centrist party like the German U. S. P. D. or the 
I The account which follows is drawn entirely from For Discussion 
(Internal Bulletin of British Bolshevik-Leninisti-), 28 Nov. 1936, 
M. S. S. 15/4/1/15, the only account of the meeting extant. 
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.. I P. O. U. M. in Spain. 
'Any split-perspective must be aimed at the decisive 
smashing of this party. In the process of splitting 
the best eLýments must be won against the leadership 
and for a mass exit. 12 
For Cooper great freedom of action was still possible in the 
I!. L. P. whereas Labour Party activities could only be generally left. 
It, was the unions, and the-Co-ops which, offered-the,., chance. to pursue 
political demands. Cooper reiterated his conclusions drawn earlier in 
the year: work should be centrally coordinated; ' all available forces 
should work in the unions; all available forces should also be drafted 
into the Labour League of Youth, but Labour Party involvement should 
be of a short term character preliminary to launching an open 
revolutionary party. As for the Marxist Group in the I. L. P., all its 
members must work for 'a short term split perspective'.. Those who did 
not feel they could do so should leave and join the other Bolshevik- 
Leninists in the Labour Party. 
I Trotsky had urged the tiny Spanish Bolshevik-Leninist Group to join 
the leftward moving Socialist Party of Largo Caballero. They 
rejected his advice, unifying instead with the left nationalist group 
around Joaquim, Maurin to form the Workers'-Party of Marxist Unity, 
(P. O. U. M. ). This party achieved significant support among the working 
class, notably in Catalonia up to the time of its suppression after 
the Barcelona events of May 1937. But the absence of Trotskyism 
from the Socialist Party facilitated a communist entry far more 
extensive that that carried out in Britain. In 1935, the whole 
Spanish Socialist Youth, which the previous year had invited the 
Trotskyists to join them, declared for the Third International. The 
communists were eventually to become the most powerful political 
force in the Republic, but the P. O. U. M. was to disappear. For a 
contemporary Trotskyist appraisal see F. Morrow, Revolution and Counter- 
Revolution in Spain (first published New York 1937,1975 ed. ). 
2 A-Cooper et,, al. p'Tasks of British Bolshevik-Leninistsl. ibid., 7. 
I 
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The third position was that advanced by Collins, whose 
interview with Trotsky on tactics in Britain had been circulated during 
the summer. 
I He had been denied minority representation at the joint 
conference due to take place the next day,. despite the preponderance of 
the full Marxist Group vote, 
Collins's paper was'a precis of Trotsky's replies to his 
interview. He only added that the Marxist Group's theoretic acceptance 
of the need one-day to leave the I. L, P. was avoiding, the issue. An, 
umbilical cord tied them to the I, L. P. Meanwhile European. revolutionary 
developments were preparing a similar pattern in Britain, and the 
communists were meeting with great success in their unity campaign and 
penetration of the Labour League of Youth. No justification remained 
for staying within the I. L. P., which was not a mass party but a small 
propaganda machine. There was no longer even the excuse that the I. L. P. - 
line was the most nearly correct of all parties, since Maxton was 
beginning to slide towards a popular front, The urgent need was for. a 
break with the I. L. P. within a few weeks. 
In this discussion on 10 October, it rapidly became clear that 
James was proposing a complete-reshuffling of members between the groups. 
Essentially he and Cooper rejected Labour Party entry whether for 
. mmediate independence or for an extended stay in the I. L. P.; they 
were united in their opposition to the view expressed by Trotsky and 
by the International Secretariat, which James had heard at Geneva. 
Those broadly on this side of the argument questioned Trotsky's 
grasp of the organisational structure of the labour movement in Britain. 
Had he had greater authority among British Bolshevik-Leninists the 
discussion might have been constructively resolved. As it was all 
I Trotsky had emphatically supported the thesis, advocated by Matlow, 
that there should be immediate entry into the Labour' Party. Cooper's 
views on the matter had, he thought, 'no relationship'to Marxism at 
all' ('Interview by Collins', Summer 1936, Writings (1935-36), 76-7). 
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sorts of discontents surfaced. Liverpool (Don James), Islington 
(Collins) and'Glasgow were not prepared to stay in the I. L. P. any 
longer. Matlow, now in the Labour Party, was quoted to the effect'that 
the Marxist Grovp had become integrated in the I. L. P. Don James 
observed that internal life had ceased within the group: no bulletin 
had appeared since before Keighley, when the group, should have been 
preparing to split. 
Harber, like Matlow, was already in the Labour Party$ and 
attended- this preliminary meeting as a fraternal 
_delegate. 
He 
claimed that the fecundity of the Labour Party was illustrated by the 
growth of his L. L. O. Y. group in London from six to sixty since February 
1936. Twelve were old Bolshevik-Leninists, thirteen from the Marble 
Arch group 
I 
and the rest new recruits. But those who had stayed in the 
I. L. P. rested on a majority in the Group. A Don James amendment to 
C. L. R. James's resolution, putting the Geneva resolution position was 
lost eight to thirteen, and C. L. R. was also proof against an amendment 
io his statement from Cooper calling for a continued commitment to the 
I. L. P. This fell ten to thirteen. James's original resolution was 
passed eleven to ten, and Cooper's full statement was also carried in 
amended form., thirteen to eight. This left the Marxist Group in 
rejection of Trotsky's view and the urgings of the International, with 
James's resolution as the basis on which it would approach the other 
two groups the following day. 
11 October saw the first broad gathering of the Trotskyists 
since December 1933. Thirty nine Marxist Group delegates were present 
and twenty six from the Labour Party group (the 'Bolshevik-Leninists', 
those largely in the Labour League of Youth). The Marxist League sent 
three delegates and there were 'fraternal delegates and unattached 
IA loose association of those prepared to sell Fourth International 
literature in Central London. See Chapter VII. 
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comrades' in attendance as well. The Marxist League's attitude was 
that the widest possible diffusion of Bolshevik-Leninists was desirable. 
This view was no surprise, being essentially a restatement of the 
Communist League, majority view. The League believed itself free of 
blame for the division of forces in Britain but also held that some 
degree of cooperation might now be achieved. To the Marxist League the 
present discussion oscillated between false parameters. Taking 
'a purely formal decision' between the reformist Labour Party and the 
centrist I. L. P. did not raise the Bolshevik-Lenini sts' status in the 
eyes of the advanced workers. Rather than appear like splitters the 
Marxist Group ought to set out its programme and seek to win the I. L. P. 
to, it. Agitation around the demand for the Fourth International might 
be abridge across which local Labour parties could become involved. 
Abandoning the I. L. P. for the Labour Party because it did not support 
a Fourth International was asking to become a laughing stock. 
The League went further: it believed the time for exclusive 
work in the Labour Party was coming to an end. Growing collaboration 
of the Labour Party with the government would drive the workers 
lef I tward, 
I 
possibly in the direction of a, new revolutionary party 
comprising the left, the League of Youth, and the I. L. P. To achieve 
this there was required simultaneous pressure from within the Labour 
Party and the I. L. P. A concerted drive by the Bolshevik-Leninists 
would bring the creation of the new revolutionary section nearer. 
The Marxist Group was governed by its decisions of the 
previous day. It would work towards unity along the lines proposed in 
some detail by C. L. R. James, but it would simultaneously intensify its 
I. L. P. activities in order to speed up perspectives. 
I This idea is developed by Trotsky himself in Trade Unions in the Epoch 
of Imperialist Decay. 
I 
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After the Marxist Group, the Bolshevik-Leninists in the 
Labour Party represented the most sizeable force. Essentially they 
were a fusion of Roma Dewar, and her associates who had published the 
Youth'Militant, I :, and those members of the Marxist Group who had already 
joined the Labour Party. They reported sixty members in London, forty 
of whom were-in the Labour Leage of Youth, plus small groups in Norwich 
and Sheffield. 
2 Sales of Youth Militant had more than trebled from 
their March total-of 250. The Bolshevik-Leninists clearly believed 
their own rapid growth in 1936 stemmed from the, opp ortunities offered 
by the Labour Party. Part of the strength of this group was that it 
stood on the Geneva resolution. It was able to complain that its 
attempts to fuse with Groves had been unavailing; a joint E. C. with the 
Marxist Group had functioned however and guided common activities such 
as trade union work and agitation over the Moscow*"Trials. 
3 The 
Bolshevik-Leninists now went further, and offered to cooperate on the 
basis of the James resolution from the Marxist Group. 
The three groups, as represented at the meeting agreed to 
appoint two representatives each to form. a central coordinating 
committee. The C. C. C. would oversee each faction's journal and keep 
them as supplements rather than competitors; it would produce a 
regular bulletin; it would draw up joint plans and thesed to be 
presented to separate aggregates and a delegate conference. 
While the national meeting went on to discuss Spain and the 
Trials, unity was felt by all concerned to be-the main achievement. 
They were cruelly deceived. After the meeting the Bolshevik-Leninists 
I See Chapter VII. 
2 Total membership was claimed to be around eighty with fifty contacts. 
3 See Chapter VI. 
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in the Labour Party reflected belatedly on why the Marxist Group had 
passed the Cooper paper with its I. L. P. perspective. They decided to 
reject organisational fusion until there was'some definite agreement 
on tactics; thýy also condemned the Marxist League for still being 
unprepared to enter an immediate fusion. 'The Bolshevik-Leninists 
declared themselves ready for fusion with any Fourth International 
Group which could reach agreement on tactics on the basis of the Geneva 
resolution. Since it was precisely the Ge neva resolution which divided 
the groups, this was disingenuous. 
While the Bolshevik-Leninists pulled away from the Marxist 
Group, the Group itself changed. On 15 November C. L. R. James, with the 
support of Ballard (who earlier had backed Cooper) convinced the 
Group to break free. of the I. L. P. 
I There should be, it resolved, an 
independent organisation of the Fourth International in Britain. Factions 
might be permissible, buý they would be subordinate to the main task of 
establishing a separate identity. There was to be an immediate split 
2 from the I. L. P. with the aim of launching the Fourth International. 
On 21 November the Group informed the Bureau for the Fourth International 
of its decision, and set about preparing the next issue of Fight! as an 
independent paper. - 
The Marxist Group's rapid shift did not please the Bureau. 
At a 13 December meeting it declared the decision for 'independence' 
invalid: it rested solely on a sixteen to six decision of the London 
group to reverse a vote taken only four weeks earlier; there was no 
fundamental discussion involving all members; no balance sheet had 
been drawn up, The decision of James and his comrades to opt for 
I for Discussion (28 Nov. 1936), 18. 
2 The decision for independence was taken sixteen to six at a meeting of 
London members of the Group. 
r 
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leaving the I. L. P. tacitly confirmed the Geneva resolution. The 
Bureau still found it reprehensible since no honest accounting of the 
I. L. P. experience had been made, and particularly since James's 
continued presepce in the party had contributed to the decay within the 
group which was now advanced as a reason for leaving. Departing in this 
way started the independent group on false premises:, '. instead of 
repairing the damage you will greatly increase W. ' 
James's predicted numerical reinforcement had not materialised. 
Cooperls'anticipated mass withdrawal had'not*occurred. " The Marxist 
Group had, in six months, recruited no-one and lost half its members. 
No member of the I. L. P. was likely to follow such a group into 
%I 
isolation; some might well opt for*the nascent Labour left however. 
And there was a further ground for criticism. The 
impromptu split from the I. L. P. would not only have negative impact, 
but it would also obstruct the fusion of all groups deemed a necessity 
by the Geneva conference. James rejected fusion. The Bolshevik- 
Le ninists were growing rapidly with a principal aim 'to inoculate 
British youth ajainst the Stalinist plague', that is, to prevent a 
repetition of the events in Spain or Belgium. Fusion would strengthen 
the serum; but fusion was now impossible. 
Meanwhile important developments were unfolding within the 
Labour Party, where a left analogous to that of the French and Belgian 
Socialist Parties was crystallizing: 
1 James had written to Brockway declaring the intention to withdraw 
and form. a separate organisation. Brockway circulated his branches 
on 5 December 1936 estimating that only thirty members of the I. L. P. 
would be involved, mostly in London but possibly in Liverpool too. 
(ýLuM, op. cit., 233-4; The New Leader, II Dec. 1936). 
r 
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'Only someone politically blind could fail to see 
that the Bolshevik-Leninists, protected by the 
growing opposition coming from the radica'lised 
worker mass, ts demanding democracy in the Party, 
contains enormous possibilities of development. 
' 
The Bureau impatiently swept away'James's pretensions.. The 
split of this left wing away from Labour would not lead, to it falling 
in behindthe tiny Marxist Group: 
It is only, in the closest contact with, this Left Wing, 
it is only as active members of this Left Wing, that you 
will obtain sufficient possibilities of influencing it, 
to win the revolutionary part of it for Bolshevik- 
Leninism. From outside, you will be regarded as impotent 
and hopeless sectarians, who fear contact with the masses, 
but who want to impose themselves on the masses from 
outside as sage counsellors. 
2 
The Marxist Group offer to help the Bolshevik-Leninists in 
the Labour Party was in reality no help, declared the Bureau. The 
Labour Party Fourth Internationalists were 'severe opponents of this 
over-hasty independence' which could only harm them by contagion. And 
in any case practical experience argued against the feasibility of such 
joint operations. 
The Marxist Group was, concluded the Bureau, most likely to 
cultivate sectarian and opportunist tendencies within itself which 
would fasten on personal 
4ique 
politics. It was already 'full of 
personal bitterness', unlike the Fourth Internationalists in the 
.1 Declaration of the International Bureau For the Fourth International 
- on the sTbject of the English Marxist Groy2j (13 Dec. 1936, -4). 
2 ibid., 5. 
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Labour League of Youth. In practical terms therefore the Bureau 
called for a new decision by the Marxist Group recogriising the 
opinions of these who had voted with their feet by joining the Labour 
Party. There s4ould be a constituent conference of all of those who 
recognised the authority of the Geneva conference to create a single 
homogenous organisation. The majority view of the English Bolshevik- 
Leninists must prevail: anything less than a majority would not 
automatically enjoy relations with the Secretariat. 
Before the view of the Bureau reached Britain, the Marxist 
Group had taken irrevocable steps. The second issue of Fight! was 
not the product of cooperation with the other factions but a plain 
appeal for an independent presence. On 16 December the first open 
meeting of the Group declared itself as an independent party for the 
Fourth International. 
Some years later Trotsky reflected on the Marxist Group 
experience: 
It seems to me that our comrades who entered the I. L. P. 
had the same experience with the I. L. P. that our American 
comrades made with the Socialist Party. But not all our 
comrades entered the I. L. P. and they developed an 
opportunistic policy so far as I could observe and that 
is why their experience in. the I. L. P. was not so good. 
The I. L. P. remained almost as it was before, while the 
Socialist Party is now empty. 
And yet the American Trotskyists camp out of the Socialist 
Party much strengthened and ready to form the S. W. P. The Marxist Group 
made progress for nearly two years and no serious accusations of 
'Fighting Against The Stream' (a conversation in Mexico with ark 
English Fourth Internationalist (C. L. R. James), April. 1939) 
Writings 1938-9,150n. 
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opportunism could be levelled before autumn 1935. Nor was the I. L. P. 
largely unchanged: by 1936 it was a shrunken shell and replaced as an 
alternative to Labour by the Communist Party. 
I But the Marxist Group 
failed in the objective of winning the whole I. L. P. and even in the 
lesser one of splitting. a large portion away. Nor can the limited 
success' of the C. P. G. B. be attributed to Trotskyist intervention. The 
best that can be claimed is that Trotskyism did not become extinct, that 
the existence of an alternative Marxist critique was, maintained which 
the communists sometimes had to challenge. But the chaos in the 
Marxist Group during 1936 demonstrated again the preoccupation of 
Trotskyists with internal and secondary tactical disputes while great 
events were taking place. 
1 Even in October 1936 however the communists were still concerned about 
a possible Trotskyist takeover of the I. L. P. See R. P. Arnot's fears 
in London Monthly quoted in B. Pearce, 'The British Stalinists and 
the McscowTrials', in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, op, cit., 225. 
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THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE AND THE MARXIST IEAGUE, 
JANUARY 1934 - OCTOBER 1937ý 
I 
The, Cqmmunist League did not remain long outside all p-arties. 
By the middle of, 1934 discussions were taking place about joining not 
the I. L. P. but the Labour Party,, and it quickly entered that autumn 
Within the Labour Party'it rediscovered access to a South London 
following and found a ready platform in the Socialist League, For a 
time it ceased to be an identifiable faction, 'but began'again in 1936 
as the Marxist League, principal exponent of Trotskyist views and 
opponent of the Unity Campaign from within the Socialist League. The 
demise, of the-Socialist League in 1937 ended effective activity despite 
attempts to replace it, and the Marxist League dissolved that October. 
***** .** 
The Communist League complained to the I. S. that the 
December 1933 split flouted majority rule. In a sharp reply it was 
told that respect for majorities had. to be earned and that there were 
international as well as national boundaries to them. 
I The I. S. 
further considered the C. L. narrow in outlook and experience 
2 
and 
effectively withdrew official status from it. 
3 
I 'The I. S. Reply To The British Majority', 23 Jan. 1934, Writings 
Supplement, (1934-40), 440. In 1947 when a split over entry also 
took place the International again backed a Minority and there was a 
reversal of roles with an international leadership acting against 
established leaders in Britain. 
2 This reference to the C. P. G. B. background of many in the C. L. was not 
absolutely correct since there were ex-Marxist League members among 
them. It could also be argued that by its desultory fashion of 
joining the I. L. P. the Minority had shown itself devoid of that very 
communist quality, organisational discipline. 
3 ibid., 441. Trotsky's draft of this letter was refashioned by Bauer 
with the chief effect of explicitly taking away British Section status 
and conferring sympathising status on both Majority and Minority, 
ibid., 892n. The League shortly concluded that struggling for, status 
in the I. C. L. was 'a losing battle', (Warwick M. S. S.,. n. d., @an. or 
Feb? 11934). 
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The split was a blow, as eleventh hour concessions by the 
Majority indicated. Yet the C. L. was now free of pressure from an 
international body in whose grasp of British affairs it did not have 
complete confldqnce. Events were to give some support to the 
argument that the C. L. rather than the international was in closest 
touch, with affairs in Britain. When the new, national committee met 
early in the year it held-a broad discussion about entrism and ihowed 
awareness of Labour's rising fortunes and, the importance of this for 
Trotskyist growth: the Communist League would have to be part of the 
2 
movement to put Labour back in power. 
The C. L. view was now that the fragile eggs of Trotskyism 
could not be entrusted only to the leaky basket of the I. L. P. Indeed 
Dewar and Groves were coming to believe that of the internationals 
only the second looked likely to revive. 
3 
The Red FlM perceived a 
strong link between the fortunes of social democrats everywhere. Most 
notably the great Labour victory in the L, C, Cs elections of March 1934 
was connected with the decision of socialists in Vienna to mount armed 
I Notes for guidance at this meeting under the title Our Attitude to 
the Labour Party have been located. There are two drafts: one - 
apparently the earlier - is dated 20 Jan. 1934 (Warwick M. S. S. ) 
2 Labour's electoral revival of the early 1930s is discussed by 
C. T. Stannage, 'The East Fulham by-election, 25 Oct. 19331, 
Historical Journal, Vol. 14, (1971), 165-200 and R. Heller, 'East Fulham 
Revisited', J. C. H , Vol. 6, no. 3, (1971), 172-96. See also M. Ceadel, 'Interpreting East Fulham', 
in C. Cook and J. Ramsden (eds. ), By-electioLis in British Politics, 
(1973), 118--ý39 and The Red Flag*, (Jan. 1934). 
3 R. Groves to Sara[Feb.? 19341. 
. 
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resistance to Dollfuss. 
1 The C. L. strongly backed Labour in the 
elections. To communist criticisms it replied: 
Actually the result of the election was a striking 
confirmation of the opinion previously expressed 
that the anger of the workers against, the National 
Gqvernment-, Uould . find.. "Jts expression at the present... 
stage,, -through the Labour Party: that the policy, pf 
contesting. any or every, constituencyvould only,.,,,. ý 
result in the further isolation of the, revolutionary 
movement. 
2 
Like Harber in the I. L. P. at this time Groves was sensitive 
to Labour's revival. The Red Flag even argued that a rising vote 
indicated an industrial upswing also. 
3 The League was becoming 
scornful of any activities outside official movements. It admonished 
communist fondness for rank and file organisations 
4 
and scorned the 
I. L. P. for turning towards the C. P. G. B. rather than the Labour Party 
and trade unions. 
I The Red Flag, (March-April 1934). The'C. L. detected a feeling of 
hope in the labour movement in 1934 as a result of these struggles, 
(interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). 
2 ibid. 
3 In its January 1934 issue. 
4 
'The 
Red Flag presented rank and file trade unionism as the result of 
false political perspectives: economic recession, it argued, meant 
a weaker not a stronger movement. New unions or workers' councils 
meant only isolation. Even the usefulness of the N. U. W. M. was 
doubted: the T. U. C. or Trades Councils could develop far more 
impressive agitation over unemployment. Yet N. U. W. M. success was 
due if anything to resistance by its leaders to King Street 
directives, See H. McShane and J. Smith, Harry McShane : No Mean 
. 
Fighter, (1976), 215, passim. 
For the N. U. W. M. generally, W. Hannington, Unemployed_Struggles, 
. 
1918-1936, (1977, 'first published 1936). 
133. 
Communist League advice did not rest upon underpinning 
official activities. Part Of its argument about the orientation of the 
N. U. W. M. was that within the mainstream the movement would have to 
broaden its polýtical outlook. Yet at leastluntil the middle, of 1934 
the Communist League was still issuing ultimatums to the labour 
movement. When, the I. L. P. - C, P. G. B. drive for-May Day brought, forth 
only a limited, response, it concluded: 
it drives home the very real, and urgent need for, 
the assembling of all left wing (sic) and revolutionaries 
behind the banner of the Communist Leagueq as a step 
towards the establishment in this country of a new 
fighting party of the British workers. 
" 
In the pages of The Red Flag a critique of the I. L. P. and the 
communists, similar to that of the MarxiS't Group, is made, But the C. L. 
was in an inferior position to make it since there was no reason why it 
should be able to participate in debate. 
2 Until the Comunist League 
entered the Labour Party after the summer, it lacked a positive 
direction for its work and its energies were apparently diffused in 
several directions. 
Internally, League affairs were not happy. Groves thought 
the national committee 'very feeble' and functioning as a collection of 
factions rather than as a national body. 
3 The League's main strength 
was the two strong locals of Balham and Chelsea, though there were 
I The Red Flag, (May-June 1934). 
2 'Will the I. L. P. Break at York', The Red Fl 
, 
gj, (March-April 1934). 
The article argues that the 'nerveless hands' of I. L. P. ers must save 
their party and-turn it to the Fourth International. 
3 R. Groves,, Warwick M. S. S., (Jan. or Feb.? ) 1934., Hugo Dewar was 
secretary of the N. C. which was seven strong. 
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several smaller local groups. 
I It had a definite asset in The Red Flag 
2 
and continued to turn out its distinctively produced leaflets on issues 
3 
of the hour. But there is no evidence of significant growth by the 
4 League in its-phase of standing apart from all parties, although it 
had survived against predi ctions 
5 
The League's international standing was uncertain. It had 
lost official ýstatus but was still part of the I. C. L, It continued to 
campaigafor the Fourth International yet apparently. took no part in. 
6 
gatherings of that body. It was approached by Albert Weisbord, whose 
L. Bradley, untitled Warwick M. S. S. (n. d. ). Bradley, a member of 
the Chelsea Group brought onto the N. C. after the split, proposed a 
tighter, more centralised structure and made severe criticisms of 
the League's failure to intervene effectively at a recent Conference 
of Action. 
2 The Red Flag failed to appear in December 1933, and in the new year 
sometimes came out in joint issues. 1 
3 See below and also the leaflet Five Communist Reasons for Voting 
Labour, an early attempt at Labour Party orientation, issuWd_ during 
a 1934 by-election at Hammersmith North. 
4 High spots in 1934 were the recruitment of five expelled Croydon 
communists and three from Tottenham, (The Red Flag, Oct. 1934). 
5 The Red F12Z, (May-June 1934). On 3 May, Stuart Purkis resigned 
1rom the League. No reason was given in his letter of resignation 
but he had dragged his feet at the time of the turn away from 
Communist Parties a year earlier. Purkis now concentrated on trade 
union activity rising to the position of executive member of the 
R. C. A. and president of the St. Pancras Trades Council. He 
continued to assist his comrades from time to time, notably during 
the Moscow Trials. 
6 No-one from Britain attended the I. C. L. plenum of October 14-16 
1934. Only Harber and Kirby joined the extended plenum of the 
following spring. 
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Communist League of Struggle had split from the American movement 
I but 
continued in correspondence with Trotsky. 
2 Perhaps a prime catalyst 
of continued loyalty to the I. C. L. was the League's growing interest in 
social democracy, which was paralleled by the thinking of Trotsky and 
the International. 
3 
The Red Flag, policy of faithfully publishing the 
writings of the opposition leader now brought it the reward of articles 
4 
which supported, its own inclinations. 
Yet this did not imply monolithic support in the Communist 
League for Trotsky's views. The publication of War and the Fourth 
International, 5a manifesto which decisively wro'te off the Comintern 
and the Labour and Socialist International and anticipated, the 
I Albert Weisbord (1900-77) expressed disquiet to Henry Sara about the 
role the I. S. had played in the December 1933 split in the Communist 
League and called for an international congress of Opposition groups. 
(A. Weisbord to Sara, 6 June and 9 July 1934, Warwick M. S. S. 
15/3/1/54 and 55). The Red Flag contented itself with announcing in 
its April-May issue that a plenum of the I. C. L. was to thrash out the 
British problem. 
2 In July Trotsky wrote to all the British groups seeking their 
attendance at a proposed international conference where a British 
Commission comprised of 'our best international comrades' would with 
their help determine perspectives. [Trotsky] to [British groups], 
n. d., Warwick M. S. S. This may have been an early attempt to convene 
the conference which actually met in July 1936. 
3 Trotsky had now concluded that the trade unions were the most 
important field of work and that 'the I. L. P., in this respect, is 
becoming more of a handicap than an aid', ibid. In the late summer 
of 1934 the French Bolshevik-Leninist group entered the S. F. I. O., 
not without internal anguish, but under pressure from Trotsky. 
4 'V,, 'The French League and the Socialist Party', The Red Flag 
(Nov. 1934). This was a compression of two articles from Trotsky 
which urged the French turn. They were pseudonymous because of the 
conditions attached to his presence in France. 
5 Writings (1933-34), 299-330. 
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Transitional Programme of '1938 in its catastrophist predictions 
provoked a minor crisis. War and the Fourth International, together 
with Trotsky's urgent appeals for unity in France had the effect of 
predicting an immediate decision between fascism and revolution. ' In 
Britain, Lee Bradley demanded clarification as'to how an inmediate 
perspective of civil war accorded-with C. L. support for the return of a 
Labour Gover=ent. Since the Fourth International was so weak, it 
needed to gather strength before it could bring the'social crisis to a 
2 head. If anything, this marked a misconstruction of War and the 
Fourth International, since its author was also forcefully advocating 
entrism by the French, Belgian and, soon, the American Trotskyists. 
Trotsky's argument was that the case for a united front against fascism 
was best advanced from within a mass party. The League as a whole 
3, - -' rested strongly on Trotsky's analysis of fascism in Germany with its 
powerful call for unity, but communism was about to dish Trotskyism 
en passant by moving towards a united front. 
I 'France is now the Key to the Situation', (March 1934). 
Writings (1933-341,238-44. The article appeared under the title 
'For the Fourth International' in The Militant, (New York), 
31 March 1934. 
2 L. Bradley, untitled manuscript, (1934), Warwick M. S. S. 
3 See Forward Against Fascism, a leaflet forbiddingly sub-titled 'a 
Thesis for Labour Youthl, (July 1934), Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/1/56. See 
also Groves's review of Fascism and Social Revolution by R. P. Dutt, 
a book which loaded the blame for Hitler taking power on 'social 
fascism'. Groves wrote: 
'Fascism derives its support from the middle classes and 
from the lumpen-proletariat. Social Democracy is based 
upon the workers. Parliament is the main arena of Social 
Democracy and the workers' organisations upon which it 
rests. ' 
(The Red Flag, Aug. 1934) 
137. 
Growing League interest in the Labour Party culminated in 
entry into the Balham and Tooting D. L. P. in the summer of 1934.1 In 
July of that year dissident members of the Labour League of Youth were 
urged not to beý, enticed out of it by the Y. C. L., but to stay in the 
2 Labour Party and build a mass base. - Within the League several drafts 
were made of statements of imm diate intent. One by Hanton 
sta rtlingly, concluded that the League should concentrate on the I. L. P. 
3 
This was rejected for Groves's draft, a frank statement of entrist 
purpose. In its printed version 
4 
the C. L. stated it would work loyally 
in the Labour Party. A new Labour Government would, it believed, be 
seen by most workers as 'the path to emancipation'; whether it would 
be a Government of real advance would depend on the success of the 
left in obtaining commitment to a socialist programme and unity of-the 
labour movement. The present National Government was seen as the last 
strong popularly elected parliamentary administration of the bourgeoisie. 
Without labour action, fascism would quickly loom. ý 
Groves spelled out the implications in a gloss. 
5 The time 
had'come, he suggested, to draw conclusions from 1934 discussions on 
the Labour Party. There must be an end to internal wrangles and 
spasmodic street activities. In their place must come systematic 
I In July 1934 The Red Flag commended the division's resolution to 
Labour's annual conference though it need 'clarification in a 
number of important details'. 
2 See Forward Against Fascism. 
3 W. G. Hanton, Draft for Immediate Programme, 17 Aug, 1934, Warwick 
M. S. S. 15/3/IT5-9. 
4A leaflet printed on both sides, (1934), Warwick M. S. S. 
5 Statement to all members concerning the present Dolicv of the Leaeue 
and its International, 23 Aug. 1934, Warwick M. S. S. 15/412/1Z 
tI 
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fraction work in the Labour Party: this would be the prime means of 
recruitment-to the C. L. For the time being, the League would have to 
settle for the establishment of a national base, an objective less 
ambitious than ýaunching the Fourth International. This last' 
argument was not confined to Britain and was vehemently opposed by 
Trotsky, 
In the Left Socialist Parties there had been great interest 
in the programme of the Opposition., But horror at Hitler's ability 
to take power had in the C. L. view, led the mass, of people to hurry 
3 into ill-concelved unity: new alternatives to the major parties had 
been by-passed and the Fourth International had not been built. It was 
still needed, 'now more than ever', but until the time was ripe a road 
to the masses must be found via their day/to/day 'concerns. Some 
workers had understood the meaning of recent'defeats, and it was to 
4 them that The Red Flag would address itself. The task was complicated 
by the new advocacy of a united front by communists. 
5 The call for such 
I He argued that the reawakened interest of the I. S. in social 
democracy was 'a striking justification of the stand we had made many 
months ago, and a tribute, although possibly unintended, to the 
political sense of the majority comrades', (ibid., 4). While the 
majority had the previous year proposed a diffusion of energies it 
had not suggested the concentration on the Labour Party that was now 
proposed. 
.2 
See for example 'To Comrade Sneevliet on the I. A. G. Conference', 
26 Feb. 1935, Writings (1934-35), 187-95. 
3 'We can see now that, whilst, as a result of our work, the reasons 
for Hitler's victory and the defeat of the workers' organisations 
were made clear to scores, perhaps hundreds, (the mass) either drew 
back in confusion or pressed forward for a hurried consolidation of 
the workers' ranks, irrespective of political ideas or party 
divisions', (The Red Flag, Oct. 1934). 
4 It would speak to 'revolutionary Marxists'. ' In the autumn the 
enlarged plenum of the I. C. L. declared not an independent party but 
an instrument for creating them. ('The Present Situation in The 
Labour Movement and the Tasks of the Bolshevik-Leninists's 
Oct. 14-, 16, Documents, 61-2). 
5 One account. of the development of Comintern policy, with particular 
reference to events in France is in J. Braunthal, History of the 
International, Vol. 2,191471943,415-46. 
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an alliance had been a cardinal principle of Trotskyism. Now it was 
dished by Stalin and Thorez. But the C. L. critique of suspending 
criticism within a united front could still be made. 
The q. L. turn towards the Labour Party is a-rare instance 
from'the annals of British Trotskyism. where joining or leaving a 
larger party, did not cause a split. Participants recollect that they 
had a following immediately they joined the Labour, Party. ý. Those who 
were well-known figures in, their locality (Wicks in Batterseal'Groves 
in Balham) started with an advantage. - In Wimbledon, Henry Sara was 
short-listed for a parliamentary candidature. 
I Groves was actually 
selected as delegate from the Balham. and Tooting division to the 1934 
Labour Party conference with near unanimous backing, though he was in 
the end barred by the N. E. C. 
2ý The division's membership almost trebled 
in the immediate aftermath of the League moving in. Also on the wider 
stage, Wicks was now able, as a Labour Party membert to secure a 
delegate's place at a conference summoned by the London Trades Council, 
from which body he had been excluded for many years, 
The N. E. C. did not prevent the Leaguý entering the Labour 
Party. It was of course tiny in comparison to the C. P#G. B., the main 
preoccupation of those whose responsibility it was to watch infiltration. 
The previous year the Labour Party had published The Communist Solar 
System, a, forceful.; ejection of communist tactics. It may well be that 
I Interview with H. Wicks, (30 Nov. 1979). 
2 He was replaced at the last minute by J. N. Pyne, a former Balham 
Group member. In a speech seconding the reference back of a passage 
on the united front in the N. E. C. report, Pyne accused the executive 
of not being serious in its call-to boost Labour Party membership 
since it did not welcome the adherence of a C. L. repelled by 
dictatorial communist methods, (L. P. C. R. (1934), p. 135). 
4 
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Morrison, its author and hammer of the left throughout the decade, had 
I his own reason for turning his blind eye to the Communist League, 
The Red Flag appeared in a new series- in November, more of a 
magazine than a.. paper and carrying trenchant criticisms of the united 
front as proposed by the communists. 
2 It turned out to beý, the first 
_and-last of the new-series. Havingýmarched-, _back 
into-step with the 
International Communist Leagueo the British seem to have marched away 
again. For more than a year, until the start of 1936, there is no 
evidence of internal life'inside the C. L. Possibly the loss of a 
paper which could only claim a limited impact in any case was considered 
only a small sacrifice for securing a place inside the Labour Party. 
3 
Additionally it could be argued that new arenas of work were opening 
up. The C. L. was aware of communist penetration'of the League of 
Youth, 4 but its main interest was the Socialist League. 
In November 1934, the Socialist League, which had achieved 
an important impact on Labour Party conferencesq resolved to turn 
itself into a 'mass organisation'. 
5 This was fortuitous for the C. L. 
I Morrison might never have quoted British Trotskyists against the 
C. P. G. B., but he did use Trotsky himself in this way to rebut left 
critics of the S. P. D. 's part in failing to prevent Hitler coming to 
power: 
'Trotsky himself has criticised the Communist International 
for its handling of the situation, and Trotsky is right 
and Miss Wilkinson is wrong. ' 
(L. P. C. R., (1933), 221) 
Morrison was to be well informed about Trotskyist movements in Britain 
for a decade. He may have appreciated that only an ex-C. P. G. B. 
member like Groves would be well equipped to handle such arguments 
as those of Dutt. See Groves's lengthy review of Fascism and Social 
Revolution, (The Red Flag, Oct. 1934). 
2 It carried sixteen small pages, poorly laid. out. 
3 Trotsky himself had considered it fair exchange for I. L. P. entry 
during the debate of the previous year, (see above, 
4 The Red Flag (Nov. 1934) 
5 B. Pimlott, Labour-and the Left in the 1930s, (Cambridge, 1977), 91. 
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which must also have been aware that Trotsky was still considered 
legitimate in this sector at least. 
I 
The C. L. established a Balham 
and Tooting branch of the Socialist League in time for it to move 
resolutions at-the League's Bristol Conference. 
The C. L. arrived in the Socialist League 
2 
at exactly the 
right time to advocate to a willing audience the case which came most 
naturally to it: 'the need for an indusýrial drive.. One, Balham and 
Tooting motion declared trades councils 'local unifying centres of the 
Movement'; the other called for a drive to commit trade unions to 
Socialist League policy. 
3 Locally the Balham and Tooting branch 
campaigned against the Unemployment Assistance Act. The Socialist 
League was trying to transform itself from an association of middle 
class radicals into a movement with a working class base. Groves and 
his coileagues were uniquely placed to make efforts in this direction. 
I Perhaps as a result of, rapid success in the Socialist League the 
Communist League as an identifiable faction ceased to exist. Its 1935 
influence is apparent in the activities of Groves who was speaking on 
. League platforms from May and in the autumn published a pamphlet on the 
importance of trades councils on the League's behalf. 
I The editor of the S. L. journal Socialist Leaguer was Frank Horrabin 
who had defended Trotsky in the 1920s. The journal thought Trotsky's 
History 'the authentic voice of the proletarian revolution' early on, 
(Oct. - Nov. 1934,77) and a year later H. H. Elvin in the course of an 
otherwise favourable review of A Handbook of Marxism regretted an 
excess of Stalin and the absence of Trotsky, (The Socialist, 
(Nov. 1935), 6). 
2 C. L. members were by no means the only ex-communists drawn to the 
Socialist League. J. T. Murphy, a contemporary evacuee, was first 
League secretary. His successor William Mellor had, like 
Frank Horrabin, briefly been a party member in the early 1920s. 
3 Socialist League, Third Annual Conference, preliminary agenda. 
4 Trades Councils in the Fight for Socialism, (Sept. 1935). 
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The relationship of the Communist League to organised 
Trotskyism, never unambiguous, progressively dissolved. The negative 
meaning of joining the Labour Party was that 'It'felt no confidence in 
establishing a qeparate organised presence. An attempt to1ink up 
with Harber who abandoned the I. L. P. for the Labour Party early in 
1935 foundered on Harber's objections. 
I 
What the ex-Communist 
Leaguers established during this year was a current'of opinion rather 
than a'disciplined fraction. 
By the autumn Groves had advanced to a position of 
prominence within the Socialist League. He became one of the most 
regular contributors to The Socialist Leaguer and its successor' 
The Socialist, ably contrasting the rightward trend of communism with 
2 the leftward trend of socialism. When the League, like the I. L. P., 
adopted the workers' sanctions line on the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia, 3 he was prominent in its mobilization against war. 
4 
I After this a tacit division of labour developed between Harber and 
Groves. Harber did obtain the position of West London Sales Leader 
for the Socialist Leaguer in May 1935, (see June 1935 issue), but 
nothing significant resulted. The base of Harber became the Labour 
ýLeague of Youth. The Communist League had a slim interest in youth 
work via Socialist Youth, a paper launched by the S. L. But this 
had only a limited impact. An informal and personal link between 
the two factions existed in the person of Roma Dewar, younger sister 
of Hugo, who had launched the duplicated Trotskyist journal Youth 
Militant in the Labour League of Youth. 
2 'After the French Socialist Congress', The Socialist Leaguer, 
, (July/Aug. 1935), 214. 
3 Somewhat unfairly to the I. L. P., Daniel Waley finds the S. L. the 
principal upholder of the anti-imperialist, anti-sanctions view, 
British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War, (1975), 25-6. 
4 The League launched an anti-war campaign in September 1935, centred 
on area conferences. Groves was the secretary of the London 
conference held that month and a week later'was elected to the area 
committee at an aggregate meeting. 
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At. this time a remarkable opportunity was presented to the Trotskyists 
with the I. L. P. and the S. L., both still organisations of some account, 
advocating a line on the issue of the hour of'which they could approve. 
Yet their forces, were divided between these two organisations and the 
League of Youth, and no common campaign was launched. United 
Trotskyist activity did not take place until, a year later, at the time 
of the Moscow Trials, and by this time the arch-enemy, the C. P. G. B., 
was far deeper, entrenched, Not only had tactical differences led to, a 
diffusion of the weak Trotskyist movement, but, they had, led also to 
some adaption by the respective factions to the organisations which 
they were working. In that autumn of 1935, the Marxist Group was 
projecting the transformation of the I. L. P. into a revolutionary party, 
a thesis explicitly rejected by the Communist League. 
I Groves and his 
comrades meanwhile mounted no systematic criticism of the Socialist 
League. 
In 1936 they made a new attempt to pull together their 
support.. A bulletin was launched in the name of the 'Marxist League', 
its main content, two articles from the pen of Trotsky. 
2 Its editor, 
Hugo Dewar, recognised the sea change which had occurred in communist 
policy since The Red FIE& had ceased publication in November 1934 and 
promised that the paper would now reappear. New Comintern policies, he 
suggested, had wrongfooted the Trotskyists, who must now make a critique 
I' The Red Flag (Oct. 1934). 
2 Marxist Bulletin (Jan. - Feb. 1936). No further issues have been 
located, 
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from the left instead of the right. 
1 1936 brought an inquiry from 
Trotsky as to the progress made in the Labour Party and seeking an 
exchange of information. There seems to have been little awareness in 
the international of what was happening in Britain, but Trotsky knew 
enough to inquire whether members had been lost from 'the opportunist 
adaption to-the party apparatus'. 
2ý He may have had in mind Groves, 
who in 1936 was a favourite speaker at Socialist League rallies and 
3. its authority on trade'union affairs, 
The new Red Flag appeared in May as the 'organ of the 
Marxist League'. It noted how the policies against which it had 
campaigned previously were now abandoned, and thatIthe battleground for 
the creation of the new revolutionary leadership is, at present, 
within the organised labour movement'. Within this entrist perspective, 
albeit qualified, The Red Flag promised a propagandist'contribution 
towards policy, the building of a strong left wing and 'the presentation 
and application of revolutionary Marxism'. The paper promised to 
maintain contact with groups abroad working for the same purpose. All 
'This, (the dropping of sectarian policy by the Comintern) together 
with .... the special position our group holds in the organised 
workers' movement more than justifies our re-entry into the sphere 
of publication. ' Dewar went on to imply that The Red Flag had last 
appeared in Feb. 1935; in fact it ceased publication in November of 
the previous year. His expressed hope of re-establishing contact 
with erstwhile readers of The Red Flag is an admission that the 
League had effectively been liquidated in 1935. 
2 Warwick M. S. S., 15 Jan. 1936. The letter was not addressed but 
contextually would appear to have been destined for a member of the 
Marxist League. It consisted of a list of questions which it 
undertakes to consider on a private basis. 
3 The M. L. handled trade union matters more confidently than the other 
two factions, but at this date it had an unimpressive'rdcord by'- 
comparison with the American Trotskyists, who had led two important 
strikes. For the New York hotel workers' strike, led by B. J. ' Field, 
who was a C. L. A. member for its first weeks, and for the 
Minneapolis teamsters' dispute, see C. A. Myers, . 
The Prophet! s Army 
(Westport, Conn. 1977), 61-4,82. 
145. 
this came without a word about Trotsky and the Fourth International, 
but the Marxist League. was alive, as was Trotsky himself, to 
developments within the Labour League of Youth. Conflicting political 
groupings had cqmbined at the League of Youth conference to carry 
demands for autonomy against N. E. C. opposition., The Marxist League 
thought-futile. the perspective of 'a quick, snap division and the 
subsequent dragging out of a small sectionl, a slap on the wrist for 
Harber's Bolshevik-Leninists. As for Advance, its campaign for 
organisational independence was belied by its political dependence on 
reformism. Turning to the otýer arena of Trotskyist activities, the 
Marxist League had few kind words for the I. L. P., whose conference 
had shown itself willing to throw over pacifist policies but not the 
leaders who advocated them. I. L. P. opposition to the bankrupt second 
and third internationals focussed on the London Bureau, but that body, 
by refusing to come out for a new international, condemned itself to 
swing between the other two. Yet. The Red Flag had nothing, at all to 
say, in this its first issue of the new series, about its own theatre 
of operations, the Socialist League, although it was the only 
Trotskyist journal in regular printed publication during 1936. It 
gave Trotsky's writings regular publication, something they had not had 
in Britain since'the paper's first series. 
I There remained from 1934 
a propaganda tone, concentration on issues of history and theory, and 
I There is at least one Trotsky article in each of the early Red Flags 
of the new series, including his comments on. Stalin'S interview 
with Roy Howard, (May), extracts from his introduction to the .. 
second French edition of In Defence of Terrorism (June-July); an 
article on Spain (September) and an extract. on the peasantry from 
The New Course (Jan. 1937). 
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zeal to debate with communist policy. 
I 
The paper was strong on the 
need to retain rights of criticism within the united front 
2 
and on the 
developing revolutionary situation in Spain. 
Groveq's progress within the Socialist League - London area 
secretary from September 1935, London Region representative on the 
3_ National Council from September 1936, tended to outdistance'the 
others. None. of them'seem, ', to have obtained League positions, though- 
Jack Winocour 
4 
wroteýfor The Socialist. - Hilary Sumner-Boyd had hi s 
hands full as business manAger of The Red Flag and , the following year,, 
as secretary of the Trotsky Defence Committee. Hugo*'Dewar was the 
organiser of the League, and Wicks and the more distant Purkis were 
busy on trade union matters. 
Without The Red Flag that summer rio Trotskyist'analysis 
would have been made in printed form at all of the Moscow Trials and 
the revolution and civil war in Spain. There were many papers in the 
labour movement which did not swallow the Stalinist line on either, 
but none could be relied upon to put the Trotskyist view. In 
IA lengthy critical review by Wicks of Ralph Fox's Leniý under the 
title 'Some Notes on the History of Bolshevism' appeared first as a 
serial in The Red Flag and then as a pamphlet in 1937. 
2 See Henry Sara's review of William Gallacher's pamphlet Pensioners, 
of Capitalism. where great play is made with the reversed communist 
stand on the united front. 
3 B. Pimlott, op. cit., 218n. This was a significant achievement in- 
the London-centred League. 
1 4 'Spain has Lighted a Torch', (Oct. 1936). The article was a strong 
argument against coalition with bourgeois parties. Winocour, 'who 
wrote for The Red Flag under the pseudonym Bill Commoner, was an 
American who returned to the United States in 1938.1 am grateful 
to Mr. Harry Wicks for this information about Winocour's pseudonym. 
The S. L. was always attracted to a, class analysis of the Spanish 
struggle, see its manifesto A Workers' or a Fascist Spain (1936), 
Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/8/227, iie 
5 Purkis was president of the St. Pancras trades council. He helped 
over the Trotsky Defence Committee from the outset and contributed. 
to The Red Flag after the Unity Campaign was launched in January 
1937. Another contributor to the paper, probably pseudonymous, 
was Jack Glasgow. 
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September The Red Flag tried to relate the two issues by a novel 
argument that those being purged in Moscow were the most enthusiastic 
protagonists of assistance to the Spanish workers. But this was 
during the non-ýnterventionist phase of Soviet policy; when that came 
to an end it was politically far more difficult to argue against 
Russia, seemingly the only friend the Spanish workers had. The Red 
Flag sought for Spain the independent working class policy that had 
received support during the Abyssinian crisis. Trade Union action was 
advocated to bar supplies to the rebel forces and those countries 
backing them, to 'stop the press lies' and obtain provisions for the 
Republic from the Cooperatives. 
I In the early phases of the war, 
The Red Flag was searching for a Marxist policy. Its opposition to the 
Popular Front principle was already set down. But it parted from 
Trotskyism in its failure to keep an independent distance from the 
P. O. U. M. in Spain. It published a resolution of that party's central 
committeeo hailed the party's growth and declared: 
'Upon the rapid evolution of P. O. U. M. Central Committee 
into a Bolshevik Party depends the fate of the Spanish 
Revolution. 
The P. O. U. M. was not a Trotskyist party, though there were 
Trotskyists within it. It had close relationship with the I. L. P. (its 
sister party) and the Socialist League. 
3 
The Red FIM might be 
expected to be among P. O. U. M9's few defenders in Britain, but it failed 
I 
I The Red Flag (Sept. 1936). 
2 'Who Leads the Fight for Workers' Party in Spain? ', The Red Flag 
(Oct. 1936). 
3 It was linked to the I. L. P. through the London Bureau, while the 
Socialist League published a bulletin on its behalf in Britain. 
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to make simultaneously the standard Trotskyist critique of the party's 
Icentrism'. It commented 'many of its (the P. O. U. M. 's) friends have 
criticised it because it made so many concessions to the demands of 
the other p artios'. In fact the P. O. U. M. had, from September 1936 to 
the time of its ejection on 16 December, been a member of the Catalan 
coalition government, a popular front of the very kind to which 
The Red Flag was so strongly opposed, and the orthodox Trotskyist 
denunciation of this was fierce. 
2 
The personal position of Groves, if not that of all members 
of the Marxist League, was strong as the projected Unity Campaign 
began to build up-in the autumn. Groves joined the National Council 
of the League as representative for its London Region in September and 
was to be for once in a position to mount an effective rather than a 
propaganda opposition to the communist version of a unity pact. He 
also bade fair to be the League's chief pamphleteer with two more 
I The paper's claim that it 'defends P. O. U. M. when even its closest 
allies in Britain remain silent for their own fractional 
advantage', was an effective riposte to the I. L. P., but also perhaps 
a concession to feelings within the Socialist League. The 
Bolshevik-Leninists accused the Marxist League of supporting 
P. O. U. M. 's 'opportunist policy' by organising distribution of the 
P. O. U. M. bul 
* 
letin, (E. C., B/L Group, Statement to the Bureau for the 
Fourth International, 29 Dec. 1936). In February 1937 The Red Flag 
advertised the Red Aid Fund of the P. O. U. M. 
2 See F. Morrow, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain (New York, 
1974), 112-20. Morrow's book was published first in 1936. 
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contributions during 1936. 
But the Marxist League did not cover Socialist League affairs 
at all: effectively it pursued the very policy of suspension of 
criticism for wjAch it attacked parties to the Unity Campaign. Nor 
did the Marxist League use its paper to expound a policy on immediate 
issues for, which it might hope-to capture the-Socialist League, Of the 
trouncing of'the left at the Edinburgh conference, The Red Flag wrote, 
It is only the lack of organisation'and the confusion 
created by the Communist Party's retreat from_ 
revolutionary Marxism that has prevented the creation 
of a powerful militant movement within the unions and 
the local Labour Parties. With a correct policy and 
leadership such a movement could transform the political 
situation in this country . 
But what would this powerful militant movement be? An 
improved Socialist League? And if so, what improvements needed to be 
made within it? These questions remained unanswered. Curiously the 
League considered that its support had grown to the point where it 
I East End Crisis! (1936), 6p. was an anti-fascist pamphlet aimed at 
the Mosleyite offensive in London. It made a standard Marxist 
analysis which blamed exploitation on class not race and its 
intensification on increased competition in a dwindling market. 
British financiers backed Mosley so that divided East Enders might 
be rendered helpless before them, suggested Groves, and proposed 
combination of workers against sweating, bad housing and the Means 
Test. Arms and the Unions (1936), 12p., called for the maintenance 
and extension of trade union organisation in the face of rearmament. 
2 In its October 1936 issue. 
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might consider breaking away 
I 
though lack of distinct policy meant it 
had not put its backers to the test. To the other groups it spoke of 
the possibility of the 'existing left in the I. L. P., a considerable 
section of the-youth and of the discontented rank and fileo and the 
I. L. P. 1 blazing, through a breakaway, the trail of a future - 
revolutionary party. Seemingly the Marxist League foresaw the Socialist 
League breaking away en bloc: it would have a rude awakening. 
The first and last big political division within the Socialist 
League came not-from inside but from outside. During the closing months 
of the year secret negotiations between the leaders of the I. L. P., 
C. P. G. B., and Socialist League led to the signing of a Unity Agreement. 
2 
There is no doubt that the accession of the Socialist League, a Labour 
Party body, was the crucial step for the I. L. P. and the C. P. G. B., both 
of whom were outside. Rumours abounded in and out of the League that 
a pact between the parties was under preparation. It is remarkable 
that Groves should have been absent from the vital meeting of the S. L. 
'The time is approaching when that support will have to be organised 
independently and openly', (ibid. ). At the meeting of Bolshevik- 
Leninists on 11 October the League declared it now believed the time 
for exclusive Labour Party work to be coming to an end, (A Short 
Statement from the Marxist League to the delegates from the Youth 
Militant Groug and the Marxist Group, (11 Oct. 1936), Warwick 
"R. S. S. - 15/411/13). 
2 The background to this agreement can be followed in P. Seyd, 
'Factionalism Within the Labour Party : The Socialist League 1932 - 
1937' in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds. ) Essays in Labour History, 3, 
1918-1939 (1977), 219-224. See also B. Pimlott, op. cit., 94-7, 
which absorbs the treatment in his earlier article 'The Socialist 
League : Intellectuals and the Labour Left in the 1930s', J. C. H., 
Vol. 6s no. 3, (1971), 35-8. More general are M. Foot, 
Aneurin Bevan, 1,1897-1945 (1966), 169-210 and F. Brockway, 
1-n-side the Left. (1942), 264-75. 
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executive on 20 November 1936 which approved the agreement, 
I 
and that 
The Red Flag should fail to appear during the three critical months 
during which the fate of the League was decided. 
2 
When Groves and 
the paper joined battle in January 1937, the issue was already resolved. 
A better organised Marxist League, and one moreover which 
had fought every inch of the way on S. L. policy in 1936 might,, 
arguably, 'have had substantial backing against Cripps when the terms 
ofýthe Unity Agreement becam-known in December. More important still, 
the Marxist League was propagandising against the Socialist League 
when it was divided from other Trotskyists over-tactical issues, a 
damaging example of disunity which did not pass unnoticed. 
3 The 
January 1937 Red Flag led with an open letter to Fenner Brockway by the 
hand of Stuart Purkis. 
4 It reminded the I. L. P. leader that Trotskyism 
had a consistent record on the united front and argued that seeking a 
split over a constitutional issue was not the way to achieve it, 
Purkis implied strongly that Brockway's attacks on Trotskyism were not 
unconnected with the negotiations to launch the Unity Campaign. 5 
I P. Seyd in A. Briggs and J. Saville, op. -cit., 229n. 
2 After a six page issue in October, The Red Flag did not come out 
until January 1937, when it carried a strong attack on the Unity 
Agreement by Stuart Purkis. 
3 Trotsky Defence Committee members met Fenner Brockway on 
27 November 1936 for a broad discussion. On 4 December The New Leader 
carried an article, 'What Price Unity? ', in which Brockway sharply 
condemned Trotskyists as destroyers not builders. This was of course 
the moment'of the split of C. L. R. James and the Marxist Group from 
the I. L. P. to attempt an independent-existence. 
4 For which he borrowed Brockway's title 'What Price Unity? '. 
5 Brockway had been sharp not only in The New Leader but also in 
'A New United Front', Controversy, (Dec. 1936). 
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and enquired how parties so divided over Abyssinia, the Trials, the 
Comintern line and Spain could possibly unite. 
I 
This attack, well-argued as it was. ' fell almost completely 
beside the point. Why should The Red Flag take on Brockway? It had 
no members in the I. L. P. Was Brockwayls involvement, in the Unity 
Campaigndn some way less important than that of Cripps? There was no 
critique of the role Cripps had played in, negotiations, even though 
there was ample room and opposition was growing strongly,. 
2 The, beqt 
prospect of torpedoing the Campaign was to concentrate all strength at 
the point of attack: the leaders of the Socialist League, By its 
silence The Red Flag could only have sent messages that it considered 
3 
all was well. 
When Groves acted, he apparently did so as an individual, not 
as a member of an organised faction. He circulated all S. L. branches 
with a confidential letter against the agreement in January 1937, and 
a copy of it came into the hands of The Daily Herald who published 
I The Red Flag carried an editorial note declaringsorýe differences 
with Purkis's views, though no details were given. Purkis's 
concession that Brockway had fought for the right to maintain 
criticism within the United Front may well have caused disquiet. 
2 See below. 
3 The decision of the S. L. executive on 20 November had been that the 
League would make a campaign with the C. P. G. B. even without I. L. P. 
involvement, (P. Seyd in A. Briggs and J. Savil , op. cit., 220). 
This made 
' 
The Red Flag line even more fatuous. It was remarkable 
that even in the New Year no analysis was made of Cripps's role in 
the steps which were to lead to the dissolution of the S. L. The 
nearest it came was a warning in February 1937 that the course of 
events would punish those who lent themselves to coumunist 
falsehoods. 
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1%1.. 
The special conference of the Socialist League convened on 
16-17 January 1937 to consider the executive proposal did endorse it 
but only against stiff opposition. It was done on a minority vote, 
fifty six to thýrty eight with twenty three abstentions, 
2 
and there 
were doubts about the validity*of the rýajority. 
3 
Two days later-the- 
agreement was signed. The appearance of Groves's letter in the 
Herald. led to a strong attack on him by John. Strachey in 
I The Daily Worker, (18 Jan. 1937), named Groves. as the source of. the 
leak and accused him of 'opposition to any attdmpt at building the 
unity of the working class movement in Britain'. Groves wrote to 
the paper that he supported a united front but that he objected to 
'sacrificing the Socialist League's position in the organised 
Labour Movement without sufficient advantage to the revolutionary 
left in return'. 
He went on to argue, like Purkis, against suspension of 
the right to criticise, reasoning: 
-No revolutionary fears an open discussion of policies. 
The Communist Party enforced this kind of agreement 
precisely because it was preparing to put over a 
campaign designed not only to destroy a handful of 
Trotskyists in this country but to destroy revolutionary 
socialism generally. - 
The Daily Worker printed only part of Groves's letter. The full text 
appeared in The Red Flag_(Feb. 1937). The Red Flag had always 
opposed the suspension of criticism in a united front. See 'W, H. 1, 
'The United Front in Britain and France', (Oct. 1934). 
2 B. Pimlott, op. cit., 97. 
3 M. S. Davidsoq of the Manchester Socialist League argued that the 
agreement had been negotiated without theirmandate, - that vital 
information had been withheld from branches until the day before the 
conference, that some'branches were not represented at the 
conference, and that others who did attend broke their mandate, 
(letter, New Statesman and Nation, 30 Jan. 1937). 
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The Daily Worker but the'battle had been lost. Movement by 
Transport House against the Socialist League because of its support 
for the campaign was predictable and predicted. Threats culminated in 
a March decision by the N. E. C. to proscribe League membership. 
After the event an effort was made to rally those who wished 
to continue the work of the Socialist League inside the Labour Party. 
'A 
bid was made in May 1937, at 'the 
annual conference of the League, to 
repudiate-the agreement and maintain-an active independent League, 
Its Hendon Branch argued for keeping the, agreement and the League, but 
withdrew to give a straight vote between the M. L. amendment and a 
recommendation from the leadership to dissolve-the League. Conference 
voted by fifty one to ten to dissolve and thereby pre-empt expulsions 
of individual. members. 
2 An important platform for mounting a non- 
I John Strachey wrote: 
The fact that Mr. Regin4ld Groves, the proponent of 
Trotskyist views in the Socialist League, was, on his 
own admission, willing to make desperate attempts to 
stop the conclusion of the recent unity pact, and that 
it was through his efforts that the 
, 
Daily Herald was 
given the full particulars of this pact, is a serious 
instance of this activity. (i. e. Trotskyist willing- 
ness to collaborate with Labour's right wing - M. U. ) 
(Daily Worker, 22 Jan. 1937. ) 
That he had revealed details of the pact was a new accusation against 
Groves. He countered the earlier one of leaking his circular letter 
by suggesting, perhaps tongue in cheek, that 'a disloyal branch 
secretary' might have been responsible, (The Red Flag, Feb. 1937). 
J. Jupp, with his belief that Groves repeated arguments advanced by 
League officials, seems to reflect the Strachey view, ('The Left 
in British Labour 1931 to 1941', Univ. of London, M. A. thesis, 1956). 
2 R. Bishop, 'The Socialist League Suspends Activities " Inprecorr, 
Vol. 17, no. 22, (22 May 1937), 517. Bishop refers to la sma 
nest of Trotskyists' who opposed this tactical move backed by the 
C. P. G. B., but others opposed dissolution as. well, including the 
absent Brailsford, (Pimlott, op. cit., 104-5). 
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Stalinist critique from within the movement had been destroyed. 
I 
It was now Labour or communism. 
2 
The Trotskyists' best hope was to gain support from within 
a thriving organisation. Launching a new one was entirely a 
different matter. The S. L. had been born of the maximalist wave of 
19329 when all leading, party members sought, to make. their distance 
from MacDonaldism by espousing undiluted socialism. In 1937, this 
type of rhetoric was found predominantly on the right wing while the 
left and the communists had shifted to seeking any form of coalition, 
however broad, which might dislodge the National Government. 
3 
An intended replacement for the Socialist League was launched 
in June, one month after the decision to dissolve. 
4 The Socialist 
5 Left Federation seems never to have exceeded 100 members. The leading 
cadre of the Marxist League, Sara, Wicks and Sumner-Boyd were all 
'The net result of the Unity Committee's activities was a further 
weakening of the moribund I. L. P., to the benefit of the C. P. G. B., 
and the dissolution of the Socialist1eague. Thus vanished the 
only body within the Labour Party offering some possibility of 
revolutionary socialist propaganda, against the policy of the' 
party itself and of the communist 'cells' within it. ' (H. Dewar, 
Communist Politics in Britain, (1976), 111-2. ) 
2 B. Pearce, The Left in British Labour, (author's unpublished 
manuscript), 9-10. 
3 This evolution is well illustrated by the development of Tribune, 
which effectively replaced The Socialist, into a fellow-travelling 
journal immediately before the war,. (M. -Foot, Aneurin Bevan. 
A biography, Vol. I: 1897-1945, (196.6). (See Appendix BT_ 
4 The New Leader, 18 June 1937. 
5 This was the belief of Don James who, as a Militant group member in 
1937 challenged its involvement in the S. L. F. 
(See Chapter VII, below. ) 
156. 
involved, and Groves was chairman. There was some non-Trotskyist 
involvement, with the secretaryship falling to the ex-communist 
Margaret McCarthy, who had sympathised with Trotsky in the! early 1930s. 
But she and a handful of others did not make an army. Nor could the 
largely unemployed membership hope to match Cripps's financial support 
for the S. L. The S. L. F. held meetings, buts its executive proceedings 
were'perhaps most notable for bitter clashes between Groves and 
D. D. Harber, who sought to swing it behind the line of Militants 
2 
II 
Harber's striVings for a Trotskyist front did not-appeal to Groves who 
sought to keep non-Trotskyists within it. It mattered very little, as 
the S. L. F. died in the New Year after achieving little impact. 
* *. ***** 
The factional clash at the S. L. F. merely illuminated the 
continuing division of Trotskyist forces. The Marxist League had 
failed to send delegates to the pre-conference of the International 
Communist League. convened in July 1936 
3 
but-was sufficiently moved by 
the. ('Geneval) resolution on Britain to send threle delegates to the 
national meeting of Bolshevik-Leninists on 11 October. 
4 
It had 
attempted to unite with Harber in 1935 when he joined the Labour 
I P. Seyd in. A. Briggs' and J. Saville, op. cit., 230n. Though 
. 
repelled by Trotskyists she had met in Glasgow sometime after she 
resigned from the C. P. G. B., McCarthy came to be intellectually 
convinced of Marxist League policy, (M. McCarthy, Generation in 
Revolt, (1953), 258; M. McCarthy to Sara, 27 Jan. 1938, Warwick 
M. S. S. ). 
2 Interview with R. Groves, April 1980. 
For Harber's view. and that of the Militant Group, on replacing the 
S. L., see-the discussion on the Socialist League at Minutes, 
. 
London E. C., (Militant Group), 20 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. -J. H. 2A/4. 
3 'For material reasonst. British Trotskyists may have met Shachtman 
and Muste as they passed through Britain on their way to Geneva, 
(L. Trotsky to Muste, 'How the Conference Was and Wasn't Prepared', 
17 July 1936, Writings : Supplement (1934-40), 698-703). 
4 for Discussion, 28 Nov. 1936. 
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Party from the I. L. P. Attempts were being made in 1936 by Marxist 
League members, and notably Wicks, to gather the factions together 
round a strong Trotsky Defence Committee. But the Marxist League was 
resistant to thp Geneva resolution, and especially its emphasis on 
Labour Party work. The only tangible gain of the national meeting was 
a commitment by all participants to set up a national coordinating 
committee izi response to Trotsky's suggestion ofa Lenin Club'to 
I 
ensure. cooper, ation. 
The M. L. viewed the existence of a separate Bolshevik- 
Leninist group in the Labour Party as impossible to justify and a 
fault not of its making. 
2 
The Bolshevik-Leninists themselves saw the 
M. L. by its presence in the Labour Party as closer to the Geneva 
resolution with its emphasis on concentration of forces within Social 
Democracy than was the Marxist Group, which was in late 1936 leading 
an independent existence. 
3 Spurred by the crisis surrounding the 
Unity Campaign the Bolshevik-Leninists approached the Marxist-League 
for a meeting to discuss joint activity. The Marxist League, however, 
insisted on the presence of the Marxist Group since it placed far less 
value than did the Bolshevik-Leninists on tactical agreement, over the 
need to be within the Labour Party. 
4 The meeting of all three on 
I ibid. Trotsky had suggested the Lenin Club in the 'Interview by 
Collins', Writings (1935-36), 77. 
2A Short Statement from the Marxist League to the delegates from the 
Youth Militant Group and the Marxist Group, 11 Oct. 1936, 
(WWa-mick M. S. S. 15/4/l/13). 
3 For the views of the Bolshevik-Leninists, see Chapter VII. 
4 It reasoned that the need was-to draw together all those who stood 
for the Fourth International rather than make decisions for or 
against the Labour Party or the I. L. P., ibid. - 
FI 
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14 February 1937 failed-to solve any problems, 
I 
Still separated from the other groups by tactical differences 
and personal antipathy, the M. L. faced 1937 without even a base forý 
activity. The-Red Flag appeared sporadically after Februaryý and was 
published for the last time in October-1937. Differences developed 
within the'League. Groves, had perhaps ceased to believe in the need 
for an organised Trotskyist faction. - His-rapid advance within the 
Socialist League may-have been due to this as well*as to his undoubted 
ability as a propagandist. In April 1937 he had become prospective 
parliamentary candidate for Aylesbury, where he was the following year 
to fight an 
3 
_ýmportant 
by-election. After yearsof sectarian politics 
he, and also Hugo Dewar, put value on the Socialist Left Federation$ a 
body which kept them in touch with people outside the factional 
struggle. 
4 
They had enough support behind them in October for agreement 
to be reached on dissolving the Marxist League and putting an end to 
The. Red Flag. 
I See Chapter VIII. 
2, It came out in three issues after this date, perhaps chiefly 
deserving attention for the way it put before British readers 
statements from the P. O. U, M. revealing the murderous course of 
events in Barcelona. See especially its issue for May-June 1937. 
3 See Appendix 
4 Dewar explained his views to the fusion conference of 27 Feb. 1938, 
(R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 1, (April 1938), 14-15. ). He flatly 
opposed any attempt to transform the S. L. F. into a Trotskyist body. 
I 
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The history of the Communist/Marxist League is a lesson in 
the damage brought by disunity. It had capable members who lacked 
sufficient flexibility and sense. of proportion to Seize an opportunity 
provided by the-%I. L. P. in 1933. Their political independence led. them 
to see that in 1934 there were greater prospects in the Labour Party and 
especially the Socialist League. But just as the I, L. P. Trotskyists 
lacked the C. L. leaders'greater organising ability, derived from a 
communist training, so they'in turn lacked sufficient members to turn 
the tide their way in the S. L. Worse still they proved unableýto keep 
in being as an organised fraction and insufficiently firm, in their 
politics to withstand the pressure of an unaccustomed environment. 
It is possible that greater firmness in 1935 and 1936 might have led to 
action being taken against them by the Labour Party apparatus or even 
the Socialist League. As it was they were unable to rally a majority 
against Cripps when it really mattered. They had failed to unite with 
Harber's Bolshevik-Leninists in the League of Youth. They lacked a 
long term perspective of working within the Labour Party. It is 
therefore difficult to see what alternative they had to dissolution in 
October 1937, though external events were to haul them back into the 
. British Trotskyist mainstream. 
f 
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vi TROTSKYISM AND BRITISH RESPONSES TO THE 
MOSCOW TRIALS, 1936 - 1938. 
The Moscow Trials offer a plateau from which to observe the 
limited progress of Trotskyism in the 1930s. There was more criticism 
of the-Trials in Britain than is generally appreciated, but this was 
outweighed by the heavy pressure of official opinion and strong - 
communist influence. The period covered by the three trials and the 
Generals purge'(August 1936 to March 1938) was one of dramatic 
political developments: nearly two years of civil war in Spain and of 
the popular front government in France; the march of Hitler, first 
into the Rhineland and into Austria; the progressive reversal of 
Labour's earlier opposition to rearmament; the move of the bulk of the 
Labour Left and the communists from a working class united front to 
support for a popular front and then a peace alliance. 
In such a world as that of the years before 1939, there was 
a disposition on the part of many to seek unity, in alliance with the 
Soviets abroad, and all available forces at home, in the face of a 
mounting fascist threat. This made easier the efforts of British 
communists to secure acceptance of the verdict of the trials, however 
bizarre in style and content. Russia, it seemed, was the only hope, 
and it. took more than eighteen months of trial and 'plot' finally to 
alienate liberal opinion. 
It has been argued that the trials were less controversial 
in Britain than in America because of Trotskyist weakness and lack of 
support among the intelligentsia, because the-Spanish Civil War 
1, 'When reports of labour camps and rigged trials and forced confessions 
came through, it was easy to discuss them as yet another example of 
capitalist hostility', Ted Willis, Wýatever Happened to Tom Mix? 
(1970)p 171. 
rI 
161. 
diverted attention, and because'influential press reporting accepted 
the official line. 
I Without a doubt, concern over the menace of 
fascism and war, the central political controversy of the day, was far 
more immediate in Britain than in the United States. It was to be 
suggested that the Trials themselves weakened Soviet Russia, considered 
the main bulwark against fascism., But more difficult to resist was the 
argument thatýit was' Trotskyism, all-pervasive, ' nebulously,. defined, 
which caused disunity in the battle against reaction.. The Trotskyist 
case that the Soviet economic systems must be supported but not its 
political regime was difficult to carry. Indee4, in the west, the 
opening of the first trial marked the moment when communis tý were no 
longer prepared to concede to Trotskyists a legitimate place in the 
labour movement from which they might advance their critique. 
Earlr, -iW-1936, Trotskyists in the Labour League of Youth were 
being relatively gently handled. Communist sympathisers had withdrawn 
by then from the I. L. P., but the emnity between them and the 
Trotskyists did not approach the pitch of later years. In the Socialist 
League, Groves and Marxist League members did not face accusations of 
being agents of counter-revolution. As for the intellectual world, 
destined to be most scarred by the trials, it was still possible for 
2 
writers to be reviewed on the merit of their work. 
Trotsky himself was closely observing Soviet affairs. In 
May 1936, he observed from his Norway exile that Stalin was facing a 
I N. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, (1959), 47-8. 
2 In 'Writers under two flags', (Left Review, (Feb. 1936), 228-30), 
Charles Madge felt able to review Problems of Soviet Literature, a 
symposium which included essays by Bukharin and Radek, without any 
gratuitous cuffs. 
162. 
greater threat than before, but that his. methods, and those of 
Yagoda, the G. P. U. chief, had been refined. 
I Even he cannot have 
expected anything as grotesque as the trials. When they began he 
. mmediately bent every effort toward debunking the charges cascading 
-upon him from Moscow. He had time to rush out several statements to 
2 
the press and, crucially, to call for an investigation by the world's 
labour organisations, or better still their leaders. Within days 
howeverl Soviet diploInatic pressure led to him being placed effectively 
under house arrest and then suppressed by a legal 
-gag 
which prevented 
him replying to the charges. 
3 
Some of Trotsky's early opinions appeared in Britain. His 
15 August statement, 'Let Us Know The Facts', in reply to charges 
rehearsed by the Tass Bureau, was printed by The New Leader with 
Tass's comments. 
4 
He also told the News Chronicle that the trials were 
I 
, one of the biggest, clumsiest and most criminal plots against world 
I 'The Spiciest Dishes are Still to Comel, (May 1936), Writings (1935-36) 
109. 
2 Notably 'To the Public opinions of the Workers of the Whole World'$ 
1(4 July 1936), Writings (1935-36), 35-7. 
3 After August 1936, Trotsky was effectively silenced for four crucial 
months, the time remaining to him in Norway before his removal to 
Mexico at the end of the year. His enforced silence clearly helped 
the Trials with their stunning verdicts to gain credibility. His 
fate was for this time in the hands of his followers in the West. 
The shifting attitude of Norwegian Social Democracy towards Trotsky, 
changing from warm comradeship and hospitality when he arrived 
from France in 1935, to frigidly forcing him out, is chronicled 
imaginatively by, Isaac Deutscher in The Prophet Outcast (1963), 
292-355. 
4 'Trotsky Accused and Trotsky Replies', The New Leader, 21 Aug. 1936. 
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opinion. 
I 
Emrys Hughes in Forward, and - initially'- Fenner Brockway 
also supported his call for an international commission of 
investigation. to which he would present evidence. 
2 
This demand 
became refined-to a call for an international working class inquiry 
into the first trial, which was backed by the Spanish P. O. U. M. and the 
ý, ý. 
I London. 
-Bureau. 
3, 
Finally, The Red-FlM, at that, moment the only 
Trotskyist journal in regular publication, also published Trotsky's 
statement of 15 August with a call for resolutions to be sent to the 
Labour Party N. E. C., the T. U. C. General Council and the Norwegian' 
governmen .4 
But while all this provided an input into the labour 
movement, it was of very limited importance compared with the general 
press. It might only have been the Daily Worker which headlined a 
report 'Shoot the Reptiles! ', but there was a general disposition to 
take the trials as Moscow intended. The News Chronicle did sound a 
note of editorial doubt, but A. J. Cummings, its reporter, was impressed 
by the confessions of the defendants. The other daily paper to sound 
a sceptical note was the Manchester' Guardian, which had carried 
occasional articles by Trotsky during the 1930s. Support for Trotsky 
in the right-wing press was widely commented by communists. 
5 
I (Interview), 26 Aug. 1936. 
2-The New Leader, 28 Aug. 1936 
'. 
The London and Southern Counties 
divisiona7-council of the I. L. P. also supported the inquiry call 
'without associating itself with Trotsky's views'. 
3 Reported by Brockway in The New Statesman, 19 Sept. 1936. 
4 With Dewar's account of the events leading to his confinement, 
'Fascists-and Stalinists Hound Leon Trotsky!, The Red FlM, 
Sept. 1936. 
5 No study of the attitude of the Tory press. in Britain has been 
undertaken. 
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In a hostile atmosphere, the British Trotskyists faced their 
sternest test. Success would not only vindicate Trotsky but confirm 
their right to be part of the labour movement. Some early efforts 
were made. A cTowd of'2-300 gathered in Hyde Park on 31 August 1936 
to call'for an international investigation and support Trotsky's 
, right of'asylum. 
I 
-, On 9 September the first indoor meeting, against 
the"Trials was held, But the British Trotskyist movement was at a low 
ebb. -, Marxist Group members were dribbling out of the I, L. P, into the 
Labour Party where they had not yet hardened into a coherent faction. 
The Marxist League, though small, was advancing. in the Socialist 
League but it was, of all the British factions, the most distant from 
Trotsky, who had advised his British supporters to struggle against 
Groves. 2 None of the three British groups was in a position within 
social democracy even comparable to that obtained by the American 
TrotSkyists, who entered the Socialist Party on the very eve of the 
first Trial. Divided, and lacking in influence, the British Trotskyists 
were not well placed for a fight against the odds. 
Each British group turned its meagre propaganda resources 
over in part to putting Trotsky's case against'the Moscow charges. 
But so isolated were they before'the first Trial that the key to 
success palpably lay in mobilising liberal and radical opinion on 
Trotsky's behalf. In the United States and in France, where defence 
committees were also to be established, there was a non-Stalinist 
sector within the left*intelligentsia including numbers of writers at 
I Fight, 10 Oct. 1936. A delegation sent to the Soviet Embassy did 
not gain entrance. 
2 'Interview by Collins', Writings (1935-36). 77. 
fI 
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one time associated with Trotsky. This was much less the case in 
Britain and the Trotskyists had to create a favourable atmosphere if 
they were to make progress. 
The British Defence Committee was'primarily a product of work 
undertaken by the Marxist League. Harry Wicks approached the Marxist 
Group about the, possibility of forming one soon after the August trial. 
A provisional committee was established, but it led only a precarious 
2 
existence during the rest of the year. After several otheiudeclined 
3 
to act as provisional secretary the position fell to Wicks. 'He set 
about circulating left celebrities to gain their backing for an appeal 
for an inquiry. 
The response was not encouraging. In 1929-31 Trotskylý had 
still been a name to conjure with in Britain. By autumn 1936 his 
appeal had palpably shrunk. A changed world political context made 
unity a far more seductive call at the later date, and the Communist 
Party, no longer at its sectarian nadir, wgs incomparably better placed 
to put it out. 
I Dewar to*Wicks an. ? '19373. Li 
2 Only Wicks and another turned up for a 16 October meeting. Not more 
than three meetings could have been held in 1936, ('Charles Sumner' 
to C. L. R. James, 10'March 1937). The University of Hull papers 
contain no minutes of meetings before 1937. 
3 One who. declined was Stuart Purkis, who had parted with the League in 
1934, since which time he had devoted himself to trade union affairs, 
rising to the executive of the Railway Clerks' Association and the 
presidency of the St. Pancras Trades Council. He was to be a 
stalwart of the committee, the only. active participant not a member 
of one of the Trotskyist groups, (S. Purkis to Dewar, 12 Oct. 1936). 
4 The first circular from the Trotskyist movement was of Trotsky's 
reply to Tass to which was appended a petition to the Norwegian 
government over the Norwegian gag, over the name Judith Walters, 
(n. d., Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/l/75). 
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I 
S'.. ý 
Kingsley Martin was asked to lend his name. He had initially 
found the August trial wholly / 
Inconvincing, 
though he failed to report 
that the Norwegian government had imposed silence on Trotsky by 
judicial means6, He argued that the trial helped Conservatives, 
Transport. House. and opponents of the popular'front. Following letters 
to the New Statesman from communists and other supporters of, the trial$ 
his condemnation became more cautious, focussing on the need for a 
national explanation and the insubstantiality of confessions which 
lacked corroborative evidence. 
I He felt there was a plot but believed 
the Trials argued widespread discontent in the U. S. S. R. Privately he 
told Purkis an inquiry would be a good thing and he would be pleased 
to discuss it in the New Statesman if it was proposed 'by responsible 
people'. 
2 
He would not associate himself with it however since his 
partisanship would'then inhibit him from joining the discussion. 
D. N. Pritt, K. C., M. P. for. Hammersmith North and a close 
adherent of communist policy, predictably refused to sign. 
3 *He had 
been present in Moscow during the-August trial and pronounced it 
judicially fair. His verdict was given wide coverage in the British 
press, and he was shortly to write the introduction to W. G. Shepherd's 
pamphlet, The Moscow TrIal. 
4 Trotsky believed Prittis presence in 
V, The New Statesman and Nation, '22,29 August and 5 September 1936. 
2 This presumably meant people who were not Trotskyists, 
(Kingsley Martin to Purkis, 15 September 1936). 
3 D. N. Pritt, M. P., to J. Walters, 17 Sept. 1936. He took the 
opportunity, in declining, to correct her account of the trial. 
4 This pamphlet of the Anglo Russian Parliamentary Committee 
explained that Trotsky was a bad organiser and had not in fact 
organised, the 1917 revolution, (B. Pearce, 'The British Stalinists 
and the Moscow Trials' in M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce, Essays on the 
History of Communism in Britain, (1975), 221). 
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Moscow at the time of the-trial to have been more than a coincidence, 
though the Norwegian gag made him unable to express this view publicly. 
2 
When Pritt saw the coverage given the Trials by Emrys Hughes in Forward, 
he broke off alongstanding friendship. 
3 Hughes, who had been friendly 
if occasionally mocking - towards Trotsky over the years, gave over 
much space to his-defence and ridiculed the August Trial as 'crazy 
stupidity', -, Yet-the_Trotsky Defence-Committee seems, not to have been , 
aware of the potential of this unsolicited friend who was engaged 
that autumn in an extended debate with Zelda K. Coates of the Anglo- 
Russian Friendship Committee, a persistent apologist for the trials., 
Its contact with Hughes apparently dates only from late 1937, by which 
time the game was won and lost. 
Fenner Brockway was under instruction from the I. L. P. 
executive not to sign the appeal 
5 but he told Wicks he might be allowed 
to examine documents from the Trial with other. prominent persons with 
the intention of publishing a report, 
6 Thisýcame to nothing, though he 
was informally helpful in providing Wicks with a list of intellectuals 
'Two Crooked Lawyers', I Feb. 1937, Writings : Supplement (1934-40 
729. In later years Pritt continued to believe that reactions to 
the trial were a straight index of friendship or emnity to the 
U. S. S. R. There had been 'tragic abuses' during the Stalin period 
but the trials were not among them, From Right to Left, (1965), 
108-115. 
2 'In 'Socialist' Norway', Writings (1935-36), 129. 
3 Emrys Hughes to 'Sumner', 15 Feb. 1938. 
4 See for example Forward for 12 Sept. 1936. 
5 F. Brockway to Dewar, 22 Oct. 1936. Dewar sought to allay his fears 
by expressing the hope that an authoritative. committee might be built. 
6 H. Wicks to Denise Naville, 29 Nov. 1936. Denise Naville lived 
with Trotsky's son Leon Sedov, the coordinator of the European 
Trotskyist anti-trial drive. Wicks may have addressed the letter to 
her for security reasons. 
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likely to prove amenable and making, suggestions. 
I But he, would prove 
the biggest obstacle within the London Bureau to backing the inquiry 
campaign. 
In thq Labour League of Youth, the Militant Group was 
embroiled in an increasingly bitter. fight with the Advance faction led 
by-Ted Willis; the Marxist Group was in the process of severing all 
connections with the I. L. P. and in December. 1936, it. pub , licly, declared its 
independence, None of the Trotskyisti, groups had a significant trade 
union following. It-is not therefore surprising that-the best source 
of support for the provisional committee late in 1936 came from the 
milieu of the Socialist League, now approaching the climax of its 
tense relationship with Transport House. 
On I December 1936, the Manchester Guardian published 
A letter from the Provisional Committee for the Defence of'Leon Trotsky 
over the signature of H. N. Brailsford, Frank-Horrabin, Conrad Noel, 
Fred Shaw, Rowland Hill, Eleanor Rathbone and Garry Allingham, as well 
2 
as those of Groves, Wicks and Purkis. The letter protested at the 
continued legal gag on Trotsky in Norway and called for an international 
inquiry. Wicks's hope was that this would break the ice and lead, to 
better things. 3 It was misplaced, This was a moderate list and even 
I- One of which was the possibility of taking action for libel against 
communist and fascist papers. Though Brockway undertook to obtain 
a legal opinion it was Wicks who approached Arthur Reade, now a 
prosperous lawyer for advice. Reade thought the odds were stacked 
against success but was prepared to make the attempt, given 
solicitor's instructions. He made it plain, however, that while he 
considered Trotsky as I the most superb warrior in the 'cause of the 
working people in modern history', he had no sympathy for the Fourth 
International. Wicks knew of his association with the New Party and 
was interested only in his legal advice, (A. E. E. Reade to Wicks, 
2 Dec. 1936; author's interview with Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). Reade 
did, however, write to The Times and The Spectator supporting Trotsky. 
2. ý It also appeared in. The New Leader for 4 Dec. 1936 and in the January 
1937 Red Flag. 
3 Wicks to Naville, 29 Nov. 1936. 
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so it was to prove impossible to maintain. 
I By the*same date the 
Americans had gathered Norman Thomas, Dewey, Eastman, James T. Farrell, 
Dos, Passos, Sydney Hook and Suzanne La Follette. 'Surely', asked 
The Red Flag, '-there are in Great Britain sufficient forces to strengthen 
the work of our own Defence Committee? '.. 
The answer was in the negative. It has been argued that the 
reason may lie in the split within the British intelligentsia not 
between Stalinism and Trotskyism, but between commitment and the lack 
Of Ito 
2, 
But-an intellectual who was aware only of-the broad issues of 
war or peace, fascism or democracy, was likely to',. see only hair- 
splitting in Trotsky's cause. And yet some of the blame for the lack 
of initial impact must also lie with the weakness of the Trotskyists 
themselves. Rousing the intellectuals was of prime importance, as 
Sedov insisted. Yet C. L. R. James, the most eminent of the Trotskyists 
intellectually, played no central role in the committee, failing to 
attend its meetings and preferring to counter the Trials through his 
new paper Fight. The proletarian character of the early Trotskyist 
movement in Britain might be seen as an advantage. But the Americans 
gained crucial assistance from their acquisition, through their 1935 
fusion with the American Workers Party of A. J. Muste, of an 
impressive layer of intellectuals who were to prove_ 
I Brailsford and Horrabin, the two signatories best known in the labour 
movement were to curtail their support. Rowland Hill, the Bradford 
Trades Council president and Conrad Noel, Christian Socialist and 
Vicar of Thaxted, were minor figures. There was no one on the list 
with a major reputation outside politics which makes a strong 
contrast to the position in the United States. 
2 S. Samuels, 'English Intellectuals and Politics in the 1930st, 
P. Rieff (ed. ) On Intellectuals, (New York, 1969), 242, There was 
certainly no English equivalent of Partisan Review, (J. Gilbert, 
'Literature and Revolution in the United S-ta-te-s-T-, J. C. H,, Vol. II, 
no, 2, (1967), 161-76). 
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their worth the following'year. 
I 
And starting with'some of the 
intelligentsia made it far easier for the Trotskyists in America to 
recruit more. 
At the end of 1936 the Provisional Committee had little on 
which to congratulate itself. It had failed to persuade numbers of 
celebrities of sufficient prestige that Trotsky's cause needed their 
support. It had organised few public activities. -The most successful 
work on Trotsky's. behalf had been done in the pages of Forward by' 
2 Emrys Hughes., with whom they were not in contact. 
_ 
Since 1935 Forward 
had appeared in a London edition and was circulated by 
Herbert Morrison's Labour machine in the capital. Morrison, hammer of 
the communists, had his own, more traditional, reasons for taking an 
interest in the trials, 
3 but his attitude confirms the way that labour 
movement critics of Moscow increasingly-could be found only among the 
opponents, right and left, of the projected popular front. 
4 
V For the work of the American Committee, J. P. Cannon, The History of 
American Trotskyism, (New York, 1973), 241; C. A. Myers, 
The Prophet's Amy, (Westport, Conn., 1977), 133-7; Shachtman's 
powerful polemic Behind the Moscow Trial, (New York 1936) clarified 
by the context of its thesis just how much assistance the American 
.. Trotskyists received in the work from their presence in the 
Socialist Party. (Shachtman's book was first published in Britain 
in 1971. ) 
2 For two years Hughes engaged in a running debate with Zelda K. Coates 
of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Committee over the form and 
significance of the-frials. 
3 He thought the-rrials one reason for the rebuff suffered by the 
communists at the Plymouth T. U. C., (Forward, 19 Septý 1937). 
4 Into this category also would fall the Independent Socialist Party, 
I. L. P. dissidents whom Elijah Sandham had led out in 1934 in protest 
against working with the communists. The I. S. P. welcomed the idea 
of a commission but advised against a meeting in Manchester, its 
base, unless success was certain, (I. S. P. to Trotsky Defence 
Committee, 9 Dec. 1936 and 5 March 1937)'. 
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It is scarcely a surprise to learn that the dying weeks of 
1936 saw the British Trotskyists engrossed in faction-fighting which 
left little space for a sustained effort to lift the Trotsky Defence 
Committee. I The papers of the factions, and notably the Red Flag 
and Fight) were each devoting space to arguments against the trials 
but they were mutually estranged over-essentially secondary tactical 
questions. Success might have drawn them together, but it now 
became clear that even the ground they thought they_had gained was 
slipping. Brailsford, whose backing for the. 1 December letterhad 
been taken as indicating adherence to the Provisional Committee, 
withdrew when this construction was put on his'signature in the 
American press. 
2 
He had vacillated for some time, airing iný public 
the inner anguish many others must have felt who wanted to criticise 
the Soviets. 
3 
The Militant group at least saw the importance of 
drawing together in view of the events*of January 1937,4 and regular 
meetings of the Defence Committee seem to have occurred in the 
New Year. 
I Wicks recorded this as a constraint in his letter to Denise Naville 
of 29 November 1936. He confided to May Matlow that the stature of 
the Committee was 
, 
at risk in view of the failure of other Trotskyists 
to send in material and complained of 'a complete absence of 
cooperation', (letter of 31 Dec. 1936). 
2 Reynolds News, 4 April 1937. Sumner wrote to the paper's editor 
on 8 April to try and limit the damage, arguing that the Committee 
was not partisan but existed to achieve an international inquiry. 
This was an honest statement of intent, but simply did not square 
with Committee composition. 
3 Brailsford was impressed by the fact of confession, yet thought the 
guilt of all save Stalin not 'plausible history', ('Moscow Trial 
must not shake our Faith in Russia; Reynolds News, 7 Feb. 1937. ) 
The Reynolds postbag was dominated by critics of Brailsford's 
misgivings. 
4 They proposed common action with the Marxist League because of the 
advent of the Unity Campaign. 
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1937 brought with it the second Trial. Unlike previous key 
events in Russia involving the Opposition, there was this time no 
shortage of information. It was a question of interpretation not 
discovery. Thewe was an extensive and faciual coverage in 
The'Manchester Guardian throughout January. 
1. 
, The letter page'of that 
paper provided a fascinating mixture of responses to the Trials. In 
4s columns could be read the, views of Dr. -Steinberg, -a Menshevik who 
even-handedly attested the isolation of St4lin's regime and the eager 
desire of the-opposition for war; oflJoan Beauchampqýan apologist; 
of A. J. P. Taylor,, no longýr a party member, who commented on Lenin's 
'infallible gift' for choosing counter-revolutionaries as his closest 
associates, and asserted that the achievements of the Revolution would 
survive Stalin and socialists cease to be Stalinists. 
2 
On the same 
day as Taylor's letter was published, Low's cartoon portrayed Hitler 
equipped with a shotgun on an 'anti world revolution expedition' 
unaware that nearby his quarry 'the Trotsky Policy' had been buried. 
The Manchester Guardian, of course, wap no more, fond of 'the Trotsky 
I Policy' than anyone else, though this did not prevent Moscow being 
sufficiently stung by its coverage and publication policy 
3 
to allege 
Trotskyist sympathies among its staff, 
4 
and denounce its's a 'fascist- 
speaking trumpet'. Pat Sloan, presenting himself somewhat coyly as 
I ...... of all the liberal and radical newspapers . ...... the most 
cogent and compelling in its scepticism', J. Saville, 'May Day 
1937', in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History, 
1918-1939 (1977), 266. 
2 The Manchester Guardian, 2 Feb. 1937. 
3 On 25 January 1937 Trotsky's cable replying to allegations made at 
the Trial was printed in full. The following day his second cable- 
gram appeared, as did a denial by Erwin Wolf of the I. S., that 
Piatakov had ever made an alleged visit to Trotsky in December 1935. 
An article by Sedov was also published. Trotsky's denunciation of 
the Trials was printed by the Daily Express, also on 26 January, 
Trotsky had arrived in Tampico, Mexico, on 9 January 1937 and was 
able to reply point by point to the charges made against him in the 
second Trial. 
4 C. L. R. James was, of course, one of the paper's cricket correspondents. 
r 
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'an Englishman who has lived in the U. S. S. R. for five years', replied 
to Trotsky and Sedov. He disputed that Zinoviev and Kamenev were 
leaders of the Revolution and pursued the argument that Trotsky's 
analysis of thL-%nature of the regime necessarily led to belief in the 
need to use force to overthrow it. But IY. Z. 1, a Menshevik, called 
for an independent court, and concluded that the charges would 
discredit the Soviet dictatorship more than the Opposition. 
D. N, Pritt marched toward the sound of gunfire on 5 February. His case 
was not a model of jurisprudence. Contacts between Germany or Japan 
and the Trotskyists should surprise no one familiar with diplomatic 
methods, he argued, and anyway (echoing Sloan) forcible overthrow 
followed necessarily from Trotsky's political estimate of the Stalin 
government, 
2 
He detected, however, a reluctant move by British 
opinion towards acceptance of the genuineness of the Trials, and he 
clinched his argument with this question: 
'If it were not so why would the government have introduced 
the November 1936 constitution, a relaxation of the power 
of the Executive, and the increase of individual freedom? 13 
More perceptive was the letter of 'a former member of the Comintern 
Executive' which appeared the same day. 
I The Manchester Guardian, 3 Feb. 1937. 
2 This line of reasoning was much in favour, as is shown by the letter 
from William Rust to The Manchester Guardian on the same day. 
Dudley Collard, a Fabian lawyer and author of another pamphlet 
upholding the trials, refined the argument to explain Trotsky's plans 
as desperate measures born of knowledge that he would get no support 
in view of 'the rapid progress toward general prosperity', 
(, The Manchester Guardian, 5 Feb. 1937). 
3 Central to Marjorie Pollitt's pamphlet, Defeat of Trotskyism, 
(Dec. 1937) was the argument that the So-viets, if they were unsound, 
would not dare to introduce a new constitution. This was a popular 
argument among defenders of the Trials as the pages of Forward and 
The New Statesman and Nation testified. 
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'If the Nazis (not the'Trotskyists) had wanted to show 
the world the rottenness of the whole Stalin regime 
they could not have improved on the two great Moscow 
Trials. ' 
This writer cautiously predicted a mo-fe by Stalin in a German direction, 
the very crime of which Trotsky and his associates had been accused. 
Communist polemics against Trotskyism accelerate from 1936. 
Trotskyisml, a pamphlet by many hands appeared in 1937, as did a 
pamphlet by Marjorie Pollitt entitled Defeat of Trotskyisme 
The Daily Worker and Labour Monthly were busy. To counter this the- 
Trotskyists had only their own papers, cruelly dubbed 'miserable 
little rags' by Orwell. Yet in the labour movement there was a debate 
about the trials. Advance in 1937, Controversy (until the communists 
withdrew from it), Forward, The New Leader and The Plebs all gave 
space for the expression of different points of view, sometimes by 
Trqtskyists. This did not sustain Trotskyism, but it certainly 
contributed to the eventual disenchantment of liberals*and non-aligned 
2 
socialists with the Soviets. 
I The second trial was simultaneous with critical events in 
Britain. The Unity Campaign was launched in January 1937, and a chain 
of events begun which would lead to the voluntary dissolution of the 
Socialist League in May. Hopes were high, but the communists had 
extracted as a price for cooperation, that criticism of the Soviets be 
suspended. Cripps, in the eye of the storm, rebuffed an approach from 
the Defence Committee. Horrabin, of whom much might have been expected, 
I One publication remarkably uninterested in the Trials and Trotskyism 
was the internal organ of the C. P. G. B., Discussion, which appeared 
from 1936 but never matched Controversy for interest. 
2 There is an extensive discussion of the reactions of many; fellow- 
travellers to the Trials in D. Caute, The Fellow-Travellers (1973), 
86,115-26. 
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turned down a request to preside at a February meetingln a letter at 
once warm and frank: 
'I sympathise very much indeed with its object, but I 
feel that the success of the Unity Campaign may mean 
-a great deal to the Movement here, and I ought not, toý 
prejudice it by any individual action which might 
cause. friction. Believe me, I have thought this over 
seriously before-replying. 
" 
Brailsford, who had been 
'sympathetic 
the previous year, now 
refused to send a letter to the Memorial Hall. Despairing Wicks 
informed Dewar that their efforts looked likely to be fruitless. 
'Sumaerl was convinced that the Unity Campaign pr6vented I. L. P. and 
S. L. leaders offering any help. 
2 
He wrote in March: 
'Unlike the American Committee for the Defence of 
Leon Trotsky, which contains some of the best known 
leaders of American thought, the British Committee 
has remained a small body. We are doing our best 
to enlarge it'. 
The American Committee was able to convene a rally 7,000 strong at the 
New York Hippodrome on 9 February to call for an international inquiry. 
I Horrabin to Wicks, 26 January 1937. 
2 'Sumner' to Bertrand Russell, 10 March 1937. Once Russell had helped 
secure the release of a political prisoner he allowed the Committee to 
use his name but made it u=istakeably clear that none of his time 
or money would be at its disposal. 
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The next day a British audience of 500, at the Memorial Hall, 
12.. heard Sidney Silverman, and Garry Allingham with Socialist League 
and Trotsky Defence Committee speakers making a further appeal for an 
in ternational commission. Silverman, the main speaker, scorned the 
notion of a Trotsky-Japanese link, and stated that the exiled leader, 
and not Stalin, was Lenin's heir. Y. C. L, members disrupted the 
3 
meeting, but it backed the call for an investigation into the charges.. 
The following week a further meeting was held, this time by the 
Friends of the Soviet Union, under the chairmanship of Victor Gollancz. 
James, Purkis and Matlow were invited to put their view of the Trials 
from the Platform. The Manchester Guardian reporter felt that James 
had made out a 'rather stronger' case than Purkis. Pritt added his 
weight to the views of Gollancz. This appears to have been one of 
the few cases where a debate took place about the Trials on equal 
terms, 
4 
The Memorial Hall meeting was a financial success though 
dogged later by a misunderstanding typifying inter-group. relations, 
when, through an oversight, the name of E. L. Davis of the Militant 
Group was not advertised with those of other speakers. 
5 Among the 
I Sidney Silverman had concluded as early as September 1936 that a 
Trotskyist plot with the Nazis against Stalin's life was impossible, 
(E. Hughes, Sidney Silverman : Rebel in Parliament, (1969), 60). 
2A member of the London Area Council of the Socialist League, war- 
time Daily Mirror journalist and later Labour M. P. for Gravesend. 
3 The Manchester Guardian, 11 Feb. 1937; Fight, Feb. 1937; Sara and 
James were on the pl=tform, (J. Saville, 'May Day 1937', in 
A. Briggs and J. Saville, op. cit., 284n). With the establishment 
Of the full committeet Harry Wicks, the provisional secretary, was 
succeeded by Hilary Sumer-Boyd (q. v. ). Reports of the contributions 
by Silverman and Groves also appear in The Star, 11 Feb. 1937. 
4 The Manchester Guardian, 18 Feb. 1937. The previous day John Paton, 
no longer an I. L. P. er, had, in a long letter to the paper's editor, 
drawn on his personal acquaintance with Trotsky and familiarity with 
his ideas to dispute salient points of the prosecution case. 
5 Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee, 19 Feb. 1937. -- 
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I 
active workers for the conmittee was May Matlow, of the Militant 
group, who seems to have undertaken much of the typing. Wicks, Sara, 
Dewar and Boyd 
2 
commonly attended meetings, Groves seems never to 
have come, but Rurkis was a stalwart. From the other groups 
Alexander and Jackson might appear for the Militant, but the Marxist 
Group apparently went its own way. When Harry Wicks, pleaded excess of 
work and resigned the secretaryship in March'1937, it was , 
Hilary Sumner-Boyd who, on Dewar's proposal9, replaced him. 
3 One of' 
Sumner's functions was to circulate Trotskyl, s, articles to the British 
press. His success in 1937 was limited and he had none at all with 
IA Marxist Group member and wife of Bert Matlow, who had her own 
links with the International Secretariat in Paris. 
2 Hilary Sumner-Boyd (1910-76) was born in Boston, Mass., and educated 
privately there and at Christ Church, Oxford. He spoke Greek, 
German, French, Turkisý and the Latin languages. His father had 
known John Reed and Trotsky appears to have been. acquainted with his 
mother. He was business manager of The Red Fla of the Marxist 
League and his flat at 238 Edgware Road, a centre for League 
activities, (The Times, 18 Sept. 1976; L. Trotsky to Sumner, 
21 May 1937, (Writings: Supplement (1934-40), 738); Interview with 
Harry Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). 
3 Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee, 5 March 1937. Boyd took 
the name 'Charles Sumner' in committee work, as it was felt the name 
of its secretary should not be one which appeared on The Red Flag. 
('Sumner' to C. L. R. James, 10 March 1937). He also occasionally 
used the pseudonym A. Boyd. On 16 April 'Hausa', and on 30 April 
'Raja Rao' attended the Defence Committee. Possibly both were 
foreign Trotskyists. 
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his own articles on Spainý 
I 
Forward, the New Statesman and the 
Manchester Guardian did publish his letter of 27. March pleading for 
affadavits pertaining to Trotsky's movements during the past seven 
years and f or f; indsg but the response was negligible. 
2 
In_March 1937 
the committee began'arrangements, on the request of Erwin Wolf, 
3 
for 
sworn statements to be made by Maxton, C. A. Smith and John Paton 
concerning 
'their 
visits to France in 1933, when the last two had met 
Trotsky. 4_ Wicks also had to draw up a statement concerning his visit 
5 to Copenhagen in 1932 . 
I. L. P. attitudes towards Trotsky fluctuated. They were not 
as close to espousing his cause as the communists alleged. The New 
Leader had publicised the withdrawal of his correspondence rights, 
6 
and Brockway attempted to gather what he saw as an impartial 
I The Manchester-Guardian editor wrote 'we do not think, however, that 
the 
, 
Manchester Guardian can fairly be criticised for having closed 
our pages either to Trotsky himself or to his sympathisers during 
the last few years', and declined Sumner's articles. Only late in 
the year and in 1938 did the most willing Labour journal editor, 
Emrys Hughes, start to have exclusive articles from. Trotsky far 
Forward. Summer had played a part in ensuring that he would not have 
to pay Trotsky royalties, (Writings (1937-38), 177). 
2 He did receive an invitation from G. T. Hudson, Fellow of All Souls 
and secretary of the Thursday Lunch Club for Oxford Socialist Dons 
to address the club (G. T. Hudson to Sumner, 18 May 1937). 
3 Erwin Wolf (1902-1937), a Czechoslovak refugee, was Trotsky's 
secretary in Norway. He made the request under his pseudonym of 
Braun to May Matlow. Later that year Wolf fell into the hands of 
G. P. U. agents in Spain and was never seen again. 
4 Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee for 19 March 1937. 
5 Sworn declarations were made by the three late in April 1937 but 
unfortunately they arrived in America too late to be useful, 
(C. Sumner to Brockway I May 1937). 
6 In its issue for 20 Nov. 1936. 
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commission with French, Scandinavian and American personnel. 
I But 
during the Unity Campaign the party distanced itself from Trotsky by 
attempting to occupy. a kind of middle ground 'on the second Trial: 
'We acknow4dge that we cannot answer the doubts 
raised by the Trial - neither, the evidence given-. 
by Radek on the one side, nor the questions put 4- 
-by-Trotsky on the other. 12. 
While. the I, L. P. urged the, Soviets not to-implement the 
sentences passed at the second Trial before an international commission 
had met, it also refused until that time to join Trotskyists in 
declaring the Trials to be frame-ups. 
3 When the composition of the 
Dewey Craission was first announced, the I. L. P. found it impressive. 
On 21 May 1937, however, Brockway announced that the London Bureau 
would not back the Commission since it had been set up through the 
efforts of the American Trotskyists, who were partisan. He urged an 
investigation which would deal not only with Trotsky's charges, but 
also Stalin's and which, moreover, would be a political inquiry. 
Trotsky exploded, dubbing Brockway 'Mr. Pritt No. 21.4 To him the 
1 Trotsky's removal to Mexico in December frustrated this effort, 
(Inside the Left, (1942), 258-9). 
2 The New Leader, Jan. 1937. ý 
3 The Scottish I. L. P. expressed disquiet at the new trial, following 
a heated controversy at its conference of January 1937, (Forward, 
30 Jan. 1937) but Caermichael, on behalf of the N. A. C., told the 
National Party Conference at Easter that 'the evidence at present 
available is inadequate to reach a final judgment', (The New Leader, 
2 April 1937)'. 
4 An article of 6 March 1937. Bropkway published it with. hip reply. 
'The Tragedy of Trotsky' restating the impartiality argument in 
The New Leader for 3 Sept. 1937. Sumner analysed Brockway's 
attitude in 'The Case of Leon Trotsky', Information Bulletin, 2, 
(July 1937). 
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the whole value of the Dewey Commission 
I lay precisely in the 
political differences he had with its members. There were no 
Trotskyists upon it as Brockway and Martin were to claim. 
The Committee never shook itself free of internecine 
quarrels. It was primarily the Marxist League which provided the 
impetus for activity: it also produced the two secretaries. The 
Marxist Group was interested in Trotsky's case, but considerably less 
solin, the'Committee, -which its-repres entatives attended only rarely? 
2 
Yet the Marxist Group was holding meetings of its own on the subject 
of the trials. 
3 
Relations were no better with the Militant Group, 
as Boyd observed: 
'The Committee has to contend with so many, 
obstacles, above all the United Front, that 
it is very difficult for it if it does not 
receive regular collaboration from the three 
Trotskyist groups in this country. 
It did not help matters when Erwin Wolf communicated with 
Britain through May Matlow and not the secretary of the committee. 
Lack of coordination also showed up when the Committee made arrangements 
to print Trotsky's Hippodrome speech simultaneously with a militant 
I The Dewey Commission was formed by an initiative of the American, 
British, French and Czech defence committees in March 1937. It was 
established to stage a counter-trial which was held in April, and 
that year published two volumes of evidence, The Case of Leon Trotsky 
and Not Guilty! Deutscher's account of the Commission proceedings 
is n The Prophet Outcast, 371-82. 
2A Marxist Group delegate was present at only one of the eight 
committee meetings up to 5 March 1937 ('Charles Sumner' to 
C'. L. R. James, 10 March 1937). 
3 This matter was discussed, though no action was taken, at the Defence 
Committee meeting of 5 March. 
4 'Charles Simmer' to C. L. R. James, 10 March 1937. 
5 Minutes of Trotsky Defence Committee, 19 March 1937. 
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qroup deal to, import the American edition in bulk. 
I Possibly it was 
lack of success which contributed to the fractions atmosphere at 
committee meetings - though a plausible case could be constructed in 
reverse. At the end of April 1937 there was a sharp disagreement 
over whether the Bulletin should be a vehicle carrying news of 
successes (at home) or information (from abroad). As secretary, Boyd 
was responsible for its content and the dispute was resolved in a 
sound, British way - by the appointment of May Matlow and Jackson to 
2 
make with him an editorial committee of three. )ýarxist Group 
cooperation did not increase markedly, despite occasional attendance 
at Committee meetings by Ballard. Committee publications seem to have 
been sold only by the Marxist League. 
3 These were not great in number. 
Only two issues of the Information Bulletin appeared and they reveal 
narrow interests. and participation. 
4 
The'accounts for May-July 1937 
indicate a considerable operating deficit. Another aspect of 
I The speech is Iýnown under the title I Stake My Life! Shaw was to 
be asked to write an introduction to' the Engli7h-edition which 
never materialised due to imports of the American edition undertaken 
by Sid. Sandel, Militant Group literature secretary and English 
agent for Pioneer Press, the New York Trotskyist Publishing House. 
2 Minutes of Trotsky Defence Committee, 30 April 1937. 
3 'Neither in the meetings of the committee, announcements of which 
have been regularly sent, nor in the selling of its publications, 
nor in the production of its Bulletins has the committee received 
the least help from the Marxist Group. ' (C. Sumner to Ballard, 
16 July 1937. ) 
4 And, perhaps, attacks on the wrong people: see Sumner, 'The Case of 
Fenner Brockway', Information Bulletin, 2, (July 1937). Elsewhere 
in the same issue were a re , view 
by Sumner of The Revolution Betrayed 
and World Revolution and an article_ by Hugo Dewar, 'The G. P. U. in 
Spa It has been suggested that there were five Information 
Bulletins (A. Penn, op. cit., 117 
5 Warwick M. S. S. 
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Committee work was contact with the United States, the main centre of 
activity. There was hope of obtaining the services of an English 
socialist for the Dewey Commission. Sumner proposed in early April 
' "that George Novýck be urged to invite Morrison or. Sydney Silverman to 
JOIn 3. t. 
I Later that month the Committee decided to approach Pritt 
and-Collard-to attend. 
2 The proposal foundered later in the year 
3 through shortage of cash. Sumner also made appeals for cash to help 
4 finance the Dewey, proceedings, but'it seems unlikely that large 
amounts were forthcoming. 
Criticism of the trials did not break through in the Left 
Book Club machine. Ivor Montagu, who admitted his earlier pilgrimage 
to Prinkipo wrote important articles in Left Book News, conveying the 
sentiments of the trials. He urged young men not -to be seduced by 
Trotsky's magnetism as he himself had been in 1931. Trotsky was now 
desperate, he explained, because of the impregnable. strength of the 
U. S. S. R. Even in this journal Montagu did not feel obliged to treat 
critics of the trials seriously-, 
5 An outraged Dewar complained to 
Gollancz, but was told that the journal could not carry . 
'all points 
of view', being constrained by space. Montagu's writing, Collancz 
thought,, had justified itself. 6 The Red Flag asserted that Gollancz 
had received. letters of protest. 
7 It called on all local Left Book 
I Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee, 2 April 1937. Silverman 
was chosen at the next meeting. 
2 Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee, 16 April 1937. 
3 The Dewey Commission was prepared to have a British member, but' 
could not finance the visit, (Suzanne LaFollette, secretary of the 
Commission, to Sumer, 29 July 1937). 
4 Warwick M. S. S. 
5 'The U. S. S. R. Month By Month : The Trial', Left Book News, (Oct. 
1936,123-8; 'The U. S. S. R. Month By Month : The Guilty', Left Book 
News, (April 1937), 326-32. 
6 (Victor Gollancz] to Hugo Dewar, 17 Oct. 1936, 
7 It quoted only one instance however, (The Red Flag, March-April 1937). 
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Clubs to raise the matterand secure 'freedom of opinion inside the 
Left Book Club and in the pages of the Left News'. Yet when the 
Defence Committee circulated twenty four Left Book Clubs it drew no 
iesponse. Sumner had to use. Th_e Red Flag to challenge Montagu and 
showed that he had misrepresented Trotsky by quoting him out of 
context, 
I 
Things were not greatly, different at Left Review, which 
II supported the trials and was 
impatient, of doubts. T, A. Jackson 
uncritically reported the proceedingsýand declared_that Trotsky-had 
behaved to Stalin just as he had to Lenin. 
2 Earlier in the year, 
the. willing Pat Sloan had savaged Gide's chronicle of disillusionment, 
Back from the U. S. S. R.. When a further volume of Gide, Afterthoughts o 
, 
the U. S. S. R., had been printed, Warburg placed a provocative text in 
an advertisement for it in Left Review, challenging communists to read 
3 
a view opposed to theirs. John Strachey, like Montagu, admitted to 
having been impressed by Trotsky in the past. He claimed his mind had 
been changed by Trotsky's reversal of views on the united front: he 
just opposed whatever Stalin said. The united front was in fact a 
supreme example of consistency in Trotsky's thought, but this did not 
shake Strachey's conviction, by the time of the second trial, that 
Trotskyists had to be driven out of the working class movement. 
4 
I The Red Flag, (May-June 1937). 
2 Left Review, (April 1937), 116-8. When a second edition of his 
Marxism and History was projected Jackson was reduced to trying to 
remove Trotsky and Bukharin from the reading list, (R. Challinor, 
John S. Clarke, (1977), 77-9. ). Neither Left Review nor Left News 
told thei ers that the 'transcript' of the trial was not a 
full one. 
3 Left Review, (Sept. 1937) 
4 J. Strachey, 'Trotskyism', Daily Worker, 22 Jan. 1937. 
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Controversy over the Left Book Club list was to reach a 
climax late in 1937, but even before then therewas disquiet. The 
Left Book Club by no means confined itself to comunist writers, but 
it published no., critics of Stalinism, particularly if, they stood'on 
the left of the-labour movement. In April, J. Allen Skinner floated 
in the New Statesman the idea of broadening the Clubýand, in particular, 
of snapping its exclusive ties with o publishing house, An ensuing 
correspondence brome evenly between supporters and opponents of the, 
idea. I By the middle of the year the idea of'a rival book club had 
2 Orwell's belief gained ground but it seems to have faded later. 
that ? the central stream of English literature was more or less 
directly under communist control 
3 for the three years before the war, 
I One enthusiast was Frank Horrabin, who had earlier suppressed his 
inclination to support Trotsky. Frederic Warburg, head of Secker 
and Warburg ran a provocative advertisement capitalising on the 
correspondence in The New Statesman for 15 May. 
2 Skinner claimed the backing of Brockway, W. T. Colyer, Ernest 
Fernybough, Horrabin, Arthur Creech-Jones, M. P., J. P. M. Millar, 
John Parker M. P., Reginald Reynolds, Sydney Silverman, M. P., and 
others, l(ibid., 12 June). 
On 7-May Reginald Sorenson wrote to defend 
the idea from a right wing point of view. In his broad 'The Left 
in Britain, 1931 to 1941', Jupp justifies Left Book Club selectivity 
by reference to an alleged absence of alternative socialist writing, 
but Warburg's lists confound this belief. An interesting post- 
script is the letter by 'Critic' (Kingsley Martin? ) to Forward, 
25 June 1938. For Skinner see J. Bellamy and J. Saville, (eds), 
Dictionary of Labour Biography,., Vol. 5,198-9. 
3 Inside the Whale and other essays, (1967), 32. Orwell was never a 
Trotskyist. He thought their papers 'miserable little rags' and 
held Trotskyism one of 'the ruthless ideologies of the Continent'. 
It was the ex-Trotskyists Burnham and Souvarine, rather than Trotsky 
himself, who inspired 1984 and Animal Farm, ' (William Steinhoff, 
The Road to 1984, (1975), 32-3). Orwell did sign the Breton-Rivera 
manifesto Towards A Free Revolutionary Art, which Trotsky endorsed., 
(The Collected Essays, 1, (1971), 416). 
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has been challenged by a contemporary 
I but C. P. G. B.. influence was 
enormous during the period of the Trials. - 
Kingsley Martin's puzzlement and scepticism about the trials 
is less interesting than the correspondence which it stimulated, 
Dudley Collard, Roy Pascal and. Pat Sloan, (especially the third), 
wrote adding correctives to his doubts. After wobbling, Martin 
declared in 1.937 that he would not take sides until he-saw the 
evidence presented to Dewey, 
2 
though he doubted the impact of the, 
3 Commission in view of the presence of Trotskyists upon it. 
Martin had at least met Trotsky, though he was shaken by his 
4 
vehemence. Had he known Trotsky's view of the encounter he might 
have been more shaken still. 
5 Martinýs treatment of Orwell'later in 
I George Woodcock suggested that those younger poets who began to 
write in the later 1930s were anti-Stalinists of. one or other kind, 
(The Crystal Spirit, 1970,198). T, S. Eliot, whom Woodcock quoted 
as an exception contradicting Orwell's charge rejected Animal Farm 
on behalf of Faber and Faber in 1944, apparently for political 
reasons, (W. Steinhoff, The Road to 1984,116). 
2 The New Statesman and Nation, 10 April 1937. 
3 ibid., 22 May 1937, This belief, which Brockway shared, was of 
course false, (see above). N. Wood describes the 'critical 
independence' of The New Statesman with useful references, in 
Communism and British Intellectuals (1959), 49-50. 
4 The New Statesman and Nation, 10 April 1937. Martin told his 
readers that Trotsky's anger made him think there might be something 
in the Moscow charges. 
5 It was Martin's defence of Pritt which enraged Trotsky, who 
described the interview publicly as 'rather piquant' but privately 
believed Martin to have been drunk and to have attributed 
instability to him because his condition had been apparent 
('Opinions and Information', 12 May 1937, Writings : Supplement 
(1934-40), 736-7). 
I 
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the year was appalling 
I 
and it is hard to see why he believed Trotsky 
thought his journal one of the few honest and genuinely radical 
2 
papers, 
The communists were not content that writers should not 
support Trotsky: all trace of doubt about the Trials must be 
expunged. Brailsford had done more than most writers were prepared to 
do by signing the I December, 1936 statement.,. After he retracted that, 
he floundered. in-public confusion in Reynolds News.. In the summer of 
1937 Palme Dutt drubbed him in The New Statesman: 
__Lenin's 
and Stalin's 
enemies were the same 'bourgeois press, Independent Labour Party, 
Liberals, etc. '. When Brailsford-sought cover by reference to his record 
in support of correct causes, Dutt showed his concern about the left, 
not the right: 
'But cannot he see that these services, so far from 
mitigating the danger when he comes out from time to 
time on the enemy side, can only make such an 
attack more se rious? 
3 
Strachey and Spender, both much closer to the party. than 
Brailsford, had their knuckles rapped for unguarded remarks. 
4 
I He would not print two articles by Orwell, who had earlier respected 
the New Statesman's coverage, on the situation behind the lines in 
Spain, nor a review by him of Franz Borkenau's The Spanish Cockpit. 
For a discussion of his motives see C. H. Rolph, ' Kingsley, (1973), 
225-30. See also 'Spilling the Spanish Beans', The Collected Essays, 
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, (1971), ' 305. 
2 Editor, (1968), 232-4. 
3 The New Statesman and Nation, 24 July 1937. 
4 H. Thomas I John Strachey, (1973), 164-5; Spender's observation in Forward from Liberalism, (1937) that the party line on the trials 
'insulted the intelligence' and had been prejudged was sourly 
handled by Randall Swingler, 'Spender's Approach to Communism', 
Left Review, (1937), 112. 
187. 
, Within the Committee, Sumner fought hard for a heterogeneous 
front, I arguing that a paragraph should be inserted in a Committee 
circular, explicitly stating that support did not involve endorsing 
Trotsky's politics. 
2 He was under pressure from Sedov, whom he met in 
3 
Paris in March 1937, to achieve a broad committee. , In search of 
it 
.I 
Alexander was commissioned to secure the adherence of P. A. Voight and 
David Low, 4, But no'one who was not in some way - connec ted with.. the 
Trotskyist movement-ever attended Committee meetings. -Only five 
intellectuals replied to an April 1937 circular letter, from Boyd, and 
of these Llewellyn Powys alone agreed to join the Committee. 
5 
Brockway., who had proved informally helpfull was prepared to collaborate 
with the Dewey inquiry but would give no, undertaking to endorse it. 
6 
Trotsky deceived himself as to the ease with which the Defence 
Committee might progress. Once the investigation was begun, he told 
Sumner., 'the truth will reveal itself almost as automatically as a 
natural force'; a favourable shift in United States opinion would 
7 
also facilitate the work, he suggested. In the slimmer the Committee 
'Charles Sumner' to Noel, Shaw, Hill, Rathbone and Allingham, 10 
March 1937. He also informed them that Ethel Mannin, as well as 
Russell, was now of their number. She was a writer who had joined 
the I. L. P. in 1932 and whose articles on Russia were admired by 
Trotsky ('Schmidt's Trip to England', 19 Jan. 1936, Writings : 
Supplement (1934-40), 639-40). For an example of her analysis of 
the Soviets see The New Leader for 17 Dec. 1936. 
2 Minutes of the Trotsky Defence Committee, 19 March 1937. Wicks, May 
Matlow and Jackson backed him, but Dewar, Purkis and Hilda Lane 
favoured an approach to working class organisations. 
3 'Charles Sumner' to K. Alexander (2 April 1937). Sumner reported 
Sedov's views to the committee on 2 April. Sedov and Trotsky seem 
to have differed on this point: Trotsky reproached the Americans 
for failing to involve workers in their Defence Committee, 
(I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 367). 
4 Minutes of Trotsky Defence Committee, 2 April 1937. 
5 Minutes of Trotsky Defence Committee, 30 April 1937. 
6 Brockway to Sumner, 9 April 1937. Sumner's sharp reply, dated I May 
1937 sarcastically inquired just how far collaboration went. 
7 Trotsky to Sumner, 21 May 1937, (Writings : Supplement (1934-40). 
738). 
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again approached a number of socialist celebrities. Shaw had not 
ceased to admire Trotsky, but thought his appearance before the 
Commission would be a mistake. He should stick to pamphlets, where 
his enemies were%at his mercy. The Webbs of course declined. 
2 
H. G. Wells wavered but then decided against joining in. No real' 
progress was made, 
In the autumn, the Unity Campaign collapsed. Communist 
attacks on the F. O. U. M., sister party of'the I. L. P., had not ceased in 
Britain or elsewhere, In Spain they were now reaching murderous 
levels. The suppression of the P. O. U. M. has been linked with the 
Trials as the cause for the campaign's collapse. 
3 
Contemporaries like 
Martin in 1936,4 and Laski early in 1937,5 had both warned of the 
danger presented by the Trials to a British popular front. The 
October 1937 Bournemouth conference of the Labour Party had made it 
clear that there would be no participation from that quarter and 
Morrison had taken the opportunity to contrast a united front with a 
popular front. Despite this decisive setback the idea lived on in 
I 
I Letters to the British Committee dated 20 June, 21 July 1937. 
2 Beatrice Webb told Madame Halevy on I September 1936 that testimony 
had to be accepted in law as conclusive evidence in view of the lack 
of stability in Russia, (The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
Vol. 3, N. Mackenzie, (ed. -), Pilgrimage, 1912-1947, . Cambridge 1978). 
3 See M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan, 264, and B. Pimlott, Labour and the Left 
in the 1930s, 81. 
4 The New Statesman and Nation, 22,29 Aug. 1936. 
5 'British Labour Comes to Life'. The Nation (New York), 20 Nov. 1937. 
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different form., * Together witha still more immediate threat of war, 
which brought an increasingly desperate. search for any alternative to 
the National Government, it was enough to set a firm ceiling to any 
further progressby the Trotsky Defence Committee. 
Publishing was a theatre in which pressure on rivals and 
critics of the C. P, G. B. was strong. Trotsky does not seem to have had 
difficulties over bringing out his own books. He was a marketable 
commodity, even for the bourgeois houses. In 1937 British publishers 
released The Stalin School of Falsification and The Revolution 
2 
etrayed. In the first part of 1938 he signed contracts with 
Nicholson and Watson for Stalin. 
3 
Deutscher 4 held that the title of The Revolution Betrayed had 
more impact than the argument of this, -arguably Trotsky's major book. 
Makton, who was always interested in what Trotsky wrote, felt there 
would have been no talk of betrayal had Lenin still been in Moscow. 
Tribune commissioned Pat Sloan to review the book with, presumably, 
I For the electoral facet of the Popular Front case see M. Foot, 
op. cit., 242-3. 
2 Published by Faber and Faber. 
3 1. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, 445n. As late as 28 September 
1933 Trotsky had hopes that Gollancz, who had published The History 
of the Russian Revolution (1930) might bring out his Lenin, (and 
that Arthur Ransome might edit it), ibid., 260n. 
4 The Prophet Outcast, ibid., 32). J. Jupp, on the other hand believes it 
made an impression, ('The Left in Britain, 1931 to 19411,6. ). 
5 The New Leader, 11 June 1937. 
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the intended results, 
I but-Fight thought 'no such piece of-social 
02 
analysis had been produced since Lenin died in 1924 . 
1937 saw also the publication of World Revolution, dedicated 
'to the MarxisttGroup', the major historical-theoretical contribution 
from these islands to the Trotskyist canon. It was a massive tour-de- 
force reviewing the 'rise and fall',, of the Comintern up to 1935., 
ýerhaps, most interesting in its account was the concentration on 
Lenin, '. s. key, role in 1917, and later: James was'one Trotskyist not in 
awe of the leader of the. Fourth International. Trotsky himself 
r thought World Revolution good but detected 'a lack of dialectical 
3 
approach, Anglo-Saxon empiricism and formalism' . To Orwell the book 
was 'very able'. 
4 Brockway, James's former patron, who had introduced 
him to Frederic Warburg, thought. it 'will influence substantially the 
thought of the time' but criticised TrotsýY and his followers for 
seeing only the mistakes, of Russia and the Comintern. 
5. Emrys Hughes 
prescribed World Revolution with Back from the U. S. S. R. as the 
antidote to Soviet Democracy by Pat Sloan. 
6 
For The New Statesman, 
Postgate could find no errors of fact, and considered it 'badly needed 
and likely to excite more anger than anything yet published this year. ' 
I D. Caute, The, Fellow Travellers, 158. 
2 Though it thought a lack of references might prevent Trotsky's text 
moving hardened sceptics, (Fight, Aug. 1937. ). 
3 'On the History of the Left Opposition', Writings : 1938-39,61-2. 
4 Time and Tide, 9 Oct. 1937, from The Collected Essays, Journalism 
and Letters of George Orwell, (1971), 320-2. 
5 The New Leader, 16 April 1937. Brockway's dismissal, in his review, 
of the Trotskyists as 'the merest trifling sects' stung James into 
replying the following week that the Fourth. International, though 
small, still constituted a threat. 
6 Forward, 15 May 1937. 
7- The New Statesman and Nation, 8 May 1937. 
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0 
The Communist press was certainly not pleased to see the book, but 
they did not ignore it. 
I Within the Trotskyist movement no theoretical 
2 
criticisms of James were made, though there was scope in his account 
of the events of 1917. 
In November, the British Committee announced publication of 
The Case of Leon Trotsky, 
3 being his case to'the Dewey Commission. 
'. -Brockway for once was positive: the book showed the evidence so far 
4 
-lay with Trotsky, Hughes projected the book less forcefully than 
might, have been expected. Martin, having read the proceedings of the 
trials as well as this volume-concluded 'the one court heard only the 
case for the prosecution, the other court only the case for the defence'. 
In a statement probably reflecting the views of many, ýhe wrote: 
'The more closely I follow the present controversies about 
the U. S. S. R., the more convinced I am that the only honest 
attitude for a Socialist is to give general, but critical 
support to the one country in the world which has adopted 
a planned socialist economy'. 
He continued, 
'The-Socialist's duty is to watch the tendencies at work in 
the U. S. S. R. with the closest and most critical attention 
and to be outspoken when they appear to be directed away 
from the ideals that the U. S. S, R. set out to realise. 
5 
R. F. Andrews, 'Leninism Trotskyified'., Left Review (1937), 291-9. 
2 Hilda Vernon for Youth Militant thought it filled 'a considerable gap 
in revolutionary'literature'. Harry Wicks, who had assisted the 
author in his work was asked in a non-sectarian gesture by Fight 
to review it in May 1937. In the United States, the Trotskyists had 
their own press, Pioneer, which they used to bring out World 
Revolution in 1937. 
3 Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/1/17 (1). 
4 The New Leader, 26 Nov. 1937. 
5 See footnotes on next page, 
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1ý1, 
The Case of Leon Trotsky was published by Secker and Warburg. 
Frederic Warburg was refused an advertisement for it in Left Review, a 
ban which, he observed, was 'striking at reason itself'. 
' 
J. P. M. Millar gleefully ran 'The Left Book Club's Suppressed Editorial' 
in The Plebs in November 1937,2 as a counter to Left News, Yet Left 
Review did allow J. R. Campbell to review the book whose advertisement 
it had refused. 
3 
In the'years-before the war non-communist writers 
on-the left would have been lost without Warburg. His 1938 list -ý 
included not only The Black Jacobins, by James but also The Conquest of 
Power, by Albert Weisbord, Ethel Mannin's Women and the Revolution and 
The Jesuits, by F. A. Ridley. 
4 So books of unorthodox Marxist 
From previous page. The New Statesman and Nation., 6 Nov. 1937. 
The following week Sumner wrote that Dewey was examining not only 
verbal evidence but documents as well, and that factual errors in 
the Moscow case'had been decisively established. But the same issue' 
also carried a letter from Randall Swingler who thought there was a 
-distinction between criticism and destructive-attacks, and that"this 
line separates us both from Dr. Goebbels and from Leon Trotsky'. 
I The Plebs, (Dec. 1937), 298. Warburg wrote to The New Statesman 
(6 Nov. 1937) and The New Leader, (5 Nov. 1937). In the Statesman he 
declared: 
2 
3 
4 
'We must all fight for liberty against fascism 
but we need not all fall in behind the communist 
steamroller'. 
It was revealed early in 1938 that the communists had stopped advert- 
ising in Controversy. 
See also F. Warburg, An Occupation for Gentlemen, (1959), 201-2,250. 
'Trotsky'sý! Explanations", Left Review, (Dec. 1937), 
-685-8. 
The relationship between Warburg and unorthodox intellectuals of the 
Left is discussed in Ivor Oxaal, Black Intellectuals came to Power, 
(1971), 70-1. See also F. Warburg, An Occupation for Gentlemen. 
The story of Orwell's difficulties with Homage to Catalonia are well 
known and representative enough, though Orwell-later came to feel 
that he had marred the book by being soft on the Trotskyists 
('Why I Write', The Collected Essays, Vol. 1, (1971), 29). 
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inspiration were available, if not as well publicised as orthodox 
left works. It was not then for this reason that Trotsky's works had 
a $minimal influence'. 
' More to the point is the meagre output of the 
Trotskyists themselves: C. L. R. James alone was an exception, and his 
2 
work was known. But most compelling, was thVi6neral perception on 
. 
the Left that the central issue of the time was one between a national 
government which given a choice between Stalin and Hitler would choose 
Hitler,,, 'and. a-popular. front (later a 'peace alliance') of all those 
opposed to it. The Trotskyist view that unity should beý, a principle 
within and not beyond the working class movement could easily be 
presented as sectarian hair-splitting.,, , 
The Trotskyist press was small and tended to be spasmodic. 
Those with access to it could read regularly Trotsky's replies to the 
4 
charges and critical articles by British and foreign Trotskyistso 
I G. Werskey, The Visible College (1977), 180. Werskey devotes 
negligible attention to the Trials though it is remarkable that 
scientific inquirers did not raise questions about Russia. 
2 Communist historians, at least, read The Black Jacobins. 
(E. Hobsbawm, 'The Historians Group of the Communist Party', 
M. Cornforth (ed. ), Rebels and their Causes (1978), 23). 
3 The Red Flag was more regular in 1936 than in 1937. Fight began 
publication late in 1936 but appeared fairly regularly in 1937. In 
February of that year the printed Militant appeared and it came out 
monthly. 
4 The Red Flag and Fight gave the strongest coverage. Among The Red 
Flag articles were 'Trotsky's Traducers' (Oct. 1936), 
'The Novosibirsk Trial' (Jan. 1937), and some of 'Shame! ' in March- 
April 1937. Fight discussed the Report of the Proceedings in the 
Case of the Zinoviev - Trotskyite Centre in April 1937 and in July 
1937 printed an extract from Trotsky's opening speech to the Dewey 
Commission. His closing speech appeared the next month., 
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But Emrys Hughes was also a strong friend of Trotsky's cause, even at 
the cost of his friendship with Pritt. 
I In view of his early stand 
the Committee seems to have dilatory in, making contact with him. When 
they did he wast%helpful, inviting Sumner, to use the pages of Forward 
to address an open letter to Pritt and Collard on_the. eve of the third 
2 
trial. He told Sumner that he was--i; i complete agreement with the 
Dewey_verdict and, that neutrality was '. impossible' in a, so great. an 
-, historical controversy. To a London meeting he, deqlared:: 
'It is the duty of all socialists whether Righ t or Left 
to stand fearlessly by the truth always. That is why 
in this particular controversy I am on the side of 
Comrade Trotsky. ' 
3 
The Committee would have had more to show for it had they 
given Hughes, the attention they gave Brockway. Their relationship with 
The New Leader editor had finally dissolved in an acrimonious 
correspondence with Sumaer. 
4 
Yet curiously it was the third (Bukharin) 
trial of March 1938 which finally led the I. L. P. to make up its mind. 
In the dock were some of those who had levelled accusations against 
Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1936. The New Leader called for an-end to the 
I Pritt ceased to read Forward because of. its coverage of theTrials, 
(Hughes. to Sumner, 15 Feb. 1938). 
-2 'C. Sumner to Hughes, 15 February 1938. - 
3 From a letter to be read out at an Essex Hall meeting, 25 February 
1938. 
4 Of which the last shot was F. Brockway to Summer, 7 February 1938. 
Hughes's correspondence with Trotsky and related papers are held 
at the Hardie/Hughes Collection, National Library of Scotland, 
M. S. Dep. 176, Box 1, File 4. 
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Trials and on Jay Lovestone's suggestion wrote'to Stalin to protest. 
I 
Hughes maintained his policy of enthusiastic and independent criticism 
to the end. 
1 
From December 1937 his arrangement to publish Trotsky was 
in evidence 
2 
and a long debate with stalwarts like William Gallacher 
3 
and Zelda-,, Coates'stretched through to. spring 1938. Trotsky also had 
the occasional opportunity still to give his'views to the capitalist 
4 
press, which indeed continued to cover the trials. 
The third trial was almost exactly -contemporaneous with the 
6- 
Anschluss, ýwhich coincidence muffled the impact of Bukharin's appeal. 
By the time it took place, the News Chronicle, which had thought they 
would end in February 1937, was disenchanted. 
7 
The Manchester Guardian 
I 'Stalin - StopP, The New Leader, 11 March 1938; The Times, 10 
March 1938. Brockway had now concluded that the Stalin-Trotsky 
clash sprange from a fundamental conflict between the economic and 
political structures in Russia: the absence of workersIdemocracy, 
he decided, was the root cause, (Inside the Left, (1942), 260). 
When Not Guilty! ', the second Dewey volume, was published he 
concl7uded, 'of the evidence against Trotsky I will say only that in 
every case where it could be tested it has been conclusively 
disproved', (The New Leader, 11 Nov. 1938). 
2 See-Trotsky's Forward articles, 'Cain-in the Kremlin' (11 Dec. 1937), 
and. other'cont7r-ibutions on 15 January, 16 April and 20 August 1938. 
3 Forward, 18 and 25 December 1937. and passim. See also the exchange 
between Charles van Gelderen and Gallacher, 22,29 January 1938. 
. 
W. P. and Z. Coates published The Moscow Trial, which included two 
speeches by Stalin, a 1937 pamphlet for the Friends of the Soviet 
Union. 
4 'Behind-the Moscow Trials', Sunday Express, 6 March 1938. 
5 This was notably the case with the Daily Express and the Daily Mail. 
6 J. Saville, loc. cit., 268. 
7 Although A. J. Cummings's direct coverage had been favourable to them 
an early'editorial had expressed doubts and by late 1937 Cummings 
himself.. was writing of 'Trotsky-crazy Russia'. 
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had, of course, always allowed criticism. The New Statesman thought 
the third trial 'even more appalling', than the others and was puzzled 
at Kremlin unconcern at the effect it'had on outside opinions. Its 
tone was now frank incredulity rather than the scepticism of the 
previous year. The'change was noted by the active army of, fellow 
travelling and communist correspondents whose letters now had the tone 
reserved for Forward. Albert,, "Iýkpinp now of the Friends of the Soviet 
Uniong told Martin that all the bitterest enemies of the U*S. S. R, 
would applaud4iis 'Diary. '. But Martin pertinently enquired, 'What 
Soviet hero dare we praise today? Who is tomorrow's carrion? 'I Yet 
recoiling from the bizarre trials left Martin no more favourably' 
disposed towards Trotsky. He still believed there was no value in 
Trotsky's oppositionist movement and he felt forced to believe in an 
extended plot. 
Disillusionment with communism may not have strengthened 
Trotskyism, 2 but it ctidfatally weaken the popular front in Britain. 
Russia's image was harmed but the belief of some Trotskyists that they 
were put centre-stage as a result was quite misplaced. Communist 
dissidents questioned Marxism per se rather. than moved to the left. 
I The New Statesman and Nation, 12 March 1938. 
2 George Orwell for example became disillusioned far earlier than his 
contemporaries, but though he used Ggllancz to stop attacks by the 
Daily Worker and denounced communism as a counter-revolutionary 
force he never became a Trotskyist 
,. 
Similarly, the development of 
the Labour League of Youth was stunted, but Trotskyism did not 
significantly grow, (T. Willis, Whatever Happened to Tom Mix? ', 
(1970), 185 ). 
3 J. P. Naylor, Labour's International Policy (1969), 236-7; Inside the 
Left, 269; B. Jones, The Russia Complex (1977), 24-6. 
4 The 1930s recruits to the party had no background in its history, 
(W. Kendall, 'The Communist Party of Great Britain', Survey, nb, 4 1. (1974), 118-31). 
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While firm Trotskyists were toughened by the experience, the older 
cadre of British Trotskyism shif ted f rom the centre of activity about 
this time, perhaps not coincidentally. And at least one prominent 
Trotskyist, Artjiur Ballard, lapsed from the movement because of the 
trials. 
I At this distance it might be easy to ask, with Shachtman, 
'Who can believe that theýmen who literally taught the I 
Russian proletariat the difference between Marxism and 
- terrorism should now, under the workers' statef have 
taken up (in company, moreover, with Hitler and Himmler! ) 
,a weapon which they had rejected even in the struggle 
against Tsarism? 12 
But they did believe it, or at least did not strive 
strenuously to disbelieve. As for the purveyors-of the big lie, there 
were few limits to what they could now say. A choice morsel from a 
3 
virulent feast is J. R. Campbell's Labour Monthly article 'Munich' . 
The 'servile grovelling' of Maxton and McGovern before Chamberlain on 
his return was evidence in the I. L, P. of Trotskyist fifth column 
activity he declared. Impatient of nice distinctions between 
Trotskyism and the I. L. P., he asked if any British Communist would have 
been given the freedom allowed McGovern to tour Germany? It was now 
possible to say more or less anything about Trotsky and the Trotskyists. 
Reuben Osbert pioneered new psychoanalytic territory in 1938 with his 
I Interview with Harry Wicks, Nov. 1979. Ballard resumed connections 
with the I. L. P. and wrote for The New Leader on colonial affairs 
from 1938. Helwas a delegate to the I. L. P. annual conference in 
1939. 
2 Behind the Moscow Trial, (1971), 7. Trotsky! s In Defence of 
Terrorism, in which he opposed individual terror, was republished in 
1938. 
3 "'Left",, Socialism and the Crisis :A study in Fifth Column Activity', 
Labour Monthly, (Nov. 1938), 690-8, 
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discovery that Trotskyist-theories were a mask for personal ambition; 
' 
this was why the unstable, unhappy, neurotic types on trial in Moscow 
abandoned their theories so easily. Trotsky and Zinoviev might have 
been inspiring-figures in 1917, but 'other tasks became, necessary 
later'. The 1936-7 trials, he concluded, showed that many of the 
leaders of the Russian Revolution were 'akin to Fascist leaders in the 
subjective factors'. Such books were a threat to the already 
2 
precarious existence. of Trotskyism in the labour movement. Strachey, 
writing after the cycle of trials was concluded, thought, no one who 
read the various reports would not be 'wholly convinced of the 
3 
authenticity of the confessions' Trotsky might pose the 
unanswerable question, 'if all the key positions were occupied by 
Trotskyists who submitted to me, why, in that case is Stalin in the 
Kremlin and I am in exile? '; it was a debate, however, not of truth 
with untruth, but of hugely unequal political forces. We can reflect, 
with Hugo Dewar, 
'There can be little doubt that they (the conmunists - M. U. ) 
did finally succeed in diverting the attention of left-wing 
opinion and those others whom they courted from the essential 
issues raised by the trials, and in persuading a very large 
4 body of public opinion that Stalin's policy was right' . 
I Writing under the pseudonym R. Osborn, Osbert devoted a whole chapter 
of The Psychology of Reaction (1938) to the dark forces of the id 
wh reated Trotskyism. 
2 The culmination of communist attacks on Trotskyism was 
J. R. Campbell's full-length Soviet Policy and Its Critics (1939) 
in which the author, who quoted from British Trotskyists as well as 
those abroad)sought to demonstrate that Trotskyism was the source of 
all streams of criticism which confuse and weaken the working class. 
3 He accepted the whole farrago of links between Trotsky, Hitler, 
Yagoda and Bukharin but his article, unlike his books, did not rest 
on a single quotation, 'Topic of the Month : The Soviet Trials', 
The Left News,. (July, 1938), 885-91. In 1936, however, he had, 
shown himself far more fastidious than others. See The Theory and 
Practice of Socialism, (1936), 431-2. 
4 'The Moscow Trials', Encounter, (1962), 93. 
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Inevitably, the'work of the Trotsky Defence Committee suffers 
by comparison with its counterpart in the United States and, to a- 
lesser extent, that in France. Why was this? Clearly, the Americans 
gained strength%from fast work. They had broadened before the'end of 
1936 to embrace an impressive galaxy of intellectuals so much so 
that Trotsky called for the inclusion of more workers in the, committee. 
By this date the British had only a dull list of adherents to offer 
and were to, prove unable to retain them all'. But this begs the 
question of why this early success was possible. 
_In 
this respect the 
Americans had made a crucial break-through within the intelligentsia 
by their-fUsion with the American Workers Party in 1935. In the end, a 
number of intellectuals gained thereby became alienated from 
Trotskyism, but they retained a respect for Trotsky and their influence 
in 1.936-38 was critical. A second vital factor bringing success in 
America was-the presence from June 1936 of the entire Trotskyist 
movement within the Socialist Party, The triils were a live issue in 
the party and one reason for the willingness of Norman Thomas and 
others accepting the Trotskyists into membership. Finally, the 
Americans had from 1937 a positive immediate domestic focus for their 
work in the gathering of the Dewey Commission, whose impact on public 
opinion was strong. For the Americans, this was more than an 
intellectual debate. They actually doubled the size of their party 
in their short stay in the S. P., the most successful entrist 
experiment ever conducted by Trotskyists. 
The British were fully aware of the importance of a broad 
committee, but their efforts'were not fruitful. Intellectuals had not 
rallied'-to Trotsky during his battle with Stalin in the 1920s. 
-- Indeed intellectuals did not come to communism in significant numbers 
I James T. Farrell organised-an early committee to win-right of asylum for Trotsky during his incarceration at Honefoss. 
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until the 1930s after Trotskyism had been routed. They could feel no 
continuity with an earlier experience they had not shared. And they 
CA-A to communism, or to belief in the need for a united or popular 
front,, becauseof the threat of fascism and war, immediate, - 
geographically and in time. 'Unity' had necessarily to be a more 
powerful rallying cry in Europe than in the United States. If 
British writers, and intellectuals doubted the trialsi it did not imply 
support for Trotsky., Sturdy Anglo-Saxon empiricism kept them aloof 
from another totalitarian ideology, particularly one which had put on 
such a poor showing in its short life. Had the Trotskyist movement 
scored one direct political success, had it, for example, kept the 
Socialist League out of the Unity Campaign ,- things might have been 
different, but it was worsted at every stage. 
In France, the threat of fascism was more immediate still, 
and the country had a far stronger Communist Party. Trotskyism had 
appealed to some intellectuals since the 1920s however. In 1936 the 
Pazes were available and Victor Serge had been released from Russia. 
France was also the home of the International: 'Sdcretariat, the, centre 
of the world Trotskyist movement. -Sedov, Trotsky's sonwas an 
important'figure within it and the chief organiser of evidence to be 
presented to Dewey from Europe. Yet it is thought that the Trials 
did 'not materially alter the balance of opinion on the French 
extreme left' ", - even after the Barcelona events, 
I The French 
Trotskyists were just as fractious as the British and certainly no 
more successful in their entry work within social democracy. The 
significance of the popular front was an immediate matter in France 
where the fate of the Blum goverment was linked to that of Spain. In 
Spain the Trotskyists were physically liquidated or driven out; in 
I D. Caute, Communisbi''and the French Intellectuals, 19 14-1960, 
(1964), 127. 
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France their influence declined; in Britain a definite limit was 
drawn to their growth. Only in America was the campaign against the 
Moscow Trials a bridge to progress. There, in the view of Shachtman, 
the anti-Trials-scampaign of Trotskyists split the radical intellectual 
world wide open. It happened nowhere else. In Britain especially, 
there was enough diversity on the left to prevent the Communist Party 
2 
version carrying all before it, but communism's loss,, given that, 
third parties had, survived, was not Trotskyism's gain. 
Given the balance of forces on the left, in mid 1936, there. 
was no question of the Trotsky Defence Committee decisively 
-discrediting the 
Trials. Something. less than that would have counted 
as success. It has to be recorded, however* that the sense of malaise 
many liberal and socialist intellectuals felt by 1938 was traceable 
not to the Committee's efforts but to the grotesque spectacle of 
medieval witchcraft trials in what was supposed to be the world's 
first'socialist State. A depressing codicil to the Trotsky Defence 
Committee was a letter to the International Secretariat just before 
the Bukharin Trial. In it the'three British groups, so fractious in 
other respects, united to condemn Lee and his group for publishing 
Workers International News and, as a pamphlet, the summary of Dewey's 
final report, 'without the permission or even the knowledge of the 
Trotsky Defence Committee, and without mentioning the Committee on the 
3 title-page of the pamphlet' . It is lamentably significant that the 
three groups were able to avoid*fractiousness only in their condemnation 
of a fourth. After Wicks and James had spoken on the Dewey Commission 
on 4 March 1938, little further activity seems-to have been organised. 
I In The Prophet's-Army, 1928-41, (Westport, Conn., 1977), C. A. Myers 
quotes from Shachtman's unpublished reminiscences* - 
2 J. Saville, 'May Day 1937' in A. Briggs and J. Saville, '(eds. ), 
Essays in Labour History, 3, (1977), 264-70. 
3 1C. Sumner' to the International Secretariats 6 Feb. 1938. Sumner 
sent copies to Trotsky and Sedov. 
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vii THE BOLSHEVIK-LENINISTS AND THE 
MILITANT GROUP (1934-1937). 
1%.. 
i, I,,, 
The "Bolshevik-Leninists' in the Labour Party worked'in the 
political area with the greatest potential for Trotskyist growth in the 
1930s: the Labour League of Youth, It took two years for them to 
concentrate in the L. L. O. Y., and they thus lost their b. est--chance to 
rival communist sympathisers on equal terms. They were,. ýalsovhampered 
by arguing a tactical case for which it was difficult to obtain support. 
. 
In 1937 communist pressure on the League became more intense and a 
debate between Stalinism. and Trotskyism. took place, with Trotskyism, on 
the defensive. The Bolshevik-Leninists gained sufficient backing to 
pass beyond exclusively youth work, but remained confined within 
Labour Party boundaries. This circumscribed growth. Differences of 
style among the Bolshevik-Leninists, now known as the Militant Group, 
maimed their organisation at the end of 1937. 
******* 
Within the Labour League of Youth there was throughout the 
1930s a strong desire for autonomy and widespread political criticism 
of the partýls leadership. The League was small in 1934 when 
Ted Willis, a Tottenham Leaguer who had moved to the left and Roma, 
younger sister of Hugo Dewar, combined in opposition to Labour's 
Peace and War policy at its 1934 conference. Willis successfully 
moved rejection of the League of Nations and a call for the formation 
of anti-war committees by ninety to seventeen. There were at this 
stage no definite factions either of communism'or Trotskyism, 
2 
though 
I Advance (April 1938); J. Cleary and N. Cobbett, Labour's Misspent 
ýouth, (P), [28 July 19791,6. 
2 However, Trotsky believed that there were three groups in Brit*ain as 
early as July 1934, (L. Trotsky to H. Dewar, July 1934, Warwich M. S. S. ). 
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C. P. G. B. interest in the League was growing, 
I It was'possible for 
Dewar and Willis to collaborate in a small unofficial journal Youth 
2 Forum. During 1935 and 1936 communist influence grew on Willis and 
other leading aetivists within the League. The Trotskyist presence 
I hardened with the departure from the. I. L. P.. for the League of Youth 
3 
and, (initially),, the Socialist League, of Stuart Kirby, and. 
D. D.. Harber early in 1935.4 , It seems no definite faction was formed 
. at once 
but in October of that, year with Roma Dewar, they published 
5 Youth Militant, a duplicated journal. Two months. later a group of 
London League members led by Ted Willis launched. the dupl3. Cated Advance 
6 
with an initial print run of, 500. Around these journals rival 
factions would crystallize. 
1 0. Bell, 'The Leftward Development of the British Youth Movement', 
-Inprecorr Vol. 14, no. 33, (8 June 1934), 890-1. 
2 N. Cleary and J. Abbott, op. cit., 6. ' 
3 Kirby was a minority spokesman during the debate within the C. L. of 
December 1933. Sometime after this he left Britain for Japan, 
returning later to pursue an academic career, (Interview with 
J. Archer, Nov. 1973). 
4 -They withdrew individually, -a step they later considered a mistake. 
Othe 
, 
rs with whom they were in contact with the I. L. P. also were 
interested in the League of Youth, (A. B. Doncaster et. al.. to the 
International Secretariat, I. C. L., ([April? 19353, H. P., D. J. H. 5/2). 
Both Harber and Kirby attended the I. S. plenum of spring 1935. 
5 Beneath its masthead the journal proclaimed itself 'the first result 
, of a Committee of Young Socialists 
in Organised Youth Movements', 
(A. Richardson, op.. cit. ). 
6 Advance was printed from June 1936. 
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1936 was a critical year for the League of Youth. Within 
its ranks there was mounting resentment at the N. E. C. policy of 
curtailing political debate. Defenders of the official position were 
2 few and on the-defensive. Youth Militant-supporters, six'strong, 
formed'themselves into the 'Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour Party' 
3 in February-of that year. At that time they controlled the League's 
London Advisory Committee and were selling 2.50_copies of their 
4 
journal., They shared with Advance an intransigent oppositimto a 
memorandum from the National Executive which' sought 'to restrict* League 
activity to social matters. But whereas Advance favoured a merger with 
the Young Communist League to form a mass youth movement, Youth Militant 
argued for a breakaway from the Labour Party and the establishment of 
an independent League. 
5 In the Spring months of 1936, Advance gained 
ground against Youth Militant in the London Region. Youth Militant 
was unable to transform its position on the Advisory Committee into 
strength at quarterly conferences. 
6 
Advance carried its views forty 
two to sixteen at the first of the year against not only the Bolshevik- 
7 Leninists, but others of different persuasion as well, The League 
I For the running battle between young Labour Party members and the 
National Executive see J. Ferris,. 'The Labour League of Youth, 1924- 
! 940 
, 
!,, (University of Warwick M. A. thesis, 1977)', and Z. Layton-Henry, 
Labourfs Lost Youth', J. C. H., Vol. '11, (1976), 275-308. 
2 Arthur Peacock, editor of The New Nation, the official League 
journal, gave his account in, Yours Fraternally, (1945), 18-26. 
3 'Statement by the Bolshevik-Leninists Group to joint session of 
British Trotskyists', For Discussion, rio. 1,28 Nov. 1936,15. 
4 Advance (April 1937); ibid. The N. E. C. memorandum reduced the 
League's age to twenty one and forbade it to discuss policy. 
5 J. Ferris, op. cit., 108 and passim; Advance (Nov. 1936). For the 
memorandum, see L. P. C. R. (1936). 
6 On manyoccasions the London Advisory Committee was deadlocked five to 
five, (letter from Ernest Harrison, Advance, Aug. 1936). 
7 At conference and on the N. A. C. Roma Dewar was accused of making 
luýi'py with reactionary elements', ibid. 
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met in national conference at Manchester that slimmer, There was only 
one dissenter from a-South Tottenham resolution condemning the 
memorandum. Roma Dewar was returned to the National Advisory Committee 
as-its only Trotskyist, but a narrow majority backed unity of the left 
2 
parties. Following the Manchester decisions. the Y, 'C. L., approached the 
3 League, of Youth to propose a Y. C. L. -L. L. O. Y. merger. 
Through . 1936 the Bolshevik-Leninists built'up their support' 
in*the League of Youth. Sales. of Youth Militant more*than, trebled to 
4 800 by October. In the same period they'grew from six to sixty 
members, mainly by recruiting people new to Trotskyism. Forty of these 
5 
were within the League of Youth. Harber attended thi youth-conference 
of the I. C. L. of I August 1936 following the international pre- 
conference, The youth conference resolved that the Fourth International 
could be buili only by a resolute struggle against the Second and Third 
Internationals and the International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist' 
6 Youth OrganisatiOns. Taken with the 'Geneva' resolution and Trotsky', s 
writings, this was a strong inducement for assembling all personnel in 
the Labour League of Youth. Some former Marxist Groupers came over to 
I J. Ferris, op. cit., 94. 
.2 Youth Militant,, (April 1937). 
3* For-the merger proposal of John Gollan, Y. P. L. national chairman, 
see Advance (Aug. 1936). Gollan cited as proof of the worth of his 
proposition the merger of. socialist and communist youth in Spain 
and their imminent fusion in Belgium. These were the very 
developments that most alarmed Trotsky and increased the urgency of 
his plea for concentration in the League of Youth. 
4A Short Statement, loc. cit. 
5 ibid. 
6 'Youth And The Fourth International', Documents, 108-112. 
r 
206. 
the Bolshevik-Leninists following the debacle at the Keighley 
conference of the I. L. P. 
I On 11 October 1936, twenty six Bolshevik- 
Leninists attended the national meeting of the groups and put a strong 
line based on ýýe Geneva conference. The Marxist Group conference of 
the previous day effectively marked off those I. L. P. ers who'were now 
prepared to join the Labour Party. 
2 The autumn Don James and two 
others'came over from the Liverpool I. L. P? The'Bolshevik-Leninists 
also encountered a loose association of dissident Marxists, who sold , 
Trotsky's pamphlets and the American Militant in Hyde Park and at 
4 
Marble Arch, They were inducted before 1936 was out. Against these 
accessions had to be býlanced the failure to achieve a modus operandi 
with the Marxist League 
5- 
although both it and the Bolshevik-Leninists 
had an interest in each other's field of work. 
6 
But Bolshevik-Leninists 
had played some part in launching Fight as an F. I. journal in October. 
7 
I Among those stimulated by the 'Geneva' resolution and the 'Interview 
with Collins' were John Goffe and John Archer (P. J. B., 1910- 
two Yorkshire activists (Interview with J. Goffe, July 1974). 
2 After this Marxist Group conference Max Nicholls, Bert Matlow and 
John Robinson entered the Labour Party.. E. L. Davis and Starkey 
Jackson, who were to take leading positions, came over in September 
1936. Davis had been introduced to Trotskyism by Margaret Johns, 
whom he met at a union meeting. Jackson was an ex-communist. 
3 This branch was to grow to eleven members by August, retaining one 
Harry Cund, as an official of the I. L. P. who had not been asked by 
that party to leave, ([Militant Group3, Minutes of National 
Conference, 1-2 Aug. 1937). 
4 It effectively became the Paddington branch of the Bolshevik- 
Leninists by 1937. Most prominent among its tiny membership was 
Jock Haston, (1912- ), a former seaman and steeplejack who had left 
the C. P. G. B. in disagreement with its line on Germany (J. P. M. Millar, 
The Labour College Movement C1971; interview with J. Haston, July 
1973; J. H. to Lmembers of the Caub? 3 10 June 1950, H. P. 0 D. J. H., 
158/111). 
5 Each organisation blamed the other for this. For the Marxist League, 
see Chapter V. The Bolshevik-Leninists claimed they had made a 
number of approaches to the Marxist League for unity. 
6 At the time of the Unity Campaign there were claimed to be five 
followers of the Militant in the Socialist League. The M. L. was 
involved with thý"-Socialist Youth Committee, an outgrowth of the 
Socialist League, which tried unsuccessfully to gain support in the 
League of Youth during 1936, 
7 'Interim Reply of the E. C., Militani Group', 5 Atg. 1937, ' 
Inter-Group Relations, [Sept. ] 1937,2. 
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The Bolshevik-Leninists, (who from summer 1937 became known 
as the Militant Group), operated within what became known as a'split 
perspective'. They intended, like all other Trotskyists who in these 
years joined larger parties, to leave-with the forseeable future. 
I 
Hopefully, this break would be made with an enhanced membership. But 
'the 
corrollary-of aiming at-a breakaway was that the entrists and not 
the party apparatus would decide the timing. It therefore became'vital 
that, they'should not be compromised by unconstitutional activities 
before they had'sufficient opportunity to gather support. This, was not 
a new problem: it had preoccupied members of the Marxist Group in the 
I. L. P. Some of them were now among the Bolshevik-Leninists and fear of 
premature expulsion was to be a steady influence on their behaviour. 
The Bolshevik-Leninists knew-they had to establish a separate identity 
and give the appearance of intending, a permanent Labour Party presence. 
2 
For the moment they had strong backing from Trotsky and the International 
. in their stress on party activities. - The International Bureau, when it 
rapped the knuckles of C. L. R. James foran ill-considered departure 
. 
from the I. L. P., endorsed the Bolshevik-Leninistsl. fear that an outside 
group for the Fourth'International would compromise them. 
I See R. W., On the Work of Bolshevik-Leninists in the Labour Party, 
(Sept 1936), Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/1/10. R. W., who did not show great 
knowledge of Labour Party procedure, forsaw establishing independence 
from the party, within a year'of joining, with a following of 
hundreds of workers. 
2 R. W. advised his readers not to act as 'wise strangers' or declare 
their future exit from the rooftops, (ibid. ). Trotsky had also 
remarked that one did not enter the Labour Party and declare 'I am 
a revolutionist'. (see above, 
3 The Bolshevik-Leninists launched a duplicated paper, Militant, in 
February', 1937. Its-circulation was below 500 (Minutes, 20 Feb. 1937, 
H. P., D. J. H. 2A/4). On 13 December the Bureau wrote of the 
Bolshevik-Leninists, 'they declare that an independent group outside 
could only cause them harm because they would in that case be regarded 
as age , nts of an alien organisationl,., 
(Declaration of the 
International Bureau). By 1939 Trotsky. had apparently moved away 
from this view. See note to 'Fighting &gainst the Stream', 
Writings : 1938-39,150n. 
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Thus while the Socialist League, with communist support, 
confronted the Labour Party apparatus-virtually courting expulsion, 
the Labour'League of. Youth, also with communist suppor; backed away 
from'a clash and'restrained its demands, Trotskyism. found itself 
arguing for the Socialist League to stay within the party and the 
Labour League of Youth to come out, though in both places it opposed 
2 
the imminent Unity Campaign. ý Youth Militant rejected the, Advance 
policy of local fights against the memorandum and proposed an'indepen- 
-3 
, 
dent League. . Although Advance was to weaken its resistance'to the 
memorandum, it-was Youth Militant wýich had the more difficult case to 
argue. Its strategy was less concrete, more speculative,, and as well 
as the contemporary spectacle of the doomed Socialist League, there 
was the salutary example of the fate of the-. I. L. P. to hold up as aý 
-warning of what happened to those who defied Transpo"rt''House. 
4 
I From late 1936 Advance campaigned for building up membership within 
--the Labour. l! arty, 
ý -policy the League of Youth endorsed'on 8 May'1937. 
Meanwhile, Challenge was. made into a weeklyjournal in the effort to 
build up Y. C. L. membership too,. (J.. Ferris, op. cit., 107-B)o 
Ferris attributes L. L. O. Y. resistance to the memorandum to pressure 
from leading League members being due to pass twenty. one in 1938 
-Communist advice was now that'the League of Youth should turn its 
back on Isplittersl-and devote itself to youth activity land not 
only to'a fight against the L. P. Execdýtve', (W. Cohen, For 
Discussion, (Dec. 1936), 7; Z. Layton-Henry, 'Labour's Lost-Youth', 
J. C. H. 0 11, (1976), 283). There was some communist bewilderment 
-: at the. change in Y. C. L. policy to opposition to a merger, (For 
Discussion, Nov. 1936,32). 
2 F. L. Brown, Advance (March 1937). 
3 Youth Militant (Sept. 1936). 
4- Advance for. -March 1937: thi-s example was given by Ted. Willis. 
The influence of-the C. P. G. B. on Advance du . ring 1937 is marked:, 
Gollan, Sloan and R. P. Dutt all wrote articles for it that year. 
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In 1937 there was far more sourness than before in the 
debate within the League. The change of mood coincided with increased 
communist bitterness towards Trotsky and his followers arising from 
the-first Moscow trial of August 1936 and the development of the 
revolution in Spain. It turned on the different reactions of the two 
., factions. t6 the decision of the. Edinburgh conference of the Labour 
Party, to. uphold the. N. E. C,. memorandum. Ted Willis and Advance 
concluded that the battle against,. it. had failed to rouse youth and 
ascribed this failure-to introspection and-deadlock in the London area 
where three papers other than theirs. circulated. From this time they 
discouraged the projected Y. C. L. merger and advised against the split 
policy of Youth Militant, described as.. 'throwing in the sponge'.. 
Youth Militant persisted with its policy of fighting for an independent 
2 League and became principal. advocate of defying the N. E, C. 
With the-Socialist League, decision to join the Unity Campaigm 
three discernible groups within it were left with the problem of how 
to react, As well as the Marxist League'and the Militant Group 
(who had five S. L.. activists) there were those like Margaret McCarthy 
and Carry Allingham who had no group. Within the Militant Group a 
speedy dissolution of the Socialist League was anticipated and a 
proposal by Harber that it seek a merger with these 'centrists' was 
discussed, 3 Had his proposal been adopted and the attempt met with 
success it*is possible that a step away from isolation, similar to that 
I Advance (Nov. 1936). 
2A third ýolicy proposal of this time was that of Bob Edwards of the 
I. L. P. Guild of Youth who projected all three youth movements as 
obstructed by their parties and recommended unity between them, ibid. I 
3 Minutes. London E. Ce, 20 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2A/4. 
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taken by the Communist League of America in 1935, might have 
considerably enhanced Trotskyism's clout. 
I But there is a depressing 
significance in discussion of merger with these individuals rather 
thanwith the Marxist League. On the Trotsky Defence Committee 
2 
and in 
the S. L. it was clear that membership of the'Labour Party, was 
practically the only thing these'two factions had in common. But the 
Militant*Group did, Ieel keenly the_need. fo, r common-Trotskyist-' 
action in face of'the Unity Campaign and its January initiative led to 
the meeting, of all factions on 14 February 1937., 
*' ****** 
Youth Militant's circulation was 1600 in February and it had 
3. 
established contact with-70 Leagues, but a February 1937 gathering of 
the Leagues showed it to be on-the defensive. In the spring it printed 
its programme for youth, a platform intended to-revive the League and 
prevent membership loss to, the Y. C. L. -or Mosley. The League was faced 
with the N. E. C. memorandum. To capitulate meant extinction; to reject 
meant dissolution... Youth Militant proposed that the League should take 
its own organisation into its own hands and build a mass base. It 
would then seek affiliation-to the Labour Party (from which it would 
-sever no ties in the interim) as an autonomous unit. The programm 
provided by Youth Militant was for the most part a-standard Trotskyist 
analysis of imperialism, the danger of war and the rise of fascism. 
I In 1935 the C. L. 4, fused with. the American Workers Party of the 
Rev. 
' 
A. J. Muste. This merger took place outside a social democratic 
milieu however. 
2 It was Marxist League domination of the. Defence Committee which 
repelled the Militant Groupq who hoped to replace Harry Wicks, 
. 
its secretary, with their own member May Matlow, (Minutes, London 
E. C., 20 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2A/4). 
3 Minutes. London E. C., 20 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. ' 2A/4. 
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Its immediate demands were for a total rejection of all activities 
connected with war preparation - rearmament, industrial conscription - 
and exposure of the League of Nations; for resistance to fascist 
advance not by-employing state forces but. by use of workers' defence 
corps; for industrial action to prevent arms being sent to suppress 
colonial movements; for the right of all working class parties to 
affiliate, to the, Labour Party; , 
for the closed shop, jndustrial 
union . ism. and the forty, hour week; for a labour movement campaign 
against the embargo on arms for Spain and the banning of volunteers, 
and. for. an international cQmmission of enquiry into comminist 
allegations against the P. O. U. M. 
On 4 April 1937, the London Leagues met and condemned 
Youth Militant by a majority of three to one. It had committed a 
tactical -error. by condemning a summer campaign projected by Advance 
as a non-political concession to the requirements of the memorandum. 
In February a Youth Militant supporter called for a League conference 
to be summoned. 
2 The National Advisory Council of the League, 
dominated by Advance supporters, shortly moved to convene an unofficial 
conference. Youth Militant criticised the nature of its arrangements 
3 
and insisted that a healthy youth body could only be built outside the 
I Youth Militant (April 1937). 
2 S. Bone ' Advance (Feb. 1937), advised one to free the League of Labour's 'throttling control'. 
3 Under the arrangements, two resolutions, both submitted by the N. A. C., 
were to be the only ones tabled. One effectively yielded to the 
memorandum, the other committed the Leagues to a campaign around 
Labour's Immediate Programme. Local Leagues could only table 
amendments. Youth Militant threatened a shadow agenda. 
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party . The c onference, 3. 't predicted, would decide if there was to be 
'a Revolutionary Socialist Youth Organisation, or o., a pale and feeble 
j2 imitation of the Young Imperialists? The debate between Advance, 
(assisted by th! 3 Y. C, L. ), and Youth Militant, grew increasingly sharp. 
Indeed from the time of the second Moscow Trial of February 1937# 
., there is little to choose between Y. C. L. attacks and'those mounted by 
Advance on the Trotskylsts. Programmatically they were accused of 
lining up with the bourgeoisie and the gutter pres's''over the Trials, 
with Transport House and'The Times over'the Unity Pampaign'and with 
the P. O. U. M. 'against the Spanish Goverment 'objectively aiding the 
4 fascists' . When the unofficial conference convened at Whitsun 
1937, it upheld the Advance perspective for League growth and trounced 
the Trotskyists on Spain. Conference was held in London, the base of 
Advance, 'and provider of more'than seventy, five per cent of the 
delegates. The debate on Spain occurred simultaneously with the 
To remain. in the party is to commit suicide, to end the League 
as a political organisation. The only road for the League is to part, 
company with the party for a while, to form an independent Socialist 
Youth organisation, with its own programme. Having developed a 
programme on a political basis, the Socialist Youth organisation 
could then apply to the L. P. as an autonomous body, retaining its 
right to discuss policy and its right to call national conferences 
and elect its own Executive body. On this basis only can the League 
go forward. 
(Youth Militant, April 1937. ) 
2 Youth Militant, (May 1937). 
3 To Advance they were 'middle class types' with a disruptive record. 
It declared there was no place for them in a living movement 'as 
there is no place foý boils on a healthy human'. They produced no 
-concrete proposals, only 'monotonous talk of splitting', (Advance 
March 1937). 
4 ibid. 
5 130 
' 
out of 170 delegates came from London but the capital had only 
one fifth of total L. L. O. Y. membership of 3,500, (Youth Militant, 
June 1937). Of course London was also the chief base of Youth 
Militant itself which controlled branches at Stoke Newin n, East 
Islington, Peckham and Golders Green. 
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Barcelona uprising. Emergency resolutions were allowed and Sid Bone 
and Charles van Gelderen put forward the case against suppression of 
working class parties. In a tumultuous debate delegateslindignation 
was restrained qnly with difficulty and a different resolution was 
carried by acclamation. 
I Trotskyist strength among the delegates 
did not rise above a dozen votes on any issue. 
2 It can only have 
been potential. rather than present Trotskyist appeal which sparked 
the vituperation of Y. C. L. and Advance attacks on Youth Militane 
after the conferdnce. 
3 Spain 
4 
and the unofficial conference marked 
off a phase in the development of the League of Youth and a stage in 
the growth of the Militant, group as, well. 
5 
I Willis, Harry Rigg and Alec Bernstein spoke for the Advance majority 
deploring the 'treasonable role of the Barcelona insurgents 
Advance (June 1937), Youth Militant (June 1937). 
2 'Carried with twelve votes against - carried with twelvavotes against 
this is the story of the conference as far as voting was concerned', 
A. Bernstein, Advance, (June 1937). 
3 John Gollan at the Y. C. L. annual conference declared 'these people 
have been sheltered too long in the hospitable ranks of the League 
of Youth. These people must be driven out of the working class 
youth movement for the enemies they are'. Conference passed a 
resolution, 'Drive Out the Trotskyists' which insisted expulsion of 
the Trotskyists was a pre-requisite for unity, (Youth of Britain 
Advance!, 1937,31-2; See also J. Gollan, What Next for Youth Unity? 
7193-7), 13). The N. A. C. of the League of Youth was aware that 
Trotskyism was being suppressed within the Socialist Youth of 
Belgium and France, (Advance, May 1937). The next month Bernstein 
informed Advance readers that 'the link up between the Trotskyists 
and the Fascists is shown clear for all to see' and called for 
Roma Dewar, Van Gelderen, Fred Emmett, Ken Alexander and Bone to 
be cleared out as wreckers. 
4 Only in the I. L. P. was there a comparable debate between followers of 
the communist and Trotskyist lines. Space was also given. in Advance 
for June 1937, but see A. Marwick, 'Youth in Britain, 1920-1960 : 
Detachment and Commitment', J. C. H., Vol. 5, no. 1, (1970), 49 for the 
handling of Spain by youth movement papers. 
5 Fight for June 1937 declared its opinion that the L. L. O. Y. would 
rapidly decline if Youth Militant did not increase its influence, 
a development it thought unlikely. 
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Youth Militant did not pull out of the League after Whitsun, 
but the group felt its limited opportunities in the youth movement 
rivalled by Labour Party potential. Carriage of the Advance 
programme by thA L. L. O. Y. meant 'complete oblivion of the League as a 
political. organisation'. The only hope was felt to be links with the 
Socialist Left fighting for party democracy. Youth Militant 
supporters were to have a hand in launching the Socialist Left 
Federation in June 1937 though this initiative came to little; Advance 
on the other hand did lead the League to a spell of rapid growth even' 
with its less ambitious orientation. When the 1937 Labour Party 
conference reinstated Willis, his paper and the N. A. C. with official 
I 
status their prestige as people who had argued that a modus vivendi 
might be reached was much enhanced. 
2 Youth activities by the 
Trotskyists continued but they never passed the strength reached by 
the time of the Whitsun conference. 
3 They retained control of-some 
London Leagues and even expanded, but their own coverage of their 
activities reads as a catalogue of defeats. At quarterly conferences 
qf the London Leagues they were steadily and depressingly voted down. 
I Youth Militant (June 1937). 
2 Advance (Oct. 1937). Outside the Trotskyist movement there seems to 
have-been little comment on the modification by Advance which had 
allowed the N. E. C. to come to terms with it. 
3 Youth Militant sellers covered the Battersea conference of the 
Y. C. L. This may have encouraged Gollan to urge young people to 
'expose the wrecking aims and activities of the Trotskyists' in his 
Y. C. L. pamphlet What Will London's Youth Do? (1937), quoted in 
. R. Black, Stalinism in Britain, (1970), 110. 
4 The 27 June 1937 conference heard delegates from Trotskyist branches 
at East Islington and Peckham. Paddington, East and West Islington 
had resolutions on the agenda. Trotskyist views on unity and 
workers' sanctions against the Japanese were crushed at the autumn 
- conference, (Militant, Oct. 1937). 
215. 
It may have been this impasse as well as lack of money which led to the 
absence of a delegate from Britain's Trotskyist Youth from the August 
1937 meeting of the International Youth Bureau. One attempt to 
concretise the Trotskyist alternative was a startling proposal that 
the L. L. O. Y. should merge with the Y. C. L. That body had no enthusiasm 
for it and Advance, which had itself moved in this direction a year 
earlier, now opposed the plan. The Trotskyists stayed within the 
League of Youth but felt they now had outlets in the Labour Party 
2 itself. The last Youth Militant for the time being offered model 
resolutions for submission to party conference that autumn. In July 
1937 the duplicated Militant2A absorbed the printed Militant to give 
one printed monthly. 
3 Under the editorship of E. Starkey Jackson, 
with assistance from Margaret Johns, the Militant was a less 
introverted paper which dropped its knockabout lampoons of Willis 
et. al. for a broader appeal. It had some claim to being the best 
paper yet produced by British Trotskyism and was certainly the first 
to appear with consistent regularity. But it is arguable that the 
change from a youth paper was made late 
4 
and certain that the Group 
had not yet shown it 'could transcend mere commentary on union affairs. 
5 
I J. Jupp, op. cit., 223-4. 
2 This was the issue for June 1937. 
_2A. Militant was launched as a duplicated monthly on 15 January 1937. 
3 The Militan sub-titled '(Incorporat ing Youth Militant) Organ of the 
Mili7ta-nt Group in the Labour Party'. 
4 The democratic ferment among Labour Party members had been commented 
upon by the International six months earlier, (Declaration of the 
International Bureau, (13 Dec. 1936). For the successful campaign 
of D. L. P. s to increase constituency representation on, Labour's 
N. E. C., see B. Pimlott, op. cit., 123-38. 
5 See 'Bus Militants Expelled', of August 1937, with its list of 
propagandist 'warnings'. Only in. October 1937 did the paper report 
participation in an actual struggle, that to organise a Croydon 
engineering firm. The author, John Goffe, was an apprentice, m, anager in Sheffield. 
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Militant's real*drive was towards Labour Party change. It 
insisted - quite wrongly as it turned out - that the only hope for 
the League of Youth was as part of the movement for democracy now 
accelerating within the party. This was a time when defeats for the 
Divisional Labour Parties led them to rally and secure constitutional 
success in their drive for expression within the party. The first. 
printed Militant declared: 
We therefore call for the immediate creati6n of a left-wing 
organisation which will include all Labour Par'ty workers 
who are willing to struggle for a revolutionary programme 
and leadership, an organisation which can offer to the 
workers a clear socialist alternative to the policies of 
treachery and despair of the existing leadership, 
2 
For a time the Militant, Group hoped, like the Marxist League, to fill 
the vacuum with the Socialist Left Federation, formed by twelve 
Labour Party members in June. Led by a Bureau of seven, whose members 
included Groves and Harber, it managed some initial growth. Militant's 
hopes were to be dashed, but it did take the opportunity here and 
elsewhere to explain its conception of unity in opposition to that in 
the name of which the Socialist League had sacrificed itself. 
3 
Because 
IA meeting of D. L. P. s after the crushing of the Left at Edinburgh in 
October 1936 led to agitation which resulted in the constituency 
section being expanded from five to seven seats, (B. Pimlott, 
op. cit., 112-5). Militant welcomed the extension of the constit- 
uency section on the grounds that this part of the party was more 
sensitive to the mood of the masses than 'the bureaucratically 
controlled trade unions'. But little improvement was forseen since 
celebrities like Cripps and Mellor were more likely to secure election 
than members of the rank and file. 
2 Militant (July 1937). 
3 Militant condemned in August 1937 the unity programme which 
'consisted of piffling reforms and contained no more radical demands 
than can be found in the Immediate Programme of the Labour Party'. 
Its conception of unity implied temporary agreement on specific issues by labour movement organisations, and it had available, the 
precepts of early Comintern congresses for support. - 
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of willingness on either side to engage in war, Militant's shots were 
aimed equally at right and left, 
I 
with the League of Nations singled 
out for particular attention. 
* '* ***** 
By August 1937 Militant had established a national identity. 
Its paper, whether in its youth or adult incarnation, was probably the 
best known Trotskyist journal and certainly the chief organ of the 
movement within the Labour Party and the League of Youth. Circulation- 
was still below-2,000 although it was known that i-t could pay on a 
3,000 print run. Militant was to make an admirable break with 
Trotskyist tradition by appearing monthly for several years. Members 
were separately organised not only in eight London areas'but also in 
groups in Liverpool, Sheffield, Leeds, Hull, Glasgow, Norwich and 
Leicester. Membership was in double figures in London and Liverpool. 
It was still overwhelmingly a Labour Party group, though I. L. P. 
members had been retained in Liverpool, Glasgow and elsewhere. 
2 When 
delegates gathered in London for the annual conference on 1-2 August 
1937 they had every reason to believe they had established the most 
stable organisation yet in British Trotskyism's chequered history 
'The Communist Party and its henchmen o, f the "Unity" bloc are using 
this confusion in order to foist policies on the workers which, 
although they are trapped out in left-wing phrases, in actual fact 
are every whit as reactionary as those of the Labour bureaucracy', 
Militant,, (Aug. 1937). The alternative policy can be seen in 
resolutions on Spain which Militant influence had brought on to the 
1937 Labour Party conference agenda: Fairfield (Liverpool) called 
for a workers' boycott of arms and goods for Franco; East Islington 
sought a workers' r. epublic in Spain. 1 
2 *Militant Group, Minutes of National Conference, 1-2 August 1937,1-3. 
3 The success - and failures - of the Militant Group must be attributed 
in large measure to the leading cadre which it had established. 
D. D. Harber was the dominant political influence within the Group 
and E. S. Jackson, its secretary. With E. L. Davis and Margaret Johns 
they remained its leading figures to the end of the decade. 
f 
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and certainly that they had convened the most representative gathering 
to date. Yet the same conference revealed that different local groups 
were operating in different ways. Some were working secretly and 
presumably not selling papers atIall. The August conference was 
confronted by an executive resolution, moved. by Harber, which called 
for the'setting up, of a front organisation to. adyance most of the 
Bolshevik7Leninist progra- in the Labour Party. It. would notg-he 
suggestedg call for the creation, of a new party and, the Fourth 
International. So long as the Bolshevik-Leni; iists-, continued as a 
disciplined group within it, steering towards a split, centrist 
degeneration like that shown by the I. L. P. and. the Socialist League 
could be prevented. During the debate there was some unease. After 
all, there had been a vacuum at the heart of the Marxist Group in the 
experience of some of those present. 
I Harber's proposition for siich 
an organisation to be set up was carried easily, but the majority for 
2 keeping a Bolshevik-Leninist faction in being was far narrower, 
This debate overlapped a tactical dispute over whether or not to enter 
the Socialist Left Federation. The Liverpool Group proposed staying 
clear of 'centrism' which, moreover, it believed to be very weak in 
this case. Jackson explained the B. C. fear that ignoring it might 
isolate. the group from the left of the old Socialist League and permit 
the emergence of new centrist'currents. Before he carried the day 
I K. Alexander was also aware of the difficulty the Americans had 
experienced. 
.2 The first point was carried forty eight to thirteen with one 
abstention. the second thirty eight to twenty with one abstention. 
(The Militant Group, Minutes of the National Conference, Aug. 1-2, 
1937). F-eLiverpool Group favoured having no secret faction and 
merely using the Militant Labour League which was the name the front 
organisation was given. 
By a vote of forty to eighteen on the EX. report, ibid., 8. 
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there was the expression of much misgiving. Essentially the 
Liverpool/E. C. clash on the S. L. F. was over timing, since the decision 
to set up what was to be the Militant Labour League was already made 
and the whole group would give up the S. L. F. in September. Once again 
however, the important and the unimportant had been inverted. It was 
true that Militant was easily the premier British group, but the moment 
for maximum impact in the Labour Party had been six months earliýr. 
Militant had managed a leaflet to the special conference of the 
Socialist League which had decided to join the Unýty'Campaign, but, 
as Jackson reflected,: 
'When the S. L. capitulated to the Stalinists wewere-unable 
to capitalise (on) the situation because of our unpreparedness. 
At that time we. had five members in the S. L. 1 
In the trade unions the Militant Group was doing practically 
no work. This was a general weakness of Trotskyism in the 1930s. For 
this particular group it might be disastrous because, as Davis 
observed, when the intended split from the Labour Party took place, 
trade unions would be its lifeline. Of course the split perspective 
maintained for the Labour Party was not applied to the trade unions: 
Trotskyism had no time for 'red unionism'. But when discussion took 
place at conference there was a revealing confusion between rank and 
file organisation and strike committeesand all references to disputes 
2 
were clearly made by. obsdrvers. Two months after conference trade 
union activity extended only to the semblance of an A. E. U. fraction, 
3 
I ibid. 
2 ibid., 9-12. 
3 Minutes of Executive Committee, 9 Oct. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/6. 
i 
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a foothold in the N. U. R. 
1. 
and the Musicians Union 
2 
and a presence 
(shared by the Marxist Group) on the Metro Council of the Shop 
Assistants' Union. 3 When a comparison is made with the capable 
industrial workers the C. P. G. B. had within its ranks, this was poor. 
John Goffe, a management trainee, was industrial organiser. An 
attempt was made to improve matters in November with the decision to 
promote joint fractions with the Marxist Group-in the A. E. U., SeAeUvp, 
4. 
and N. U. C. When, following workers' sanctions.. policies over 
Abyssinia and Spain, the Trotskyists proposed blacking war supplies 
for Japan in 1937-8, they lacked the influence to make the policy 
stick and the policy's fortunes varied with communist interest. 
5 
The August conference was noteworthy, finally, for the 
introduction to the Militant Group of four recent arrivals from South 
Africa, best known of whom was Ralph Lee, a Trotskyist well known in 
I Sydney Bidwell was on the London District Council of the union and 
assistant secretary of his branch, (Minutes of G. M. M., 14 Nov. 1937, 
H. P., D. J. H. 2a/7). 
2 Principal activist was Michael Kemp Tippett (1905- )a Royal 
College of Music graduate who taught French at Hazlewood until. 1931. 
He then entered adult education in music, working for the L. C. C. 
and the Royal Arsenal Cooperative education departments. Tippett 
had worked for a time with the Marxist League and Marxist Group and 
was now the organiser of Socialist International Press a 
translators' group service formed on an I. S. initiative on I March 
1937, (Who's Wh ; 'Statement of M. T. ', 8 Jan. 1938, H. P., D. J. H. 
2A/100). 
3 Each group had one member there in 1937. 
4 Xinutes of Executive Committee, 27 Nov. 1937, Har. P. 
5 Militant, LL. P. and C. P. G. B. all called for a ban on munitions to 
Japan in October 1937 and the N. U. R. Executive was deadlocked on an 
embargo motion. Some action was taken on the docks. In 1938 
however, the C. P. G. B. ceased to support the policy, (B. Pearce, 
'Stalinists and Blackshirts' , The Newsletter, 19 Nov. 1960) . 
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the Johannesburg labour movement. 
1, They had given up hope of further 
progress in South Africa although they had played a leading role in 
some industrial struggles. On Haston's proposal, all four were made 
members of theCroup but they took no part in the proceedings and for 
the time being proposed no new departures. 
Ralph Lee, Millie Kahn (1913- ), Richard Frieslich and. Heaton Lee 
(1916- ), left South Africa in June. On arrival, Lee met 
Trotskyists'from different organisations, but. 'several meetings with 
Harber convinced him to join Militant (Interview with E. Grant, 
Jan.. 1973). His. induction was later considered by Jackson to be a 
great mistake since the only information to hand about Lee was that 
which he himself had provided, (E. S. Jackson to Douth African 
Trotskyists], 30 Dec. 1937, H. P., 2B. 3.15. )# Ralph Lee had been a 
communist since 1923 and had risen to the executive of the South 
African party. Possibly it was in 1930 that he left it and joined 
the International Workers Club, modelled on the Cape Town Lenin Club, 
which was 
, 
not Trotskyist but interested in the Fourth International. 
He was a pioneer Trotskyist in Johannesburg, advancing Trotsky's 
views in the Club and one of the founders, with Millie Kahn, of the 
Workers' Party of South Africa (Johannesburg branch). After a 1935 
split these two rebuilt the branch. He helped organise the Bantu 
laundry workers, who struck in 1934 and, through the revived Workersl 
Party, the African Metal Trades Union in January 1937. His record 
led the Metalworkers to ask his help when on 23 February they 
embarked on a strike which they abandoned, defeated, ten days later, 
(Sapire to Militant Group, 21 Feb. 1938, H. P., 2B. 3.26; Anon., 
Report on R. Lee; reports on metalworkers and laundry workers 
disputes in Fight, May 1937). Heaton Lee, who was no relation to. -,, --. 
Ralph Lee, was a mining engineer who had met Ann (Angel) Keen, a 
non-political South African Jewess, on the boat to England. She 
became politically convinced and joined the Trotskyist movement the 
following year. In Johannesburg the other three had also known 
Ted Grant, who had travelled to England in 1934 or 1935. This strain 
of South African Trotskyism should be distinguished from that in 
C4petown in the English speaking division, whence Charles van Gelderen, 
his brother (who remained there), and Millie Matthews hailed, 
(Interview with-M. Haston, July 1973; interview with A. Keen, 
30 July 1974). For a communist impression of the South African 
Trotskyists in 1936, see G. Hardy, Those Stormy Years, (1956), 
228-36. More detached is H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in 
South Africa 1850-1950, (1969), 503-4,508-16. 
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The decision to'set up its own front organisation within 
the party did not mean that the Militant Group had given up the 
Socialist Left Federation. Faced with the historic decision of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party not to oppose the arms estimates Militant 
ýI 
declared: 
'Here too is an opportunity for the newly formed Socialist, 
Left Federation to win its spurs by showing the workers how 
-- the capitulation of. Cripps and Co. to the Communist Party has 
inevitably led to the desertion of the-socialist anti-war -, 
struggle'. 
' 
War was-the paramount issue for all Trotskyists, a prime 
source of their hostility to the Unity Campaign. They did not believe 
action by capitalist countries, however presented, or by the League of 
Nations, could be progressive or a means of keeping peace. It would 
lead instead, he believed, to a new imperialist conflict. Hence 
their distaste in the autumn of 1937 for League sanctions against 
Japan: this would lead to a war not for democracy but for plunder. 
2 
But while Militant could see no difference between Attlee and Morrison 
and Cripps and the C. P. G. B. in view of their common willingness to 
countenance a war, it was not sure everyone else had grasped the point. 
The only reason why the minority and the communists do not 
openly support the arms plan is because they -do not 
'trust' 
the National Government to carry out this line in a sincere 
manner. If the interests of British Capitalism demanded a 
temporary alliance with France or the Soviet Union this 
opposition would collapse immediately 
3 
I Militant (Aug. 1937). 
2 Militant (Sept., Oct., 1937) 
3 Militant (Sept. 1937) 
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In Militant's view resting on imperialist alliances was a 
false policy: it was the workýing class which could prevent war. 
The paper criticised the S. L. F. for condemnin g the right and not the 
left for this folly. It committed itself to pushing the Federation 
and applied as a body to join it. Refused, it took up an invitation 
ýto'its members to participate on an-individual basis. As a result it 
now found itself in difficulties'on its right and on its left. it 
clashed bitterly with the Marxist League and Groves, who believed that 
týe S. L. F. should not be made into a Trotskyist body for this would 
narrow 'its appeal. 
2 Militant sought to become the official organ of 
the S. L. F. and the Group took factional steps to bring this to pass. 
Clashes occurred every month at S. L. F. bureau meetings, without 
Groves's domination ever being challenged. On 23 September 1937 the 
S. L. F. called on Militant to cease publication and rally all forces 
behind the broad body. 
4. But Militant concluded that the Marxist League 
I By printing membership forms for the S, L. F. in"its pages, ibid. 
2 Interview with R. Groves, April 1980. 
3 In September 1937, it resolved to recruit to the S. L. F. only those 
sophisticated workers who were ready for it, to form new S. L. F. 
branches under its own control, and to make Jackson its faction. 
organiser, (Militant Group, [E. C. 3 Minutes, 19 Sept. 1937). The aim 
was to win an S. L. F. majority. 
4 Militant (Oct. 1937) 
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had parted from Bolshevik-Leninism 
I 
and in October disappeared from 
the S. L. F. Within the Group there was disquiet at these efforts, 
notably in the Liverpool Group, led by Don James. On 18 September it 
I resolved not to, implement the S. L. F. tactic; a week later it stopped 
selling Militant which, it claimed, was giving one third of its space 
to S. L. F. affairs. 
2 The Liverpool Group was suspended on 9 October 
1937 just before the Militant leadership as a whole itself despaired 
of the S. L. F. and turned away from it. Militant now launched its own 
front organisation against war, the Militant Labour League, and in 
November 1937 printed eight pages for the first time. The League was 
the public presence of the Group in the Labour Party. Group members 
were active in other organisations, 
3 but it was the Labour Party which 
really interested them. M. L. L. members were expected to be in the - 
party, membership of which was considered to be a badge of political 
understanding. 
In the autumn of 1937 the Militant, Group bad behind it a 
year's steady activity, but it could not claim the kind of progress 
which would make possible a strong Trotskyist impact. Increasing 
emphasis on the Labour Party conflicted with the extravert inclinations 
of the former Hyde Park group, which had dwindled almost to nothing 
before it was reinforced by Ralph Lee and his comrades from South Africa 
I Minutes of Executive Committee, 9 October 1937. This same month the 
Marxist League dissolved itself thus bearing out Militant fears. It 
wrote that the Bureau included those 'who, by their weakness and 
vacillation contributed to the defeat of the left wing in the 
Socialist League' (A. Dean, 'S. L. F. Leaders Sabotage Left Wing', 
Militant, Oct. 1937). 
2 Minutes of Executive Committee, 9 Oct. 1937. 
3 Margaret Johns was secretary of the Co-op political council in 
St. Pancras; both the Militant and Marxist Groups had members on the 
Islington Co-op politiýal council in 1937. * Margaret Johns also 
joined the London Labour Party executive in November of that year. 
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at the August conference. * There was some awareness within the Group 
leadership that activities around their paper were too much confined 
but it was the revived Paddington Group which really pioneered street 
and canvassing sales. 
2 
Ralph Lee joined the National Committee in 
September in recognition, it seems, of his ability and energy. The 
Paddington Group worked on its local'Y. C. L. as well as the League of 
Youth and began to recruit from its outside activities. 
3 
There is no 
evidence in 1937 of actual political disagreements'between-Paddington 
and the rest of the Militant Group. 
4 
Its intern'al_regime was. 
considered a model by the centre. On-the resignation of K. Alexander 
from the executive, Haston was elected to the vacant position. 
5 
There was a minor clash over the centre's ban on the issue of an 
anti-fascist pamphlet, but the partisans here bissected the December 
split. And when stylistic criticisms of Militant were made the 
response of the Group was to place Ralph Lee and Richard Frieslich on 
the editorial board, 
6 
I Jackson had told the August conference that a Labour Party sales base 
for Militant was too narrow and advised that an outside drive should 
be mounted. 
2 -Only one or two groups had contributed to the increased sales 
recorded in the autumn, (Minutes of G. M. M., 12 Sept. 1937, H. P,, 
D. J. H. 2a/5; 10 Oct. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/6; 14 Nov. 1937, H. P. 9 D. J. H. 2a/7). 
3 It claimed these had led to the disbandment of the Paddington Y. C. L., 
(Minutes of G. M. M., 1'2 Sept. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/5). In November it took control of the Paddington League of Youth ' (Minutes of Executive Committee, 11 Dec. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9c). Among the 
recruits made around this time was Gerry Healy, another ex--co=unist 
seaman, encountered in Hyde Park sales. 
4 None of its members had dissented from. approval of the E, C. report 
to the August conference which included, inter alia, the S. L. F. 
tactic they were later to condema. 
5 Minutes of G. M. M., 10 Oct. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/6. 
6 ibid. The Group also prepared local supplements to Militant,, 
(Minutes of Executive Committee, 11 Dec. 1937, H. P, q D. J. H. 2a/9c), 
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The worm in the-apple was a series of rumours which 
reached Militant Group leaders in October 1937 about the record of 
Ralph Lee, and about which they received confirmation in the second 
week of November. 
I Lee was accused of calling out 300 Bantu workers 
in February on a hopeless issue and of leaving for Europe in the 
middle of the strike. Money collected for the strikers' benefit was 
also said to be missing. Even before the rumours were confirmed, 
Group leaders had acted upon them. 
2 Lee himself was, only-informed. of 
them late in the day and the assurances given him of confidential 
treatment were false. 
3A 
special executive of 13 November, from which 
I The source of them was Charles van Gelderen's brother in 
Cape Town., Charles van Gelderen reported confirmation to Jackson, 
the Group secretary, on 11 November. 
2 When Sid Sandel, Group literature and secretary and British agent 
for Pioneer Press was forced to resign due to failing eyesight, it 
was proposed to replace him by Millie Kahn who had been agent for 
Pioneer in South Africa. Pioneer raised no objection to Kahn, but 
it was Margaret Johns who, after a slight delay, replaced Sandel. 
Kahn lived with Lee and the doubts about him inhibited Group leaders 
from letting Kahn have the post. She was finally approached only 
after theert; ptionof the affair had led to the suspension of Harber 
and Jackson, (Jackson to Pioneer Publishing Association, 4 Oct. 
1937; Pioneer to Jackson, 14 Oct. 1937; Jackson to Pioneer, 
26 Oct. 1937; H. P., D. J. H 28/2; Minutes of Executive Committee, 
20 Nov. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/7. ) - 
3 Jackson informed Lee of the rumours verbally, gave him a copy of the 
11 November letter, then wrote to him on 12 November. He told him 
not to be inhibited in his activities and that the accusations were 
probably Stalinist fabrications. Jackson added that Harber and 
van Gelderen alone were privy to the charges, but they certainly 
reached Johns, Coffe and Archer, who also relayed them to I. S. 
member 'Camille' while in Paris as an observer at the P. S. O. P. 
conference, (van Gelderen to Jackson, 11 Nov. 1937; Jackson to 
Lee, 12 Nov. 1937; Lee to Archer, 16 Nov. 1937; Archer to Lee, 
19 Nov. 1937). At a special executive of 13 November Lee obtained 
confirmation that knowledge of the charges had leaked out, 
(Minutes., H. P., D. J. H. 2a/7). 
227. 
Harber and Jackson were absent, unanimously recorded its confidence 
in Lee. The next day the matter surfaced lengthily at a General 
Members' Meeting, where Lee charged that the Group was under control of 
a bureaucratic, plique who feared loss of control to him. Jackson, 
Harber and others had admitted they had. handled the affair badly, but 
protested no evil intention. It was Lee who stated that the group 
was faced with a split over whether or not the leadership should-be 
expelled. At the conclusion of discussion the meeting resolved by 
only one vote to take the soft option of reducing-Harbii, Jackson 
and van Gelderen to probationary membership. 
I It'then proceeded to 
elect a new executive which included neither Lee nor them. But when 
this executive met on 20 November it considered correspondence from 
parties to the quarrel, including a letter from Harber, Jackson and 
van Gelderen claiming their suspension as full members to be 
unconstitutional. This argument was upheld and, on Haston's 
proposal, the new executive dissolved itself in favour of the old! 
The discussion over Lee, which seems to have occupied the 
whole Militant organisation for two months reveals little sense of 
proportion. In their letter to the executive Harber, Jackson and 
van Gelderen spoke. of it being the 'only revolutionary group'. A 
letter from Harber to Betty Hamilton, (a French member of the Central 
branch who had backed Lee), talked of only f if ty functioning members 
3 in London, ten of whom were on the E. C. One group member who tried 
I Minutes of G. M. M., 14 November 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/7.. In 
December these minutes were-challenged by Frieslich, Haston, Healy 
and Grant as distorted to show Lee in an unfavourable light. 
2 Minutes of Executive Committee, 20 November 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/7. 
Haston later explained that his motivation was that this second 
step logically followed from the first, (Minutes of Executive 
Committee, 27 November 1937, H. P., D. J. H. _2-a-/"9_`a. 
3 D. D. Harber to Hamilton, 25 November 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9a.,. 
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at least to understand how such a minor affair could gain this 
importance was Michael Tippett, who detected a residue of the 'low 
political and moral level of the past', (by which he meant the 
Marxist League -and the Marxist Group). Those longest in the 
movement-Pwere, he thought, the most likely to be drawn into personal 
recriminations. Exhibitions like those at the General Members' 
Meeting, which he had not attended, would be 'unthinkable in a group 
of comrades that felt the living revolution as at all imminent'. 
Tippett thought the situation was worsening and called for a new 
leadership, free of suspicion. 
I Another explanation was volunteered 
by Hamilton who thought group members were recruiting their personal 
friends rather than working in the wider movement. 
2 
Tippett's fears 
were confirmed in December. Camille (Klement) the I. S. secretary 
expressed alarm at the 'bad internal situation' in the group, 
3 
and 
the centre was deluged with letters from members levelling (and 
occasionally retracting) charges. Frieslich and Lee failed to attend 
editorial board meetings; Lee 
4 
and Haston 
5 
refused to turn up at 
I As from the Central Group, 26 Nov. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9a. 
2 B. Hamilton to Harber, 8 Dec. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2B/3/7. 
3 'Camille' to Jackson, 5 Dec. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9b. 
4 His attitude was thought not 'Bolshevik' by the Group leaders. 
5 Haston was protesting at the minutes of the 14 November G. M. M. and 
declared he no longer expected objective records of meetings, 
(Minutes of Executive Committee, 11 Dec. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9c). 
He charged that the manoevres of Harber et. al. had 'a deep political 
significance' (J. Haston to the Militant Group, 12 Dec. 1937, H. P., 
D. J. H. 2a/9c). What this might have been is a mystery. 
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the executive. Tippett at least attempted to generalise, 
I but it is 
impossible to dissent from the lament of K. Alexander who had witnessed 
two months of strife and frenzy from afar: 
'I sign for the translation of all that labour power into 
2 
the more fruitful channels of work in the Labour Party' . 
On 19 December 1937, a G. M. M. heavily condemned splits and 
called for adherence to Group decisions. But Lee and his supporters 
insisted on the expulsion of the officials who had mishandled the 
affair. When this did not happen they withdrew. 
3 
Tippett and 
Hamilton, nominated for the vacant E. C. places, refused to fill them. 
There is some evidence that Lee himself anticipated independent 
activities and he and his supporters certainly began at once to seek 
4 
outside backing . The Militant Group set in train its cumbersome 
I M. Tippett [to the Militant Group], 11 Dec. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9c. 
Tippett linked the Lee affair to the suspension of the Liverpool 
Group and concluded that in the face of war those anticipating 
illegal or semi-legal work would have to look elsewhere for 
leadership. 
2 K. Alexander to Jackson, n. d., H. P., 2B. 3.33. Alexander was the 
only opponent of Lee in the Paddington group. During the affair he 
was out of the capital. 
3 The withdrawal took place early in the meeting during discussion on 
matters arising from the minutes of the November G. M. M. They may have 
just pulled out of the meeting, (Interview with E. Grant, Jan. 1973). 
Group leaders believed they were leaving the Group, (Comments of E. C. 
on Statement of Former Members of Paddington, Central and North 
Groups, [March? ]1938 , H. P. ). Tippett, who was well-disposed 
towards them, believed they should have followed the meeting through, 
(S_t_atement of Comrade M. T., 8 Jan. 1938, H. P. 2a/10a). Everyone 
who accompanied Lee was from his own Paddington group, (E. S. Jackson 
to [South African Trotskyists), 30. Dec. 1937, H. P. 2B. 3.15). 
4 In October Lee had written to Camille (Klement) of the International 
Secretariat concerning the founding of a Marxist theoretical 
journal in England, (Statement of P. J. B. (Leeds), 8 Dec. 1937, 
H. P., D. J. H. 2a/9b). X -pilot issue of Workers International News 
appeared on 18 December, a day before the final meeting and regular 
monthly publication of it from I January 1938 (although the January 
and 18 December issues are similar) argues more than twelve days 
preparation. Lee obtained the participation of former Marxist 
Leaguer Hilary Sumner-Boyd, and with other Paddington group members 
he approached disenchanted Advance followers in the East End with 
whom the local Militant group had been in contact (H. P., D. J. H., 
2B. 3.16). 
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expulsion machinery. 
IA few days later the Central Group withdrew, 
and on 16 January a majority of the North Group ended its 
participation in the main organisation. 
Jackson believed Lee intended 'a publishing centre 
independent of the Groups', 
2 
and the Marxist Group joined him in 
protesting at such a project. Workers International News, the first 
theoretical journal of British Trotskyism had been under discussion 
on the Militant executive, but it now became Lee's flag-bearer. He 
and the others were expelled formally on 17 February 1938,3 and faced 
the united opposition of the other groups. 
4 
The split was formalised the following year by a letter 
from nineteen former Militant Group members to the Group. 
5 
Much of 
the letter was concerned with the Lee affair, but what seems to have 
rankled most within it was the failure of the group majority to curb 
a leadership 'untrustworthy, incapable, irresponsible and dishonest'. 
The letter also alleged that the confidence of the signatories in the 
Group had been 'long undermined' by the way it functioned, 
6 
that the 
I This existed as a result of a Paddington proposition introduced at 
the time of the disciplinary action against the Liverpool group. It 
amounted to a national consultative referendum on expulsions. 
2 E. S. Jackson to Sapire, (Johannesburg Group), 17 Feb. 1938, H. P., 
2B. 3.25. 
3 E. S. Jackson to Lee, H. P., 2B. 3.25.2. 
4 C. Sumner to I. S. ,6 Feb. 19 38, 
(See Chapter VI) . 
5 To the Militant Group, 10 March 1938. Signed by K. Chapman, 
F. Clifford, T. de Moor, B. Fisher, R. Freislich, B. French, T. Grant, 
J. Haston, B. Hamilton, G. Healy, D. James, K. Kemshead, M. Kahn, 
H. Lee, R. Lee, T. Mundy, H. Ratner, M. Tippett, E. Truman. 
6 There had been a clash in September 1937 over the suppression of an 
anti-fascist leaflet by the leadership, but leading Group figures 
were ranged on both sides over the issue. As the Group pointed out 
in its reply, there was no record of objections by Haston or Lee, 
both of whom were members of the leading bodies. 
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Lee affair was a symptom. The failure of the membership to replace 
its leaders is thus presented as a last straw. Politics, however, did 
not intrude into the list of indictments. The Militant Cro4p 
countered that there was no evidence of this alleged long degeneration, 
that it was being produced ex post facto. In its view it was Lee who 
had a degenerate history as the letters from South Africa suggested, 
and who had now split from 'insane egoism'. 
' 
The 'Lee split' was not the first in British Trotskyist 
2 history, but it was to be the most controversial. . 
Previous splits 
had all been difficult to defend since they had in each case occurred 
over a tactical difference. This split was also difficult to defend 
since no political, differences emergedat all. It can only be 
explained by a personal clash and divergence of style. The Militant 
leadership had crystallized during 1937, not a long period for a 
stable cadre to hang together. Lee and his comrades represented a 
different political tradition and Lee in particular had a talent for 
the vivid or cruel phrase. Had Militant been progressing rapidly in 
the later months of 1937, factionalism would have taken root only 
with far greater difficulty. What also lay behind the split was a 
growing emphasis on exclusive Labour Party work by the Group and its 
leaders, while Paddington was a marriage of two extravert experiences. 
Group leaders and Paddington foresaw a different path to growth, and 
by the empirical test of results it was the second which would be most 
successful in the next ten years. 
0 
I Comments of E. C. to Statement of former members of_Paddington, Central 
and North Groups, E1938], Warwick M. S. S. 
2 Nor has the controversy died. See the account in M. and J. Archer, 
'Notes on Healy's Role in Early Days of the British Trotskyist 
Movement', Intercontinental Press, 10 May 1976,772-5. 
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In 1938 the Militant Group attributed the failures of 
Trotskyism in 1937 to 'the weakness of our forces and their dispersal 
in several organisations'. 
1 This empirical verdict could be applied 
to the whole decade, but it does not provide a full explanation. 
Certainly a full Trotskyist mobilisation in the Labour League of 
Youth in 1934 or 1935 might have radically altered that movement's 
subsequent history; at the very least communists and their 
sympathisers within the League might have been counter-balanced. But 
the Trotskyist appeal was vitiated by forces beyond its control, 
notably the flexibility of communist policy and the international 
campaign against Trotsky. The communists also showed themselves able 
to adjust their tactics at every stage. The Militant Group seemed by 
contrast to be arguing an abstract strategy for pulling young people 
out of the Labour Party, and it involved communist co-operation which 
would certainly not be forthcoming. Although the organisation 
established by 1937 was superior to its predecessors it did not represent 
an impressive alternative to the other political movements of the time: 
it showed an unhealthy preoccupation with the activity of its 
Trotskyist rivals, and an overweening fear of the Labour Party 
apparatus. These features blunted its cutting edge and contributed to 
an atmosphere where a split which was to have far-reaching 
consequences could take place. 
I Militant Group, Statement on Fusion with the R. S. L., 27 May 1938, 
R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 3, (July 1938), 4. 
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viii UNITY, 1936 - 1938 
In the two years from 1936 to 1938 British followers of the 
Fourth International made their most sustained effort to date to 
achieve a united body whiýh might have some impact on events. There 
were many difficulties on the way. Those pressing hardest for unity 
were outside the Labour Party and therefore in living contradiction of 
the 'Geneva' resolution. Those within the Labour Party were opposed 
to unity which did not resolve tactical differences. These objections 
were partly overcome by the intervention of the International which 
sought to pressurise an unready British movement into its own time- 
table for unity. The result was an inherently unstable British Section 
and confirmation of the pessimistic forecast made by WIL, the only 
group to stay aloof. 
Fight appeared on 10 October 1936 in a sixteen page issue 
appended to which was a four page supplement on the Moscow Trial. It 
led with a statement on the need for a new international and launched 
an attack on Brockway who - unlike Maxton, it was felt - knew the 
right course and shunned it. It carried an interview with Trotsky, and 
much other material on the Trials including a document of the Geneva 
conference. Right from the start Fight ran advertisements for 
The Red Flag and Youth Militant. This brotherliness originated in 
joint control of the paper by the Marxist Group and the Bolshevik- 
Leninists in the Labour Party. The paper's statement of intent 
declared: 
'We, the Bolshevik-Leninists of Britain, whether we are in 
the Labour Party, I. L. P., Co-op or Trade Union, will fight 
with the workers .. * ...... 
I Fight (fO Oct. 1936). 
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Around the time of the first trial the Marxist Group had 
worked closely with the Bolshevik-Leninists. There had even been a 
joint executive formed from the two to control whatever I. L. P. union 
factions were under Marxist Group control. 
I At the national*meating 
of 11 October a Central Co-ordinating Committee was established for 
all three groups. It met twice more in 1936, but then lapsed for a 
time. 2 Chief obstacle to regular functioning was the blurring of the 
decisions taken at the October national meeting by the sudden decision 
of the Marxist Group to withdraw from the I. L. P., motivated by that 
party's decline since its Keighley conference. The Marxist Group 
informed the National Administrative Council of the I. L. P. that it 
would withdraw and call on all revolutionaries to join it. 
3 
On the 
eve of the launching of the Unity Campaign the Group held its first 
meeting, began to imitate the action of a full-blown party 
4 
and made 
its counter proposals for unity. 
5 
By February 1937 it had pulled out 
of the I. L. P. 
I 'Bolshevik-Leninist statement to Joint Session of groups', 11 Oct. 
1936, For Discussion, 1, (28 Nov. 1936), 15. 
2 Statement to the Bureau for the Fourth International from B. L. Group 
in the Labour Party regarding the fulfillment of the Geneva 
Resolution on the question of the Unity of the British Groups, 
29 Dec. 1936. 
3 In the view of the Marxist Group the I. L. P. had fudged on Abyssinia, 
the Popular Front, the Trials and Spain. The leadership was 'a body 
of political manoeuverers without vision or principle' (Towards the 
New Workers' Party, (Statement to the I. L. P. N. A. C. from members ZT 
the former Marxist Group), Fight, 12 Dec. 1936. ) 
4 The Marxist Group was proclaimed as an independent force at a public 
meeting on 16 December 1936. 
5 The Marxist Group analysis of the Unity Campaign was rather more 
concrete than that offered by the other Trotskyists. If there was 
agreement between the I. L. P., C. P. G. B. and Socialist League, it 
asked, why were they not all in one party? There were differences 
and they could not be blurred: 
The Marxist Group will therefore not apply to join this bloc 
as outlined by the I. L. P. and it warns the workers that no 
ultimate good will come of it. The C. P. will swallow the 
majority of the Socialist League and half of the I. L. P. for 
its counter-revolutionary policy. The I. L. P. will capitulate 
entirely to the C. P. or run for shelter into the Labour Party. 
(Fight, Jan. 1937. ) 
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A Marxist Group outside all parties had implications for 
Trotskyists elsewhere. Independent existence had been adopted in 
defiance of the Declaration of the International Bureau. Joint 
control of Fight ceased at once, since the Marxist Group majority 
on the editorial board imposed its view. 
I 
The rapid shift in 
Marxist Group policy is difficult to explain. The Bolshevik-Leninists 
attributed it to middle class influence, but this cannot be 
empirically sustained. 
2 
It shivered a not overlarge organisation 
into three fragments. 
3 
There were international parallels to the step 
now taken by the Marxist Group and knowledge of them helped reinforce 
I The Bolshevik-Leninists had sold the first (10 Oct. ) issue of Fight 
but withdrew from any contact with it after this to avoid 
embarrassment in the Labour Party, (E. C., Bolshevik-Leninist Group 
in the Labour Party, Statement to the Bureau for the Fourth 
International, 29 Dec. 1936,3) 
2 In opting for independence C. L. R. James, chairman of the Group, had 
the support of Arthur Ballard, its secretary, who was a Croydon 
carpenter, Jock Milligan, a building worker and Karl Westwood. The 
charge of middle class influence is levelled in E. C. , of the Bolshevik-Leninist Group, Statement to the Bureau, 4. 
3 Arthur Cooper (who had voted with James on 15 November at the 
crucial London meeting of the Group), Frederick Marzillier and 
Ernie Patterson stayed within the I. L. P. These three were all 
Londoners, but they were thought to have more support among 
provincial Marxist Group members than am ng those in the Capital. 
They were a minority sufficiently sizeable to retain fraction status 
within the Marxist Group, though this seems to have meant very 
little. Cooper, at least, left the I. L. P. later. A third part of 
the Marxist Group was identified as the former members of the 
Communist League minority, all but one of whom now joined the 
Labour Party. 
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the reaction of other Trotskyists. 
I 
The Bolshevik-Leninists, for whom 
presence in the Labour Party was the Ark of the Covenant, were 
naturally inclined in favour of the Marxist League, though they 
differentiated between Groves and Dewar and its other members. But 
the League had concluded by late 1936 that the time for exclusive 
Labour Party work was nearing its end and when it looked for unity it 
was the Marxist Group, not the Bolshevik-Leninists, which interested 
it. 2 The Bolshevik-Leninists, known from January 1937 as the Militant 
Group, not unreasonably concluded that new efforts-to achieve unity 
were not likely to be efficacious. They were larger than the other 
two groups put together; there were many workers among their members; 
they were moving out of a purely youth milieu: they considered that 
they now had a case for recognition as the British Section of the 
international movement. 
I There was strong hostility within the International Communist League 
to entering social-democratic parties. Joining the I. L. P. provoked 
no crisis outside Britain, but the French turn followed by that of 
the Belgians was denounced by many leading figures. When the 
Americans entered the Socialist Party in 1936, the dispute was 
extended. C. L. R. James was in touch with Creme who belonged to the 
Canadian followers of B. J. Field, who had split from the C. L. A. 
during his leadership of an industrial dispute in 1935. Whatever 
the significance of this and other contacts in terms of influence, 
James argued along similar lines to those of Bauer against the 
French turn and Hugo Oehler against the American turn. The views 
of Oehler, a veteran labour organiser, who split from the C. L. A. in 
1935 are well expressed in his remark at an October 1934 Plenum of 
the League: 
'In fact, French, Belgium, (sic) and British entrism. 
were disasters (and) because of excessive organic 
unity, virtual capitulation. ' 
(quoted in C. A. Myers, op. cit., 16) 
2 Wicks may have joined the Fight editorial board early in 1937, 
(A. Cooper to Wicks, 25 Jan. 1937. This information is crossed 
through in the letter). He was also collaborating with James on 
World Revolution (1937). It was to be the League which secured the 
Group's attendance at the February 1937 national meeting against 
Bolshevik-Leninist inclinations (see below). 
3 Additional arguments they deployed were that they were the only 
group in Britain following international recommendations, and that 
conferral of official status would hasten the disintegration of the 
other two, a process already underway, (E. C., Bolshevik-Leninist 
Group, Statement to the Bureau, 5-7). 
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The International Bureau did not move this far but it did 
encourage the Bolshevik-Leninists to build up the strongest 
organisation they could. By a December 1936 declaration it had 
called for a conference of those of the country's Trotskyists who 
accepted the Geneva resolution. 
I The Militant Group reacted along 
slightly different lines, with a February call for unity with the 
Marxist League on the basis of the Geneva resolution. 
2 All three 
groups had members at the national meeting of 14 February 1937, 
convened in the presence of Braun of the International Secretariat. 
3 
The Militant case for unity in the Labour Party was countered by a 
Groves-Wicks bid for unity of all three factions. Braun seems to have 
endorsed the Militant approach, by opposition to an early split from 
the Labour Party, though he expressed reservations on its youth line. 
4 
He concluded that little progress was likely to be made towards fusion 
and encouraged it to concentrate on its own work. 
5 It was ironic that 
I Declaration of the International Bureau for the Fourth International 
on the subject of the English Marxist Group, 13 Dec. 1936, n. p., 
kindly lent to author by Mr. John Archer. 
2 Minutes B/L Group Secretariat, 13 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. J. H. 2a/3a. 
3 'Braun' was the pseudonym of Erwin Wolf (1902-37) secretary of the 
I. S. until his murder in Spain, probably by the C. P. U., late in the 
year. The initiative for this meeting came from the Militant Croup 
who sought a-common approach to the Unity Campaign, 'Interim Reply 
of the E. C., Milit_a_n_t Group to the Marxist League', 3 Aug. 1937, in 
Inter-Group Relations, [Sept. ] 1937. 
4 These are likely to have been misgivings about its campaign for early 
independence for the League of Youth, (Secretary, London Croup, 
[Militant Group], Report to Provincial Branch on Joint Meetina, 
14 Feb. 1937, H. P., D. J. H 2A/3B. ) 
5 'Statement of the Executive Committee of the Militant Group on Inter- 
Group Relations', 20 Aug. 1937, in Inter-Group Relations, [Sept. ] 
1937. 
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the two groups closest in their tactical views should in practice be 
so bitterly divided as were the Militant. Group and the Marxist League. 
Yet it is impossible to understand their actions or those of 
the Marxist Group except in the light of a deeply held conviction that 
every possible step must be taken to rally the workers against war. 
2 
Militant propaganda against the Unity Campaign was galvanised by the 
certainty that the Left and the C. P. G. B. would accept a war for 
democracy. Fight insisted that every form of war preparation must be 
opposed: war could be supported only when Britain was in the workers' 
hands. All of them were haunted by 1914 when socialist leaders in 
every country had yielded to a chauvinist mood. During the years 
imm diately before the war this lent their writings an abstract slant 
as they fought old battles. It was a sense of approaching war which 
led the Marxist Group to seek independence from the I. L. P., even at 
the risk of expulsion from the international movement. 
3 
The new 
I The Marxist League never sold Youth Militant but did put efforts into 
a short-lived and narrowly based Socialist League journal Socialist 
Youth, of which, suggested Militant, it had control. The League also 
circulated the P. O. U. M. bulletin in England. The irony that two 
groups who vehemently opposed the Unity Campaign could not them- 
selves unite, passed without comment. 
2 Without this sense of time running out, it seems unlikely that the 
Marxist Group would have made its rapid turn away from the I. L. P. 
This explains the willingness of Cooper to reverse his earlier view 
and move into independence. Other prominent members of the Group 
with I. L. P. connections were Arthur Ballard, the Croydon carpenter 
who had once run the Strand I. L. P. bookshop with Jon Kimche and was 
now Group secretary, and Jim Wood, who was married to Audrey Brockway. 
3 This threat was scarcely veiled, see the concluding words of, 
(Declaration of the International Bureau, 13 Dec. 1936). 
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party had to be built: 
'Do not hesitate, do not put it off. Above all do not 
be disconcerted by the fact that we are not a large 
organisation. Particularly we appeal to old revolutionaries, 
disillusioned by the crimes and treacheries of the 
Stalinists. Everyone who comes makes us larger'. 
I 
Repetitive appeals of this kind did not make a strategy for 
producing a powerful Trotskyist movement. They flew in the face of 
Trotsky's own pleas of 1933 and 1936 for a sense of proportion, but 
they were also an anticipation of the 1938 decision to launch a 
Fourth International in the hope of holding the revolutionary forces 
together. James shared an international illusion that successive 
labour movement defeats left workers looking for an alternative. 
Hence Fight had the tone of a paper merely drawing attention to the 
obvious. The Labour Party, it declared, would only bring disillusion- 
ment. 'The sooner this happens the better. To be disillusioned with 
2 Labour Party reformism is the first step to revolutionary clarity' 
When confronted by the London Busmen's Strike, Fight observed that the 
behaviour of the L. P. T. B. and union officials 'occasions no surprise'. 
'The mere substitution of, say, Bevin by Papworth would achieve 
nothing', it warned. 
3 
Fight and the Marxist Group did not deceive 
I Fight (April 1937). Nevertheless, the Marxist Group had Labour 
Party members. One of them, 'P. T. ', spoke at the Fusion Conference 
of 27 February 1938, (R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 1, (April 1938), 
11). 
2 Fight (July 1937). 
3 ibid. 
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themselves that they werea party. But they believed that coming 
disaffection from established parties would lead people to look for 
onez 
I 
the Fourth International had to maintain an independent presence 
so that it could be found. Other Trotskyists, engaged in entry work, 
had, infight's view, a futile task. The I. L. P. had reached the limit 
of its leftward swing in early 1935. 'To think that the I. L. P., as a 
party, can be won for revolutionary Marxism, is, in fact, not to think 
at all'. As for the Labour Party, a Trotskyist presence within it was 
usually justified by reference to the presence of the masses: Fight 
expressed great scepticism as to whether this was indeed where they 
were. It also felt that earlier objections to being separate from all 
parties were no longer valid. Trotskyism was better known in 1937 than 
in 1932 and the capitulation of the Comintern more abject than before. 
Advanced workers searching for international socialism would not find 
it 'hidden away in the rotten archives of the Labour Party'. They 
were also moving away from Stalinism. On these doubtful arguments was 
2 
predicated the Marxist Group case for independence. 
I James, with his relatively wide reputation, had an appeal to those 
of other parties and of none. The years immediately before the war 
were intensely productive for him. He published The Black Jacobins, 
a study of the Haitian slave revolt of Toussaint 00-uverture, in 1938 
and the following year translated Boris Souvarine's Staline. His 
later fame as a theorist of nationalism in developing countries was 
anticipated in his last years in Britain by his pivotal position in 
the London community of black radicals. He was editor of 
International African opinion, the journal of the International 
African Service Bureau, of which George Padmore, Jomo Kenyatta and 
Kwame Nkrumah were members. Padmore's wife had acted as James's 
secretary during the writing of World Revolution. 
2 This argument can be followed in Fight throughout 1937, and especially 
in its August issue. 
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The existence of the Marxist Group was an invitation to 
other Trotskyists to realign. It had personal links with some Marxist 
League members, perhaps made easier by the departure of former Group 
members who had. been in the Communist League minority for the Labour 
Party. I It was also pursuing a policy of publishing Fourth 
International documents and seems to have consciously followed a 
tactic of regroupment. In July 1937 discussions between the 
Trotskyists began again, precipitated by a call from the Croup at its 
half-yearly conference for an aggregate of all Bolshevik-Leninists. 
But this did not imply an altered view by the Group of the need for an 
open identifiable Fourth International fraction: 
'The methods of a fused group can be none other than the 
maintenance of an independent platform and propaganda 
2 
allied to correct fraction work in the mass organisations' . 
In its view the Marxist League and Militant Group were 
making sacrifices in the Labour Party in return for access to potential 
which was less than that available outside the party. Not surprisingly 
Starkey Jackson of the Militant told the conference that there was 
little basis for cooperation. He was unmoved by a Group offer to 
canvass in local elections. This was no less likely, he thought, to 
I Harry Wicks assisted C. L. R. James with World Revolution (1937) and 
had helped him as early as Minty Alley, a novel written while the 
Marxist Group was still in the I. L. P. P (Interview with H. Wicks, 
30 Nov. 1979). Wicks was also a member of the Fight editorial 
board in 1937 and, as first secretary of the Trotsky Defence 
Committee, in contact with all groups. His Notes on the History of 
Bolshevism (1937) were drawn up with help from D. D. Harber whom he 
would encounter in the British Museum. 
2 'Statement of Marxist Group from its half-yearly conference', 
11 July 1937, (Inter-Group Relations, [Sept. 3 1937,1). The Group's 
favoured sectors for joint fraction work were certain local 
co-ops, union branches, trades councils and the Socialist Left 
Federation. There was not unanimous support within the Marxist 
Group for its interest in the S. L. F.: objections were raised - 
and sustained - by Bill Duncan and Hilda Lane, (see below). 
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jeopardise a Labour Party presence than it would have been six months 
earlier. 
I Militant perceived, not surprisingly, that nothing 
essential had changed. It decided to abstain from the Central 
Co-ordinating Committee until that body's affairs were covered by a 
definite remit. 
2 It was prepared to continue cooperation with the 
Marxist Group over such activities as the Trotsky Defence Committee 
or the Committee for the Defence of the P. O. U. M. It did not, however, 
feel able to speak on public platforms as this would invite 
'premature expulsion from the Labour Party'. Tactics were as 
important as principles and it saw no reason to change them. It fore- 
saw only limited possibilities for cooperation. 
3 
Militant's 
preference was still for unity with the Marxist League since both were 
operating in the Labour Party sphere. It had experienced little 
encouragement in response to its advances, 
4 
and saw only limited value 
in joint meetings with the others unless they were to assist joint 
work in the Socialist Left Federation. Morally its position was strong. 
It continued to feel it was pursuing the line of the Geneva conference 
resolution; Braun had on his February visit advised consolidation of 
its own position, rather than fusion, as a main immediate task; in 
the summer it had convened what it felt was the most successful 
Trotskyist conference to date. 
5 It was more entrenched by August than 
I 'Marxist Group Proposals for Joint Work', 28 July 1937, Inter-Group 
Relations, [Sept. 1 1937. Other suggestions included were a central 
London meeting on 'Stalinism and the Colonial Struggle' and a system 
of exchange sales for the three group papers, 
2 ibid., 4-5. 
3 'Interim Reply of the E. C., Militant Group', 5 Aug. 1937, Inter- 
Group Relations, ýept. j 1937,2. 
4 'Interim Reply of the E. C., Militant Grou 
.p 
to the Marxist League', 
3 Aug. 1937, Inter-Group Relations (Sept. 1 1937,3-4. 
5 The August 1937 Militant Group conference is described in the 
previous chapter. 
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it had been at the National Meeting of February 1937. If offered 
joint fraction work where it and the Marxist Group found themselves in 
the same organisation, but declined all joint activities which would 
compromise it within the Labour Party. It agreed to a swop arrangement 
for all three papers and went so far as to propose phased publication 
so that a new Trotskyist paper appeared at fortnightly intervals, with 
each - if it wished - carrying articles from members of other groups. 
I 
But there was more interest in the Marxist Group initiative 
2 
in the Marxist League, which did not operate in the Labour Party 
within a long term perspective. Marxist Group interest in a combined 
drive within the S. L. F. had some appeal when the League discussed it at 
a members' meeting of 23 July 1937. The Marxist League did not 
consider that all Trotskyist activity should take place within the 
Labour Party. It had recognised, for example, the importance of work 
within the I. L. P. Nor did it concede to the Marxist Group that 
revolutionary questions were subordinated to immediate issues: the 
problem was to relate immediate issues to the struggle for workers' 
power. Like the Militant Group, the Marxist League immediately 
perceived the Marxist Group's fusion proposals to consist essentially 
in the addition of a Labour Party fraction to its independent presence. 
Its counter-proposal was a committee composed of three members of each 
faction to meet monthly, arrange joint meetings and monitor the work of 
the two groups and the League. After six months, during which all 
three factions would refrain from public attacks on each other, 'concrete 
proposals for fusion' would be submitted. 
3 
The C. C. C. met on 
I 'Statement of the Executive Committee of the Militant Group on Inter- 
Group Relations', 20 Aug. 1937, Inter-Group Relations [Septj 1937. 
2 'Statement to the M. L. from the Marxist Group', Marxist League 
Information Bulletin, 20 July 1937, Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/1/16. 
3 'Marxist League Reply to the Marxist Group and Proposals of the M. Lo'p 
Inter-Group Relations,, [Sept2 1937,2-3. 
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12 August 1937 and Starkey Jackson there proposed a joint meeting of 
the groups. This should have been decisive since Militant's 
objections were the most deep-seated. But the Militant executive 
withdrew Jackson's proposal after they saw the editorial in the August 
Fight, which attacked the presence of revolutionaries in the Labour 
Party. 
The Marxist League had continued to publish The Red Flag on 
an occasional basis, and also to put out Trotsky's writings. 
2 Its 
members persisted with the Socialist Left Federation. But in October 
1937, the Marxist League officially dissolved itself and suspended 
publication of The Red Flag. Some time later a majority of former 
M. L. members gathered and considered the overall position of 
Trotskyism in Britain. They set up an ad hoc committee and approached 
the Marxist Group for fusion. Late in January 1938, a joint commission 
was established with three members from either side and it was this 
body which drew up a political statement and constitution which each 
party then discussed. The political statement called for 'a strong 
centralised independent organisation (to) be built on the platform of 
the Fourth International'. The problem of where to be in the short 
term had been resolved in favour of a body separate from other parties, 
though the new body would aspire to organise workers in the established 
organisations. There would eventually be a revolutionary party under 
'Reply of the E. C., Militant Group, to Proposal of Co-ordinating 
Committee for Joint Membership Meeting to Discuss Perspectives', 
27 Aug. 1937, Inter-Group Relations [Sept. ) 1937. 
2 In attractively designed cyclostyled editions it brought out 
Of Those Who Forget Their ABC and A Letter to a Social Democratic 
Worker concerning the UniFedFronCof Defence, (Warwick M. S. S. 
15/3/1/70 and 71 ). 
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whose discipline militants in reformist and centrist parties would 
work: 
This would end the situation which confronts many today of 
being the "left" critics, who, as time drags on, soften and 
adapt themselves to the so-called "long perspective" of 
protracted work in the reformist organisations which is a 
renunciation of the task of preparing the revolutionary party. 
Clearly this fusion was a conscious rebuff to the chosen method of 
the Militant. The renunciation of abstract discus-sion in small 
closed circles however, might have been applied to all three factions. 
There was thought to be some ground for optimism in differentiation 
in the Labour Party which the policy of Cripps and the communists 
during the Unity Campaign was thought to have delayed: there were 
now 'signs of the emergence of a militant opposition on the crucial 
issue of war'.. 
On the eve of their fusion, the Marxist Group and the Marxist 
League joined the Militant Group in united condemnation of Lee. The 
occasion of their formal protest was the Lee group's action in starting 
publication of Workers International News: 
Each of the existing groups wishes to dissociate itself 
entirely from this enterprise; deplores the attempted 
creation of a fourth Trotskyist "group" in this country; 
and objects particularly to the impression given by 
Lee's journal that it represents and is under the 
patronage of the International Secretariat. 
2 
1 Political Statement, Revolutionary Socialist League, Internal 
Bulletin, (April 1938) Special Number, 2. 
2 'Charles Sumner' to International Secretariat, 6 February 1938. 
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S... 
Sumner-Boyd, the author of these lines, had been a 
participant in the first two issues of, Workers International News, 
but now informed the I. S. that he had formed 'an erroneous impression' 
of WIN's objectand policies and ceased collaboration. Lee, 
complained the united British groups, would run the journal as a 
personal vehicle and not submit to discipline. He had also. published, 
in pamphlet form, the summary of the Dewey Commission's final report. 
But collaboration against Lee was not enough to break down 
all barriers. The Marxist Group and the former Marxist League 
members were alone the active parties to the projected fusion. The 
Fusion Conference convened on February 17 1938 with Henry Sara in the 
chair. Wicks introduced the discussion, arguing that the standing 
distinction between those in and those out of the Labour Party could 
be overcome. There would be an independent organisation with more 
successful fraction work in the mass parties. He quoted the Communist 
Party as proof that this duality was viable. Two years in the Labour 
Party had been, for the Marxist Leaguers, a 'bitter experience'. 
With the party moving towards war, there was no organisation or paper 
which represented the policy of Trotskyism. 
I 
They needed an 'open 
voice, an unambiguous and revolutionary paper'. The discussion 
revealed that the protagonists of fusion had not achieved unanimity. 
Cooper argued that the statement blurred differences over the Left 
Federation. Frost proved him right by categorically rejecting work in 
that body, and Lane pointedly enquired what the attitude of the 
Federation was to the Militant Labour League. Sumner-Boyd only went 
some limited distance towards meeting these objections with his 
argument that there had to be some organisation such as the S. L. F. in 
Militant presumably did not qualify because it did not call for the 
Fourth International or for an independent revolutionary party* 
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order to provide a platform within the Labour Party. There were, 
effectively, three attitudes towards the Labour Party: Jackson, a 
fraternal visitor from the Militant, expounded the standard entrist 
case; the Marxist Group had no time for any kind of contact with the 
Labour Party; the former Marxist Leaguers were largely in agreement 
but still favoured participation in the S. L. F. What should also be 
stressed is that the cause of the new intransigence towards the 
Labour Party was its slide towards support for a putative anti- 
fascist war. In the end C. L. R. James put it as the view of the 
commission that those within the S. L. F. should attempt, in their near 
future, to evaluate their experience within it. Only then could a 
decision be made. After the conclusion of discussion Jackson 
indicated that the Militant Group was quite prepared to discuss fusion 
of the M. L. L. with the S. L. F. Hugo Dewar, however, one of those who 
had remained aloof from the fusion made it clear that he saw the prime 
task as building up the S. L. F., that the independent group was 
secondary, and that 'we' (he and Groves presumably) were not prepared 
to see the S. L. F. made into a Trotskyi-st organisation. 
I With one 
encouragement and one warning in its ears, the Fusion Conference 
elected a central committee of seven and took the name Revolutionary 
Socialist League. 2 The R. S. L. affiliated at once to the Bureau for 
the Fourth International. 
The R. S. L. did not conceive itself as starting from scratch: 
'We do not need to create all our cadres. The work of the 
Communist Party in its early days has not been without results. 13 
I For the record of the debate, see R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 1, 
(April 1938), 8-15. 
2 This name may have been suggested by a desire to attract radical 
former members of the Socialist League. 
3 C. L. R. James, 'Revolutionary Socialist League', Fight (April 1938). 
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There were, it argued, thousands of disillusioned 
revolutionaries around who had been alienated by the Trotskyist 
analysis, but the Trials had opened their eyes. This was an 
expectation carried over lock, stock and barrel from the Marxist Croup. 
Fight, cheaper and livelier than before, became the official paper to 
tap the mood. 
I 
The R. S. L. took on an aggressive propagandist plan of 
public meetings. It was the last great era of the open-air gathering 
2 
and with unemployment high, a speaker could still draw a crowd. The 
R. S. L., launched on an independent tactic, had to put an emphasis on 
direct appeal and ran a summer campaign of open-air rallies in London, 
Sheffield and elsewhere. 
3 
Some members were picked up by this method, 
but the sought-for thousands never materialised, 
4 
and some time in the 
simmer the R. S. L. had to give up an asset unique among Trotskyist groups, 
the tiny premises from which C. L. R. James worked in Grays Inn Road. 
I Sub-titled, '(Organ of the Revolutionary Socialist League affiliated 
to the Bureau for the Fourth International)'. It appeared every 
month until July 1938, the month of the second merger, when shortage 
of funds stopped it coming out. 
2 R. Barltrop records the S. P. G. B. 's attempt to rally support by open- 
air meetings in The Monument (1974). 
3 One of the speakers used was Hugo Dewar, who had not patticipated in 
the February 1938 merger. Apart from the Marxist League cadre, there 
were within the R. S. L. Cliff Stanton, Ivor Cresswell, Rowlands and 
Bradley (whose connections stretched back to the Communist League). 
4 On the eve of the second fusion the R. S. L. claimed a fifty per cent 
increase in membership since the first, (R. S. L., On The Necessity for 
an Independent Bolshevik-Leninist Organisation in Britain, 24 July 
1938, National Bulletin, H. P. , D. J. H. , 2A/ 12A/ 3-4). Other 
f ields of 
work o'pen to the R. S. L. were the trade unions and co-ops. Its 
members intervened in the Mens' Guild of the Co-operative Movement, 
but were unable to prevent support for the peace alliance launched 
by Reynolds' earlier in the year from sweeping on. Fight recorded 
in May 1938 that the communists, formerly 'uncritical and subservient 
lackeys of the Labour Party', now rejected resolutions for a Labour 
government in favour of a peace alliance. 
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The Militant Group faced 1938 without its most dynamic 
branch but this was not a fatal blow. It retained a national framework. 
The Militant Labour League had been launched and Jackson had felt 
confident enough to tell the February 1938 Fusion Conference that 
roots had first to be sunk in the Labour Party before independence 
could be achieved, and to underpin his argument with Trotsky's 1933 
thesis on the I. L. P. 
I He and Harber, Lee Davis, Margaret Johns, 
John Archer and John Goffe held together as a leading cadre. Militant 
continued to appear regularly and, though the organisation lost members 
to WIL,. it-gained some too. 
In what had been its main field, the Labour League of Youth, 
expansion was blocked. In 1937 there had been a limited debate 
between Trotskyism and Stalinism in Advance; in 1938 there was none. 
2 
The 1938 conference of the League marked no advance from the previous 
year. 
3 
But the Militant did not now rest mainly on its youth presence. 
It subordinated its other activities to the M. L. L. since it seemed 
likely that the approach of war would bring with it illegality. 
Militant knew it could not prevent war and would only make limited 
progress during a war. Its hope therefore was to dig in deeply within 
the Labour Party, a body it tended to equate with the mass movement. 
I R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 1, (April 1938), 12. 
2 There were denunciations however. Willis and Bernstein warned 
delegates to the approaching annual conference that the Trotskyists 
would put amendments which, if accepted, would put the stamp of 
impossibility or unreality on its programme, (Advance, March 1938). 
Their views were echoed in a warning from Gollan that Trotskyists 
would 'hinder and disrupt' the development of the League of Youth 
into a mass force and 'confine it to an oppositional movement', 
(Defend The People, Easter 1938). 
3 Fight (April 1938) noted few had rallied to the Youth Militant 
proposal of a campaign against conscription. The New Leader 
(11 March 1938) saw its delegates as 'small, hopelessly outnumbered'. 
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The Group resolved therefore to prepare for illegal conditions and 
resist adventurist pressures which might lead to premature separation: 
'Naturally our work in the Labour Party in wartime 
will be severely limited, but outside it will be 
completely impotent. 
" 
Like the Marxist Group's foray into independent life, the 
M. L. L. was intended to provide a rallying point against war. It was a 
front for the Militant Group itself and at no time achieved an 
independent existence. 
2 
one reason would be the, decline in Labour Party 
activity immediately before the war, just when it was becoming an 
exclusive preoccupation of the Group; 
3 
another was that the M. L. L. was 
working in a somewhat competitive market. During the initial months of 
its life the Socialist Left Federation still existed: later there were 
the Socialist Anti-War Front and the No-Conscription Fellowship. 
4 
All 
three of these bodies had more appeal to non-Trotskyists who were 
opposed to prevailing communist policy. But while this might be 
explained partly by the willingness of Groves and his comrades to blur 
I 'The Group and the struggle against War', passed by the Political 
Education Committee, 30 March 19389 (National Committee, 9 April 
1938). 
2 The first national M. L. L. conference claimed 150 members, not a 
large number though greater than that of the S. L. F. Margaret Johns, 
editor of Militant, told it that there was a print run of 2,000 
monthly, not greatly in excess of its circulation as organ of the 
Militant Group. The M. L. L. branch structure - six in London, seven 
in the provinces - resembled that of the Group, (Report of the 
first National Conference of the Militant Labour League, (1938), 
H. P., D. J. H. 3/2). 
3 Constituency membership in 1937-39 was: 447,150; 428,826; 408,844 
(L. P. C. R., 1979). 
4 At its first annual conference the M. L. L. spoke of continued work 
with the S. L. F. and 'considerable influence' within the S. A. W. F., 
(see below, am. Report of the first National Conference). 
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their differences with pacifism, the M. L. L. itself did not put a 
full Trotskyist line. The programme adopted by its first conference 
contains transitional demands similar to those advanced by the 
Founding Congress of the Fourth International in September 1938, but 
there is no reference to the International or Militant's belief in 
the need for a new party. 
I Without these two statements of principle, 
however necessary it may have been for tactical reasons to drop them, 
even the M. L. L. appeared as an anti-war organisation. And yet the 
M. L. L. argument was expressed in undiluted Leninist terms. The clash 
between democratic and fascist powers was presented as a distinction 
between satiated countries and those with colonies. 
2 
The real enemy 
was at home, it argued, but only the working class could overthrow it. 
That was why a popular front or peace alliance had to be rejected, for 
it politically disarmed the working class and made it easier for 
capitalism to go to war. 
3 
Like the Group, the M. L. L. campaigned for a 
'Third Labour Government' and its speakers at local meetings demanded a 
special party conference to change Government foreign policy. 
4 
There 
I ibid. 
2 Manifesto of the Militant Labour League, 
[19381, (published by 
'J. D. Parry', probably a pseudonym). 
3 S. Jac kson, 'Peace Alliance' - The Road to War (1938). Jackson 
presented Ernest Bevin and Harry Pollitt as divided only on tactics, 
the one representing British capitalism, the other the Soviet 
bureaucracy. His alternative was a Third Labour Government. 
4 Manifesto of the Militant Labour League. 
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was no prospect of this taking place, but Transport House began to 
watch the League. 
I 
Outside the two main groups there were in 1938 three other 
factions who identified themselves with the Fourth International. 
Workers International League: 
Following the split of 19 December 1937, the 
Paddington branch of the Militant Group took steps to secure 
its position. It made efforts to convince other group members 
to join it, with some success. It maintained its distinctive 
style of street and public paper sales, while continuing to be 
active within the Labour League of Youth. It may also have been 
the first Trotskyist faction in Britain to cover strikes on a 
regular basis. Most remarkably of all, the group set itself 
the task of 're-forming of the ranks of revolutionary socialismi. 
On I January 1938 it began publication of Workers International 
News, the first theoretical journal of the Trotskyist movement 
in Britain. 
2 
Early editions showed an attempt to put right 
a perceived deficiency in the movement's performance by putting 
some of Trotsky's prolific output into print. 
3 
After a few 
months original articles began to appear, though by then WIN's 
loyalty to publishing Trotsky had laid it open to the type of 
criticism levelled at the 1933 Red Flag. 
What was Paddington's purpose? The controversy over 
their intention at the December 19 G. M. M. can never be resolved. 
Very quickly eight members of the Militant Group resolved to 
I A. L. Williams, (Leeds party agent) to J. Middleton, 14 Oct. 1938; 
H. Atkinson (London District Organiser) to Middleton, 18 Oct. 1938, 
(Middleton Papers, Labour Party Head Office). 
2 Sub-titled 'Theoretical organ of the Workers International League'. 
The priority this small group gave to theory contradicts the received 
wisdom about them as primarily an activist group not at home in the 
realm of ideas. 
See footnotes on following page. 
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establish a new body, the Workers' International League. They 
later saw themselves as having made a conscious break with 
1930s experience. 
I 
Regroupment was an early success as WIL 
had within its ranks members of three different Militant Group 
branches, as well as the brief adherence of Hilary Sumner-Boyd. 
2 
During 1938 it made considerable efforts to contact provincial 
branches: had there not been tangible discontent, it would 
have met with less success. Its energetic youth work built a 
local base, 3 though it did not launch an agitational journal 
until September. 
4 By the time of the second fusion of 
Trotskyist groups in July 1938, Workers' International League 
had thirty members. 
5 
3 From previous page. 
Beginning with 'G. P. U. Stalks Abroad. Open letter to all working- 
class organisations', (WIN, I Jan. 1938,1-3), the journal published 
thirteen articles by Trotsky in its first nine issues. 
I [WIL document on the history of Trotskyism. 
3, [Autumn? 3 1943. 
2 The Paddington, North and Central branches. Sumner-Boyd had, like 
other Marxist League members, been left without an organisation 
following its October 1937 dissolution. While the majority of 
former M. L. members regrouped, Boyd seems to have believed Lee's 
purpose not to be a new group but only the establishment of a 
journal. He contributed an article, 'Stalin the Assassin', 
to the I January 1938 issue and 
collaborated on the second. On 6 March, however, he informed the 
I. S. that his cooperation had ended, (see above). 
3 On 15 April, an eight page magazine, The Searchlight was published 
from the Paddington League of Youth over the name of Gerry Healey 
(sic). Only Vol. 1, no. I has been located. 
4 Youth for Socialism, see below. 
5 Interview with E. Grant, Jan. 1973. 
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The Revolutionary Socialist Party: 
In Scotland a faction of the Socialist Labour Party, 
itself little more than a shell, split away in the early 1930s 
and emolved towards the Fourth International. 
I Taking first 
the name International Socialist Labour Party and then the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party, it published a journal 
The British Revolutionary Socialist 
2 
at slightly irregular 
intervals. It had an Edinburgh office and most members lived 
in the city, though others were scattered in Glasgow and 
Yorkshire. 3 Leading members included the Taits, a family with 
a background in De Leonism, and the pamphleteer Frank Maitland. 
The R. S. P. rested on outdoor meetings and had no interest in 
Labour Party work. Though its concerns had been largely 
Scottish the R. S. P. approached the I. L. P. in 1937.5 When the 
I. L. P. rebuffed it, it turned towards the Trotskyist movement. 
I The historian of the S, L. P., Raymond Challinor does not trace this 
postscript to the party, (The origins of British Bolshevism, 1977). 
2 Later the Revolutionary Socialist, (Id monthly). Numbers 10,11,12, 
(July 1934, August 1934 and January 1935), are deposited at the 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick. 
3 In 1934 and 1935 the Revolutionary Socialist reported some support in 
England. The Leeds branch of the Militant Group encountered R. S. P. 
members in Fitzwilliam, Yorks. in 1937 and found them ultra-left, 
presumably in their attitude to the Labour Party. 
4 Principally W. Tait, the organiser, though A. Tait was also active. 
Maitland had written for The Plebs ('History - which made Scott 
_ _ -5)and was the author of several 444 unnecessary', vol. 26(193J 
pamphlets including Holidays with Pay, (1938), 7p. 
5 The R. S. P. applied for affiliation but was rejected by the I. L. P. 1s 
N. A. C. on 10 August 1937 (J. Jupp, op. cit., 244). It had attended 
congresses of the London Bureau though it had never been an affiliate. 
I. L. P. rejection came about from fears that the R. S. P. was already 
under Trotskyist influence. 
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It wrote to Trotsky-and contacted his British followers in 
London. 
(iii) The I. L. P. fraction 
, Those who had not followed C. L. R. James out of the 
I. L. P. attacked the party leaders' centrism and propagandised 
for the Fourth International up to the eve of the war. Their 
activities were based on the Clapham I. L. P. and its bookshop, 
a Trotskyist centre throughout the decade. There was support 
from Militant Group members in Liverpool, who had stayed in the 
I. L. P. 2 At the 1937 annual conference of the party, 
Ernie Patterson, with few backers, pressed the case against the 
Unity Campaign, attacked the Trials and demanded the formation 
of the Fourth International. 
3 Only when, with the backing of the 
London Division, he deleted from the official resolution on 
resistance to war, qualifications on party support for colonial 
revolts, did he meet with success. 
I The R. S. L. informed it that a unity conference of British Trotskyists 
was imminent and this naturally increased R. S. P. interest. 
Frank Maitland helped bridge the gap between the two with his article 
'The Antics of Forward', Fight, (Aug. 1938); (W. Tait and 
F. Maitland, 'Statement of the R. S. P. ', 23 Dec. 1938, in WIL 
document on history of Trotskyism, [19433,9). 
2 These included Cund, of Kirkdale I. L. P., who had a full time party 
post. 
3 The New Leader, 2 April 1937; R. Bishop, 'The Independent Labour 
Party in Conference', Inprecorr, vol. 17, no. 16,10 April 1937, 
380-1. Bishop argued that while most organised Trotskyists had 
pulled out, 'the leadership has taken over Trotskyism as its 
ideological stock-in-trade'. It may be that Trotsky's thinking did 
inspire Brockway from time to time, but he had no respect for his 
movement, dismissing it as 'the merest trifling sects' (The New 
Leader, 16 April 1937). 
4 The New Leader, 2 April 1937. 
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S. - 
As one of the I. L. P. 's rare trade union activists, 
Patterson found space in The New Leader and used it with some 
skill. 
I He also held a place on the party's London Divisional 
Council. -ýIn 1938 his assault on the popular front, morally 
strengthened by knowledge of the fate of the P. O. U. M. in Spain, 
had the backing of Jack Huntz and C. A. Smiths but still fell. 
In the debate on Labour-I. L. P. relations, he argued strongly for 
a limited united front but rejection of reaffiliation. Smith 
again supported him and his plea fell narrowly by forty nine 
to fifty five. 2 The following year Patterson reversed his view 
on affiliation and was part of the majority which carried it. 
Apart from his activities, Trotskyism. had little to show in 
the I. L. P. after 1936 though attention continued to be paid to 
the tiny, but lively, Guild of Youth. Future Trotskyists 
within its ranks included Sydney Bidwell, Sam Bornstein and 
Ted Fletcher, who that year succeeded the late Bob Smillie as 
chairman. Trotskyist influence was nevertheless not confined 
to the efforts of those who remained active within the I. L. P. 
In Controversy, the journal launched by the party in October 
1936 for discussion purposes, Trotsky and British Trotskyists 
were published, and there were occasional written debates 
I See his fantasy of a Pollitt speech in the House of Commons, 
'I dream about Harry Pollitt', The New Leader, 13 Aug. 1937. 
2 The New Leader, 22 April 1938. 
) 
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between them and members of the C. P. G. B. 
I 
Controversy tended 
to confirm continued communist suspicion of the I. L. P. as a 
Trotskyist breeding ground. 
It had been thought at the time of the February 1938 fusion 
that the conversion of a majority of former Marxist Leaguers of itself 
constituted a strong argument with which to approach the Militant Group 
anew. After reflection the R. S. L. Central Committee rejected this 
course in view of the entrenchment of positions. It was only the 
growing threat of war which led it to-extend a further invitation to 
unite. open preparations for war, it argued, compelled revolutionaries 
to reappraise their tactical line. The R. S. L. suggested that in the 
event of war, it would be disastrous if Trotskyists were not united. 
Since the Militant Group's Labour Party presence was not intended to 
be permanent, just when would it be brought to an end? It argued that 
gains could not be made of an order which would justify an extended 
stay. Against the possibilities within the Labour Party had to be set 
I The rareness of such occurrences has been commented upon by 
J. Saville, in his article 'May Day 1937', loc. cit., 268. 
Among the articles of interest in Controversy are H. Sara, 
'Communist Party History', (Sept. 1937); "Communist", 'Six 
Questions to Trotskyists', and C. L. R. James, 'Reply to "Communist"', 
(Feb. 1938); L. Trotsky, 'The Communist Manifesto Ninety Years 
After', (April and May 1938); S. Hook, 'The U. S. S. R. Frame-Ups', 
(May 1938); and L. Trotsky and P. Sloan, 'The Soviet Purge', 
(July 1938). Sara was Controversy's reviewer for Japan's Gamble 
in China for which he adopted a detached style. When he reviewed 
Harold Isaacs's The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, (1938), he 
was less restrained, (The New Leader, 21 Oct. 1938). The book had 
an introduction by Trotsky and Sara criticised Isaacs for failing to 
follow the evolution of his thought. 
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'the foundation of a party which could act with tremendous effect on 
the various disjointed groups and individual Trotskyists and neo- 
Trotskyists who exist in this country in many thousands'. This was 
somewhat sanguine, and limited in its impact by the admission that a 
united group would number 200.1 
The postponed first conference of the Fourth International 
was planned for I September 1938. This meant new pressure on countries 
where the Trotskyist movement was divided to pull together. The I. S. 
intervened in Britain to condemn the Lee split as being 'on a basis 
devoid of all political meaning 12 (though it called on Militant 
publicly to clear Lee's name from any calumny), 
3 
All British groups, 
it declared, had to make self-criticism and prepare for unity. The 
S. W. P. was deputed to meet all groups standing for the Fourth 
International and prepare 'an objective statement of the position of 
the various groupings in order that the next international conference 
can settle the English question on the basis of precise proportions' . 
I C. Sumner, secretary R. S. L., to Militant ' 
Group, 22 April 1938, 
Internal Bulletin, 3, (July 1938), 1-2. 
2 Resolution of the International Secretariat on the R. L. affair, 
(Beginning May 1938), H. P., D. J. H. 2B/4/1. The I. S. described the 
WIL as 'a new, minute, independent, so-called "Trotskyist" group' 
and declared unity in Britain to be the most crucial task of the 
hour. 
3 Jackson, van Celderen and 1J. S. V. ' were charged with the main 
responsibility for poor handling of the Lee affair. The charge of 
misappropriating funds was branded 'pure calumny' by the I. S. though 
it made no comment on other allegations concerning Lee's activities 
there. The Militant Group declined to publish a statement clearing 
Lee's name on the grounds that the matter was only of narrow 
interest and that Lee had not used WIN for the purpose, (Militant 
Group to the I. S., 19 June 1938, H. F-., - 2B/4/2. ) 
4 Resolution of the International Secretariat, 
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The Militant Group had derived great security from its belief that it 
was applying the Geneva resolution, but it had failed to secure 
official British Section status and its position was weakened since 
the I. S. resolution put priority on unity and not tactical agreement. 
Militant dropped its argument that different tactics meant different 
organisations, but insisted that the main field of operation had to be 
the Labour Party. It told the R. S. L. in May 1938 that a fusion was 
acceptable provided those in the Labour Party did not have to associate 
themselves openly with the outside body. Within the Labour Party they 
would continue to put the Trotskyist programme but remain mute on the 
need for a new party and the Fourth International. The S. L. F. and 
M. L. L. could be unified on the M. L. L. programme: 
I 
within the Labour 
Party they still suggested the main thrust of Trotskyist activity must 
be to try and wrest the leadership of left wing workers from the 
communists. Thus, argued the Militant Group, there should be the open 
organisation, (the M. L. L. ), within which there would be a'disciplined 
group of Bolshevik-Leninists steering for a split. No time limit could 
be set upon the experience. The weakness and division of the 
Trotskyists had prevented them taking advantage of the first left swing 
at the time of the Unity Campaign, but a new opportunity approached. 
Trotskyism would not, it argued, be in a position to offer alternative 
leadership on the outbreak of war: its aim should therefore be to 
hold together. There could be no assumption that war itself would be 
the signal for a split from the Labour Party: that would depend on 
what had been achieved by then. The existence of an open Fourth ' 
International Party, of whose use to it Militant was still unconvinced, 
was the price for securing unity of all Trotskyists now in the Labour 
I If Groves's 'bureaucratic control' prevented amalgamation, then the 
R. S. L. members in the S. L. F. must join the M. L. L. This organisation 
was recognised as the Trotskyist faction, and Militant better known 
than The Call (see below). 
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Party. The outside body would have a limited propaganda role: and 
must avoid masquerading as a party. Conceding its continued existence 
was the limit of compromises the Militant was prepared to make. 
Militant had pledged itself to the I. S. work for unity. 
2 
In 
June 1938 it was approached by Harry Wicks, acting secretary of the 
new R. S. L. urging it further in this direction. 
3 The plan was to convene 
a conference and thus implement the I. S. declaration. Invitations would 
be sent, he reported, not only to the R. S. L. and the Militant Group, but 
to Don James's dissidents in Liverpool, to the R. S P., to the WIL and 
to the Leninist League. 
4 
militant agreed to a conference but demanded 
the exclusion -of WIL and the Leninist League, which its Glasgow 
members knew. Its counter-proposal was a fusion of itself with the 
R. S. L. 5 This offer was turned down and Militant's worries about the 
Leninist League scorned. 
6 
I 'From the Militant Group', 27 May 1938, (R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 
3, July 1938). 
2 Though it expected more from the I. S. on what it considered Lee's 
factional course, (Militant Group to I. S., 19 June 1938, H. P., 2B/4/2). 
3 R. S. L., Internal Bulletin, 3, (July 1938), 7. 
4A Glasgow-based group, followers of HugoOehlerwho had opposed on 
principle the French turn and the proposition to enter the American 
Socialist Party. In October 1935 the Oehlerites had been expelled 
from the C. L. A. for violation of party discipline by publishing their 
own journal. They then formed the Revolutionary Workers' League. 
5 E. S. Jackson to R. S. L., 9 July 1938, ibid., 9. 
6 C. Sumner to the Militant Group, 14 July 1938, ibid., 11-12. 
Naturally an open faction like the R. S. L. would be less concerned 
than one in the Labour Party about a third less than ten strong 
which opposed Labour Party membership in principle. But within the 
R. S. L. itself there were also doubts about the catholicity of the 
invitation to the forthcoming conference, (W. Duncan, Fusion and C. C. 
Muddle, 14 July 1938, H. P., D. J. H., 13A/3). 
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Some time in July 1938, J. P. Cannon, a leader of the 
American Socialist Workers Party, 
I 
then at a zenith of influence, 
arrived in Britain as midwife to the merger. 
2 
He met each party to 
the project separately to persuade them to come in. His immediate 
object was a unified delegation to the imminent Fourth International 
conference. only in WIL's case did he meet the membership and 
not just leading figures 
3 but he secured the agreement of all except 
the Leninist League to take part in a conference. He did not, 
however, dispel WIL's doubts about the possibility. of fusing such 
different factions into one. 
The National Conference of Bolshevik-Leninists gathered in 
the New Morris Hall on 30-31 July 1938, with Sara again the chairman. 
It had before it papers from the R. S. L., R. S. P. and WIL. It seems 
that the Militant, which was to dominate the new bodydid not submit 
a document. The R. S. L. argument was familiar: 'the policy of 
confiniiig our work to that of a fraction within the Labour Party is 
calculated to sow the most dangerous illusions among the workers'. 
After the debacle of the Socialist League there was suspicion of left 
wing movements. Neither the S. L. F. nor the M. L. L. had met with 
success in 1938. If the I. L. P. reaffiliated, these two would be 
reduced to insignificance; but if the I. L. P. was in the Labour Party, 
a dangerous rival to the Fourth International would be removed. 
Militant had argued that a split would be justified only by the 
prospect of establishing an alternative leadership. But, countered 
I When the C. L. A. left the Socialist Party of America in mid 1937 
it took this name. 
2 It was a sign of the times that Cannon, following the recent 
murdersof Trotskyists, was carrying a gun, (Interview with E. Grant, 
Jan. 1973). 
3 The WIL convened a meeting of its full membership, thirty strong 
and all in London at this point, (Interview with E. Grant). He 
met only the leaders of the Militant Group (Interview with M. Johns). 
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the R. S. L., there could be no such outcome without a clear break 
with the Labour leaders over the war question. The Transitional 
Programme was now to hand with supporting quotes for such a thesis. 
It also tilted the argument towards independent rather than entrist 
activity. Indeed the shift in the approach of the international 
from support for the Militant to encouragement of unity via the R. S. L. 
seems to have been decisive. 
The limited progress which the Revolutionary Socialist 
Party had met in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and elsewhere in Scotland was, 
like the R. S. L. 's early experiences, empirical proof that independence 
could work. It claimed to have attracted a larger crowd than the 
Labour Party or the communists in Edinburgh to its May Day rally. The 
R. S. P. submission to the conference rested upon a De Leonite 
interpretation of British history in the twentieth century - 'the long 
struggle of the workers to break away from the Labour Party'. The 
R. S. P. had no time for entry work. 'Never must the revolutionary 
banner be lowered in capitulation to such a party. ' A political 
crisis had arisýn which a new party must meet; on the industrial field 
there was 'a spontaneous movement of the masses ..... of the utmost 
significance'. An independent party was needed to marry the two. If 
it could it would catalyse a revolutionary mood before the war; if 
this proved impossible it would work by every means possible for the 
defeat of British capitalism, even if by then it was in alliance with 
Russia. I 
The WIL recognised that all groups united in seeing the 
epoch as one of imperialist crisis and decay. They differed on 'how 
I Revolutionary Socialist Party N. E. C., 'The Revolution in Britain'p 
National Bulletin (July] 1938 (sep. pag. 1-7). 
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to overcome the present exasperating isolation of the revolutionary 
elements from the broad masses'. 
' 
The R. S. L., claimed WIL, made 
ineffective criticism from outside which could yet be damaging. 
Revolutionaries'-could not abandon the Labour Party. Politically 
awakening workers would just pass through it unless there were 
revolutionaries present around whom they might gather. While Labour 
at present was weak, it would grow, and its current feeble condition 
could give revolutionaries extra weight 
2 
and influence in the short 
run on which they might capitalise in the long. Nor did presence in 
the Labour Party mean submersion, as WIL's own active life had shown. 
WIL dismissed the M. L. L. and the S. L. F., each less likely to provide 
revolutionary support than an I. L. P. returned to the Labour Party. 
Within that party it urged all groups to organise 'full strength at 
the point of attack'. 
No minutes of the conference have been located. The 
proceedings unfolded under the influence of Cannon's prestige, 
knowledge of the approach of the Founding Conference and also Lee's 
bitter phrases. 
3 
The final agreement, 
4 
though drawn up by Cannon, 
I Contribution by Workers' International League to the Discussion on 
the Tasks of Bolshevik-Leninists in Britain, June 1938, H. P., 
D. J. H. 5/1,1. 
2 At the present moment the right wingers search for a stick 
with which to beat the Stalinists who threaten to tear the machine 
from out of their hands. They do not hesitate to publish selected 
articles by Trotsky in Forward and to quote from the Trotskyites. 
Only from within the Labour Party is it possible to extract a price 
from the bureaucracy, forcing it to acknowledge the revolutionary 
content of Trotskyism instead of merely utilising the anti-Stalinist 
aspect of its revolutionary programme, (ibid., 4). 
3 Lee referred to the pre-conference negotiations as a French bedroom 
farce; he called the factions Kilkenny cats, tied by their tales, 
fated to fight for evermore, (Interview with John Coffe, 1974). 
4 For full text, see Appendix D. 
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was more in the nature of a British compromise. It set up one 
organisation, the Revolutionary Socialist League, to run all activities, 
funds and property and to engage a full-time secretary. This much was 
to be expected.,, But whereas the main emphasis was to be placed on 
Labour Party work 'in the next period', members fully active outside 
the party were not required to join. 
IA 
publishing house was to be 
established to run a Fourth International journal fused from Fight, 
Revolutionary Socialist and Workers International News. The Militant 
would continue to appear as an agitational paper published by the 
M. L. L. There would also be an internal bulletin for all comrades 
every two months. While everyone was to sell the Fourth International 
journal, there was no explicit clause enforcing sales of Militant on 
those outside the Labour Party, and it is difficult to see how such 
sales could have been achieved. The agreement allotted five 
executive places each to the R. S. L. and Militant Groups, to the R. S. P. 
and WIL went two apiece. After six months a national conference would 
elect a new executive. During that time the parties pledged them- 
selves to 'liquidate' past conflicts, collaborate harmoniously, and 
impose Fourth International discipline on disrupters. The final stage 
of unification was to be ratification of the agreement by the member- 
ship of all parties to it and a general aggregate meeting of all 
members. When each group had elected its members to the unified 
executive, that executive would elect delegates to the imminent 
World Congress. 
I It was this clause in particular which was to attract the objections 
of WIL. Nor was WIL the only critic. In 1941 the Left Fraction 
(q. v. ) opposed the concession of minority rights in an agreement it 
construed as based on Labour Party work, (Brief Notes on the History 
of the Left Fraction, 2). The Socialist Workers Group (q. v. ) 
declared that the fusion 'took place under pressure from the 
international and left unsolved the burning question of the 'Labour 
Party perspective", (For the Building of the British Section of 
the Fourth International, 30 April 1941, H. P., D. J. H. 7/1). 
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The R. S. L., R. S. P. and Militant signed the Peace and Unity 
agreement. But the WIL refused, despite repeated appeals from Cannon, 
to take part, resting on the argument that there could be no true 
unity until experience forged it. 
I 
There was support for this view 
outside its ranks, 
2 but most seem to have genuinely believed that they 
had conquered the debilitating weakness of the 1930s. The unified 
Executive Committee elected Harber (Militant), Maitland (R. S. P. ), and 
C. L. R. James (R. S. L. ) as its delegates to the coming conference. 
Sumner-Boyd was also to attend as a consultative delegate, and he 
took one of the sets of minutes. WIL sent with Harber a statement 
that it stood on the Geneva resolution, that the controversy over the 
Labour Party had been fudged in the new R. S. L., that individuals were 
effectively left to work where they wished. WIL argued that as the 
organisation implementing the Geneva resolution it ought to be the 
official British Section. Failing that it requested sympathising 
status and offered collaboration with the R. S. L. in all shared fields. 
3 
******* 
I [WIL document on the history of Trotskyism), 5. 
2 Two R. S. L. members, Bill Duncan and Hilda Lane were unhappy that 
fusion could take place without resolving disagreements over the 
S. L. F. In their view working within a 'centrist' organisation was 
a very different matter to setting one up, (W. Duncan, Fusion and 
C. C. Muddle, 14 July 1938, H. P., D. J. H. 13 A/3). Some months later 
the R. S. P. wrote 'the Unity agreement was more of an organisational 
than a political document. Unity was achieved without preliminary 
discussions on the various national and international issues'. 
(Letter and Statement of the R. S. P. (Edinburg4 and reply of 
E7xecutive Committee, [Jan.? 19393,7 H. P., D. J. H. 13 A/6. ) 
3 Statement of Workers' International League to the International 
Congress of the Fourth International, 1938, [August ? 19381 reprinted 
in LWIL document on the history of Trotskyism], 7-8. 
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The 'Geneva' conference 
I 
to found the Fourth International 
lasted for one day, 3 September 1938. Thirty delegates from eleven 
countries attended. 
2 
With difficulty a majority had been assembled 
to consi-ate the swing away from the Comintern begun after the 
German debacle of 1933 by launching a new international. Unifications 
in Britain and Greece, facilitated by the approach of the Conference 
now were quoted as auspicious signs: 
These two steps symbolised for the conference the growing 
integration of our international movement made-possibly by 
our whole past course, which was based not on the concept 
of superficial, temporary, and deceptive advances but on 
the concept of the process of revolutionary selection 
which alone leads to the creation and victory of the 
tempered revolutionary party. 
3 
In Britain there was no political disagreement, only the 
tactical clash over the Labour Party. The International had determined 
upon 'a definite roll-call of our forces' and looked at Britain in that 
light. 4 In fact there was no opposition among the British groups to 
I Held in reality at the Rosmers' home in the Paris suburbs. Geneva 
was a subterfuge used for security reasons. 
2 Shachtman was chairman and the joint secretaries were Sumner, Ilic 
and Gould. The published minutes are Sumner's. 
3 'Review of the Conference', Documents, 160. Growth in 'England', 
(though the R. S. P. was surely included), was quoted with that in the 
U. S. A. as evidence of fruitful activity by the International 
Secretariat. The figure of 170 members given for England does not 
appear fanciful. 
4 It was faced not only with unifications in Britain and Greece but 
also with the withdrawal of Vereecken and Sneevliet. The Poles 
constituted a loyal opposition within the conference, (I. Deutscher, 
The_Prophet Outcast, 419-29). 
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the launching of the Fourth International: 
1 WIL in particular 
identified itself with this cause right from the start. Nonetheless, 
the Statutes made it clear that there could be but one section of 
the Fourth International in a given country. Cannon argued that the 
recent British fusion demanded the recognition of two places on the 
I. E. C. and James and Harber were elected to fill them. A discussion 
on Britain followed. Conference resolved to offer Lee a hand of 
friendship, but if he rejected it to fight him. Clart argued for a 
conciliatory approach in view of the strength of the R. S. L. 's 
position. 
2 
Nevertheless, WIL was unambiguously condemned. It 
was held to have been established and maintained for purely personal 
reasons: 
'Under these circumstances it ispecessary to warn the comrades. 
associated with the Lee group that they are being led on a path 
of unprincipled clique politics which can only land them in the 
3 
mi re' . 
I James argued against delay, refuting Shachtman's argument that the 
launch had been delayed in 1936 by hope of convincing the centrists, 
(Documents, 298). He was the chief British participant. Like 
Harber he was at his second conference. With seven others he 
interviewed observers from the P. S. O. P. and the P. O. U. M.; he 
argued that the K. P. D. collapse of 1933 was a conscious policy; he 
moved an amendment from the R. S. L. Central Committee to the slogan 
of the right to work in the Transitional Programme, seeking the 
insertion of Keir Hardie's phrase, 'work or full maintenance'. 
When Russia was discussed James defended the progressive nature of 
the Soviet economy against Craipeau but anticipated his own split 
from the Fourth International by joining Shachtman in resisting a 
precise characterisation of the Russian bureaucracy. 
2 Documents, 302. In Harber's record it was James who made this 
adjustment. 
3 [Fourth International], On Unification of the British Section, [Sept. 19381, Documents, 270. WIL was accused of not even making a 
statement though it had sent an appeal with Harber, (see above, '? -65. 
). 
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The following day the new executive of the Fourth 
International met. It was this body which discussed the Lee group 
in detail. Shachtman, supported by Cannon, argued against sympathetic 
affiliation for WIL on the grounds that its action showed it moving 
away from the Fourth. Cannon thought WIL akin to Molinier's 
organisation, 
I but on a lower plane. Maitland spoke forcefully 
against WIL, 
2 
but James and Harber joined in only to assent to the 
proposed resolution, which the I. E. C. then went on to pass. 
3 
The 
International Youth conference passed a guiding resolution on the 
English Youth Movement, moved by Gould. 
4 
It expected the situation 
in the Labour Party League of Youth to develop in favour of the 
Trotskyists and proposed concentration there with work in the Y. C. L. 
and Guild of Youth from within the League of Youth. Achievements 
I Raymond Molinier was the leader of the Parti Communiste 
Internationaliste, one of two warring factions which comprised the 
French Trotskyist movement. The International Conference of 1936 
had expelled Molinier for use of funds to maintain hegemony in the 
French Section. The Founding Conference declared the ranks of the 
F. I. open to P. C. I. members but not to Molinier, (Documents, 262-4). 
Cannon's comparison seems to have been intended to draw a parallel 
between the personal roles of Molinier and Lee. 
2 Described as a 'vicious attack' by WIL, [WIL document on the history 
of Trotskyism), 8. 
3 This paragraph is based on Harber's minutes of the executive meeting, 
ER. S . L. 
3, Report Of International Conference ISept.? 19383, 
(Warwick M. S. S. ). According to the R. S. P. a misunderstanding of the 
conference arrangements, (which were shrouded in secrecy), led to 
Willie Tait, Harber and van Gelderen missing the main conference, 
('Letter and Statement of the R. S. P. 1, loc. cit., 6). Tait may be in 
error for Maitland, but neither this, nor van Gelderen's presence 
has been confirmed. 
4 Gould (often known in the International as Anton) was a youth leader 
of the S. W. P. and was to be youth representative on the resident 
I. E. C. established in the United States after the outbreak of war. 
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there in the past year were thought meagre, not only for objective 
reasons but because of inefficiency. As a remedy, a certain amount of 
specialisation was proposed: as many as possible should concentrate 
on youth work and compose a youth section of the R. S. L. Note was also 
taken of the 'nascent' youth apprentices movement 
I 
and the R. S. L. 
youth was thought to have a great responsibility to steer towards it. 
2 
On his journey back to the United States, Shachtman had 
further discussions with the British including the WIL. There was no 
tangible result. The first important development after the conference 
was the loosening of the cadre which had dominated the British 
movement during the middle of the decade. Sumner-Boyd who had been 
present at all important developments since 1936 left almost at once 
for an academic career in Turkey. 
3 James, reduced in effectiveness by 
a stomach ulcer, left, perhaps without warning, in early October 1938 
to join the S. W. P. in the United States. 
4 Some time during the year 
Jack Winocour also-departed for America. 
5 
This had the effect of 
I There had been strikes am ng apprentices in 1937, in which the 
C. P. G. B. had intervened. 
2 'Resolution on English Youth Movement', D. D. Harber, Report of 
International Conference, [19387, Warwick M. S. S., 21. 
3 He began teaching at Robert College, Istanbul whence, until his 
death, he made a deep impression on Turkish intellectual life. He 
wrote the definitive Strolling through Istanbul, collected the 
works of Turkish artists and 'effectively created the modern Turkish 
theatre'. (The Times, 18 Sept. 1976). 
4 The S. W. P. 's black membership was negligible and Cannon, during his 
visit, invited James to undertake a lecture tour of the States. 
James informed Starkey Jackson, the new R. S. L. secretary of his 
impending departure in September. One of his last acts before 
leaving was the Manifesto of The African Service Bureau, whose call 
for inter-racial unity against imperialist war was endorsed by the 
M. L. L.: (Militant (Oct 1938) ; I. Oxaal, Black Intellectuals 
Come to Power, (1971), 
ý)- 
5 Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979. 
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weakening the R. S. L. half of the fusion. 
I Those that remained from 
the R. S. L. side felt that there had to be action to make a reality of 
the agenda set by the Transitional Programme adopted by the Founding 
Congress. 2 But-, they were confronted by a political environment more 
hostile than before. There was no widespread movement against the 
coming war and what the Trotskyists had to say about it was less 
effective for the impact of the Trials. 
3 
Unity had thus come late and in most unfavourable circumstances 
for all the optimism of the Transitional Programme. It was also to be 
shortlived. Unity was achieved because many in Britain genuinely 
desired it and because differences were felt to be relatively 
unimportant in the face of approaching war. If the International 
Secretariat had stood firm on its 1936 Geneva resolution and its 
statement in December of that year, unity could not possibly have come 
about. But the I. S. never made the, Militant Group, the faction in 
I Harber also moved out of London about this time to take work as a 
. C. I. S. agent 
in Eastbourne. As an asthmatic he would expect also 
to improve his health in the sea air, (Information from 
Mr. J. Harber ). 
2 'The strategic task of the next period -a prerevolutionary period 
of agitation, propaganda, and organisation - consists in over- 
coming the contradiction between the maturity of the objective 
revolutionary conditions and the immaturity of the proletariat and 
its vanguard .... I (The Transitional Programme. The death agony 
of capitalism and tlýe_tasks of the Fourth International, reprinted 
in Documents, 182). 
3 At least one Trotskyist, Arthur Ballard, became disillusioned with 
the movement after the third trial and C. L. R. James was unable to 
persuade him to remain active, (Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 
1979). Ballard appears to have rejoined the I. L. P. shortly after 
this. He began to write for The New Leader on colonial affairs 
and opened a regular column, 'In the Empire' late in 1938 which he 
used on 9 December to review The Black Jacobins. At the 1939 
annual conference of the I. L. P. he moved a Hampstead/Hounslow/ 
Wimbledon resolution on subject peoples which was carried with 
N. A. C. support. 
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Britain operating its policy, its official British Section. It only 
conferred this status on the fused R. S. L., which resulted from the 
Peace and Unity conference of July 1938. This was a hasty affair 
arranged within, an international timetable, not one which suited the 
natural course of events in Britain. The only group in Britain to 
perceive this clearly was the Workers' International League which 
would have no part of it. The next six years were to vindicate its 
abstention and prove the International's condemnation of it a wild 
misjudgment. 
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PART TWO 
(1938 - 1944) 
272. 
IX APPLYING THE MILITARY POLICY: 
1938 - 1941 
British Trotskyists, like the general labour movement, 
were increasingly concerned about war. During the peacetime years up 
to 1939 they were able to live off the traditional Bolshevik view of 
imperialist war, though there was already controversy about what this 
meant in practical terms. No Trotskyists supported the war when it 
finally broke out: all factions continued to maintain that it was an 
imperialist war. But a bitter and protracted dispute developed 
between the R. S. L., and WIL and the Fourth International over the 
application of the anti-patriotic line. 
The general Trotskyist attitude to war was established as 
early as 1934. War and the Fourth International (1934)1 declared 
that a future world conflict would be imperialist and called for 
opposition to patriotism in all capitalist countries. War was likely 
to threaten the Soviet Union and there it was the duty of the working 
class to seek defence. The support of socialist and trade union 
leaders in every country for their government in the event of war was 
predicted as a certainty. British Trotskyists vigilantly watched the 
rising threat of war which they saw as a political issue dwarfing 
most others. In 1935 it had been enough to reverse the policy of the 
Marxist Group. From that year also, part of the Trotskyist charge 
against communism was its willingness to support an alliance of anti- 
fascist powers, if such a project should be cobbled into reality. 
When Trotskyists speculated on war, they drew on knowledge of the 
Great War, the only precedent they had. In 1936 Groves forecast 
I The full text of this document, which was written by Trotsky, is in 
Writings (1933-34), 299-329. It appeared as a document of the I. S. 
of the International Communist League in July 1934. 
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dilution, theekeletal emergence of strike-breaking machinery and the 
exclusion of leftists from war industry. He predicted a gradual loss 
of trade union rights and recommended resistance to conscription, 
which was likely to be introduced in peacetime. Only thus would 
democratic countries be able to match their national resources to 
those of fascist countries. 
' 
Suspicion of war preparations led Trotskyists to oppose 
every step in that direction. Their difficulty was that if their 
response was confined' to opposition of this kind they were doomed 
to impotence. The Marxist Group recognised the problem early on: 
'While we must combine planning for protection with anti-war 
propaganda, and must make every effort to present the outbreak 
of another world war, we cannot neglect to face the 
possibility of that war, and meet the problems involved'. 
2 
But that conclusion could be drawn only after a frank 
recognition that the international situation was deteriorating faster 
than Trotskyism was gathering strength. There was no widespread 
disposition to face the implications of this unpalatable truth. 
3 
When E. L. Davis argued within the Militant Group for penetration of 
A. R. P. organisations4 he was rebuked. 
5 
I R. Groves, Arms and the Unions (1936). This pamphlet was published 
by the Socialist League. 
2 Fight (June 1937). 
3 One of the Marxist Group recruits to the Labour Party opposed a 
purely negative attitude towards defence, raising the call for 
adequate protection, as far as possible under the control of 
workers' organisations, (R. W., Air Raid Policy, (Sept. 1936), 
Warwick M. S. S. 15/4/2/15). 
4 Quite early on Davis demanded 'real protection' and called on the 
government to spend as lavishly on defence as on armaments, ('Air 
Raid Policy', 27 May 1937, Internal Discussion Bulletin, June 1937, 
H. P., D. J. H. 2a/2,7-10). 
5 By Robinson, Nicholls and, (later), Bone. 
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Just as Trotskyists assumed that labour and trade union 
leaders would rally patriotically, they were also sensitive to signs 
of backsliding within their own movement. 
I This made it difficult to 
move beyond an abstract anti-war line. But the capitulation of 
socialist leaders had taken place, among other reasons, because of 
intense mass pressure. This was hardly a problem for Trotskyists to 
worry about, and time was to show that chauvinistic hysteria would not, 
in any case )recur. If Trotskyism was to break out of 
isolation, it 
needed something more than a formal programme, however well grounded 
in Leninist precept. The Transitional Programme of the Fourth 
International, the second major document of the movement on war, tried 
to reach beyond pacifism, arguing 'workers must learn the military 
arts', 
2 but it was also an optimistic document declaring that crisis 
would shatter all parties and the Fourth International must be 
available to rally the proletariat. 
This strictly general guidance left Trotskyists in Britain 
and elsewhere in a formal argument. They faced a political environment 
which was utterly different to that whose precedents provided so much 
of their inspiration, the prelude to World War One. The political 
battles of the left about war and rearmament were fought not in 1939 
but in the mid 1930s. Key events in shifting the Labour Party from a 
broadly anti-war position were the trouncing of Lansbury at the 1935 
I Gould, an S. W. P. delegate to the 1938 international conference, was 
alive to the fact the patriotism was not a danger for the Trotskyist 
movement, ('Minutes of the Founding Conference of the Fourth 
International', Documents, 294-6). 
2 Military Training by the labour movement, the thesis advanced by the 
Transitional Programme, had respectable socialist antecedents in the 
armed wings of the Austrian and German social democrats. The R. S. L. 
of 1938 had delegates present at the discussion of the document in 
the first session of the Founding Congress. In 1940, however, the 
R. S. L. was to argue that a transitional demand for workers' arms did 
not have timeless application and certainly could not be advanced 
in a patriotic period where it might be used by imperialists for 
recruiting purposes. 
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conference and the critical vote of the P. L. P. in July 1937 to 
abstain on the Service Department estimates, reversing its earlier 
position of opposition. 
1 British Communist policy had been unqualified 
as late as 19342 but by a series of national and international changes 
its main thrust became a drive to make sure Britain was on the right 
side in a peace front. 
3 
This induced increased political loneliness 
which tended to reinforce Trotskyists' views. 
They rejected any involvement with war preparations. No 
fine distinctions between attack and defence were allowed to pass, 
even a zigzag trench. 
4 
For all the occasional doubts of individuals, 
there were no differences here between the factions. 
5 
The R. S. L. 
conducted an internal discussion over A. R. P., which culminated in the 
executive declaring against it after being advised by Jackson not to 
stand on passing proletarian moods. 'The workers', he advised, 'are 
I C. L. Mowat,. Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (1955), 632. For 
the evolution of Labour policy see J. F. Naylor, Labour's 
International Policy, (1969), 261-92. 
2 R. F. Andrews's often quoted Labour Monthly article of 1934 which 
demanded that British and French workers should 'under no 
circumstances' support an attack by their governments on fascist 
Germany, even if that country attacked the U. S. S. R, was well known 
to Trotskyists, (See Workers Fight, Oct. 1938). 
3 Following Hitler's march into Austria R. P. Dutt reviewed communist 
policy since 1933 on the danger of war, ('Notes of the Month', 
Labour Monthly, (April 1938), 195-219). 
4 'While it may be true that a trench of itself is not an aggressive 
measure, when it is seen as means to continuing an Imperialist war, 
then it is obviously as important a part of the Government's war 
plans as the construction of bombers', (Militant, Oct. 1938). 
A. R. P. was also condemned, incidentally, as unlikely to work. 
5 "'Defence" cannot be separated from offence. The gas-mask is the 
counterpart of the poison-gas bomb, air-raid shelters are the 
counterpart of the bombers. To tolerate the one is to tolerate the 
other, and the revolutionary must implacably reject both', 
('Voluntary Conscription', WIN, (Dec. 1938), 1-3). " 
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in general backward and lag behind the necessities of history. '1 
A. R. P. was another means of reconciling the civil population to war. 
This attitude contrasts strongly with contemporary communist policy. 
2 
Early'1939 saw Trotskyism resigned to being swamped by 
chauvinism on the outbreak of war. 
3 
But its isolation did not spring 
from the anticipated patriotic wave. Conscription, an important step 
towards militarization, was introduced in April 1939 for the first 
time in peace. 
4 Resentment was qualified, even among the communists. 
5 
In the battle against conscription and the National Register only 
Trotskyism, the still pacifist I. L. P., and Labour mavericks battled it out 
minus reservations. The R. S. L. however was later to reject the policy 
it followed at this time, whereby it allowed its members to make 
conscientious objection at tribunals. 
6 
Faced with imminent war, 
IA central committee statement of 27 October 1938 was followed by a 
brisk discussion on A. R. P. in which Robinson was sharp and 
intransigent on patriotic concessions and Hampstead declared the 
committee ultra-left, (R. S. L., Special Internal Discussion Bulletin, 
(Nov. 1938), H. P., D. J. H. 13a/5,5-8). At the February 1939 
conference of the R. S. L. only five votes were cast against the 
executive position on A. R. P. Within the Labour Party A. R. P. was 
something of an immediate issue because it was raised by local 
government representatives. This meant the R. S. L. needed a policy 
(interview with J. Archer, Nov. 1973). WIL, also in the Labour 
Party, took a similar point of view: 'No support for the National 
Register, no support for A. R. P., no support for capitalist 
"defence" - these must be our slogans' ('Voluntary Conscription', 
WIN, (Dec. 1938), 1-3). 
2 The communists had been agitating for deep shelters in London since 
1936, and with some success, (P. Piratin, Our Flag Stays Red (1978 
edit. ), 64-7). 
3 'It must be remembered that on the outbreak of imperialist war we, 
as revolutionaries, will at first be politically isolated from the 
masses who will turn to "National Defence" and class collaboration', 
(Draft Resolution on the Policy of the R. S. L. on the Outbreak of 
Imperialist War, 12 Jan. 1939, H. P., D. J. H. /391,4. ) 
4 Chamberlain announced conscription for twenty and twenty one year 
olds on 26 April 1939. It was extended on the outbreak of war. 
5 
See footnotes on following page. 6 
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Trotskyists consistently called for Soviet defence. The circumstances 
leading to the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 were criticised, but 
not the right of the Soviets to conclude such an agreement. But WIL 
did attack the way communists in Britain presented it. 
The Militant Labour League greeted the outbreak of war with 
a manifesto branding it as imperialist and calling for the overthrow 
of the British ruling class. At this general level there was no 
patriotic incursion into any of the Trotskyists' ranks. Where-the 
factions differed was in their expectations of what the first few 
months would be like. The Socialist Anti-War Front, partly through 
its activity in the No-Conscription League, had some success in 
putting itself at the centre of a movement with support from trades 
councils. Reg Groves used the extra channels open to him as a Labour 
candidate to maintain a stream of criticism until official party 
policy changed. 
2 
The R. S. L. 
3 
and WIL both expected heavy and 
5 From previous page. 
'Give us our ideals to serve, give us a policy worth serving, give 
us the means to fitness, and we will show what latent strength there 
is in our democracy, and how unitedly we can shoulder our 
responsibilities to defend it! ' (J. Gollan, Youth Will Serve For 
Freedom, 19381,11). WIL predicted that communists would support 
conscription once Chamberlain was out of power. 
6 From previous page. 
It later regretted its involvement with the Socialist Anti-War Front 
and, on 11 March 1940, its executive rescinded the decision on 
conscientious objectors. For the S. A. W. F., see Chapter X. 
I J. R. Strachan, The War Crisis - The Way Out For Workers (1939). 
'J. R. Strachan' was a pseudonym, possibly for Ralph Lee and Grant. 
2 For Groves and the S. A. W. F. see Chapter X. 
3 For some time before the war the R. S. L. had devoted time and space 
to 'special' (i. e. illegal) work. 
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immediate suppression, and WIL actually anticipated it by moving 
a centre into exile. 
' The R. S. L. had a particular fixation with 
chauvinist hysteria and continued to believe it was rampant in the 
face of all evidence. 
2 There was opposition to the war, but it tended, like 
support for it, to be low key, devoid of enthusiasm. Everyone had 
lived with the likelihood of war for some time, and for political 
activists there was also the comforting thought that Britain was at 
least in a war against fascism. 
3 These two factors, one affecting the 
majority and the other the minority isolated all revolutionaries, some 
of whom misread unanimity for enthusiasm. 
As for the form of objection to the war, this was a problem 
in itself. The Call of the S. A. W. F. publicised conscientious 
objection, but this presented theoretical problems for Trotskyists. 
Mere refusal to take part was simply pacifism. The R. S. L. expelled 
S. A. W. F. participants for this very reason. But while their view was 
that arms could be taken up either to defend workers' organisations 
or overthrow a capitalist government, this was of little help in the 
I In an obscure episode Haston and Healy with seven others moved on 
the outbreak of war to Ireland, (Interview with J. Haston, July 
1973). James Maxton fought a parallel tendency in the I. L. P., 
(J. McNair, James Maxton : Beloved Rebel (1955), 286-7). 
R. Barltrop, (The Monument (1975), 101-22), contains an interesting 
account of how the S. P. G. B. reacted. 
2A Mass Observation Survey of 2 September 1939 unearthed 2% of those 
interviewed who would be glad if there was a war, 34% who preferred 
anything to war, and 43% who would rather get it over with, (Mass 
Observation, War Begains at Home (1940), 35). The predominant 
feeling seems to have been sullen acquiescence. 'The declaration of 
war brought none of the excitement, none of the 'ebullitions' as the 
Observer put it, which had marked the August days of 1914: no 
rounds of cheers, no dancing in the streets yet 'the sense of moral 
release' was inexpressible'. (A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of 
Total War, (1968), 257). See also the comparison of public percep- 
tioT ns of the two wars in H. Pelling, Britain and the Second World 
(1970), 325-6 . 
3 See footnotes on following page. 
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concrete circumstances of September 1939. Capitalism still existed: 
it had not been overthrown. On a basis of non-complicity in an era of 
growing militarization of life, it would be difficult to distinguish 
Trotskyism from-pacifism. Trotskyism had a rich Marxist legacy to 
draw on. Liebknecht had argued that the enemy of the workers was in 
their own country. The Bolshevik slogan for the turning of the 
imperialist war into a civil war was well known. 
' 
Revolutionary 
defeatism was considered the duty of the Fourth International. Even 
before the war, however, Trotsky was trying to reach beyond these 
simple principles. He reminded the International, 
'An irreconcilable attitude against bourgeois militarism 
does not at all signify that the proletariat in all cases 
enters into a struggle against its own national army' 
2 
. 
3 From Previous Page. 
'But for the ordinary men who fought it, was this war much different 
from the first? If there was perhaps less passionate dedication 
there was probably a greater feeling of inescapable purpose: war 
resistance was a negligible factor this time ' (A. Marwick, 
The Explosion of British Society, 1914-62, (1963), 105). Gallup 
found a majority behind Chamberlain from October 1938, which grew 
from the outbreak of war, (H. Pelling, ibid., 38 ). 
I In 1914 Lenin had described this as 'the only correct proletarian 
slogan' ('The War and Russian Social Democracy, Collected Works, 
21, (Moscow 1964), 32-3). But Lenin was seeking to draw a definitive 
line between revolutionaries and social patriots which by 1939 was 
well established. 
2 Trotsky argued that the true meaning of revolutionary defeatism was 
that defeat of one's own imperialist government was a lesser evil 
than political prostration of the proletariat within national unity. 
It may have been significant that it was WIL which published this 
argument, ('Learn to Think', WIN, (Aug. 1938), 4). 
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Trotskyism expected the C. P. G. B. to support the war. This 
had been the drift of party policy before 1939. When it was reversed 
a month after war began, the communists moved to a policy which was 
radical but not Leninist. The most radical phase of this policy fell 
between October and the Fall of France. 
I 
During this time the war was 
damned as an imperialist conflict by the party, with the main blame 
falling upon the British and the French. 
2 It did not call for the war 
to be turned into a civil war, but demanded the replacement of 
Chamberlain with a new government pledged to begin peace negotiations. 
3 
WIL regarded communist policy at this time as pro-Hitler, and this 
belief was a motive behind the revulsion of many on the left from the 
party. 
4 
The change in the programme of the C. P. G. B. did not make it 
more well disposed towards Trotskyism. 
5 
I The war was 'not a people's war, but a war in the interests of the 
big capitalists against the people', The Trade Unions and The War 
[1939? ]. (This was a resolution of the party central committee). 
For the period 1939-41 see H. Pelling, The British Communist Party, 
108-119. 
2 London district committee (of the C. P. G. B. ), Workers Against The 
War [1939? ] , 9-10. 
3 W. Gallacher, The War and the Workers, [1939? ), 16. 
4 Collancz wrote that the C. P. G. B. had adopted the policy consistently 
held by the I. L. P., ('Where Are You Going? ', in V. Gollancz (ed. ) 
The Betrayal of the Left, (1940), especially 6-7). The Russian 
invasion of Finland sundered the close observation of communist 
policy by Tribune, (W. Jones, The Russia Complex, (1977), 50). 
5 Trotskyism, with pacifism, belonged among those political 
tendencies 'which confuse and disrupt the growth of working class 
opposition to the war', (Workers Against The War, [1939? ], 7). 
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But the bourgeoisie was no more inclined to civil war than 
the proletariat. The first nine months of the conflict, the Phoney 
War, were notable for relaxation at home, if anything, to the irritation 
of many in the labour movement. 
I 
This again conflicted with forecasts. 
WIL argued that the pliancy of labour leaders rendered a strong state 
apparatus superfluous and concluded that the National Government had a 
'firm hold'. But elections continued, and offered an opportunity for 
2 
anti-war candidates of various kinds to oppose it. In this phase of 
the war, the general absence of discontent was reflected in their low 
votes. 
I Rationing, for example, began only after four months of war and then 
limited to sugar, butter and bacon. Nor had conscription reached 
beyond the twenty five year olds by April 1940. At that date there 
were still more than a million unemployed, (H. Pelling, Modern 
Britain : 1885-1914, (1974), 164). 
2 'The Ballot Box Test', WIN (March 1940), 6. But WIL also believed 
that 'sober discussions' about state repression had taken place in 
ruling circles immediately before the war. It deployed the evidence 
of army manoeuvres and the text of insurance policies (which 
excluded civil war from the list of covered hazards) in support, 
('Slump', WIN, (June 1938), 8). 
3 See the results for 1940 By-elections in C. Cook and J. Ramsden, (Lag), 
By-Elections in British Politics (1973), 372. 
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The Fall of France shifted the balance of communist policy' 
and tilted WIL in a new direction. 
2 
If the much heralded patriotic 
wave had any substance it was during the period from Dunkirk to the 
start of the Battle of Britain. 
3 This could only strengthen the 
convictions of the R. S. L. WIL concluded that this was the time to 
build on an anti-fascist mood. It still expected government 
repression4 but began to see an opportunity to differentiate between 
those who would and who would not fight a genuinely anti-fascist war. 
But the R. S. L. saw in responses to the Fall of France 'a determination 
to make any sacrifices to help British imperialism to win'. 
5 It 
I On 7 July 1940 the People's Convention movement, an initiative of the 
C. P. G. B., first met in public to open a six-month campaign. 
D. Childs, 'The British Communist Party and the War, 1939-41', J. C. H. Vol. 
12, (1977), 237-53, leans too heavily on D. Hyde, I Believed (1953) 
to explore communist policy with any thoroughness. R. Black, 
Stalinists in Britain (1970), 131-59 is a Trotskyist account. 
2 'B. Farnborough' (Brian Pearce) dates WIL's Military Policy from the 
Fall of France, ('Marxists in the Second World War', Labour Review, 
(April-May 1959), 25-8). The R. S. L. believed adoption of such a 
policy at such a time was proof that it was a defencist concession. 
3A government call for the suspension of holidays, an end to 
absenteeism, and long working hours received wide backing, but only 
temporarily, (A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War (1968), 
295). Pelling concurs but stretches national unity into 1941, 
(Britain and the Second World War, -(1970), 29). 
4 In June 1940 WIL spoke ambiguously of an imminent threat to workers' 
rights ('Workers' Fight', WIN (June 1940), 8); in July it thought 
the bourgeoisie would not 'pounce' but that the main threat would 
come from 'the Stalinist machine and the Labour bureaucracy', both 
more politically astute and the latter now in government, ('The 
Lesson of France', WIN, (July 1940), 12). 
5 The Electoral Tactics of the Workers' Vanguard (1940), H. P. 
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continued to assume that the first sign of a move to the left would 
be war weariness. In the WIL and in the S. W. P., however, thoughts 
were turning towards a programme on which those participating in the 
war could stand. It was the beginning of a search for a 'Military 
Policy' which would advance positive proletarian tactics for winning 
an anti-fascist war. 
The Emergency Conference of the Fourth International, held 
in New York in May 1940, issued its own manifesto. 
1 It did not treat 
Military Policy in any detail, though it affirmed it as the only 
programme adequate for the needs of the epoch. Military Policy, it 
suggested, was an approach, not a principle. The war was merely a 
theatre in which Trotskyists advanced their views: just as in a 
factory, they shared the experiences of other workers. Since the 
proletariat had failed to prevent war, it must now seek to remove the 
ruling classes from leading positions within it. The R. S. L. received 
this manifesto with considerable embarrassment, and published it with 
a partial disclaimer. 
2 
WIL's reception was cordial and from 1940 
Youth for Socialism carried. its own military programme in every issue. 
3 
'Imperialist War and the Proletarian World Revolution', Documents, 
311-50. Although this was a manifesto Trotsky had warned before 
the war that a binding policy could not be imposed on all sections 
of the Fourth International because of national differences, 
('Learn to Think', WIN, (Aug. 1938), 5). 
2 See appendix to Imperialist War and the Proletarian World 
Revolution, in Marxist Discussion Bulletin (Aug. 1940), 2, (H. P., 
D. J. H. 6/5). The R. S. L. remarked that the section entitled 'workers 
must learn the military arts' might be opportunistically miscon- 
strued. When consciousness was low, calling for arms for the 
workers had a reactionary effect. The League wrote to the I. E. C. 
asking for clarification. 
3 This included demands for the election of workers' officers, full 
trade union and political rights for soldiers, etc. 
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What became known as the American Military Policy (A. M. P. ) 
rested on two principal texts:. a speech by J. P. Cannon to the 
Chicago convention of the S. W. P. in September 1940 and his 
presentation on-behalf of several defendants at a trial for sedition 
the next year in Minneapolis. At Chicago Cannon called for public 
money wherewith the trade unions might set up their own military 
training camps. 
1 He argued that the pre-war policy of the Fourth 
International had been sound but insufficient. Trotskyists had warned 
against war yet failed to prevent it: 
'It is not quite correct to say that the old line was wrong. 
It was a programme devised for the fight against war in time 
of peace. Our fight against war under conditions of peace 
was correct as far as it went. But it was not adequate. It 
must be extended. '2 
As Cannon recalled, Trotskyism was at a disadvantage when it 
lacked concrete suggestions as to how Hitler might be resisted. It 
had formerly argued for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and then 
repulsion of the invaders. Now, he suggested, the two tasks must be 
telescoped. At the Minneapolis Trial of October 1941, Cannon went out 
of his way to reject sabotage of a war effort or indeed any hindrance 
to it. He also opposed draft dodging. 
3 
The R. S. L. was to accuse WIL of lifting Military Policy from 
its American context, but there was stimulus enough for it in the last 
writings of Trotsky and even in some of his articles from before the 
I J. P. Cannon, 'Military Policy of the Proletariat', WIN, (Jan. 1941), 
4. 
2 J. P. Cannon, 'Our Military Policy', WIN, (March 1941), 10. 
3 WIL published his evidence as 'Smash Fascism - End War. The case 
for socialist revolution. An A. B. C. of Trotskyism. The testimony 
of J. P. Cannon in the U. S. Labour frame-up Trial', WIN, (special 
volume, 1942), 1-40. 
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war. Trotsky had been involved in a lengthy discussion with S. W. P. 
members on attitudes towards war preparation. He advised against 
draft avoidanceI and argued for using military training to acquire 
skills of arms.,. Military Policy, 
....... is revolutionary in its essence and based upon the 
whole character of our epoch, when all questions will be 
decided not only by arms of critics but by critiques of 
arms; second, it is completely free of sectarianism. We 
do not oppose to events and to the feelings of_the masses 
an abstract affirmation of our sanctity. 
2 
What Trotsky advised was that the Fourth International should 
counterpose a genuine struggle against fascism to the 'false fight' of 
the Petains. He also suggested that denunciation of war had not been 
the totality of the Bolshevik programme. While the Bolsheviks had won 
a majority between the February and October 1917 revolutions this was 
achieved chiefly, not by refusal to defend the, fatherland, but by the 
slogan All Power to the Soviets. The need for a positive programme 
in wartime made a deep impression on WIL and from the late summer of 
1940 it tried to counter embryonic Vichyism with its Military Policy: 
elected officers, government-financed trade union-controlled training 
schools, public ownership of the armaments industry and a class appeal 
I 'If he is draftable, let him be drafted. I do not think he should 
try to avoid the draft - he must go with his generation and 
participate in its life' ('Some Thoughts on American Problems', WIN, 
(March 1941), 1). 
2 'Another Thought on Conscription', 11 A,, )-j- 1g1ir0. 
(ILtls (H39-40 j, 1I4. 
3 'Leon Trotsky's Last Article', WIN, (Feb. 1941), 9. The R. S. L. 
later attempted, somewhat unconvincingly, to counter this argument. 
'This is not to say that the masses can be won to the banner of the 
Fourth International on the slogans of 'turn the imperialist war 
into civil war', etc., but slogans which are evasive and ambiguous 
with regard to the proletarian attitude to the war are a betrayal of 
Socialist International ' (Attitude of the Proletariat towards 
Imperialist War, H. P., D. J. H. 6/12,3 ). 
286. 
'ý. 
to German soldiers. 
1 
Trotskyists had to have a policy to meet every 
phase of experience of workers. Setbacks to the Allied cause in the 
spring and summer of 1940 apparently provided ample evidence for the 
WIL argument that a fight against fascism could not be won under the 
old ruling classes. Fifth column activities in Europe showed that 
there were people in influential circles who feared the workers within 
more than Nazism. 
2 
The R. S. L., with the former Militant Group in complete control 
by the outbreak of war, drew opposite conclusions. The Fall of France 
had not led in its perception to war-weariness, only to grumbling, 
which had not been converted to a struggle against capitalism. 
3 
Coalition government resting on the patriotic mass provided for the 
present an acceptable substitute for fascism, but this would not 
prevent rapid deterioration of the political position at home. 
4 
Since 
revolutionaries were inevitably isolated under such circumstances, the 
R. S. L. was not surprised that some should seek to break out by means of 
short cuts. These were opportunists however: 
An uncritical account of WIL's opposition to the war is W. Hunter, 
'Marxists in the Second World War', Labour Review (Dec. 1958), 139- 
146. 'B. Farnborough', (Brian Pearce) tried to put right the 
ommission from this article of any treatment of Military Policy, 
('Marxists in the Second World War', Labour Review, (April-May 1959), 
25-8), but did not cover the dispute between the R. S. L. and WIL. 
D. Parkin, 'British Trotskyists and the Class Struggle in World War 
2', Trotskyism Today, no. 2, (March 1978), 27-30, criticises both 
Leagues. 
2 'The Lesson of France', WIN, (July 1940), 12. 
3 The Electoral Tactics of the Workers' Vanguard, (1940), 1-2. 
4 'We may therefore assume that apart from external events the internal 
crisis of British Imperialism will be carried a step further within 
the next few months by wholesale attacks on the standard of living 
of the working class and the middle class', ('Thesis on the Crisis 
of Capitalism and the Tasks of the British Section of the Fourth 
International', adopted by the Central Committee, 11 Aug. 1940, 
The Bulletin, issued by the B. S. F. I., Sept. 1940], H. P., D. J. H. 6/3). 
The significance of this gloomy perspective for R. S. L. thought was 
that the distinction between fascism and democracy would be eroded 
and with it the basis for believing the Second World War to be 
different from the First. 
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'The basic task of revolutionary socialists in such a 
period is not to seek opportunist "short cuts" to the 
mass but to explain patiently the reactionary nature 
of the war.......... 
I 
The R. S. L. thought some workers might support the slogan 
'Labour to Power' for the wrong reason, that it would bring a more 
efficient prosecution of the war. But it also believed that in the 
experience of seeking to make the slogan a reality, they would turn 
against the war itself. Trotskyists themselves, argued the R. S. L., 
had a guarantee against backsliding in the policy of revolutionary 
defeatism. The alternative was to end up like the WIL and the Fourth 
2 International. Cannon's Chicago policy was 'in the spirit of 
Kautsky', a 'petty bourgeois hotch potch'. 
3 
WIL and others had failed 
to counterpose class features to nationalism, thus giving a left 
veneer to patriotism. Only in the case of the Soviet Union was it 
right for workers to assume a patriotic attitude. WIL was quite 
prepared to confront this argument. It saw positive features in 
popular willingness to fight fascism. People were willing to defend 
working class organisations, the true root of democracy. 
4 
It was 
sectarian to condemn defencism from an isolated position: analysis of 
war propaganda showed that the government sought support by projecting 
the conflict as a war for democracy against fascism. Far from 
abolishing workers' parties, the government leaned on their leaders to 
I ibid., 7. 
2 By 1941 the R. S. L. had concluded that the F. I. was in the hands of 
'defencist' tendencies, brought to the fore by the fear of the 
proletariat in Britain and America of losing their privileged 
position. 
3 Attitude of the Proletariat Towards Imperialist War, H. P., D. J. H., 
6/12,1. 
4 A. Calder, (The People's War, 60) doubts that ideological motivation 
against Nazism was common. One atypical exception was George Orwell, 
(W. Steinhoff, The Road to 1984, (1975), 102). Orwell thought 
socialist renewal the only policy likely to bring Britain victory. 
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gain social support. 
I After a year of war the conviction that future 
political developments would favour the workers was a steady feature 
of WIL thought. 
But neither of the two main Trotskyist factions was 
monolithic in its reaction to war. The R. S. L. had always been under 
pressure from within against compromises with chauvinism. When R. S. L. 
leaders dallied with the possibility of deep air raid shelters, the 
League branch at Leicester, where J. L. Robinson was the dominant 
influence, sternly reminded them, 'Marxism remains the same in London 
as in Leicester'. In the view of Leicester, the heart of what was to 
become the Left Faction, no demands whatsoever on the war should be 
put. If one favoured a deeper shelter, why not a better gas mask, a 
more rapid firing machine gun, a faster tank? 
2 
If revolutionaries 
began to make concessions of this kind they might be led inexorably 
to improving the military efficiency of capitalism: they had to 
desire their own government's defeat. 
3 
Hitler's victory was 
preferable for the British workers; Churchill's victory was 
preferable for the German workers. When the R. S. L. Central Committee 
resisted Leicester's critique the branch concluded that its 
'concessions' to chauvinism must be a tendency and that they should be 
I WIL, Reply to the Political Statement of the Revolutionary Socialist 
League, (1941), 2. 
2 Bolshevism and Defencism, (May 1941), 10 
3 'A revolutionary class in an imperial war desires the defeat of its 
national army in order to utilize the situation of humbling of its 
masters to overthrow them irrespective of the nature of the enemy', 
(Brief Notes on the History of the Left Faction, (1960? ), 2; 
interview with J. Goffe, July 1974). 
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removed from the leadership of the British Section. 
I 
WIL also had a debate within its ranks where Haston led a 
minority of the E. C. He was not opposed to Military Policy as such, 
but argued that-. WIL had from early 1941 moved away from this policy 
as expounded by Trotsky and Cannon. WIL had, he asserted, shifted to 
making its main enemy the foreign enemy, and by reference to an alleged 
new popular mood. 
2 WIL had argued for the distribution of arms to the 
workers who might then repel invasion, 
3 
though it insisted its purpose 
was to separate workers from the bourgeoisie not to bring collaboration 
about. But Haston, like the Leicester R. S. L. branch, thought Military 
Policy was being misused in Britain. 
4 
The formation of the Home 
Guard had been quite misunderstood: it was not a concession to the 
workers' desire for arms but the outcome of a full-blooded capitalist 
5 
campaign. Whereas WIL in the past had said that the best workers 
were against the war, it now said, 'we want to fight Hitler but the 
bourgeoisie won't let us'. 
6 But when Healy answered Haston on behalf 
I Bolshevism and Defencism, 11. Youth Militant was also singled out 
for criticism by the Leicester branch. While making an international 
onslaught the Left Faction (as it soon became)had some ideological 
companions elsewhere, notably Grandizo Munis of the Spanish section, 
currently in Mexican exile, who protested against Cannon's 
exposition of the Military Policy at the Minneapolis Trial. 
2 'J. H. ', 'A Step Towards Capitulation', Internal Bulletin, (21 March 
1941), 5, H. P., D. J. H. 14a/3. 
3 'Military Policy or Confusion', Internal Bulletin, (20 March 1941), 
H. P., D. J. H. 14a/2. 
4 His argument was that Trotsky's advice to the Americans had been 
offered in the context of a dynamic and developing labour movement 
confronted by the prospect of universal militarization: his ideas 
should not be used as an alternative to an anti-war struggle. 
5 Shortly after this exchange, Haston protested against the 
emasculation of an article he had written for Socialist Appeal and 
suggested that the formation of the Home Guard proved that the 
bourgeoisie was not in fact fearful of arming the workers ('The 
Military Policy as applied to the Home Guard', Internal Bulletin, 
21 April 1941,1-7, H. P., D. J. H., 140/4). 
6 ibid., 20. 
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of the WIL leaders, he stated what was to be a major theme of its 
perspectives documents from now on - that all its arguments were 
directed towards demonstrating the need to take power. And he 
insisted that WIL based itself on the popular mood which regarded such 
bodies as the Home Guard as a defence against invasion: 
'... the radicalisation of the workers is taking place 
at the moment not around the question of "democratic 
rights" as such but around the manner in which the 
bosses are prosecuting the war ...... 
Although Trotskyists were always projected as enemies of 
the Soviet Union, at least since the Moscow Trials, they had in fact 
consistently called for Soviet defence. Common ground among all 
British Trotskyists at this time was that Russia remained a country 
where capitalism had been overthrown, 
2- 
but they were not optimistic 
about its chances of withstanding a fascist assault. 
3 
They were faced 
with a rapid reversal of communist policy to a call for prosecution of 
the war to the full. 
4 
There was also far greater intensity in 
I G. H., 'The Home Guard - An Approach', Internal Bulletin, (19 May 
1941), H. P., D. J. H., 14A/5. 
2 The views of Burnham and Shachtman found no echo in Britain at the 
time of the Russo-Finnish war and the R. S. L. disowned C. L. R. James 
when he defected to Shachtman's side early in 1940. Nor did 
Trotskyists reject Soviet manoeuvres between the Great Powers, only 
the argument that socialist principles should be jettisoned in 
allied countries. 
3 The Trotskyist view was that the U. S. S. R. had been weakened by 
diplomatic bungling and purges of the Red Army. See A. Scott, 
-'Stalin's Diplomacy Leads to Defeats', WIN (Dec. 1941), 1-6 and 
Trotsky's earlier article 'The Decapitation of the Red Army', 
(5 July 1937), Writings (1937-38), 55-60. 
4 rtThe urgent need now is the fullest mobilisation and active energy 
of all sections of the people for the fulfilment of the tasks of the 
common struggle with the Soviet people for the defeat of Hitler. We 
strive for the united national front of all sections of the people 
(not only of the left anti-imperialist or pro-Soviet elements, but 
of all opposed to Hitler and supporting the Pact) to drive forward 
the maximum effort in the joint war with the Soviet Union for the 
defeat of Hitler. ` (R. P. Dutt, 'Notes of the Month', Labour Monthly 
(Aug. 1941), 356 ). 
291. 
communist attacks on Trotskyists whom they accused of being dishonest 
in their calls for Soviet defence. The WIL argument was that Britain 
under a Churchill government must still be waging an imperialist war. 
Acquisition of a Soviet alliance could not, it insisted, alter this 
fact. The war could only become a just war if the workers of Britain 
took military and state power into their own hands. Otherwise all 
the criticisms made of the British government before Hitler invaded 
Russia retained their validity. 
' 
WIL did not propose inactivity in 
support of the Soviets but, like Tait and others in the I. L. P., called 
for all aid to be sent to Russia under trade union control. It began 
to see a road to workers' power through a struggle over the handling 
of the war. Aided by quotations from Lenin it argued for a positive 
programme whereby the predatory war might be transformed into a just 
war. It argued that Lenin's main drive in 1917 was not against war 
but for a workers' government. Its own pre-conference thesis of 1942 
was published under the ambitious title Preparing For Power. There 
it was suggested that military incompetence was a sign that the 
bourgeois system had outlived itself, and that it was leading workers 
to question the regime. 
2 
This provoked the R. S. L., which still 
insisted that a revolutionary mood could not possibly arise through a 
desire for more efficient prosecution of the war: WIL, it charged, 
was distorting the popular mood: 
'But the same class is in control. They are still fighting for the 
same interests - their profits, markets, colonies, etc. And they 
can fight for no other interests. They are still fighting to keep 
India under their own subjection and to keep Africa enslaved. ' 
(A. Scott, 'Britain's War Remains Imperialist. It is not altered 
by the alliance with the Soviet Union', WIN, (Nov. 1941), 7. This 
article was also published separately as a pamphlet. 
2 'Preparing For Power', WIN, (Sept. 1942), 5. 
292. 
'When social explosions come, as come they will, they 
will not arise upon the basis of demands by the workers 
for a more effective prosecution of the war. No class 
struggles can arise on this issue because it is not a 
class issue as far as the workers are concerned. '1 
Workers would be taking a class approach when they desired 
peace. WIL, charged the R. S. L., was concealing its own chauvinism 
behind revolutionary - sounding slogans which, in the wartime context, 
had a counter-revolutionary content. 
2 When WIL replied, effectively 
concluding the discussion, it was at its most unapologetic. It was 
against all occupations, but not to oppose the occupation of Britain 
would be to carry literal opposition to patriotism too far. It would 
be 'inverted chauvinism', supporting a foreign bourgeoisie while 
opposing one's own. WIL agreed it had talked of an anti-fascist war, 
but claimed it had always explained that British imperialism could 
not wage such a war. 
3 
Exposure of social patriotism was not a live 
issue: revolutionaries now had to aim at workers' power: 
'Our position towards war is no longer merely a policy of 
opposition, but is determined by the epoch in which we 
live, the epoch of the socialist revolution. That is, as 
contenders for power. Only thus can we find an approach 
to the working class. '4 
1 R. S. L., 'A Criticism of the WIL Pamphlet Preparing For Power' in 
WIL, Policy and Perspectives of the British Trotskyists, (1943), 2. 
2 The example given was workers' control of production to increase 
production for the war, (R. S. L., loc. cit., 5). 
3 'Reply of WIL to the R. S. L. Criticisms of Preparing For Power', in 
WIL, Policy and Perspectives of the British Trotskyists, (1943), 16. 
4 WIL, be. cit., 17. 
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Lenin's task, reflected WIL, had been to hold an 
internationalist faction together in a patriotic time. Support would 
not come to Trotskyists who merely repeated his arguments. WIL 
reflected on the drift of Trotsky's last article where he had argued 
that Fourth International policy did continue that of Lenin, but that 
'continuation signifies a development, a deepening and a sharpening'. 
' 
1 'Bonapartism, Fascism and War', (Aug. 1940), Writings (1939-40), 121. 
WIL published this as 'Leon Trotsky's Last Article' in WIN for 
February 1941. 
29 4. 
X THE R. S. L. IN UNITY AND DISUNITY 
(SEPTEMBER 1938 - MARCH 1944). 
The Revolutionary Socialist League was a failure. It did 
not hold together and it proved unable to capitalise on wartime 
opportunities. The Marxist League cadre drifted away from it to 
joint activities against military measures with dissidents inside and 
outside the Labour Party. The R. S. P. refused any kind of Labour Party 
work, tried independence and later entered the I. L. P. The Militant 
Labour League was left in control of the R. S. L. with official backing 
from the International. But from 1940 it stagnated within the Labour 
Party and fell out with the International over the correct line to be 
advocated against the war. These two factors added to a third, the 
contrast presented by the growth of the WIL, gave rise to intense 
factionalism and the effective separation of the R. S. L. into three 
parts. It drew together at the end of 1943 but only as a preliminary 
to dissolution in the much larger WIL to form the Revolutionary 
Communist Party. 
******* 
The new Revolutionary Socialist League was formed on the eve 
of the war scare associated with the Munich crisis. This was a test 
which exposed the fragility of the union forged in July 1938 as each 
faction reacted in its own way. The M. L. L. argued that the crisis 
underlined the need for it as the only pole of revolutionary Marxism 
in the Labour Party. 
I In October, sales of Militant reached a peak 
I Though it maintained there was no contradiction between its own 
existence and that of the Socialist Anti-War Front, formed in 
September: 'on the contrary, the strong organisation of the 
revolutionary left in the Labour Party will be of great assistance 
to its work', (Militant, Oct. 1938). 
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figure of 3,000. On 6 November 1938 its conference met. 
' As the 
public face of the Revolutionary Socialist League, the M. L. L. spent 
' the post-Munich months trying to dig itself in. But until a 
conference of the R. S. L. was held to establish a firm policy on Labour 
Party work the energy of the whole organisation could not be 
concentrated on the M. L. L. What was the reaction of those signatories 
of the Peace and Unity agreement with a clear preference for 'open' 
work? 
(i) The Revolutionary Socialist Party. 
But while Militant continued to appear regularly during 
these turbulent months all was not well with other commitments made by 
the fusion. The R. S. P. had surrendered its paper, Revolutionary 
Socialist, for the promise of a revamped Fight, rechristened Workers 
Fight, for 'open' sales. To a tiny party whose mode was street 
meetings and outdoor sales, regular appearance of the outside paper 
was vital. The paper came out in October 1938, marking C. L. R. James's 
last connection with the British Trotskyist movement. 
2 
It firmly 
opposed I. L. P. reaffiliation to the Labour Party3 and continued Fight's 
I The M. L. L. conference reported 150 members, adopted a programme of 
transitional demands proposed by Jackson, claimed 2,000 monthly 
sales of Militant. It also claimed to be the driving force of the 
S. A. W. F. in some areas, (Report of the first National Conference of 
the Militant Labour League, (Nov. 1938? 3, H. P., D. J. H. 3/2). 
2 James was regarded by the R. S. P. as a pledge that open activity 
would receive sufficient emphasis in the R. S. L. He fulfilled some 
speaking engagements despite his illness, and the October Workers 
Fight bears his editorial mark, but he left for the United States 
shortly after. 
3 It was argued that the opposition of most I. L. P. leaders to 
reaffiliation would evaporate. 'Comrades of the I. L. P., you think 
some of you that you are revolutionaries. You are not. ' 
Capitulation to the Labour Party, it now predicted, would allow the 
I. L. P. to be used by Transport House as a counterweight to 
Stalinism. 
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tradition as an open Fourth International journal. 
I There was no 
change in the political line in November. Both these issues appeared 
late however, and that intended for December failed to come out at 
all. 
2 
This caused disquiet in the R. S. P. as well as among other 
devotees of outside work. The R. S. P. leaders had signed the Peace 
and Unity agreement as individuals and were meant, within a week, to 
have won. the assent of the party as a whole. Failing to manage this, 
they were allowed time to hold a referendum. This was completed late 
in October 1938, and indicated unanimous backing for joining the 
R. S. L. But Maitland and Willie Tait told the R. S. L. central committee 
the next month that conditions were attached to the union: a 
guaranteed continuation of open work and an open paper, and the 
placing of the editorial and business control of Workers Fight in the 
hands of the R. S. P.! This ultimatum was refused on the grounds that 
a revolutionary organisation must centrally control all its publications 
and that the overall tactics of the R. S. L. could be changed only by a 
national conference. 
R. S. P. suspicions of a lack of interest in London in 
activities outside the Labour Party continued to fester. It formally 
joined the R. S. L. on 15 December 1938, but presented the League's 
executive with a lengthy critique. 
3 
The R. S. L. central committee, under 
fire also from London apostles of the independent life, pleaded that as 
I It carried articles by James and Maitland, advertisements for 
Militant, the R. S. P. bookshop and even Workers International News. 
The Founding Conference was reported as were other affairs of the 
International such as the murder of its administrative secretary, 
Rudolf Klement. 
2 Suspension of publication was blamed on low revenue from sales, 
although it was claimed that October and November were sold out. 
3 R. S. P. charges against the R. S. L. centre were set down in R. S. P. to 
R. S. L., (29 Dec. 1938), Letter and Statement of the R. S. P. 
(Edinburgh) and reply of Executive Committee, H. P., D. J. H. 13a/6. 
See also 'Statement of the R. S. P., 23 Dec. 1938', in WIL document 
on the history of Trotskyism, 9-11. 
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well as the perennial dearth of funds the League lacked able and 
willing organisers for outside work. 
' There had to be, it argued, a 
period of common experience on the part of all signatories to the 
Peace and Unity agreement. The R. S. P., however, was making its own 
experience by outdoor rallies on the Munich issue2 and an intervention 
in the West Perthshire by-election. 
3 
It was never really integrated 
in the R. S. L. 
(ii) The Socialist Anti-War Front. 
Meanwhile the centre of the R. S. L. was under pressure from 
the other independent strand of thought within it. The entire leading 
cadre of the old Marxist League was involved in September 1938 in 
launching the Socialist Anti-War Front. A London conference to 
found the S. A. W. F. brought together members of a wide spectrum of 
organisations, though none of them lacked Trotskyist participation. 
4 
I ibid. Chief London critics were Lane and Duncan of the Islington 
R. S. L. branch. This branch did publish at least four issues of 
Islington Workers Voice, a duplicated supplement to Militant, early 
in 1939. See the issue for March 1939 at H. P., D. J. H. /3. 
2 It claimed to have convened the biggest protest meetings in 
Edinburgh; one of its complaints against the centre was that it 
had not been kept supplied with literature during this time. It 
believed that the R. S. L. central committee was mainly preoccupied 
with preparations to go underground. 
3 At West Perthshire there was no Labour Party candidate in the 
by-election, brought about when the Duchess of Atholl resigned her 
seat in protest against the National Government's foreign policy. 
She was the author of Searchlight on Spain, (1938), a defence of 
the Republic, and received popular front support in her 
unsuccessful bid to be returned. The R. S. P. weighed in with 
Maitland's pamphlet Searchlight on the Duchess of Atholl, (1938), 
an analysis of why a Tory should support the Republic. 
4 Present were members of the I. L. P. London Divisional Council, the 
R. S. L., the Africa Service Bureau, the M. L. L., the I. L. P. Guild of 
Youth and the Labour League of Youth. 
University 
Library 
Hull 
298. 
'ý. 
It elected Hugo Dewar secretary, formed a provisional committee and 
issued a 'call to action' in view of the Munich crisis. 
' 
On 1 October 
a youth section was set up2 and the next day a demonstration in 
Hyde Park was held. At this stage the S. A. W. F. was mainly a London 
organisation. 
3 
The S. A. W. F. was formed to organise working class 
opposition to war and to achieve unity among socialists. Its general 
analysis did not differ from the accepted Trotskyist view and the M. L. L. 
joined the provisional committee in mid-October. But the truth was 
that S. A. W. F. appeal was couched in terms sufficiently ambiguous to 
carry support from the I. L. P. as well. Indeed, it was I. L. P. interest 
which made the S. A. W. F. as broad as it. was4 Later both the M. L. L., 
and the WIL, which had also participated, were to condemn the S. A. W. F. 
for pacifism. 
5 
I All capitalist conflicts were denounced but the League of Nations, 
Collective Security and Peace Blocs rejected. The notion of a war 
for democracy was felt to be undermined since the British, French 
and Czechs were already 'ruling by decrees without consulting 
Parliament'. For the text of the Call to Action see Militant, (Oct. 1938). 
2 Members of various unions attended as well as others from the 
Woodcraft Folk, the League of Youth, Guild of Youth, WIL, R. S. L. and 
London S. A. W. F. The Youth S. A. W. F. intervened with difficulty in a 
Youth Peace conference that autumn dominated by Ted Willis and 
John Gollan, (The New Leader, 21 Oct. 1938). 
3 The September 1938 conference of the S. A. W. F. had formed a provisional 
committee for London as well as district committees all over the 
capital. In South London Dewar held the secretaryship in addition to 
the national post. 
4 Reg. Groves used The New Leader regularly to expound S. A. W. F. views, 
(see the issue for 30 Sept. 1938). Sydney Bidwell told the I. L. P. 
that the Front's anti-war call had come 'like a refreshing breeze' 
through the labour movement, (The New Leader 7 Oct. 1938), though 
this was of course vitiated by the adulatory reception extended by 
Maxton and I. L. P. M. P. s to Chamberlain on his return from Munich. 
5 The R. S. L. admitted its involvement with the S. A. W. F. during the 
Munich crisis to have been a mistake, but charged the WIL with 
sharing it, (British Section of the Fourth International, Statement 
on relations with the Workers International League, 4 Dec. 1939, 
H. P., D. J. H. 13a/8,4 ). 
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Within the R. S. L. ways began to part, first of all over the 
S. A. W. F. thesis that a block of socialist parties could prevent war, 
expounded in its pamphlet War and the Workers (1939). Workers Fight 
commented that while unity was a progressive step, only a revolutionary 
party could overthrow capitalism, the cause of war. 
I 
In November, the 
Front declared the National Register part of a dress rehearsal for 
military and police dictatorship. In Resist the Register, 
2 Hugo Dewar 
argued for non-cooperation, rejecting the government argument that 
conscription was defensive and voluntary. 
3 
When the Military Training 
Bill was introduced without strenuous opposition, a new organisation, 
the No-C onscription League, was launched, which gained important 
support and in which the S. A. W. F. functioned as a militant working- 
class wing. 
4 
At the Bermondsey convention of the N. -C. L., on 4 June 
1939, Groves5 moved an S. A. W. F. amendment to the main policy resolution. 
I See its issue for January 1939. That spring the S. A. W. F. did, 
however, issue a message to Labour's rank and file declaring 
opposition to imperialist war to be part of the struggle for 
workers' power. 
2 Dated 7 Feb. 1939, n. p. This pamphlet, with its pacifist connotations 
was later withdrawn by the Front. The Royal Arsenal Cooperative 
Society was one organisation which struck an encouraging note when 
it declared the Register 'a threat to the rights and liberties of 
Cooperators, and part of the general effort of the present 
Government to destroy peace and democracy'. 
3 See also S. A. W. F. general circular of 13 March 1939, Warwick M. S. S., 
15/4/1/19. 
4 The N. -C. L. was launched in February 1939 and two months later was 
talking of a youth section. After a year's life the N. -C. L. claimed 
6,000 members organised in 100 branches and around a quarter of a 
million affiliated members, (The New Leader, 23 Feb. 1940). 
5 Groves and Wicks were unable to carry electoral opposition to 
candidates not opposed to conscription, (No Conscription, June 1939). 
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With support from Wicks he secured a pledge for agitation against the 
Military Training Act, for trade union assistance to victimised 
objectors and help for shop stewards resisting industrial conscription. 
1 
The outbreak of war itself geared up the S. A. W. F. an extra 
notch. Its manifesto, issued on the day of declaration of war, called 
on trades councils to make themselves the centres of opposition to 
encroachment on civil liberties, and condemned Labour and the C. P. G. B. 
for their willingness to stand with exploiters behind rhetoric about 
an anti-fascist war. The Front launched its own journal, The Call, 
in November 1939, and showed signs of gathering round it substantial 
numbers of dissident Labour candidates2 and trades councils. There was 
some encouragement in the declaration of the Home Counties Labour 
Parties for socialist peace terms and against the political truce, 
and The Call claimed resolutions on these matters were 'pouring' into 
Transport House. 3 
On 12 November 1939, the N. -C. L. held an all-London 
convention against war and conscription, where Alex Sloan M. P. moved 
I No evidence has been located of Reg. Groves joining the R. S. L., 
either in its first or second incarnations, though he and Dewar now 
linked with the other Marxist Leaguers in the Socialist Anti-War 
Front. For most of the first year of the war Groves was a militant 
propagandist against the aims of the war, using whatever publication 
was open to him to advance his views, and being prime mover in 
founding another, Home Front, (See Appendix ß). 
2 In addition to Reg. Groves, still the Aylesbury candidate, 
contributors to The Call included Edgar Plaisted (Wimbledon), 
W. T. Colyer (Chislehurst) and Will Morris (Hampstead) who was also 
secretary of the N. -C. L. The Call claimed forty Parliamentary 
candidates had signed a petition for immediate peace. 
3 Writing in The Call for December 1939, Will Morris claimed for the 
N. -C. L. the backing of nine trades councils, eighteen D. L. P. s and 
300 Women's Cooperative Guilds through their national organisation. 
In Glasgow an N. -C. L. convention was called by the Glasgow Trades 
Council. The N. -C. L. also received backing from the I. S. P. and the 
R. S. P. in 1939, and the following year the British Federation of 
Cooperative Youth carried an anti-war resolution with one opposed. 
In November 1939, seventy Divisional Labour Parties, as well as 
twenty M. P. s backed a call for peace, (A. Calder, The People's War, 
67). 
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and C. A. Smith seconded a resolution opposing the war, urging repeal of 
the National Service Act, calling for the maintenance of civil 
liberties and an end to the truce, and demanding an immediate Labour 
Party conference to formulate Socialist Peace proposals. An S. A. W. F. 
amendment was carried with support from the N. -C. L. executive. 
I 
It seems that the S. A. W. F. now carried the hopes of the 
former Marxist League in much the same way as the earlier S. L. F. had. 
To Groves, and perhaps now to the others as well, a gathering of 
anti-war Labour dissidents in a convention 'would mark an end to the 
division, the fractionisation, the hole-in-the-corner groupings that 
in the past have ruined all effort to secure a large left-wing 
movement'. 
2 
The Front was militant, anti-capitalist and anti- 
Stalinist. 3 It was also, by the meagre standards of these years, a 
success. Against this it mattered little that it did not call for a 
Fourth International whose hour had not struck. 
4 
The Front rejected 
a purely pacifist appeal which it considered would not rally the 
working class, but it did demand peace on 'socialist principles'. 
I Strongest opposition came from the Peace Pledge Union which, declared 
the S. A. W. F., 'regarded the whole question of war and peace as an 
abstract one unconnected with the efforts of the workers to achieve 
political power', The Call (Dec. 1939). 
2 ibid. 
3 See H. Sara, 'Pollitt and the Party Line', The Call (Nov. 1939). 
In December The Call condemned Stalin's invasion of Finland while 
dissociating itself from official Labour opinion. 
4 W. T. Colyer, in 'The Three Internationals', The Call (Feb. 1940) 
scorned the Second and Third Internationals, but kept silent on the 
Fourth. Colyer shared a communist background with Groves, but had 
left the C. P. G. B. rather earlier and for quite opposite reasons, 
since he opposed party control of the National Left Wing Movement, 
(L. J. Macintyre, op. cit., 189-90). 
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This was what divided it from WIL and - after initial hesitation - 
from the M. L. L. It built up a significant movement against the 
anticipated demise of civil liberty and the militarisation of life1 
and even occasionally moved out of the realm of propaganda into direct 
intervention in events. 
2 
When confronted by the Call-up, however, it 
had only negative individual resistance to suggest. 
3 
An attempt was 
made to transcend this limit, 
4 but the Front was not a political 
party and when the end of the Phoney War made military resistance 
irrelevant, it also died. The Front disappeared after April 1940, 
despite ambitious plans, 
5 
and a broadening of its interests to embrace 
problems of working class life. It had for once provided a genuine 
movement in which many of Trotskyist origins might work, but the new 
phase of the war, 
6 
together with increased Transport House vigilance 
against party dissidents, now finished it off. 
I This was a perspective which it shared with the WIL and the M. L. L. 
2 Some trades councils, like that in Romford, carried out campaigns 
and The Call for April 1940 carried a report from former Ballam 
Group member Steve Dowdall on agitation in the building trade. 
3 From November 1939 to April 1940, its entire life, The Call carried 
statements from S. A. W. F. members making conscientious objection to 
conscription. 
4 In March 1940, The Call talked of ending 'the purely negative stage 
of opposing the war', arguing the need for 'a great forward 
movement of the workers'. 
5 The Call last appeared in April 1940 in a more professional format 
than previously. It claimed to have almost doubled circulation in 
six months and planned pamphlets by F. A. Ridley and George Padmore. 
Nearly sixty lecture meetings had been held in the first five months 
of the war, and the S. A. W. F. looked forward to the conference of the 
N. -C. L. planned for 9 June 1940. 
6 For the decline of conscientious objection in wartime, see 
E. A. Prince, 'Civil Liberty in Great Britain', (University of London 
Ph. D., 1950), 304. Another contributory factor to loss of support 
for. the S. A. W. F. was the death in January 1940 of Rowland gill, a 
steady friend of the Marxist League and its causes across the years 
and 'an enthusiastic admirer of Trotsky .... though he was not a Trotskyist in the full sense', (The Call, March 1940). 
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To Wicks and Sara, executive members of the R. S. L., from 
the time of the July 1938 fusion, the S. A. W. F. was a way of tapping 
the kind of revival in the movement anticipated in the Transitional 
Programme. They expected they might build as they had in the months 
following their expulsion from the C. P. G. B. 
1: 
the issue and - for 
them - the geographical location was similar. It also offered a 
forum for unity with Groves and Dewar, the one in the Labour Party, 
the other in the I. L. P. Sara-and Wicks were similarly divided. But 
on the pacifist appeal of the S. A. W. F. itself, they parted with the 
R. S. L. early in 1939.2 
The first R. S. L. conference, convened just outside the six 
month schedule set when the League was formed, did not reveal a healthy 
state of affairs. The centre was in conflict with three distinct 
groups: the former Marxist League, dissidents within the first R. S. L., 
and the R. S. P. The proceedings opened acrimoniously when the expulsion 
of Lane and Duncan, of Islington, was upheld. 
3 
This led to"a walk-out 
I Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979. 
2 They were certainly expelled from the R. S. L. by the middle of the 
year. See 'Conscription', WIN (June 1939), 3. After the Fall of 
France the S. A. W. F. contacted the R. S. L. The R. S. L. countered with 
a questionnaire on such matters as the Fourth International and 
revolutionary defeatism which could hardly do other than keep the 
two apart. It seems likely that the S. A. W. F. was in any case a 
broken reed by this time. 
3 No document detailing the reason for the original E. C. decision to 
expel them has been located, but they were in conflict over their 
belief in outside work. At the conference they charged that the 
R. S. L. had effectively been dissolved into the M. L. L., and were 
accused in turn of obstructiveness. Provincial members expressed 
bewilderment at all this and the E. C. recommendation was upheld, 
not with full authority, forty three to twenty three. A Hampstead 
delegate then proposed the withdrawal of dissidents to convene an 
alternative conference and a walk-out took place, (Report of National 
Conference of the R. S. L. [Feb? 1939), H. P., D. J. H. 13a/91). 
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of at least' ten members who were to attempt to found a new 
organisation. Jackson, the R. S. L. secretary, then had to report the 
2 
aborting of attempts to fuse with the WIL. Finally it was announced 
that fusion with the R. S. P. remained unconsummated and new ground 
rules were laid down for bringing the moment of it near. 
3 
Conference 
then approved an uncontroversial - if lengthy - constitution4 and 
returned an executive with strong Militant influence. 
5 
[R. S. L. ] , Interim Report of National Conference, 
{Feb? 1939), 
H. P., D. J. H. 13A/9K, gives sixteen. - 
2 The R. S. L. had offered WIL unification on equal terms though it 
claimed to hold twice the membership. Both sides met with Phelan of 
the S. W. P. (q. v. ) to consider the R. S. L. proposal of equal executive 
representation. WIL declined as it did not accept the M. L. L. tactic; 
nor did it respond to a second R. S. L. offer, for a three month 
discussion to be followed by a binding majority vote at a joint 
conference. [R. S. L. ], Report On Negotiations With the WIL, 
Jan. 1942]. Two WIL visitors were denied entry to the 1939 R. S. L. 
conference. Jackson told the conference that decisive steps had 
been taken against WIL where it had established relations with R. S. L. 
contacts. 
3 Jackson steered conference through the complex relations between the 
R. S. L. and the R. S. P. by reference to a thick file of documents. 
Conference first rejected immediate R. S. P. entry sixteen to thirty. 
It then instructed the executive forty two to one to open 
negotiations for fusion with the party, admitting the obvious truth 
that this task remained unaccomplished, (Interim Report). 
4 This was a full blown constitution, remarkably elaborate for an 
organisation less then sixty strong. 
5 Members were Jackson, Weston, Wood, Johns, Harber, van Gelderen, 
'B. Sh. ', 'D. B. ', 'H. S. ', (ibid. ). Two other members who had been 
prominent earlier, Bert Matlow and Roma Dewar, had drifted away from 
the centre of affairs and were reported in October 1941 to be 
inactive, (C. C. Minutes, 26 Oct. 1941, Har. P. ). Matlow's last 
important contribution to the Trotskyist cause seems to have been his 
speech to the 1939 Labour Party Conference, though he remained a central 
committee member until December 1940. 
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Conference endorsed the executive position on Air Raid 
Precautions, which rejected a distinction between offence and defence 
and called for a boycott, but not before dissent had been voiced, an 
anticipation of-, the factionalism which shook the whole League in 
1942.1 It went on to affirm the split perspective, an inevitable 
development which it believed might benefit centrism (the I. L. P. ) or 
the Fourth International. It also still believed in an open centre, 
the M. L. L.: all outside work was subordinate to that. The major 
controversy of 1938 was thus resolved in the Militant's favour. Finally 
conference recognised that it would not gain support before war broke 
out, that hostilities would delay the swing to the left (though they 
would also intensify it), and that the organisation would have to act 
in collective prudence in order to avoid provoking physical 
obliteration by a stark presentation of policy. 
2 
The M. L. L., focus for the Militant Group before the Peace and 
Unity conference became, by fission, the hub around which the whole 
R. S. L. turned. On its behalf Matlow and Wood made speeches to Labour's 
1939 conference, the first it had held for a year and a half. 
3 
I There were several positions. Finchley, Islington and Hampstead did 
not dispute the purpose of A. R. P. or the nature of the impending war, 
but they demanded transitional demands on defence. J. L. Robinson, 
always inplacable on this matter, flatly opposed any demands on the 
state for protection. George Weston proposed a resolution which 
argued that demands for defence in war were no more reactionary than 
demands for more money in peace, but even he favoured abstention from 
A. R. P. work. 
2 'It would therefore be fatal for us to carry on open propaganda 
against the war immediately after its outbreak', (Our tasks in 
relation to the outbreak of Im erialist War, in R. S. L. National 
Conference 1939, March? 1939j, H. P. ). 
3 It claimed three delegates present altogether, (B. S. F. I., Statement 
on relations with the Workers International League, 4 Dec. 1939, 
H. P., 13a/8,3-4). 
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Youth Militant reappeared, (after a lapse), in February 1939 as the 
paper of the youth section of the M. L. L. 
1 
It reviewed the attempt of 
earlier years to rally delegates for a socialist policy and advanced 
a positive and detailed youth programme stimulated by the T. U. C. Youth 
Charter. It retained the distinctive stamp of appealing for a Third 
Labour Government and autonomy for the Leagues of Youth. But the 
L. L. O. Y. was now in decline, debilitated by a repressive party 
apparatus and peacetime conscription. 
2 
The M. L. L. had fifteen 
delegates at its annual conference3 but there was now no future for 
youth work. 
In November 1939 London executive members of the R. S. L. had 
advanced a proposal to their central committee that an open Fourth 
International paper should be published. The provinces' 
representatives voted them down, thus ensuring continued dependence on 
a Labour Party presence. J. Middleton and G. Shepherd, secretary and 
national agent respectively, warned local Labour Parties in January 1940 
against pacifist attacks on party policy and candidates. By February 
early talk in Labour's propaganda of a German revolution had ceased. 
Harold Laski's pamphlet, Is it an imperialist war? appeared, intended 
to assuage the more 'ideologically minded'. He argued that the war 
might be imperialist but distinguished the contracting (Anglo-French) 
strain from the aggressive (German) kind. 
4 
Reg. Groves wrote a 
1 Youth Militant appeared in February, April and May 1939 and then 
unevenly for at least two years. A new series began in December 1939 
and continued at least to no. [161] which appeared in summer 1941. 
2 That spring Advance was ousted from control of the L. L. O. Y. by Labour 
officials. In July, Willis, most of the now unofficial N. A. C. and 
many of the rank and file joined the Young Communist League. If the 
Y. C. L. grew it was a temporary spurt before conscription bit into 
the membership of both Leagues, (J. Ferris, 'The Labour League of 
Youth, 1924-40', University of Warwick M. A. (1977), 129-32; T. Willis 
Whatever Happened to Tom Mix? (1970), 185). 
3 B. S. F. I. Statement on relations, 3-4. 
4 T. D. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War, (1976), 41; 
B. Jones, The Russia Complex, (1977), 50. 
0 
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forceful reply which was to lead later to conflict with Shepherd and 
the N. E. C. 
1 
Van Gelderen tackled the same job in a review for Militant. 
At this point early in the year, however, party conference had not 
pronounced on the war. 
Lack of constitutionally decided policy did not protect the 
M. L. L. from the Labour Party apparatus. In early March 1940 it resolved 
that the League was 'a communist organisation for the promotion of 
Leon Trotsky's views and policy', 
3 
and that membership of it was not 
compatible with party membership. The League protested that no reason 
had been given for the ban, that it was 'a denial of democracy and 
political freedom within the workers' organisation', 'a Gestapo-like 
attempt .... to crush honest political criticism'. 
4 
Jackson 
anticipated the Fourth International itself in his attempt to put a 
brave face on the ban. Labour leaders, he suggested, were less secure 
as awareness of the reactionary nature of the war began to spread: 
'It is not accidental that the M. L. L. is banned at the 
period when British Imperialism plans to extend the war 
and talk of further sacrifices in blood and money is in 
the air. '5 
1 It is an imperialist war, (1940) was written before Labour's 
conference endorsed participation by its leaders in the Churchill 
government. He was threatened with discipline by George Shepherd, 
the National Agent, but the N. E. C. opted in the end to give him the 
chance to moderate his views, (see Appendix B ). 
2 See its final issue, that for May 1940. 
3 L. P. C. R., (1940), 27. 
4 Militant (April 1940). No other paper printed this statement of the 
M. L. L. executive published over the name of 'M. Stanwick', almost 
certainly a pseudonym. 
5 ibid. 
308. 
Jackson threatened Labour with continued activity after the 
M. L. L. itself disappeared. On 16 March 1940 the W. S. L. executive had 
in fact recommended M. L. L. dissolution. Later that month, on 
23 March, an R. S. L. conference met followed by a conference of the doomed 
M. L. L. It was resolved to follow the R. S. L. recommendation, although 
the leaders were faced with Our Present Tasks, a 'document of the 
fourteen', whose authors thought the main political developments would, 
as in 1915-18, take place in the factories, workshops and streets. 
They flatly denied that there would be a swing to_the left within the 
Labour Party, 
I 
but the meaning of acquiescence in the ban had to be 
that retention of Labour Party membership was an overriding R. S. L. 
objective. The executive and J. L. Robinson's Leicester branch came 
together to reject the call to launch an openly Fourth International paper, 
and suspend Militant and the M. L. L. in favour of open work. 
2 On 
9 April 1940, M. L. L. branches were urged to agitate about the ban but 
to stop short of provoking expulsion. They were promised a monthly 
Militant and the services of a full-time organiser. The promise was 
fulfilled when Jackson moved from a voluntary to a professional basis 
on 15 April at a weekly wage of £2 a week. 
3 Transport House was told 
that the N. E. C. action threatened to turn it into 'a hardened 
bureaucracy'; the M. L. L. was informed in its turn that it was committed 
to policies of which party conference would not approve and that an 
attempt was being made by it to build an organisation within the party. 
4 
I Leaders of 'the fourteen' were 'F' (A. A. Cooper? ), Bone and Emmett, 
the last two veterans of the League of Youth. They had backing in 
the Camberwell and East branches of the R. S. L. They attributed their 
defeat at the Easter conference to the low political level of the 
provincial members. 
2 Leicester Group (of the R. S. L. ), A Circle or a Party?, [1941? ] n. pag. 
Har. P. There had been an attempt to sustain fortnightly publication 
of Militant in October 1939, (A. Penn, op. cit., 115). 
4ý See footnotes of following page. 
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The M. L. L. might express surprise that conference decisions could be 
anticipated in this way, 
I but the Bournemouth conference easily 
endorsed Labour's entry into coalition as well as the war itself. 
M. L. L. speakers there received some support but the emergency motion 
for Labour joining the government was easily carried. 
2 
The drive against Labour dissidents was the very thing the 
M. L. L. had always feared and tried to avoid. Expulsions and 
proscriptions would inhibit it from taking advantage of a swing to the 
3 From the previous page. 
E. C. Circular, 16 May 1940. Seemingly there had been plans to publish 
twice monthly before the ban. Providing Jackson's salary, regularly, 
proved a strain almost at once, and the frequency of circulars 
declined. 
4 From previous page. 
M. Stanwick to the N. E. C., Labour Party, 8 April 1940; 
G. S. Shepherd to Stanwick, 10 April 1940. 
I M. Stanwick to the N. E. C., Labour Party, 25 April 1940. Stanwick 
pointed out that other minorities, such as the Peace Pledge Union, 
had not been suppressed but that the drive was aimed against 
socialist organisations. He instanced the Russia Today Society and 
the expulsion of D. N. Pritt M. P. For Pritt's account of his 
expulsion see From Right to Left (1965), 221 and ff. The M. L. L. 
had resolutions from Norwood and Eastbourne on the agenda of the 
May 1940 annual conference. 
2 A. McDonald (Edinburgh and District) put a Leninist view of the war 
and reminded conference that the previous year any intention to join 
Chamberlain in government had been disclaimed. Joe Pawsey 
(Norwood) seconded, calling for a British workers' state as the 
surest route to defeating fascism in Germany. Among supporting 
speakers was Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire), (L. P. C. R., (1940), 
127-31). Militant seems to have had illusions in the party mood. 
In April it had written that most of the 200 resolutions tabled were 
critical of party policy, that there was 'growing uneasiness' if not 
an actual alternative. 49 out of 50 resolutions on the war, it 
told its readers, were opposed to the official line. 
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left in Labour's ranks. 
1 
The R. S. L. drew the opposite conclusion from 
the proscriptions and isolation revealed at Bournemouth to that drawn 
around this time by the WIL. Late in May 1940 even the continuation 
of Militant itself was thought risky and it was dropped for a 
proposed theoretical journal. 
2. 
Rather than pull out, the R. S. L. 
concluded that Labour's debilitated condition would permit an increase 
in its influence. In a tidying up operation, whatever M. L. L. members VJkb 
were amenable were recruited into the R. S. L., but that organisation 
kept an even lower public profile. 
3 
This retreat afforded few encouraging signs to any with a 
sense of proportion. This quality was never prominent among the 
governing bodies of the Fourth International. In 1940 the International 
was faced with a double crisis. War made it impossible for Europe to 
function as any kind of international centre. Worse yet, the 
I In May 1940 Militant argued that the proscriptions were part of a 
joint Labour government campaign against the left. Apart from the 
examples it gave action was also taken against the C. P. G. B. - 
dominated Sheffield Trades Council, against Krishna Menon, and 
League of Youth members were forbidden to sell Youth for Socialism 
(WIN, May 1940,5-6). 
2 'A Labour Party semi-agitational paper no longer has a basis in the 
absence of a left-wing tendency even such as existed, when. -the paper 
was first produced', (Resolution Passed by Enlarged E. C., 25 May 
1940). Youth Militant, it was resolved, would continue to be 
published. The theoretical journal did not appear. Instead it was 
agreed to launch an internal bulletin under the editorial control of 
Harber. 
3 To avoid risks the E. C. resolved to hold its own Trotsky Memorial 
Meeting independently of all others and, later in the year, to take 
no part in the People's Convention, (Special E. C., 23 Aug. 1940). 
Jackson remained organiser, now under the aegis of the R. S. L., but 
van Gelderen's proposal that he seek to avoid military service was not 
upheld, (E. C. Minutes, 6 July 1940). Jackson himself was uneasy at 
drift within the League and made a political statement deploring 
lack of leadership and initiative (E. C. Minutes, 11 Aug. 1940). 
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Shachtmanite schism of 1939-401 had disrupted the International 
Executive Committee, with four of its seven members supporting 
Shachtman's new party and his view of Russia. 
2 Among them was 
C. L. R. James, now working in the S. W. P. under the pseudonym 
J. R. Johnson. Faced with this crisis an Emergency Conference of the 
Fourth International was convened on 19-26 May in New York by the 
United States, Canadian and Mexican Sections. 
3 Harber, an orthodox 
I. E. C. member, did not attend, but the British Section did disown 
James who was its other representative. 
4 
When the conference looked at 
the situation in Britain it came up with a surrealistic resolution, 
5 
inspired perhaps from only one source. It declared 'a rapid 
revolutionary movement' was maturing in Britain, that a broad 
unorganised Trotskyist sentiment existed, and that the fractions 
British were in four groups. Only the third point was factually 
correct, but the International Conference made two inferences: that 
1 The course of this dispute can be traced through Trotsky's letters to 
the S. W. P. and to Shachtman and other dissidents published in 
L. Trotsky, In Defence of Marxism, (1966). See also J. P. Cannon, 
The Struggle for a Proletarian Party, (ry1972). 
2 Of the seven I. E. C. members elected at the Founding Conference 
Shachtman himself, Abern, Mario Pedrosa (of Brazil) and James were 
defectors, (R. J. Alexander, Trotskyism in Latin America, 
(Stanford, 1973), 13). 
3 For the various decisions taken by the conference see Documents, 
306-97. 
4 Between March and early April 1940 the R. S. L. contacted Trotsky or 
the I. E. C. to declare their support for Trotsky's view, 
(Declaration', 19 March 1940; 'Declaration on the Status of the 
Resident I. E. C. ', 2 April 1940, Writings : Supplement (1934-40), 
853-4). Conference resolved, 'the authority of Johnson rested upon 
the mandate given him by the British section. But the British 
section in its organs and in all communications received, condemns 
defeatism in the Soviet Union and continues to endorse the entire 
programme of the Fourth International, including the position of 
unconditional defence of the U. S. S. R. ', Documents, 354. 
5 Resolution on the Unification of the British Section, (Documents, 359). 
The four F. I. factions in Britain are identified as the M. L. L., R. W. L. 
(q. v. ), WIL and the Labour League of Youth. The erroneous belief 
that the League of Youth stood for Trotskyism reveals how ill- 
informed the International actually was. 
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the ban on the M. L. L. was motivated by the 'substantial progress' it 
was making, and that unity might now come about in Britain. Such a 
call was never likely to be efficacious, even when sweetened with a 
nudge to the M. L. L. to make what organisational concessions it could. 
' 
Those who had walked out of the February 1939 conference 
attempted for a time to maintain that they were the true R. S. L. and 
entitled to recognition. By October of that year they had to recognise 
that the International would not transfer its allegience and changed 
their name to the Revolutionary Workers' League. 
2 
The R. W. L. 
maintained a tiny independent existence3 publishing a duplicated paper, 
Workers Fight, which at Christmas changed to a printed format with 
ambitions of appearing fortnightly. 
4 
They published a manifestos and 
a pamphlet, 
6 
held meetings in London and reported a following in the 
I While remaining within its principles and those of the Founding Con- 
ference. The proceedings of the Conference were reported in Britain 
as 'The Emergency Conference of the Fourth International', 
International Bulletin, (July 1940), H. P., D. J. H. 18/2. On Harber's 
proposal the R. S. L. attempted in August to set up a European sub- 
section of the Fourth International, but only one meeting was held 
before contact was lost with other sections, (E. C. Minutes, 11 Aug. 
1940). Members were Harber, Johns, van Gelderen, one German, one 
Czech, and one Polish advisor. Present in London during this period 
was the I. K. D. (German Trotskyists) in exile. It too declared 
against Shachtman and reported a new layer of contacts 
('Organisational Report of the International Communists of Germany 
(I: K. D. )', Documents, 369). 
2 R. W. L., 'For Members Only', 27 Oct. 1939, in WIL document on the 
History of British Trotskyism. This was a resolution which deplored 
the I. S. failure to conduct an investigation into Britain. 
3 As late as May 1940 Workers Fight was telling revolutionaries in the 
I. L. P. to join the Fourth International. 
4 Workers Fight, 23 Dec. 1939. 
5 The manifesto, dated 20 Dec. 1939, stressed-the Finnish issue and 
called on workers to retain organisations independent both of Stalin 
and Mannerheim. 
6 Though they did not follow Shachtman in his view that Russia had 
ceased to be a workers' state, they did publish his important 
pamphlet Finland and the Fourth International, [1940? 
). 
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provinces. But disorganisation led to them losing control of the 
Pioneer Press outlet which they had held at the time of the walk-out. 
1 
In summer 1940 a majority entered WIL on a critical basis. 
2 
Leading 
figures like Lane and Duncan remained aloof. In July or August 1941 
twelve former R. W. L. members, among them some who had joined the WIL, 
rejoined the R. S. L. 
3 
******* 
After the Fall of France, the R. S. L. slogan remained 'For 
a Third Labour Government, with full power'. 
4 
Like WIL the R. S. L. 
thought the experience of struggling round such a slogan would be the 
best education for the masses. 
5 
The masses had to see that a struggle 
against bourgeois methods meant a struggle against war. 
6 
The sign of 
1 R. W. L. to M. Abern, 7 Dec. [1939], H. P., D. J. H. 6/2b. Abern was 
also to follow Shachtman in the split from the S. W. P. to set up the 
Workers' Party, but the R. W. L. 's connections with American dissidents 
seem coincidental. 
2 Though a fusion*of the WIL and the R. W. L., almost in response to the 
May 1940 resolution of the Emergency Conference, was announced by 
WIN in June 1940 and Youth for Socialism incorporated Workers Fight, 
only twelve R. W. L. members joined WIL, and it seems that half of 
them left soon after. Those who joined saw the WIL as providing the 
nucleus for what might become a true British Section of the F. I. 
3 Six of them, including Rose Carson, were to form the core of the 
Right Opposition', which was soon to crystallize within the R. S. L. 
One curious feature of the R. W. L. 's brief existence was the use of 
the name 'D. Gray', presumably fictitious, on Workers Fight. The 
same name was also used by Workers International News and Youth for 
Socialism in 1940-1. 
4 [R. S. L], The Electoral Tactics of the Workers' Vanguard, (1940), 1. 
5 It believed. the slogan itself might win it dissidents from within 
WIL. 
6 'Thesis on the Crisis of Capitalism and the Tasks of the British 
Section of the Fourth International' (adopted by R. S. L. central 
committee, 11 Aug. 1940), Bulletin of the British Section of the 
Fourth International (Sept. 1940), D. J. H. 6/3,8. 
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a revolutionary temper was opposition to war. The 'Third Labour 
Government' was considered by the R. S. L. an elementary slogan of the 
kind which would break the mass from illusions, 
I but it had a 
revolutionary significance only in the right context: 
'The demand for the ending of the Party truce may be 
progressive or reactionary. Progressive if counterposed 
to the bourgeois task of winning the war, reactionary if 
2 
advanced as a mean to the better prosecution of the war'. 
Militant appeared for the last time in its pre-war series in 
May 1940. An enlarged R. S. L. executive resolved on 25 May that there 
was no basis for a semi-agitational paper and suspended it with the 
initial intention of launching a theoretical journal. This was never 
published. The effective immediate replacement for Militant was 
The Bulletin of the Fourth International which first appeared in June. 
3 
Though commended by the Emergency Conference, the R. S. L. 's 
prospects were bleak. To general torpor within its chosen theatre of 
operations it had to add the practical difficulty of sustaining any 
kind of activity at all in London from mid-1940 on because of the 
blitz. 4 At the beginning of winter the London organisation, its heart, 
I R. S. L., 'Statement of the Executive Committee of the British Section 
of the Fourth International', Marxist Discussion Bulletin, 2, 
(Aug. 1940), H. P., D. J. H. 6/5,25. 
2 R. S. L., Attitude of the Proletariat Towards Imperialist War, 
H. P., D. J. H. 6/12,4. 
3 The June 1940 issue drew immediate complaints from the Leicester 
branch of the R. S. L., in August, that its appearance in the name of 
the Fourth International amounted to a declaration for open work, 
was an assertion that Trotskyism 'had an independent role outside 
of the social democratic movement of the masses', and offered Labour 
officialdom a chance to take repressive measures, (Leicester Group, 
A Circle or a Party? ). 
4A move of the centre to Glasgow to avoid the blitz was announced to 
members on 28 October 1940. In December the Central committee 
announced it had become impossible to maintain a full national 
apparatus but early in 1941 returned to London. 
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, 
was reduced to a very weak state. 
' It believed it could provide no 
more than 150 sales for a theoretical journal. 
2 This was somewhat 
academic, since no such journal ever appeared, Militant had lapsed, 
and its intended replacement, the Bulletin of the B. S. F. I., 
3 did not 
appear on a regular monthly basis. 
The suspension of publications landed the E. C. in further 
trouble on left and right. 'The fourteen' were in defiance of an 
executive directive of 25 May 1940 towards Labour Party activity. In 
July they registered vigorous opposition to the suspension of Militant 
even if it were to be substituted. 
4 
The central committee delivered 
an ultimatum which, on pain of expulsion, demanded that the fourteen 
produce a definite alternative programme to Labour Party activities 
they scorned. 
5 
Further exchanges led to the expulsion of 'F' on 
5 February 1941,6 and the decision by the three prime movers among the 
fourteen to launch a new faction, the Socialist Workers Group, in 
I The London Organisation Report of 3 Nov. 1940, gave eight to twelve 
members in Croydon, but their Labour Party had collapsed and' inter- 
member contact was poor; East London had two members left; 
Lambeth had ten but they were starting to be called up; Staines 
had one left as had Balham; Camberwell had eight; North had five 
but had not met for two months. 
2 ibid. 
3 Sometimes entitled Marxist Discussion Bulletin. Alison Penn (op. cit., 
159) gives the last Bulletin as September 1940, but there are 
references in R. S. L. papers to one for November. 
4 There must be no compromise, (24 July 1940). 
5 Dated 11 August 1940. 
6 'F' was expelled for opposing the Labour Party concentration at a 
December 1940 members meeting, and for general inactivity, (F, B, 
E, For the building of the British Section of the Fourth 
International, 30 April 1941, H. P., D. J. H. 7/1,8). 
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April. 1 It flirted with WIL, now independent itself, 
2 but five 
members of it applied to return to the R. S. L. on 3 May 1942. 
While wrangling with exponents of independence the central 
committee and the executive found itself in growing conflict with the 
Leicester R. S. L. branch which, under the uncompromising leadership of 
J. L. Robinson, also challenged the suspension of Militant and the 
appearance of The Bulletin. Leicester was further incensed to find, 
in The Bulletin for November 1940, a call by Starkey Jackson for support 
to be given to deep air raid shelters, which policy was also followed 
by Youth Militant for the same month. 
3 
It considered the step a risk 
to the Labour Party tactic by its open identification of the R. S. L. 
with the Fourth International, and the other a contravention of 1940 
conference decisions. 
4 
Leicester pressurised the Centre for the next 
five months to clarify its position on A. R. P. In the absence of a 
statement, 
5 
Leicester issued a document, Bolshevism or Defencism, 
which indicted the Centre for capitulation and a long and tedious 
polemic began. 
6 
I They declared that 'the theory of the Labour Party perspective now 
has no harmony with reality' and that the official section of the 
Fourth International in Britain no longer existed. They would launch 
a bulletin, Socialist Fight to achieve a regrouping of Fourth 
Internationalists and to direct propaganda and activity towards 'the 
industrio-military field', (ibid., 8-10). 
2 Fusion was prematurely announced in WIN. 
3 Leicester threatened to move expulsion of the whole C. C. if such 
concessions to chauvinism continued. The dispute between Leicester 
and the centre can be traced from August 1940. 
4 Central Committee, 15 Dec. 1940. 
5 The R. S. L. Centre composed a Reply to Leicester and claimed to have 
despatched it in February 1941. The Leicester branch claimed to have 
received it on 2 July 1941. 
6 Bolshevism or Defencism was published by Leicester on 25 May 1941 
and marks the effective beginning of the Left Fraction of the R. S. L. 
For the argument of this and other Faction Documents, see below, 
The Centre's reply, dated June 1941, was entitled Leicester's 
House of Straw, and has not been located. 
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The breeding ground of factionalism was inactivity which 
was itself the product not only of a false perspective, but also of 
organisational incompetence. 
' The December 1940 central committee 
resolved to begin publication of Militant anew in a duplicated format. 
2 
This occurred only in March 1941 however. Again, a July 1941 decision 
to begin printing became operative only in September. This compares 
poorly with the contemporary publishing record of WIL. In fairness it 
must be also added that by March 1941 most R. S. L. central committee 
members and alternates were in the forces. 
3 
******* 
I The December C. C. virtually confessed this by its announcement that 
wartime conditions made full implementation of the 1939 constitution 
of the R. S. L. impossible. Early in the New Year this position was 
confirmed. National Conferences were declared to be impossible and 
would be replaced by enlarged national committees and London general 
membership meetings. The central committee would become the highest 
body in the party, (E. C. Statement, Our Constitution and the War, 
(Feb. or March 1941), in Leicester Group, A Circle or a Party? ). 
2 It was duplicated in Glasgow and edited in Norwich, ([Anon, 'Dear 
Friends', [1943], H. P., D. J. H. 13A/18). The general work of the 
League was geographically dispersed from August, (E. C. Circular, 
1 Aug. 1941). 
3 E. C. Circular, 19 March 1941. In December 1940 the central 
committee had been Harber, Johns, Davis, van Gelderen, Pawsey, 
Matlow, Jackson, Wood, Archer, 'M. S. ', Robinson, 'M. Q. ', with 
Tom Mercer as an alternate. By late 1940 Tony Doncaster, another 
senior Militant Group member was in the Navy, (A. Newell, 
(secretary, Aylesbury D. L. P. ) to Groves, 2 Dec. 1940). That autumn 
the R. S. L. had changed its attitude towards conscription sufficiently 
to dissociate itself from four WIL members in Sheffield who had 
evaded military service. 
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The new Militant appeared from Glasgow in September 19411 
published in the changed political environment arising from Hitler's 
June invasion of Soviet Russia. It appeared with a strong supplement 
calling for Soviet defence, though differing from the C. P. G. B. in its 
belief that an independent factory movement was the key to achieving 
it. Like other Trotskyists, the R. S. L. considered Russia unlikely to 
survive in view of 'Russia's complete incapacity to resist the armies 
of Hitler, which can only be defeated by superior military strength, 
which thanks to the bureaucracy and its incompetence the Soviet Union 
does not possess; or by propagandising the proletarian revolution'. 
But though such forecasts reflect part of the baggage carried from the 
Founding Conference, 
2 
this Militant series was. more impressive than its 
predecessors, not least in its ability to reflect living industrial 
struggles. 
3 
I Sub-titled 'Organ of the Socialist Left of the Labour Party'. It 
appeared as from the Pioneer Publishing Association, possibly 
transferred after the collapse of the R. W. L. 's attempt to run a 
P. P. A. outlet in December 1939 (see above, 313). 
2 Signs which contradicted 1938 predictions were consistently mis- 
interpreted. Family allowances? It was no accident they existed 
in Italy and Germany. A. B. C. A.? A means for administering 
'imperialist dope'. Reveille? 'a pornographic-demagogic rag'. The 
paper showed a steady inability to recognise the potential in any 
development which fell short of the full revolutionary programme. 
See the issue for October 1941. 
3 London took 500 and Glasgow 300 of the September issue. Every 
other area took dozens or fractions thereof. Only Glasgow sustained 
high sales, however, reflecting a steady drive into the Lanarkshire 
coalfield. And it was the Glasgow R. S. L. branch's opposition which 
prevented a new suspension in 1942 when sales declined elsewhere, 
([Anon), 'Dear Friends', [19431, H. P., D. J. H. 13A/18. ) What was 
noticeable in this Glasgow Militant was its close coverage of trade 
union affairs. Disputes north and south of the border were closely 
watched, especially where factory floor feeling clashed with the 
opinions of union officials or communist stewards. 
319. 
The R. S. L. convened its national conference on 20/21 
September 1941.1 This gathering revealed growing uncertainty in the 
R. S. L. about its international standing2 and lifted a veil from new 
factional lines: Conference clearly revealed a Left Fraction, around 
Robinson, which was intractably wedded to the Labour Party tactic, 
but vigilant against any concessions to chauvinism; 
3 
a Right which 
favoured a Military Policy on the war and worked for fusion with the 
WIL; and a Centre of Harber and the traditional M. L. L. leaders which 
controlled the apparatus. Conference discussed Military Policy and 
concluded that it might not be binding on a section of the International. 
It decided to seek clarification of this point upon receipt of which a 
special conference would be held. 
4 
This gave freedom to the Right to 
develop its activities. Jackson, the R. S. L. organiser, had been 
called up 
5 
and John Lawrence became organiser responsible for industrial 
I Thereby contradicting the intention announced by the Central 
Committee at its meeting of December 1940. 
2 The R. S. L. had learned of contacts between the I. S. and WIL and was 
vulnerable by reason of its internal disputes and its differences 
with the International over Military Policy. A November 1941 
communication from the I. S. reassured the R. S. L. that it was still 
the official British Section. 
3 The Left Fraction comprised principally J. L. Robinson and his 
supporters in Leicester, and the Glasgow backers of Tom Mercer, an 
alternate member of the Central Committee and Nan Milton, daughter 
and later biographer of John MacLean. 
4 It later heard that Military Policy was not binding upon national 
sections of the Fourth International. 
5 Jackson became a submariner. On 9 January 1943 the Central Committee 
was told that he was missing, presumed lost at sea. 
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affairs. 
' At central committee meetings he and Harber clashed over 
possible fusion with WIL. 
2 
Until the end of the year, it was 
possible that the R. S. L. would be knocked off its course not only on 
the war but on the Labour Party tactic too. 
3 
The R. S. L. was vulnerable because the Military Policy it 
perceived as a concession to chauvinism had been embraced by WIL 
From August 1941, under international pressure, the two organisations 
exchanged documents. 
4 
The R. S. L. stood by its 1937 position that WIL 
had had no political right to exist when it was first formed. WIL 
claimed British Section status since it and not the R. S. L. adhered to 
Fourth International policy. It had launched its paper Socialist 
Appeal as an avowedly Fourth International journal, but the R. S. L. 
I E. C. Minutes, 26 Sept. 1941, Har. P. The Left Fraction later 
claimed that at this time the R. S. L. issued two pamphlets, Class War 
in the West and Production committees and the Soviet Union, each of 
which reflected the line of the Right. Neither has been located. 
Each was withdrawn when the R. S. L. heard from the I. S. that Military 
Policy was not binding upon it. On 5 January 1942 the R. S. L. 
recommended that Lawrence be made a professional. 
2 At the October meeting Harber moved 'that fusion with WIL is not 
politically necessary' (C. C. Minutes, 26 Oct. 1941). The following 
month Lawrence demanded immediate fusion, (E. C. Circular, 26 Nov. 
1941) but the Central Committee voted against it in November and 
December, (C. C. Minutes, 7 Dec. 1941). 
3 The October 1941 central committee heard gloomy reports about the 
. 
League of Youth and the Labour Party. Youth Militant had control 
of the League in the Midlands and South Yorkshire and its activists 
believed in a long entrist perspective, but the organisation as a 
whole was small. The Labour Party had 'no leftward tendency' and 
was 'stagnant'. Remarkably, the central committee concluded six to 
two that little could be done in the Labour Party and that the R. S. L. 
must go into industry as an organised left. An open challenge was 
tabled at this meeting to the Labour Party tactic, (Anon., 
'Opportunism and the Labour Party Perspective', [late 1941? 3 Har. P., 
F6; C. C. Minutes, 26 Oct. 1941; West Riding Faction, Labour League 
of Youth and Our Perspectives, 11941]). 
4 R. S. L. to WIL, 5 Aug. 1941, Report on Negotiations with the WIL, 
[Jan. 1942? ]. The R. S. L. sent WIL its documents The Crisis of 
British Capitalism and Political Statement (to its 1941 conference). 
WIL returned, somewhat tardily, its Reply to the Political Statement 
of the R. S. L. 
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found its documents vague and saw them as confirmation that WIL was a 
clique. The R. S. L. retained international backing but the door was 
now noticeably left open to the WIL. 
1 On 12 December 1941 the R. S. L. 
resolved to bring negotiations to an end. 
******* 
To WIL, now outside all parties, the 'Third Labour Government' 
slogan was 'completely incorrect and opportunist', a demand associated 
with the bad experiences of the past. WIL argued for advancing a 
Fourth International programme for Labour, in power, to implement. 
The R. S. L., it charged, had become Labour Party members on principle, 
not qualitatively different from the Marxist Group or the Communist 
League: 
'Like the sectarians who attempt to place the so-called 
"independence of the organisation" above time and place, the 
late adherents of the Militant Labour League turn the Labour 
Party tactic into a panacea ....... '2 
'The decision of 1938 was not taken by chance, but on the basis of 
.a definite attitude of the Lee group. Since then many things have 
occurred and our relations are not exempt from development, but that 
could be done only through a thorough explanation', (I. S. to WIL, 
28 Oct. 1941, ibid., 6). Eight months later, the I. S. attitude had 
hardened. It told the R. S. L.: 
In our opinion your attitude towards the WIL is utterly 
false. Without ignoring personal differences inherited 
from the past, it is necessary to recognise that your 
false attitude flows directly from a false political 
appreciation of this group. You see in it a centrist 
group "moving away from us". This is an opinion which 
we can by no means share. 
(I. S. to R. S. L., 21 June 1942) 
2 WIL, Reply to the Political Statement of the Revolutionary Socialist 
League, (1941), H. P., D. J. H. 5/7,4. 
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WIL did not drop its demand for Labour to take power just 
because it was outside the Labour Party. Throughout the war, and 
after, its leaders rejected a long term presence in the Labour Party. 
l 
But to surrender the advantages of independence for 'a problematical 
future possibility' of fecund Labour Party work was, in its view, 
futile. 
From 1942 it became impossible to disentangle the wrangles 
within the R. S. L. from that body's relations with WIL and the 
International Secretariat. 2 The R. S. L. Centre, supported by the Left, 
made three charges against WIL: it lacked internal democracy; it had 
abandoned revolutionary defeatism; it had rejected entrism for party 
building methods 'basically opposed to those of Bolshevism'. 
3 
The 
central committee as a whole broadened its sights on 11 January 1942 
when it declared the Chicago (Military) Policy of J. P. Cannon to be 
reactionary. This was not enough for the Left, which in April 1942 
launched its own duplicated internal journal, The Leninist. For the 
Left it was in the end all one: any concessions made to Military 
Policy must ruin everything. If Military Policy was rejected then 
I 'This tactic is designated for a period, when, under the impact of 
events, the leftward moving rank and file of reformist or centrist 
organisations in a state of flux, can be won in a short time to a 
programme of revolution. The perspective is not of long years but 
of one or two, or even of months'', (ibid., 4). 
2 One curious development early in the year was a sharp attack by 
Jackson on Harber for breaking off fusion negotiations with WIL, 
(E. S. Jackson, On the Workers International League, 18 Feb. 1942, 
Har. P. ). 
3 The charges mingle. Thus WIL was accused of building its independent 
organisation by 'pandering to the chauvinism of the workers' with its 
slogans of 'Arm the Workers' and 'Nationalise the Arms Industries 
under workers' control', (D. D. Harber, Our Political Estimation of 
the WIL, accepted by the R. S. L. central committee, 29 March 1942). 
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fusion with WIL was out of the question. 
1 
When, on 21 June 1942, the I. S. wrote to the R. S. L. again 
advancing the need for Military Policy and urging unity with WIL, 
Lawrence and thirteen others seized their opportunity. They circulated 
a statement2 among the membership backing the I. S., reserving their 
right to participate freely in fusion discussions unbound by R. S. L. 
policy and demanding an emergency conference. It seems that the Right 
at this point was about to break away and join WIL. 
3 On 18 July, 
however, an International representative, J. B. Stuart; visited London. 
He met WIL leaders, Margaret Johns and, crucially, some members of the 
Right, whom he persuaded to stay in the R. S. L. and fight for a 
majority. The next day the R. S. L. central committee met and suspended 
the fourteen signatories to the statement of dissociation, including 
Carson, Lawrence, Lane and Goffe5 but the Right, which earlier might 
have welcomed a rupture, now submitted. to being disciplined. On 
I This stricture also applied to other protagonists of 'independence'. 
It was Robinson who intervened to prevent the speedy admission of 
five S. W. G. members who had applied to rejoin the R. S. L. on 3 May. 
The terms he set were'softened by Harber however, (Minutes, 
Emergency C. C., 17 May 1942). Robinson, almost incredibly, 
suspected Harber of being soft on the WIL. At the June 1942 
meeting of the central committee he intervened to prevent the R. S. L. 
selling WIL publications in public. Connections with 'centrism', 
he warned, would damage the League's integrity. (J. L. Robinson, 
'Answer to the, Statement of the E. C. ', [March 1943? ], in 'Dear 
Friends, etc. ', H. P.., D. J. H. 13A/18. ) 
2 This happened on 14 July, (History of Expulsions of Members of the 
WIL Faction (Right Wing) accepted by a majority of the C. C., Dec. 
1942 . 
3 WIL Document on the History of British Trotskyism, 13. 
4 J. B. Stuart (Sam Gordon) was the administrative secretary of the 
F. I. appointed by the Emergency Conference in 1940. 
5 Resolutions passed by the C. C., 19 July 1942. Their appeal to 
international opinion was neutralised by Harber, who argued that 
while the I. S. had a view it had not taken a decision on which the 
Right might act. 
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26 July 1942 Stuart met Harber and Lawrence and a compromise plan was 
agreed to cover the conduct of the Right during negotiations for 
fusion. I This collapsed a few weeks later when it was discovered that 
Lawrence and others of the Right were involved in an elaborate 
subterfuge, that their conciliation screened concerted action with WIL. 
2 
In October and November nearly all members of the Right were expelled 
from the R. S. L. 
Meanwhile a special conference of the R. S. L. had been held as 
requested by the Right. The Left was itself growing in alienation from 
the R. S. L. and from the Fourth International, but it united with the 
Centre to vote down Military Policy and reluctantly advanced a panel 
for the central committee. The Left and Right captured three seats 
each and the Centre held four. Following the conference the League 
heard from the I. S. which condemned it for severing negotiations with 
I The plan was Harber's. He proposed that a period of discussions be 
held within the R. S. L. and the WIL and that when exchanges began 
between the two the Right could remain silent. Harber was reassured 
by Stuart that the R. S. L. 's status with the Fourth International 
was safe, but he suspected Stuart's relationship with the Right and 
was disturbed that he did not meet the Left. He later told the R. S. L. 
'The I. S. seeks, in my opinion, to push us into a fusion 
with the WIL, which they know would automatically give the 
supporters of the A. M. P. (American Military Policy: M. U. ) 
a majority. Such a tactic is typical of Cannonism..... ' 
(D. D. H., Report of Conversations with Comrade S. of the I. S., 
7 Aug. 1942. ) 
2 It is generally agreed that from about this time Lawrence began to 
act as a WIL agent within the R. S. L. branch at Leeds. On at least 
one occasion he actually received a salary from WIL. Lawrence, 
Lane and others of the Right were also holding secret faction 
meetings with Haston and Grant of the WIL from August 1942 onwards. 
Lawrence's activities on WIL's behalf were revealed at the August 
central committee of the R. S. L. and Harber's compromise plan was 
then withdrawn. E. L. Davis interviewed members of the Right 
involved in the WIL meetings on 5 September 1942. On 3 October they 
were confronted with the charge of acting as WIL agents and, after 
a lengthy discussion, expelled. Others who supported their action 
were expelled in November, (History of Expulsions of Members of 
the WIL Faction (Right Wing), Dec. 1942; Gradjine, Who Speaks For 
Bolshevism?, 19 Nov. 1942 ). 
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WIL1 and for the ultra-leftism of Robinson. Following the expulsion 
of the Right, however, a new central committee was returned, composed 
of six followers of the Centre and four from the Left. 
2 
The Right, 
also now known 'as the Trotskyist Opposition, was playing its own 
game, with international encouragement. 
3 
There was a feeling that 
simple adherence to WIL would mean that that body had too easily 
surmounted the 1938 declaration of the International. 
4 
From 1942 the 
idea took root that WIL was anti-internationalist, and that its 
support for the F. I. programme was only for the record. So the 
Trotskyist Opposition bobbed about independently in 1943, some 
of its members uneasy at a policy which had turned them back towards 
struggling for a majority in the R. S. L. 
By 1942 WIL was even more convinced that the place for 
Trotskyists was in the opens seizing the opportunity to recruit directly 
to the Fourth International. It was now visibly beginning to derive 
benefit from an existence outside parties, unlike the R. S. L. which 
remained immersed in the Labour Party. It would take a mass influx 
I The R. S. L. met the WIL on 25 Oct. 1942, where proposals for a joint 
discussion bulletin were opposed by Harber. He also blocked the 
holding of a joint conference before a full exchange had taken place 
between the groups. 
2 Gradjine, Who Speaks for Bolshevism?, 19 Nov. 1942. 
3 For the Trotskyist Opposition, see WIL document on the History of 
Trotskyism, 16-17. 
4 'It would be criminal to assume that, because it (WIL) pursues a by 
and large correct policy today, that is all that is important', 
(J. B. Stuart to J. L(awrence), 4 Feb. 1943, ibid., 17). 
5 'The proponents of entry have their eyes glued to the future visage 
of the Labour Party and not to its present posterior. Using the 
example of the last war, they argue, correctly enough, that the 
first big revolutionary wave will revive the Labour Party', 
(Preparing for Power, special issue WIN, (Sept. 1942), 22). 
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into the Labour Party to make it change its-mind. 
I 
The R. S. L. always 
challenged WIL's presentation of conditions for entry. WIL had argued 
that Labour must be in a state of flux, at a high level of political 
life, and moving left. The R. S. L. countered that political life in 
the Labour Party had never been on a high level and that this was not 
in any case material in determining Trotskyist behaviour. -Trotskyism, 
it insisted, had to prepare the turn to the Labour Party, a task WIL 
was manifestly failing to carry out. 
2 The R. S. L. suggested that WIL 
was preparing to argue that workers would skip the Labour Party stage 
and join it directly. 
3 
Finally, it argued that WIL's false attitude 
to the Labour Party sprang from its erroneous policy on war. WIL 
did not recognise present chauvinism, it charged, and it exaggerated 
class conflict so that it might reject the Labour Party. 
4 
'If as the result of the mass upsurge, hundreds of thousands and 
millions participate actively in the organisation of the Labour Party, 
then will come the time to enter, (ibid., 23). 
2 'A Criticism of the WIL Pamphlet Preparing for Power', in, WIL 
Discussion Bulletin, Policy and Perspectives of the British 
Trotskyists (1942), 3. Here the R. S. L. rejected a further WIL 
argument, that a turn of other parties such as the I. L. P. towards 
Labour also confirmed the time to enter. The R. S. L. reminded WIL 
that the I. L. P. had had no interest in the Labour Party in 1936 when 
Trotsky had proposed joining and that the conditions to which it 
attached such weight did not apply during WIL's own period in the 
Labour Party. 
3 ibid., 4. The R. S. L. central committee assented to this document by 
a majority on a postal ballot. 
4 The following year WIL responded to this document arguing that there 
was a pre-revolutionary situation and that it would not take an anti- 
war character at all. It dismissed as 'formalistic nonsense' the 
thesis that all workers must pass through the Labour Party and argued 
that there would be a differential response to the Labour Party 
within the working class, (Reply of WIL to the R. S. L. criticism of 
Preparing for Power, 7 June 1943,15). 
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But the already'tottering R. S. L. was now lop-sided. Indeed 
the Centre now had twenty-three members on paper to the Left's thirty 
six. 
I The Left believed Harber to be a liquidationist who would 
dissolve the revolutionary party in the centrist WIL. The Centre was 
deeply suspicious of an organised faction within the League, and one, 
moreover, which had effective control of its paper from December 
1942.2 On 9 January 1943 the Lefts were suspended for factionalism. 
When the charges against them were confirmed they were expelled on 
23 January for refusing to divulge the names of their Fraction. 
3 The 
Left boasted that it took with it the true industrial base of the 
British Section of the Fourth International4 and the early months of 
1943 passed in an ugly wrangle over the status of its paper. 
5 
I J. L. Robinson, 'Answer to the Statement', loc. cit. One rare 
product of R. S. L. thought not devoted to factional conflict at this 
time was Harber's preamble to a Draft Programme for the "Socialist 
Left", [June? ) 1942, (Har. P. ). 
2A Glasgow supporter of the Left, Gibbie Russell, was a former 
Lanarkshire miner who had retained his links with the pits. By 
1942 a rank and file movement had developed among the miners in 
Lanarkshire. See 'Fife Dispute' supplement, Militant (Glasgow), 
Sept. 1942. But it was debarred from launching a new paper by war- 
time regulations. Russell persuaded the R. S. L. executive to turn 
over the Militant to the miners in return for the proviso that all 
material be first submitted to Margaret Johns and Tom Mercer, both 
of the Glasgow R. S. L. branch, and that the R. S. L. be allowed a 200 
word editorial. The transfer took place on 3 December 1942. Even 
before this a special supplement had been issued to Militant 
between normal issues with all articles being written by Russell, 
Hugh Brannan (a Lanarkshire miner and Left Faction member) and 
Tom Stephenson, (a Cumberland miner and I. L. P. member who had been 
a disaffiliationist in 1932). 
3 P. J. B., E. L. D., M. J., D. D. H., An Answer to the Charges of the "Left", 
23 Jan. 1943, (Har. P. ). 
4 See the Left Fraction, 'On the Future of the Scottish Miner Edition 
of the Militant'. The R. S. L. did not dispute this assertion, 
('Dear Friends, etc. ', H. P., D. J. H. 13A/18). For Trotskyists in the 
Scottish pits in wartime see Chapter XI. 
5 Russell and another member circulated all R. S. L. branches on 18 
February 1943 urging joint B. S. F. I. - Lanarkshire miners control of 
Militant. By May circulation of the paper, now duplicated, had 
fallen below 300, (Minutes of the C. C. held on 9 May 1943, Har. P. ). 
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On 4 June the Left Fraction appealed to the I. S. against its expulsion 
and received a reply to the effect that this act was indeed a violation 
of the R. S. L. constitution. 
I 
In July 1943 WIL made a new offer on unification. It refused 
to devote itself to nothing else but proposed a six month discussion at 
the end of which a fusion conference would vote for one tactic in a 
majority vote. WIL demanded for itself either recognition as the 
official British Section or, failing that, sympathetic status - the 
very request it had made in 1938.2 WIL"also had grown tired of 
being lectured by American representatives on splits: 
The elements which began the work of the Opposition, even in 
the majority, were not of the best material. The difficulties 
of growth and the milieu in which they had to work; the 
composition of the Opposition itself, the different stages of 
development through which the organisation passed; the 
necessity at various stages of making sharp changes if the 
movement was even to survive; all these factors led necessarily 
and inevitably to splits. 
3 
I The I. S. specified that it continued to abhor Left Fraction policies 
(Brief Notes on the History of the Left Fraction, 2. ). 
2 WIL offered, tongue in cheek, to treat with the R. S. L. factions 
separately or together, (Conference Resolution On International 
Affiliation, H. P., D. J. H. 14B/17). 
3 Political Bureau, Internal Bulletin, 11 Sept. 1943,12. WIL also 
recalled Trotsky's part in splitting the Belgian Party in 1929 and 
his role in the C. L. split of 1933. It never conceded that its own 
existence was due to a personalised split but argued that even if 
true, this charge could not cancel out its own success while the 
R. S. L. had failed. WIL took the view that the I. S. had in any case 
been for years 'completely misinformed' about the real situation 
in Britain, (WIL, Document on the History of British Trotskyism, 2). 
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On 7 September 1943, WIL wrote to the I. S. about the mode of 
unification. On 26 September the I. S. passed a resolution on British 
Unification which identified acceptance of the F. I. programme 
principles and statutes as the sole conditions for it. Under the 
circumstances the door was open to WIL. Yet WIL had within its own 
ranks a challenge to its behaviour since 1938, a minority which, like 
the Right Opposition of the R. S. L., accused it of being anti- 
Internationalist in method! This minority led by Healy, a party to 
WIL's abstention from the Peace and Unity agreement, now condemned this 
aloofness in a critical resolution. 
2 
It reminded the WIL leaders of 
the need to observe majorities and warned, presciently, that such 
majorities had international as well as national boundaries. 
The I. S. resolution of 26 September 1943 led the warring R. S. L. 
factions to prepare unification. The Centre seems to have responded3 
most promptly: it regarded the proposed reconstitution conference as 
the reforming of the old R. S. L. The I. S. required all three parts of 
the old R. S. L. to be within the reconstitution. Bitterness persisted 
between Lawrence and Harber, leaders of the 'Right' and 'Centre' to 
the end, 
4 
but a Reconstitution Conference did gather on New Year's Day 
I See G. Healy, 'Our Most Important Task', Internal Bulletin 1943? 1; 
Political Bureau to Healy, 21 Aug. 1943; G. Healy to Political 
Bureau, 25 Aug. 1943. 
2 H. P., Political Statement of the Minority on Unification, Dec. 1943, 
H. P., 14B/21. See also An Open Letter to All Group Members, 30 Dec. 
1943, H. P. 14B/21. 
3 Minutes of E. C. of 13 Nov. 1943, Har. P. 
4 See D. D. H., H. G., Account of an Interview between S. G. and D. D. H. 
(Militant Group) and J. L. ("T. O. "): on-. 4 Dec. 1943, H. P., D. J. H. 13A/23; 
[J. L.? , Letter to the R. S. L. Membership, 18 Dec. 1943, H. P., D. J. H. 
13A/24; E. C. of the T. O., Statement to the R. S. L. membership from the 
E. C. of the T. O. (R. S. L. ), 19 Dec. 1943, H. P., D. J. H. 13A/25. 
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1944 in the presence of Phelan. The Left had hoped to secure from 
it a unified organisation with which to join WIL in fusion. 
This was not the proposition however. The Right (thirty four votes) 
and the Centre'<thirty six votes) carried the Standing Orders 
Committee proposal of a looser arrangement against twenty nine votes 
for the Left. 
The Left joined with the others in giving unanimous support 
to the I. S. resolution of 26 September reconstituting the British 
Section, a step it later regretted. But its full vote was cast 
against the resolution for fusion which was carried with seventy four 
votes behind it. The Right emerged as the faction most eager for 
unity, and in the third session of conference called for immediate 
fusion of R. S. L. and WIL locals. 
I 
An I. S. representative also 
attended the second day of WIL's January 1944 central committee2 from 
which the Minority was excluded in view of its contact with an R. S. L. 
faction. Nor was the Minority allotted a place on the negotiating 
committee in view of lack of support for its views at the 1943 WIL 
conference. 
3 
The Fusion Conference met on 11-12 March 1944. There were 
sixty-nine delegates, fifty two from the WIL and seventeen from the 
R. S. L. 
4 
This reflected a membership split of 260/75 in WIL's favour. 
5 
I Left Fraction, R. S. L. 'Reconstitution' Conference, [Jan.? 1944, Har. P. 
This is the only record of the conference located. 
2 Another recent WIL contact with the American-based I. S. had been 
through Grant who was in the United States at Christmas 1943, 
(A. Wald, op. cit., 84). 
3 Central Committee Report, [Jan. 19441, H. P., D. J. H. 14B/22. 
4 Plus a representative from the International, Terence Phelan (alias 
Sherry Mangan, 1904-61). Mangan, a C. L. A. member, worked in France 
as a Time-Life correspondent from 1938 until he was expelled by the 
Petain government for his political activities. In 1939 he had 
been technical secretary of the I. S. In 1944, again in France, he 
was part of the European Secretariat and was to join the reconstituted 
I. S. in 1946. After the war he was often known in Trotskyist papers 
as Patrice O'Daniel. 
5 See footnotes of following page. 
331. 
And the division of the R. S. L. delegates - seven to the Centre, six 
to the Trotskyist Opposition, and four to the Left Fraction - meant 
that whatever resistance there was to the WIL, was seriously weakened. 
The resolutions-of the R. S. L. Centre did not represent any 
programmatic change. It still saw workers' control as a slogan for a 
revolutionary period. As advanced in the Britain of 1941-3, at a time 
when the masses were under capitalist influence, it continued to believe 
that the slogan had 'not so much a purely reformist character as a 
definitely chauvinist one'. It furthered the illusion that it was 
justifiable to increase war production. All supporters of Military 
Policy had taken the incidental factor that the enemy was a fascist 
country and made it a cardinal principle. Since this was essentially 
a rehearsal of the old argument, it may have been aimed at justifying 
the R. S. L. 's wartime stand. When Tearse moved the WIL's industrial 
policy resolution he was able to carry it with only four votes in 
opposition. No more successful was the Left Fraction with its motion, 
A Policy for Industry. The Fraction regarded the Clyde Workers Committee 
and M. W. F. as paper organisations: 
I 
the emphasis should have been put 
on work within the existing organisations, and its aim should have been 
to achieve one shop stewards movement. 'We certainly will not assist 
in clarifying our position by attempting to imitate the Stalinists 
and building our own private concern. ' To the Left Fraction it was 
tactically preferable to court expulsion from the shop stewards' 
5 From previous page. 
The WIL membership of 260 has been wrongly taken as the membership of 
the entire R. C. P., (P. Jenkins, Where Trotskyism Got Lost, (1977), 3). 
1 These bodies, the product in part of WIL's wartime drive into 
industry, are discussed in Chapter XI. 
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movement and then campaign for democracy in the factories. The 
Fraction implied that the Militant Workers Federation was being used 
by WIL as a kind of political party. It was no more successful than 
the R. S. L. Centre had been, and secured only four votes. 
Voting on conference resolutions reflected roughly a four to 
one majority for WIL policies. Indeed, the Fusion Conference generally 
was a recognition of WIL's wartime achievement. The main WIL leaders 
were all returned to the new central committee and there was no 
representation for the WIL minority. For the R. S. L., Harber (now 
known as Paul Dixon on party documents) and John Goffe were returned as 
C. C. members. 
I 
The leading WIL figures were then confirmed in the key 
positions. Haston became general secretary, Millie Lee organisational 
secretary, Ted Grant the editor of Socialist Appeal. This paper was 
confirmed as the agitational organ of Trotskyism though Militant's 
imprint was to be used in the Labour Party. Workers International News 
remained the theoretical journal. The decision to adopt the name 
Revolutionary Communist Party was at once a rebuke to the C. P. G. B. and 
a reflection of WIL optimism rather than the bleaker outlook of the 
R. S. L. Stuart's report to the American Trotskyists is perhaps the 
source of the myths later circulated about the WIL and the R. S. L. 
2 It 
saw the R. C. P. as a marriage of the 'furious activism' of the one with 
the 'serious attention to theory' of the other, whose consummation was 
the fruit of two years' tireless international effort. 
3 
I Goffe had been on the R. S. L. Central Committee and also represented 
an important provincial area, Glasgow. 
2 See T. Ali, The Coming British Revolution (1972), where it is 
revealed that the WIL was smaller than the R. S. L., that they fused 
after the war, and that WIL's internal life was marked by an intense 
factional struggle over Labour Party entry. 
3 J. B. Stuart, 'A Brief Report On England', Fourth International, 
(June 1944), 168-70. The claim of the Fourth International that it 
played a centripetal role is set down in P. Frank, The Fourth 
International (1979), 60. 
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Stuart detected two dangers as displayed by the Fusion Conference. 
One was ultra leftism within the Left Fraction, though he urged caution 
in dealing with it in view of its class composition. The other was 
'a deviation of,, national coloration', apparently discernible in the 
ex-WIL leadership. He made complaints of references to 'our' eighth 
army which. were almost certainly directed at the views of Grant. 
The Fusion Conference was the occasion of the last in a 
series of communist pamphlets attacking Trotskyism. 
I Elsewhere the 
launching of the R. C. P. attracted some attention, but it was really 
the arrests of party leaders during an industrial crisis the following 
month which brought recognition. Even before this assault of the 
party helped bind it together, the fusion resolution declared the 
hatchet buried: 
The past clashes on the political-questions-engendered deep 
cleavages between the leading personnel and embittered the 
relations between the members of the organisation. An 
important task for the leadership of the new organisation 
is to introduce a real comradeship into the political 
discussions and life of the party, and to sweep away all the 
vestiges of the bitter disputes of the past. In the interests 
of the fusion this Conference therefore dissolves all past 
organisational conflicts and disputes and closes the discussion 
on these questions in the British Section. 
2 
I J. R. Campbell, Trotskyist Saboteurs (1944). 
2 Socialist Appeal (April 1944). Party leaders lived up to these 
sentiments, taking a close interest in how the new branches were 
holding together and referring to the fusion as the marriage. In 
Glasgow there was great enthusiasm for the merger on the part of the 
two locals, each important in its national organisation. They had 
some common work behind thema (Interview with J. Goffe, M. Johns, 
July 1974, Nov. 1973). 
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The Fusion Conference was a watershed. It did not mark the 
end of factionalism, but it redrew the demarcation lines. WIL leaders 
felt that Harber and the R. S. L. Centre adhered loyally to the new set 
up, 
1 
even though they still differed from the new party's leadership. 
The Left Fraction, of course, maintained its existence. But the Right 
or Trotskyist Opposition had some within it who were travelling in the 
same direction as the Healy group within the WIL, and the fusion 
brought them together with, in the end, profound results. 
The R. S. L. had a melancholy history. All of the WIL's 
predictions concerning the fragility of the Peace and Unity agreement 
of 1938 were borne out. The gulf over Labour Party tactics was too 
wide to be bridged by such a pact. In the end it was experience which 
resolved this, always the most difficult question for T'r. otskyists in 
Britain. WIL grew by rejecting the Labour Party and staying 
independent of the International. 
2 
The R. S. L. decayed and dissolved 
by staying within the Labour Party. The sacrifices it made for its 
Labour Party existence became increasingly futile as the anticipated 
left swing within it was seen to be a mirage. The formation of the 
R. C. P. was an endorsement of WIL's method and its policies and gave 
promise of a departure from a bleak Trotskyist tradition in Britain. 
I Interview with R. Tearse, (Nov. 1973). 
2 WIL's industrial successes are the theme of Chapter XI. 
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XI THE GROWTH OF WORKERS INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE AND 
ITS INDUSTRIAL AGITATION (1938 - 1944) 
Workers International League seemed to have poor prospects at 
the end of 1938 with all other Fourth Internationalists grouped in one 
body. Yet it survived, put a regular press on the streets and became 
the pivot of a limited regroupment. WIL moved from its original 
interpretation of entry work to a position in 1941 outside all parties. 
This, with its ability and flair, won it industrial support from 1942 
on. It intervened in all major industrial disputes from this time 
and was more successful than any other party in its attempt to fill 
the vacuum left by the communists, who had become advocates of 
increased production. While WIL's achievements and influence were 
exaggerated, they were tangible, and culminated in a celebrated court 
case which brought them national publicity. 
Debating in 1939 with C. L. R. James, Trotsky attributed the 
failure of Fourth Internationalists in Britain to lack of ability, 
inflexibility and the long domination of bourgeois thought. He urged 
continuation of the policy of critical support for the Labour Party 
but sought an independent paper which might make needed attacks on 
I. L. P. leaders. I Trotsky took no public position on the formation of 
Trotsky's wide ranging discussion with James is reproduced as 'On 
the History of the Left Opposition' and 'Fighting Against the 
Stream' (April 1939), Writings : (1938-9), 61-2,63-5. The 
reference to an independent paper may have been intended for 
Workers Fight, the open journal of the unified R. S. L., but by this 
date it would have been more appropriate to Workers International 
News. This full text was published in S. W. P. (U. S. A. ), Internal 
Bulletin, 20 Dec. 1939, (Writings : (1938-39), 150n. ). 
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Workers International League, though its leaders had written to him. 
It later claimed that it turned its back on the past, seeking a break 
with tradition. Certainly it made new recruits to Trotskyism, but 
it also rallied. a number of those who were disenchanted with the other 
groups. This was a conscious policy proclaimed in the first issue of 
WIN. I It did not retain all of those whom it drew to itself in the 
first few months of its life, 
2 
and others were expelled for 
'Molinierism'. 3 But it gained members from the R. S. P. and the R. W. L. 
as well as from non-Trotskyist formations like the I. L. P. Guild of 
I WIL wrote to inform Trotsky that it had bought a small printing press, 
which it used to produce Workers International News. He replied 
praising this as a revolutionary step, (interview with E. Grant, 
Jan. 1973). No correspondence between WIL and Trotsky has been 
located, though Trotsky did remark, in a French connection, that an 
unprincipled split might lead to post hoc justifications ('Letters 
to the P. O. I. Central Committee', 19 July 1939, Writings : 
Supplement (1934-40), 826). Pablo, a post-war secretary of the 
Fourth International, later claimed that Trotsky had condemned WIL, 
('It Is High Time To Find A Solution', [July 19473, R. C. P. 
Internal Bulletin, n. p., H. P. ). 
2 Hilary Sumner-Boyd withdrew from collaboration with Ralph Lee after 
the second issue of WIN, (see Chapter VIII). Michael Tippett, to 
whom the WIN project had appealed, (see 'Statement of M. T., 8 March 
1938) now ceased to be involved with Trotskyism. In 1940 he became 
Director of Music at Morley College, and in June 1943 was sentenced 
to three months imprisonment as a conscientious objector. 
3 In 1940 WIL expelled Betty Hamilton who with Pierre Frank (then in 
London exile) was advancing the syndic, list propositions of 
Raymond Molinier's P. C. I., (D. F. 'The Lack of Democracy Within the 
Group and Reasons' and [W. I. L. ] 'Reply of the E. C. to Comrade D. F. ', 
12 Oct. 1940, Internal Bulletin, (n. d. ), H. P. ). Raymond Molinier 
was the leader of one faction of the French Trotskyists who 
contributed to a seven year split in France. His influence was also 
felt to be at work in the East London branch of the R. S. L., which 
had produced a critical document What Is Wrong With Our Organisation?, 
and in Camberwell, where a statement There must be no compromise had 
been issued, ( [R. S. L. ], Circular Newsletter, 21 Aug. 1940). The 
R. S. L. considered WIL as a whole to resemble Molinierism in its 
aspiration to a mass appeal and desire to expound popular 
principles. Nor was the accusation new, since it had been levelled 
by J. P. Cannon in 1938, (see Chapter VIII). 
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Youth. 
I 
WIL failed to convene a national conference for the first 
five years of its life, though meetings of the London membership were 
held. It grew-steadily, first around the original leadership of 
Ralph Lee and Haston assisted by Grant2 but many recruited after the. 
split from Militant gained leading positions. 
3 
Sometime in 1940, 
Ralph Lee, the dominant influence in WIL at least until 1939, returned 
to South Africa4 and was succeeded as General Secretary by Haston. 
Illness incapacitated other WIL leaders for a time, but they were able 
to avoid conscription and thus kept a centre in being. 
5 
I WIL recruited twelve R. W. L. members in 1940, but retained only six, 
(see Chapter IX; Anon., letter to the WIL central committee, [1940? ] 
H. P. ). Ralph Lee and Haston visited the Edinburgh branch of the 
R. S. P. and convinced some of its members. WIL also expelled from 
its ranks two sympathisers who had moved towards the Leninist 
League, a Glasgow and Coventry faction which, like Hugo Oehler in 
the U. S. A., stood for an independent existence and factory work, 
(D. F., and WIL E. C., op. cit. ). The Leninist League, blocked from 
the Peace and Unity conference, maintained activity at least until 
the middle of the war. It published material from the Revolutionary 
Workers League of Chicago, an anti-Trotskyist party. 
2 E. (Ted) Grant (1914- ) had as a young man been one of the first 
South African Trotskyists to come to Britain. He had been a member 
of the Marxist and Militant Groups. He was posted to the Pioneer 
Corps but fractured his skull before joining up and was discharged. 
Another South African, Ann Keen, joined WIL sometime in. 1938 as 
part of its London organisation, (interview with Ann Finkel (Keen), 
30 July 1974). Gerry Healy, though a founder member, was a 
controversial figure. He resigned in 1938 when not consulted over a 
decision to print Youth for Socialism (q. v. ). While in Ireland he 
joined the Irish Labour Party in opposition to WIL. He was allowed 
to rejoin WIL but in 1940 resigned again following criticism of 
federalising amendments he had proposed to the WIL constitution. 
Healy's organising abilities were widely recognised, however, and he 
occupied important positions in the League throughout most of its 
life. 
3 Half of its October 1940 executive was comprised of members with less 
than two years standing. Nor were the editors of WIN or Youth for 
Socialism foundation members. 
4 No reason has been ascertained for Lee's departure nor have details 
of his subsequent career been discovered. Lee is referred to in 
Haston's 1945 correspondence with South African Trotskyists. 
5 Grant was able to stay out of the forces because of a skull injury. 
Haston had a stomach ailment, but also changed identities, for which 
offence he was arrested. Andrew Scott simply did not respond to call 
up and worked full time for WIL for some years. When he finally 
reported and told a truthful story to account for his non appearance 
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WIL put a consistent press on the streets throughout this 
time. WIN appeared regularly, and from 1939 WIL members increasingly 
contributed articles, displacing the emphasis on foreign contributions. 
1 
In September 1938 WIL launched a monthly agitational paper, Youth for 
Socialism2 to supplement its activities in the Labour League of Youth. 
Youth for Socialism was a lively newspaper, given to exuberant abuse of 
communists and their fellow-travellers in the youth movement. It seems 
unlikely, however, that WIL supplanted the M. L. L. before that body was 
proscribed in 1940.3 WIL had practically no one working full time, 
but it was more visible than the R. S. L. because of its policy of 
putting its press on streets. 
4 
Its energetic reaction to the outbreak 
of war included - as well as the transference of its controlling centre 
to Ireland - the publication for seven months of a daily handout, 
Workers Diary. S 
5 Continued from previous page. 
no action was taken against him (Interview with J. Haston, 
13 July 1973 ). 
1 WIN still regularly published Trotsky, a task no other faction of the 
1930s regularly achieved. WIL claimed that it published every 
important document of the F. I. to 1941. The R. S. L. challenged that 
WIN's emphasis on foreign articles left it 'in the realm of the 
abstract', a charge which would bolster its view that WIL had no 
reason to exist., (B. S. F. I., Statement on relations with'the Workers 
International League, 4 Dec. 1939, H. P., 13a/18,3-4). 
2 Youth for Socialism bore the imprint of G. Healy from September 1938. 
In August 1939 Healy's name was replaced by W. Clarke, and in 
September 1939 by B. French. In June 1940 the name D. Gray appeared 
and continued until May 1941 when the last issue appeared over the 
name Harold Atkinson (q. v. ). 
3 At the 1939 L. L. O. Y. conference WIL had about five delegates to 
fifteen of the M. L. L. At the party conference held that year in 
Southport, WIL had no delegates to the M. L. L. 's threes (B. S. F. I., 
ibid., 4). 
4 The R. S. L. argued that this was 'by no means the most important' kind 
of revolutionary activity and that WIL had an advantage over it by 
virtue of its freedom from international commitments (ibid., 4). 
5 Workers Diary appeared daily from 22 September 1939 to 8 April 1940, 
(A. Penn, op. cit., 157). Copies have survived in private possession 
but had not been located at the time of completion of the 
substantive draft of this thesis. 
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WIL's belief in the autumn of 1940 was that revolution.. 
or near-revolution would shake every belligerent country, 
I 
In 
anticipation it showed the flexibility for which Trotsky had yearned. 
The electoral truce between the major parties had cleared the way for 
minor parties to oppose their candidates at by-elections. Healy may 
have advocated support for Pollitt in the Silvertown contest of 
February 1940.2 The next month WIL openly supported anti-war 
candidates as the only outlet for those who wished to support 
revolutionary socialism. 
3 Youth for Socialism was shortly put on the 
list of papers League of Youth members might not sell. 
4 
WIL remained 
within the Labour Party however, though its emphasis on sales always 
gave it the opportunity to approach those outside. A Labour Party 
presence was justified by reference to. the arguments of Lenin and 
I 'The economic blockade not only of Europe but of Britain too will 
become increasingly effective and this will mark the beginning of 
wholesale social convulsions. Long before the nations can complete 
their mutual destruction, the political and social structure of 
every country will be subjected to the severest test, 
(Britain Holds Out', WIN (Oct. 1940), 7). 
2 R. S. L., The Electoral Tactics of the Workers Vanguard (1940), 2. 
Pollitt's 966 votes, while six times larger than the Fascist 
candidate polled, were swamped by a Labour total fifteen times 
larger. 
3 'The Ballot Box Test', WIN, (March 1940), 6-8. WIL advocated critical 
support for anti-war candidates, preferably the I. L. P. rather than 
the C. P. G. B., though it regarded their programme as 'a vote for 
Hitler'. 
4 It was, presumably, WIL's electoral line which provoked this ban. 
However, the paper had consistently attacked the Labour officialdom 
which ran the League of Youth and, notably, Huddlestone, the party 
Youth Officer, although it had tended to lose the character of a 
youth paper. It had also evinced an undisguised interest in the youth 
sections of other parties-such as the C. P. G. B. and I. L. P. 
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Trotsky and the early stage of WIL's development. 
I 
Yet the 
organisation was watching developments in industry and warned that 
it 
would not hesitate to alter tactics if faced with a change in the 
'objective situation'. 
2 It was still calling for 'Labour to Power' 
and would continue to do so even after leaving the party. 
3 But it 
flatly rejected the M. L. L. tactic as applied either before or after 
proscription. 
4 
WIL began to move out of the Labour Party in the spring of 
1941, though the manner of its going was confused and protracted. 
5 
'We are still in the most elementary stages of preparing the party 
and consequently it is to the politically conscious and organised 
workers to whom we must turn our faces' ('Reply of the E. C. to 
Comrade D. F. ', 12 Oct. 1940, Internal Bulletin [1940), H. P., D. J. H. 
14A/1,8 ). 
2 In October 1940 WIL had I. L. P. and C. P. G. B. fractions but believed 
main forces should be concentrated at the main point of attack, viz. 
the Labour Party. Factory work at this point was treated by WIL 
with especial. scorn: it had not yielded a single recruit. One 
possibility visualised which might change the 'objective situation' 
was the emergence of a mass communist opposition, the appearance of 
which would 'depend entirely on the future orientation of Stalin's 
foreign policy', (ibid., 8-9). Factory work had been proposed by 
another WIL member in Anon., 'For A-New Course', 26 Oct. 1940, 
H. P., D. J. H. 5/3. 
3 'Labour to Power, I. L. P. chairman supports the war', WIN (Aug. 1940), 
10-13. 
4 The R. S. L. reminded Lee and his comrades that they had not objected 
to the M. L. L. tactic when they had been members of the Militant 
Group in 1937. 
5 An undated document of the first half of 1941 put the WIL leaders' 
views to all locals. It foresaw a Labour Party split, with the Left 
and I. L. P. joining together, and predicted a harbinger in the shape 
of a turn to factory committees. But while I. L. P. and C. P. G. B. 
fractions would be needed, full strength had to be applied at the 
points of attack: the Labour Party and the unions, (Statement On 
Policy and Perspectives, [Feb. - June 1941? 
], H. P. ). Yet WIL dated 
its turn to open work from March 1941 in Preparing For Power, 
(WIN special issue, Sept. 1942,20). In June 1941 Youth for 
Socialism was transformed into the broader Socialist Appeal, which 
declared it supported the 'policy of Workers International News 
(Trotskyist)' and advertised meetings of WIL Fourth International). 
In September Workers International News appeared openly as the organ of 
Workers International League. From January 1942 Socialist Appeal 
appeared openly as an F. I. paper. 
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It was complete by September, by which date a major'shift in communist 
policy had occurred which could only reinforce the argument for 
independence. Negatively, the Labour Party no longer offered the 
prescribed high"+level of political life, debilitated as it was by the 
effects of conscription, air raids and the absence of regular 
elections. Positively there were the first signs of stirring in 
industry in this second year of war. To its critics the WIL turn 
was empiricist, an opportunist adjustment to circumstances. But it is 
noticeable that WIL continued to call for a Labour Government, which 
had not been the policy of the first R. S. L. or the Marxist Group after 
1936.1 Plans were made for a WIL conference in 1941, but it seems not 
to have met. But WIL regarded itself as programmatically the true 
representative of the Fourth International in Britain and demanded that 
this be recognised by the conferral of official status. 
2 
It actively 
projected itself as a Trotskyist party and met with a good deal more 
success in this respect than the more inhibited R. S. L. 
3 
I WIL also stated that it would still issue this call even if 
Trotskyism had a mass following, drawing on precedent in the form of 
the Bolshevik slogan 'All Power to the Soviets', ( WIL , Reply to 
the Political Statement of the Revolutionary Socialist League, 
(1941), H. P., D. J. H. 5/7,4). 
2 The July 1941 issue of WIN carried what it claimed was the manifesto 
of the Fourth International in Britain. This claim, when repeated 
on letterheads and elsewhere enraged the R. S. L. It was based on its 
record, its advocacy of the F. I. programme and that of the R. S. L. 
since 1938. Evidence later advanced included the quality and 
consistency of the WIL press and the part it had played in establish- 
ing an Irish Section, (WIL, For Discussion. To the International 
Secretariat of the Fourth International, 1941? and Reply to 
Lou Cooper. The Bolshevik attitude to unity .... and splits, H. P., 
11 Sept. 1943). 
3 WIL held Trotsky Memorial meetings in London and Birmingham during 
August 1940, the month of his death, and demonstrated outside the 
Russian Embassy. The R. S. L. initially resolved not to combine with 
other Trotskyists because this would risk its Labour Party 
presence: in the end it held a meeting in London and Glasgow with 
I. L. P. speakers as well as its own. Each organisation held a 
Russian Revolution anniversary meeting on 7 November 1941. According 
to WIL there were 200 in attendance at its own meeting, (which sent 
a resolution to Ambassador Maisky calling for the victory of the 
continued in footnotes on following page. 
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It was the second wartime change in communist policy which 
gave Workers International League its chance. Communist policy 
in 
1939-41 was not supported by Trotskyists, who saw it as a popular 
front campaign in disguise. 
' But while there is doubt about the 
success of the C. P. G. B. in this phase2 it is certain that 
it sustained 
a militant opposition to the Government. What was more, the party 
dominated the national shop stewards movement by strong 
representation on its National Council. 
3 
The People's Convention 
itself had impressive backing on paper and the possibility of a broad 
movement developing must have been one motive behind Morrison's 
3 Continued from previous page. 
Red Army but opposing Stalin) but only twenty seven at that of the 
R. S. L. ('D. Gray' to secretary, R. S. L., 31 Dec. 1941, Har. P., F7 )i 
The R. S. L. objected to WIL holding its meeting under the auspices 
of the Fourth International, (R. S. L. to WIL, 7 Oct. 1941, 
in 
Report On Negotiations With The WIL, (Jan.? 19421,4). 
1 'The "People's" Convention', WIN, (Dec. 1940), 6. 
2 In spring 1940 the communists performed poorly in by-elections and 
convened a Labour Monthly conference on 25 February, whose 
representation is difficult to assess. The People's Convention 
movement from July 1940 did win support, particularly during the 
following year, though some of its claims may have been exaggerated, 
(A. Rothstein, 'Harry Pollitt', B. S. S. L. H., (Spring 1977), 20; 
M. Johnstone, 'Harry Pollitt, B. S. S. L. H. (Autumn 1977), 24-7). The 
Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, believed that the party itself had 
not grown, (J. Hinton, 'Killing the People's Convention', B. S. S. L. H., 
(Autumn 1979), 27). 
3 While the party lost support among the intelligentsia, most 
dramatically displayed in V. Collancz (ed. ), The Betrayal of the 
Left (1941), it had a militant line for its factory members. In 
1940 the party's central committee advised 'if this industrial 
truce policy were to succeed, then the British workers, the pioneers 
of trade unionism, are faced with the danger of losing all their 
safeguards and having virtual slavery thrust upon them' (C. P. G. B., 
The Trade Unions and the War, (1940), 10). Party influence on the 
shop stewards movement was revealed at the national conference of 
6-7 April 1940 and that of the following year. E. Trory 
(Imperialist War (1977), 157-65) gives an uncritical account of this 
phase of communist policy. See also R. T. Buchanan, 'The Shop 
Steward Movement 1935-47', Journal of the Scottish Labour History 
Society, (Feb. 1978), 34-55. 
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decision to suspend publication of The Daily Worker. 
' At this time 
communists and their followers could see no difference between the 
Chamberlain and Churchill administrations2 and spoke the undiluted 
language of class war, often to the point of exaggeration. 
3 
Trotskyist attempts to intervene in the People's Convention 
met with no noticeable success. 
4 
But WIL did fear that it would make 
headway and believed the result would be to isolate the revolutionary 
I Morrison banned The Daily Worker and The Week in January 1941, rather 
late in the day and clearly alarmed by the People's Convention. 
The Daily Worker had already been punished for libelling union 
leaders the previous year, (T. U. C., Union Leaders Vindicated, 
(1940) ) 
2 Pritt wrote of the government: 
Its origins are pretty clear. It is surely the lineal 
descendant and residuary legatee of the class-government 
which conducted and "won" the last war, made the treaty 
of Versailles, intervened in Russia in the name of 
crushing the new-born and fortunately indestructible 
socialist country, acquiesced in the rape of Manchuria, 
Abyssinia, Austria, Albania and Czechoslovakia ........ 
(Labour Monthly, (Jan. 1941), 16-17. ) 
3 J. R. Campbell wrote of 'Labour in chains', 'the straight jacket on 
shop stewards' and 'compulsion in the workshop'. Joint committees 
were, he declared, an attempt to weaken shop stewards' committees, 
their appearance, with other developments, marking 'a decisive 
clearing of the ground for an advance to Fascism'. ('Workers and 
the British Totalitarians', Labour Monthly, (March 1941), 131-9. ) 
4 Sydney Bidwell's N. U. R. branch in Southall tabled five amendments 
only to have them rejected by the Standing Orders Committee, 
(B. Farnborough, loc. cit., 27). Healy may have been a delegate. 
The Convention adopted a programme including the raising of living 
standards, adequate A. R. P., restoration of civil rights, emergency 
takeover of big business and the banks, self -determination for the 
colonies, friendship with the U. S. S. R., a people's government 
representative of the working class and a people's peace based on 
self-determination of all peoples. For resolutions passed by the 
Convention see Labour Monthly, (Feb. 1941), 93-5. Motivation of 
those who supported it is discussed by J. Hinton, loc. cit., 27-32. 
See also the general discussion by A. Calder, The People's War 
(1971), 281-4. 
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vanguard from the mass of workers who still backed Labour. 
I 
Under the 
new dispensation of growing independence WIL was rallying some support 
from dissident Trotskyists, 2 though it could only hope to operate on 
the fringes of'such a movement as the Convention. But with Hitler's 
invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, the entire British political 
environment altered, especially in the labour movement. Most 
important was the alteration in communist policy for industry to one 
which made increased output the top priority. 
3 The communists had to 
operate underground in Nazi-occupied Europe. In the United States, 
the C. P. U. S. A., like the Comintern itself, was to be dissolved. The 
C. P. G. B. escapted that fate, but at the price of public contortions in 
policy. It put itself at the head of an opposition movement and used, 
with some skill, the opportunity provided when Labour shared office 
with the 'Old Gang' from May 1940. But there was no serious 
I 'People's Convention. And Now ....? ' WIN (Feb. 1941), 7. 
2 G. Weston, whose relationship with Trotskyism spanned almost a decade 
and a half, came over with several industrial workers to WIL. 
Weston was an important figure at De Havillands' Hendon factory. 
As an independent group WIL attracted Arthur Cooper, who was thought 
to have as many as twenty young workers around him in-the 
Socialist Workers Group. (R. S. L. E. C. Minutes, 5 Jan. 1942, 
Har. P. ) 
3 J. Owen, 'How to Increase War Production', Labour Monthly, (Sept. 
1941), 391-5. See also William Rust's case for lifting the ban on 
The Daily Worker, ('The Daily Worker and the National Front', 
Labour Monthly, (Aug. 1941), 368). All the demands of the Convention 
except for friendship with the U. S. S. R., were dropped as immediate 
objectives. As Pritt observed 'much of the Convention's programme 
was no longer fully applicable to the situation', (From Right to 
Left (1965), 285-6). However, his The Fall of the French Republic 
with its suggestion that the British government, like the French, 
was moving towards the suppression of liberties, was published in 
October 1941 though written before Russia entered the war. Hinton 
comments that the People's Convention, which six days after Hitler's 
attack had reaffirmed its call for a People's Government and a 
People's Peace, was by July 1941 looking 'through victory to a 
People's Peace', (loc. cit., 29n). 
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groundswell of industrial discontent during the first two years of the 
war and the communists had therefore been in opposition at a time when 
objective circumstances were at their most unfavourable. 
*"****** 
There was no great originality in WIL's policy for industry, 
only in the political conditions in which it was applied. The 
principal Trotskyist text on the subject was Trade Unions in the Epoch 
of Imperialist Decay, which Trotsky wrote towards the end of his life. 
Trotsky argued that under late capitalism, trade union leaders tended 
to draw towards the state. 
I The closer they approached the state, the 
less democratic they became. Instability of trade union leaders 
mirrored that of the capitalist state itself. At its Founding Congress, 
the Fourth International had adopted a Transitional Programme which 
argued that even minor and partial demands could not be conceded, that 
to achieve them required a struggle against the system itself. 
Trotsky observed that union leaders worked closely with popular front 
governments in France and Spain and thought that they were in Britain, 
(especially in foreign policy), 'obedient agents of the Conservative 
Party'. 2 If trade unions did not surrender their independence the 
'labour aristocrats' at their head would be driven away and the job done 
by fascists. 3 This thesis was developed by the R. S. L. and WIL in the 
I 'By transforming the trade unions into organs of the state, fascism 
invents nothing new; it merely draws to their ultimate conclusion 
the tendencies inherent in imperialism', (L. Trotsky, Trade Unions 
in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay, (1966), 6). 
2 But the Founding Congress sternly opposed 'sectarian attempts to 
build or preserve small 'revolutionary' unions, as a second edition 
of the party, (which) signify in actuality the renouncing of the 
struggle for the leadership of the working class', (The Transitional 
. Programme, Documents, 186). 
3 ibid., 11. For the positive side of trade union collaboration with 
government, see A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War, (1968) 
especially 288. 
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years before 1940.1 That year itself brought abundant empirical 
confirmation with the formation of coalition government and the 
appointment of Ernest Bevin to the Ministry of Labour. 
2 
In his wake, 
'the higher trades unionists became ultimately wedded to the present 
system', and began to feel their fate was bound up with it. 
3 
With 
electoral opposition removed, pressure increased on those prepared to 
maintain traditional conflict-based industrial relations for the 
duration. If it was true that unions tended to fuse with the state, 
then strikes were strikes against the state. By 1941 all strikes were, 
technically, illegal, 
4 
though this was for a time of little importance 
in view of the infrequency with which they occurred. 
5 Britain's 
national resources were conscripted without great difficulty and at an 
accelerating rate from the. summer of that year. 
6 
I Of minor unofficial industrial disputes before the war Grant wrote 
that the bourgeoisie 'issued a warning to the Union bureaucracy that 
unless they restored control, unless they could keep their men in 
check, then they would have to resort to other methods', ('Our Tasks 
in the Coming Revolution', WIN, (Jan. 1944), 10). 
2 Trotsky had commented that 'labour aristocrats', who were taken on 
by governments to sell an unpopular policy invariably occupied the 
posts of Labour and the Interior. Herbert Morrison was appointed 
Home Secretary when Labour joined the Government. 
3 Mass Observation, People in Production, (1942), 251. 
4 In July 1941 Bevin introduced the Conditions of Employment and 
National Arbitration Order, No. 1305. Order 1305 set up a National 
Arbitration Tribunal whose awards were enforceable by law. It 
prohibited strikes and lockouts unless reported to the minister and 
not referred for settlement within twenty one days. In fact there 
were 109 prosecutions of workers under the Order in wartime as 
against two of employers. One of the effects was to deepen the pre- 
war trend towards official strikes, (E. Wigham, Strikes and the 
Government, 1893-1974, (1976), 93). 
5 E. Wigham (op. cit., 74) points out that official national disputes 
were absent for nearly thirty years after the General Strike. While 
small unofficial strikes were, as Grant had noted, rising in number 
during the 1930s, the number of days lost thereby did not rise. 
6 At 32,000, the number of compulsory orders issued between July 1941 
and June 1942 was more than ten times as many as had been issued 
since war began, (A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. 2, 
Minister of Labour 1940-1945 (1967), 141). This represented a major 
revision of views by Bevin who had, earlier, argued that compulsion 
would cut output, (ibid., 45-6). 
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WIL flatly opposed compulsory methods in industry, 
1 but there 
was a limited market in the middle of war for such complaints. More 
common than resentment was a belief that civil measures necessary for 
effective prosecution of the war ought to be universally and fairly 
applied. 
2 
Yet the desire to win the war did not entail the suspension 
3 
of class attitudes on the shop floor. These persisted and from 1941 
could not find a traditional outlet. With the official trade union 
machinery enmeshed in the Ministry of Labour apparatus, and the 
communists hostile to interruptions in production_from June 1941, 
opportunity beckoned to the WIL. It had some success in autumn 1941. 
During a dispute at the Nottingham R. O. F. factory, a consultative 
committee emerged on which WIL gained influence through a leading 
steward, Jack Pemberton, and through which it was able to make itself 
'Industrial conscription must be ruthlessly fought because it is a 
measure directed against the working class as a whole, a measure 
to lower wens' wages by the introduction of cheap labour, to 
eliminate labour competition which forces up wages, a measure to 
utilise the badly organised state of women to smash down the 
standard of present working conditions', Youth for Socialism 
(April 1941). 
2 The conscription of women, for example, against which Youth for 
Socialism had written and which might have been an emotive issue, 
provoked no outburst, (A. Calder, op. cit., 309). 
3 The urge to beat the temporary enemy, the Axis, and the urge to beat 
the traditional enemy (the employer), mingle and muddle. When the 
situation looks as if we are bound to beat the Axis anyway - an idea 
the Government have for long inspired - the impulse to have a round 
with the traditional enemy creeps up. When things look bad, this 
impulse goes down again. But when things are more than normally 
bad, it goes down so far it comes out at the bottom. It is a 
barometer of the urgency of effort in war industry. (Mass 
Observation, People in Production, (1942), 246. ) In fact 1940 was 
the only year of the war when the number of days lost through 
strikes fell below one million and the number of men involved in 
them fell below 300,000, (A. Calder, op. cit., 299). 
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known elsewhere in the Group. 
' WIL also made progress in the London 
engineering industry, notably at De Havillands and Napiers in North 
West London. 2 There chance brought some of its members together with 
Trotskyist veterans and I. L. P. ers, now trying themselves to establish 
a trade union presence. Trotskyism and the I. L. P. found themselves 
allies against the C. P. G. B. at local and national events. 
3 
Trotskyism 
made no early headway among shop stewards at the national level4 but 
it started to make its mark at local shop stewards' conferences. 
5 
I When the consultative committee was formed during the dispute, WIL 
supported its absorption into the A. E. U. machinery, perhaps forseeing 
a chance to carry influence into the union. The Dalmuir (Glasgow) 
Works was the only factory in the R. O. F. Group that WIL controlled. 
It convinced leading communist stewards like Alex R. eoch who were 
prepared to debate with it. (Interview with R. Tearse, Nov. 1973. ) 
The WIL executive heard on 22 April 1942 of strike action at the 
Nottingham R. O. F. against compulsory transfers. 
2 There was a Napiers' steward in the Battersea I. L. P. branch which 
included Wicks, Dewar, and their supporters. In the factory a fierce 
battle was fought between supporters of the communists' engineering 
paper, The New Propeller and followers of the newly launched I. L. P. 
journal The Shop Steward. The I. L. P. and Trotskyists had some 
success in 1942 in keeping the credentials of one A. E. U. steward who 
opposed communist policy. At De Havillands, Bill Hunter, who 
remained an I. L. P. member till 1945 (when he represented Chiswick at 
the party's annual conference) was at work. George Weston, the 
veteran Trotskyist was factory convenor. Directed there were 
Alf Loughton, a bricklayer and 1930s associate of the Marxist League, 
and Roy Tearse (q. v. ). Gerry Healy worked at the nearby Park Royal 
works. 
3 The I. L. P. used this wartime opportunity to make its most serious 
drive into the factories. Wicks and Dewar joined the party's 
industrial committee which brought out a small printed journal The 
Shop Steward, (Interview with H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). In 1942 
the I. L. P. appointed Walter Padley to head its industrial drive. 
4 Trotskyists and others who opposed the C. P. G. B. line made a limited 
intervention at a production conference convened by the Shop Stewards 
Council on 19 October 1941, but their main motion was disbarred from 
discussion, (Militant Nov. 1941). 
5 In October 1941 fifty De Havilland stewards passed a second front 
resolution but appended to it calls for trade union officers to 
accompany the B. E. F. and for a joint Cabinet-aircraft shop stewards 
conference, (ibid. ). This eclectic resolution illustrated the sea- 
saw balance of power in the factory. 
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Trotskyism also worked through the I. L. P. in the pits of Scotland and 
Cumberland, and here it was R. S. L. members rather than those of the 
WIL who gained the benefit. 
' 
After'`June 1941 the C. P. G. B. added its shrill voice to 
official advice against stoppages. Its view was that winning the war 
and helping Russia were objectives which overrode other principles. 
2 
Increasingly it smeared those who were prepared to support strikes as 
witting or unwitting friends of Hitler. The party was vulnerable to 
those like the I. L. P. and the Trotskyists who sought to displace it, 
though its policy was not the simply class collaborationism that they 
liked to believe. 
3 
Once'the pressure of a threatening war situation 
I In Scotland, Hugh Brannan, a young member of the R. S. L. 's Left 
Fraction, campaigned against the Essential Work Order. Tom 
Stephenson, a leading Cumberland miner, who was an I. L. P. er but not a 
Trotskyist, campaigned with him against Bevin's measures for 
industry. Their views can be followed in The New Leader, passim. 
See also P. J. Thwaites, op, cit., 136-7. Trotskyism and the I. L. P. 
also overlapped in the Welsh mines, through Bob Condon, who wrote 
for The New Leader and joined the Revolutionary Communist Party at 
the end of the war. 
2 The Communist Party has been in the forefront of the fight to 
combat these shortcomings, to overcome every obstacle - whether of 
craft prejudice, trade union sectionalism or conservatism, suspicion 
of and opposition to necessary changes, such as the widest 
introduction of women in industry, or a narrow view of the workers' 
interests, or slackness - which stands in the way of maximum 
production. The decisive question for the increase of war 
production is the question of labour productivity, which depends 
above all on the effort, initiative and cooperation of every worker. 
(C. P. G. B., An Urgent Memorandum on Production, (1942), 6. ) 
A local pamphlet called for speed ups and an end to-absenteeism at 
Corby steelworks, as well as an increase in output of at least 15%, 
(Corby For Victory!, [ Corby 1942? ]). 
3 The C. P. G. B. argued that democracy at work and high output went'hand 
in hand. Unions ought not to cooperate to the extent of handing 
employers an advantage over the community. Unions had to defend the 
standards of transferees to make this option an attractive one. A 
1942 policy resolution of the party urged greater power to workshop 
organisations, periodic election of officials, election of district 
officers by the membership, annual policy conferences of the unions 
and the withdrawal of the 'Black' Circular (C. P. G. B., Trade Union 
Policy in the War against Fascism (1942)), The Circular was in 
fact withdrawn by the T. U. C. 's Southport Congress in 1943. 
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was lifted, non-political workers were liable to voice what might seem 
like Trotskyist views. 
' The wartime conjuncture led the C. P. G. B. to 
mount more attacks on the Trotskyists than ever before, while the 
imputation of links with Hitler was now more damaging than ever: 
'Remember that the Trotskyists are no longer part 
of the working class, movement'. 
2 
It is doubtful if Trotskyists had any great impact on the 
wartime flow of production; this was not, in any case, their 
intention. Communist attacks may have been motivated, not by the threat 
to output, but by unease at possible erosion of their industrial base. 
I WARNING 
Many workers, trade unionists and Labour Party members, 
unthinkingly express views which sound Trotskyist. Don't confuse 
these honest but muddled opinions with genuine'Trotskyism. 
The real Trotskyist is a bitter enemy of Stalin, and the 
other trusted leaders of the Soviet Union. That's his fingerprint, 
whatever else he may say. And that's how you can spot him. As for 
the people who are genuinely confused, your job is to explain. 
Explain. Explain. Get them to read this booklet. If they haven't 
time, explain what is in it to them. (W. Wainwright, Clear Out 
Hitler's Agents!, (1942), 15. ) 
D. Childs, (loc. cit., 248) suggests communist influence was not 
important in fomenting strikes before 1941 or preventing them later. 
D. N. Pritt claimed however that 'left to themselves, many workers 
of no strong political consciousness would have struck from time 
to time against the innumerable irritations to which they were 
exposed, but the communists in the factories were able to make 
clear the importance of keeping up the flow of vital production 
for war purposes ..... ' (From Right to Left, (1965), 307). 
2 W. Wainwright, op. cit. The pamphlet goes on to advise that the 
Trotskyist be exposed and turned out, and finally treated 'as you 
would an open Nazi'. 
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Though the charges of links with Nazism were absurd, they might yet 
have stuck. had it not been for spiralling industrial discontent from 
1942 onwards. The charge should have been lethal, but WIL replied with 
gusto, recalling the contortions of communist policy in recent years. 
It claimed that the C. P. G. B. had rebounded from advocating peace in 
Hitler's interests to demanding war in Churchill's. 
I 
As to the 
charge of hostility to the Soviet Union, it was argued by Trotskyists 
that the most secure ally for Russia would be a Britain in the hands 
of the workers. 
2 
Nor did Trotskyists of any British faction advocate 
any kind of sabotage. 
3 
I E. Grant, The Communist Party and the War : Look at their record! 
(1942). Grant made no concessions to the 1939-41 phase of C. P. G. B. 
policy, arguing that its call for a negotiated peace with Hitler 
stultified any possibility of it building a mass movement in the 
factories. 
2 All Trotskyist papers referred to the need to defend the U. S. S. R. 
This was a constant theme and quite unmistakeable in all their 
propaganda. Nor was the slogan in any way dependent on Britain being 
transformed from a capitalist country into a socialist one. 
3 Even the Left Fraction, whose views might be said to have led in that 
direction did not advocate it. J. R. Campbell, in Trotskyist 
Saboteurs (1943) showed awareness of James Burnham's split from the 
Fourth International. Yet Trotsky himself,, disputing with Burnham, 
had written that in all countries, regardless of alliances, workers 
must develop the class struggle, though they might use sabotage to 
help the U. S. S. R. 
If England and France tomorrow menace Leningrad or Moscow, 
the British and French workers should take the most decisive 
measures in order to hinder the sending of soldiers and 
military supplies. If Hitler finds himself constrained by 
the logic of the situation to send Stalin military supplies, 
the German workers on the contrary, would have no reason in 
this concrete case to strikes or sabotage. Nobody, I hope, 
will propose any other solution , ('Again and once more on the 
Nature of the U. S. S. R. ', in In Defence of Marxism (1966), 
36-7). 
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WIL by 1942 was a small but solid organisation. It had 
established a definite national framework, more independent of 
London than any of its predecessors. 
1 It now found itself the target 
of attacks in Tory papers which played their part in making WIL's 
lively paper, Socialist Appeal well known. This paper established 
itself in 1942 as the main Trotskyist vehicle, 
2 helped chiefly by 
being the badge of WIL's energetic intervention in industry which was 
now being organised by the Tyneside engineer Roy Tearse. 
3 Industrial 
developments during the year made WIL more and more optimistic. The 
communist drive for Joint Production Committees would fail. 
4 
Opportunities within the factories were 'unlimited' as frustrations 
with traditional trade union machinery would lead to new factory, 
regional and national committees. 
5 
It was the confinement of strikes 
to localities which, with communist influence, had prevented 'a 
I Lawrence told the R. S. L. at the start of 1942 that WIL had sixty 
London members, twenty three Glasgow members, (E. C. Minutes, 5 Jan. 
1942, Har. P. ). A WIL levy circular of 1942 gives eighteen branches: 
Kilburn, Shepherds Bush, Southall, East End, South, Edmonton, 
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Motherwell, Nottingham, Birmingham, Coventry 
Liverpool and Birkenhead, Burnley, Wolverhampton, Leeds, 
Northampton and Slough. 
2 Lawrence informed the R. S. L. that sales were 10,000 monthly. This 
may be high, but Haston had convinced the paper controllers that 
WIN and Youth for Socialism had vast pre-war circulations and until 
1943 they were not constrained by paper shortages, (Interview with 
J. Haston, 13 July 1973). 
3 Roy Tearse (1919- ) had, as a young I. L. P. member in Newcastle, 
organised peace meetings in the first year of the war. As a skilled 
engineer he moved to De Havillands in 1941 to test aero engines. 
Before he left the factory he rose to the presidency of Edgware 3, 
a new branch of the A. E. U. He had met R. S. L. members while in the 
Tyneside I. L. P., but it was the active WIL which he joined, while 
still a party member, in London, (Interview with R. Tearse, 
28 Nov. 1973 ). 
4 Joint Production Committees began when Jack Tanner, now A. E. U. 
president, persuaded a reluctant Engineering Employers Federation 
that they would be the best collaborative device to raise industrial 
output. The engineers' example spread to shipyards and engineering, 
(A. Bullock, op. cit., 945). 
5 Preparing for Power, WIN (September 1942), 24. 
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general strike on the Clydeside, at least (sic. ) among the ship- 
building workers'. 
Something of a breakthrough was provided for WIL in early 
1942 when it convened a meeting, over forty strong, of members and 
sympathisers involved in industrial work. The WIL executive was 
informed of interventions at R. O. F. factories in Enfield and 
Nottingham, 2 among miners in the North-East 
3 
and Liverpool dockers. 
4 
WIL played no part in the Betteshanger dispute, where Kent miners 
successfully defied the law. 
5 
But it did approach. striking 
Yorkshire miners in the summer of 1942. There was widespread discontent 
1 ibid., 24. T. Dan Smith, not yet a Trotskyist, gave full coverage 
in The New Leader to a successful Tyneside shipyard strike in early 
1942 where the men had stayed out in defiance of a personal appeal 
by Harry Pollitt for a return to work. 
2 See the broadsheet Socialist Appeal policy for the R. O. F. s, 
(16 June 1942), designed for an Enfield meeting on workers' control 
of production, (H. P., D. J. H. 14e/14). 
3 The Industrial Organiser [Tearse? ] found that a pro-communist mood 
among miners coexisted with 'hostility to the Stalinist strike- 
breaking'. WIL was well received in several pits and it was 
reported that a Socialist Appeal committee had replaced the lodge 
committee at Blackhall. ([WIL] E. C. Report, 22 April 1942, 
H. P., D. J. H. 14B/11/1. ) 
4 Recruitment of dockers had allowed the launch of a Dockers Bulletin 
([WIL) C. C., 20 June 1942, H. P. ). 
5 Betteshanger was a strong confirmation for WIL's perspectives of 
increased industrial militancy and power, 'the first really 
important victory to be won by the workers since the outbreak of 
war', (Socialist Appeal, (Aug. 1942) ). See also A. Bullock, 
op. Cit., 267-8. This important strike, whose consequences 
revealed the shift of power towards Labour is not mentioned by 
R. P. Arnot in his standard The Miners in Crisis and War (1961). 
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, 
among them' and when WIL members were noticed at the pits they were 
denounced by Yorkshire Miners Association leaders and the national 
press. 
2 
WIL produced a typically ebullient reply which promised a 
£5 reward for those who could find truth in the accusations against 
them! 
3 
It also felt justified in taking the more serious step of 
establishing an industrial committee, which in 1942 began to publish 
a periodical Industrial News. 
4 
I The mines were dilapidated even in 1939 and Labour would not 
propose nationalisation under the terms of the moratorium on 
controversial issues. Younger men had been conscripted into the 
forces and in early 1941 there was a 'sharp fall' in total 
production and output per man and wages were comparatively low. 
There had been therefore an inadequate response to Bevin's call 
for former miners to return to the pits, so he applied the Essential 
Work Order to the industry in May 1941. He registered all who had 
worked in the pits at any time and it was now that the committee 
was established which would propose the Bevin Boys scheme. Never- 
theless, 160,000 Yorkshire miners struck in May and June 1942. 
2 'Propaganda in the Coalfields' (Morning Post, 15 July 1942) 
included an interview with Haston and Grant. Joseph Hall, Y. M. A. 
president had charged that young men were being paid £10 a week to 
tramp the Yorkshire coalfields with Socialist Appeal. See also 
the Daily Express and the Daily Telegraph for the same date. 
3 Socialist Appeal : an open letter to the Yorkshire Miners' 
Association, 18 July 1942, H. P., D. J. H. 14E/20. See also What 
Socialist Appeal said. The Minister of Home Security questioned 
in the House of Commons, (April 1942, H. P., D. J. H. 14e/13), an 
earlier WIL broadsheet. A second open letter appeared in Socialist 
Appeal for January 1943. 
4 See Industrial News, [3? ], Aug. 1942, (H. P., D. J. H. 14F/1). This 
publication may have replaced another entitled Workshop News, 
(A. Penn, op. cit., 61). 
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There were even minor exchanges in the House of Commons that 
summer about the impact of WIL literature in industry, 
I but they 
revealed great confidence among ministers that the Trotskyists could 
do little harm.? 
******* 
By late 1942 WIL had concluded that an alternative 
organising centre for trade unionists in struggle was needed. It 
approached the I. L. P. and the Anarchists with a view to arranging 
united action on the industrial field. 
3 Similar desires had been 
voiced for some time by the I. L. P. itself4 and WIL and the I. L. P. 
already had joint activities underway. 
5 
In February 1943 a Militant 
Miners Group was established to link up workers in the pits, 
6 
and that 
I When questioned in the House by a Tory M. P., Morrison showed great 
scepticism about Joseph Hall's claims; he also reminded William 
Gallacher M. P., another questioner, that 'this organisation is only 
pursuing the same political policy as he and his own political 
friends did before the Soviet Union was attacked', (H. C. Debs 
Vol. 381, Cols. 1330-1,16 July 1942). 
2 Morrison resisted further calls for suppression and disputed the 
more exotic claims for WIL size and influence. He also went so far 
as to taunt Gallacher with the suggestion that the C. P. G. B. had 
inspired some of the alarmist stories in the Conservative press, 
(H. C. Debs, Vol. 381, Cols. 1493,1515-16,21 July 1942). 
3 G. Healy, 'Industrial Militants Need a Programme', Socialist Appeal 
(Jan. 1943). 
4 The New Leader passim. Padley had offered its pages to industrial 
workers seeking to coordinate their struggles, and a number of rank 
and file workers had taken the opportunity to call for a new 
organisation to do the job undertaken by the National Council of 
Shop Stewards to June 1941. 
5 Hunter, Don McGregor and Tearse had shared an I. L. P. platform in 
Tooting, and Grant had debated with Padley on apparently equal terms 
elsewhere. 
6 The Glasgow Militant gave way in February 1943 to Militant Scottish 
Miner, also from Glasgow, and sustained monthly publication until 
December. In January 1944 it was succeeded by the irregular 
publication The Militant Miner. Militant Scottish Miner with The 
New Leader was used by Hugh Brannan of the Lanarkshire coalfield 
to campaign for reform. Brannan stood for the presidency of the 
Lanarkshire miners in 1943 against an upholder of the wartime 
industrial truce. His poll of 7,792 was only 1,400 below that of 
his opponent. 
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same month in London a committee for Co-ordination of Militant Trade 
Union Activity was formed by members of a variety of unions. 
1 
Meetings with I. L. P. and Trotskyist speakers were set on foot and 
I. L. P. interest'"in trade union work grew. 
2 In Scotland the name 
Clyde Workers Committee was appropriated by a new body on 15 May 1943, 
which was led by expelled communists, some of whom had been recruited 
to WIL. 
3 
They were also motivated by the need to coordinate industrial 
militants and they convened a meeting in Glasgow on 5/6 June 1943 to 
which all bodies with similar aims were invited. 
There was a danger that a new coordinating body might remain 
suspended in mid-air: there had so far been few spontaneous attempts 
to by-pass established industrial organisations, and the protagonists 
here were all politically motivated. Yet a definite vacuum existed, 
I Members of the A. E. U., T. G. W. U., E. T. U., N. S. P., N. U. R., A. S. W., 
A. U. B. T. W., A. E. S. D., and others attended and Don McGregor of 
Wood Green I. L. P. was made secretary (The New Leader, 20 Feb. 1943). 
2 On 21 February militant trade unionists heard Tearse, McGregor, 
Bidwell, Jock Milligan (a Trotskyist builder) and Healy speak in 
London. The New Leader was giving a regular and growing space to 
industrial policy and the I. L. P. 's 1943 conference voted to oppose 
industrial collaboration, build a militant shop stewards movement 
and strive for industrial unionism; it stopped short of making 
Padley's position full-time, however, (The New Leader, I May 1943). 
3 They were led by Bob McCrory and Alex Reoch. The committee drew up a 
seven point programme on which to campaign and resolved to try to 
embrace all industries in its work. McCrory, Reoch and ten others 
broke with the C. P. G. B. about this time, and nine of them joined 
WIL. Reoch was a shipyard worker recruited through paper sales, in 
which the Glasgow local of WIL excelled. McCrory and the others 
were expelled from the C. P. G. B. for association with the R. O. F. 
consultative committee in defiance of party instructions. WIL 
claimed that Glasgow area communist shop stewards were equally 
split between Stalinists and Trotskyists. (Interview with 
A. Finkel (Keen), July 1974; 'A Letter from England', Fourth 
International, (N. Y. ), June 1943,190. ) 
357. 
and the meeting of June 5/6 decided to establish a National 
Confederation of Workers Committees on a programme which endorsed the 
aims of the Clyde Workers Committee. 
I This left it with vague 
intentions which possibly reflected the polyglot composition of the 
meeting. WIL, represented there by Jack Haston, was unhappy that 
perspectives had not been clarified and anxious that this should be 
put right soon. 
2 But the I. L. P. had its own definite programme, drawn 
up by its Industrial Committee, 
3 
although it could in industry sound 
I The statement of the N. C. W. C. read: 
Realising the necessity of a National Organisation in defence 
of the workers' interests, this delegate conference 
representing organised workers from London, Newcastle-on- 
Tyne, Barrow, the Midlands, Yorkshire and Glasgow, declares 
that we basically agree with the understated seven points of 
the "Clyde Workers Committee". 
1. Co-ordination of all militant T. U. activity. 
2. Annulment of all anti Working Class legislation. 
3. Every shop a closed shop. 
4. Workers control of transfers. 
5. (a) Higher standard of life for all workers. 
(b) Better standard of wages and allowances for all 
workers in the Armed Forces. 
6. Confederation of all Workers Committees (Nat. ) 
7. Workers' control of Industry. 
We call on. all workers to rally to the fight. 
(Socialist Appeal, Mid-June 1943. ) 
2 Haston's concern centred on the belief of the I. L. P. industrial 
committee that coordination should be confined to engineering and 
allied trades. This, he declared, would repeat 'all the worst 
blunders that were committed by. the industrial movement at the end 
of the last war', (Socialist Appeal (Mid-June 1943). The WIL 
leaders were very aware of the 1914-18 precedent. Their keynote 
document, Preparing for Powe; had borrowed that title from 
J. T. Murphy's account of the movement and engineering stewards in 
the First War. WIL declared 'the conquest of power is the axis of 
our propaganda'; Murphy had written 'it is significant that in all 
these discussions the central question of the CONQUEST OF POLITICAL 
POWER by the working class was entirely overlooked' (Preparing for 
Power (1972), 159). 
3 '1. Maintain Trade Union practices. 
2. Restore right of works assembly and literature distribution. 
3. Shop Stewards control of deferments, transfers and dismissals. 
4. Equal pay for the job. 
5. Independent T. U. 's and Shop Stewards - NOT whips for the bosses. 
6. For Workers Control of Production. ' 
(I. L. P. Industrial Committee, Renew the Wage Demand, (1942), 1. ) 
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very much like the Trotskyists themselves at times. 
I WIL's own 
industrial policy was far more detailed, based on trade union control 
of the circumstances produced by war, for example by shop steward 
control of transfers of labour, 
2 but it put chief importance on the 
search by workers for a broader form of organisation which could 
coordinate struggles. 
3 
In early November 1943 the Coordinating 
Committee took the name of the Militant Workers Federation. Before 
that Roy Tearse was appointed as its organiser. A more definite 
programme was outlined and local presences developed. 
4 
In the 
internal contest within the M. W. F., WIL achieved an ascendancy over 
the I. L. P. 
5 
From WIL's point of view the Federation was, of course, 
a source of contacts which it milked with some success. The M. W. F. 's 
best chance was to displace the National Council of Shop Stewards as 
"But", you may say, "we don't want pious sentiments; we want 
planes and guns and production for Russia now! " Reflect a moment. 
Are you getting this from capitalism? How is capitalism running 
its war? .... You may think you can use capitalism but capitalism is using you, and I say that the only true friend of the Soviet 
Union is the International Working Class ...... (J. McNair, 
Make Britain Socialist Now (1942), 12-13. ) The I. L. P. also 
denounced communists as 'strike-breakers', (T. Taylor, Defend 
Socialism from the Communists (1942), 3). In 1942, the WIL, perhaps 
swayed by its own perspectives, was recording that the I. L. P. was 
'beginning to penetrate the fringes of the trade union movement' 
(P. Thwaites, 'The Independent Labour Party, 1938-50', 134 ). 
2 See Appendix E. 
3 'A New Stage in History', (draft resolution of WIL central committee 
to 1943 conference), WIN, (Sept. 1943), 8. 
4 Trade union independence, union democracy, 100% trade unionism, 
workers' control, and the confiscation of war profits were in the 
programme, (The New Leader, 6 Nov. 1943). The London Group was more 
definite still raising such demands as soldiers representation on 
Trades Councils, (P. Thwaites, op. cit., 137). 
5 Socialist Appeal, in its industrial coverage, refers occasionally to 
Anarchist influences, and WIL would occasionally debate with 
Anarchists, but their importance seems to have been slight. 
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a focus for militant discontent. It was not a body of conscious 
revolutionaries however: many of its supporters were unpolitical 
factory activists looking for support outside their locality. 
Despite this, two seductive assumptions - that peace would bring a 
slump, and that the M. W. F. would benefit from rising militancy - 
were commonly made. 
' 
The timing of the M. W. F. could not be faulted. Industry was 
more troubled from autumn 1943 to D-Day than it had been for many 
years. At Vickers' Barrow shipyard, discontent had been festering 
since 1942 over a pay award, and in September 1943 a strike by 9000 
workers shut down the entire 
yard for eighteen days. Government 
guidelines may have inhibited a settlement, and state intervention 
remained a possibility throughout the dispute. Bevin rumbled from 
the platform-but did not act. 
2 
The Barrow district committee of the 
A. E. U. was affiliated to the Militant Workers Federation, but the 
union's leaders, and notably Tanner, were staunch upholders of Bevin's 
no strike policy. When the district committee, after initial 
hesitations, endorsed the strike and tried to*organise support, it was 
suspended by head office. 
3 
In the yard there were communist members 
I Within the R. S. L., the Left Fraction strongly disputed that the 
M. W. F. could become a mass force and maintained its view after the 
R. C. P. was formed in March 1944. The Trotskyists, it argued, should 
work within the national shop stewards movement until expelled. 
Only then would a separate movement be justified, 'A Policy for 
Industry', (submitted to the 1944 Fusion Conference, March 1944, 
H. P., D. J. H. 14C/m). 
2 For this he was criticised in The Times and elsewhere. His key 
speech at Farnworth on 2 October 1943, where he spoke of the 'anti- 
war people' without specifying that he intended Trotskyists, is 
discussed by A. Bullock, op. cit., 269. Nevertheless he took the 
Barrow dispute and troubles on the Clydeside Shipyards and Rolls- 
Royce (Glasgow) seriously enough to have them investigated by M. I. 5. 
His informants told him communists and Trotskyists only found an 
echo where grievances already existed, (E. Wigham, op. cit., 92). 
3 Tanner sent officials to the district committee early in the strike 
to plead for opposition to it. They were rebuffed and three weeks 
later the suspension took place. 
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of the union, two of whom were members of the strike committee. For 
their opposition they were expelled and The Daily Worker ran strong 
criticism of the strike committee. 
' Socialist Appeal and The New 
Leader gave strong support to the dispute however, and the M. W. F. 
spread news of it, developed contacts and raised cash. 
2 
Most 
tangibly the strike committee worked with Tearse and he spent most of 
the dispute in Barrow. It is little wonder that The Daily Worker 
correspondent saw Barrow as 'the cockpit of Trotskyist agitation'. 
3 
I These communists, (according to Socialist Appeal) distributed 
leaflets in opposition to the strike. Jack Owen, The Daily Worker's 
correspondent, was hostile to the strike throughout. He suggested 
that the strikers could have campaigned for an inquiry as an 
alternative to industrial action. When they stayed out after a 
tribunal had called for such an inquiry, he blamed the strike 
committee, (The Daily Worker, 27,29 Sept., and 1 Oct. 1943). 
The Times pondered all this with some bewilderment: 
.* but it has to be recorded to the credit of the strike 
committee that it has endeavoured to keep all politics out of the 
dispute and make it purely industrial. Only yesterday it expelled 
two members from the strike committee for alleged political activities. 
At the same time there has been a somewhat Gilbertian situation in 
the town. Communist meetings have been held and communist 
literature circulated in an endeavour to persuade the strikers to 
return to work. (The Times, 30 Sept. 1943. ) 
Common Wealth also had a member in the yard. Acland and Loverseed, 
leaders of C. W., visited the yard and offered sympathy but argued 
for restraint. (A. Calder, 'The Common Wealth Party, 1942-5', 
University of Sussex Ph. D. thesis, 2, (1969), 24 ). 
2 The M. W. F. and WIL were well received because the strikers were glad 
of any support in the face of such an imposing array of enemies. 
One strike leader claimed that Socialist Appeal alone had put their 
case, (Socialist Appeal, Oct. 1943). In fact The New Leader also 
explained the dispute sympathetically and savaged the communists 
with some gusto. It had the advantage over Socialist Appeal of 
being weekly: see the articles by Padley in the issues for 
25 September and 2 October 1943, the second of which contains a 
strong attack on the C. P. G. B. 
3 The C. P. G. B. was embarrassed by the role it felt compelled to play 
in industry and irritated that it received no gratitude from Bevin. 
On 27 September 1943, J. R. Campbell charged WIL with seeking a 
national anti-war engineering strike (The Daily Worker, 27 Sept. 
1943) and the accusation was extended to embrace the I. L. P. also 
when the A. E. U. Huddersfield district committee resigned in solidarity 
with the suspension of its Barrow counterpart. When Bevin coupled his 
denunciation of the Trotskyists with gibes against the C. P. G. B., in 
a speech delivered at Farnworth, The Daily Worker for 4 October 
Continued with footnotes on following page. 
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The strikers showed great'determination and defied a tribunal to 
achieve a substantial victory. 
Barrow had been a great success for WIL, though it recognised 
that its commitment to the strikers' cause, rather than its political 
programme, had won it support. There were strong grounds for optimistic 
generalisation: only later did it become clear that the Barrow strike 
had been the only successful major dispute of the war. But WIL at the 
time wrote of 'a sharp discontent and radicalisation .... transforming 
the outlook of the British working class'. 
' The movement had passed 
beyond local disputes and was steering towards national developments of 
an increasingly political character, it charged. Yet optimism was 
tempered with caution: disgruntlement had not yet hardened into a 
struggle to change the leadership; the M. W. F. might be engulfed by 
strike before it solidified. 
2 Yet WIL and the M. W. F. had basked in 
3 Continued from previous page. 
lamented his inability to distinguish between the friends and foes 
of fascism. After the strike was concluded, William Rust, the 
paper's editor, was sufficiently stung by further attacks from 
Bevin to address the Minister in an open letter. 'The handling of 
the Barrow strike has not been an easy job for The Daily Worker', 
he wrote, 'I have had many headaches over it'. Communist loyalty 
to the truce was remarkable. It was, apparently, without blemish 
in industry and ruptured electorally only once, when the party 
supported the successful candidature of the independent socialist 
Charlie White against an effete pro-Government candidate in West 
Derbyshire in 1944. 
1 In its immediate aftermath Haston noted the solidarity of women with 
the Barrow strikers, their friendly relations with the local police 
and mayor and a sympathetic feeling among soldiers and sailors on 
leave. But he warned that 'there is a growing awareness that if 
the workers do not gain concessions for themselves now, when they 
have the employers where they want them, they will not be able to 
gain concessions after the war'. (Socialist Appeal, Oct. 19t. 3). 
2 'Tasks of the Industrial Militants' (a resolution adopted by the 
1943 conference of WIL), WIN, (Oct. - Nov. 1943), 6-9. WIL could 
take some satisfaction from the confirmation of its forecast that 
factory committees would be built by militants forced to by-pass 
the quasi-official shop stewards structure. 
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national publicity and with increasing confidence approached leading 
convenors and stewards. Tearse moved to Glasgow at the end of 1943 
and met a friendly response from militants on the Clyde. 
1 
WIL with 
some I. L. P. members was beginning to assemble a fraction in the 
building trade that was to gain great influence after the war, 
2 
and 
there were hopeful signs, of inter-factional coordination by 
Trotskyists in engineering. 
3 
WIL itself had every reason to look back on 1943 with 
considerable satisfaction. It had established a national identity and 
gained vital experience. In March of that year Socialist Appeal had 
started to publish a mid-monthly supplement - in effect it became a 
fortnightly paper. Its income was enough to sustain a high level of 
publicity: 
4 
Socialist Appeal leaflets supplemented its interventions 
in all major disputes. 
5 
It had eclipsed the R. S. L. and was moving 
I Tearse was now a WIL professional and still M. W. F. national 
secretary. A number of convenors, who were not Trotskyists, were 
prepared to sell Socialist Appeal, raise money and even ask advice 
of WIL,. (Interview with R. Tearse, Nov. 1973). Yet WIL made no 
really large gains in membership despite attention it paid to 
Albion Motor Works, Singers, John Browns and other Clydeside 
factories, (H. McShane and J. Smith, op. cit., 236). 
2 The M. W. F. line was to oppose Payment By Results in building and 
civil engineering, (J. Milligan, Payment by Results, [19431, 
H. P., D. J. H. 10/1). 
3 South London A. E. U. members who were in the S. W. G., WIL and 
dissidents in the R. S. L. met to concert action on 14 March 
[19431. 
4 Income for 1943 was £2654, a sum which included Millie Lee's 
income of £350 and £781 from sales of Socialist Appeal (The 
Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain, Cabinet Paper W. P. (44), 202, 
13 April 1944). 
5 See Cortonwood Supplement, (Jan. 1943) and Barrow Workers fight, 
for living wage (Sept. 1943), H. P., D. J. H. 14E/21 and 23. The 
circulation of WIL's publications in 1943 were 8-10,000 for 
Socialist Appeal and 2,000 for WIN. 
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towards a fusion of British Trotskyists which it would dominate. WIL 
considered it of some significance that its enemies saw it as the 
chief representative of Trotskyism: this seemed to apply right and 
left. ' This achievement had been made possible by a unique wartime 
political conjuncture of which it was only one beneficiary. Its cheerful 
willingness to break the, tacit industrial truce was a parallel with the 
disruption of the electoral truce by the I. L. P. and Common Wealth. 
2 
I The Economic League drew similar parallels between the German Workers' 
Challenge radio station and articles in Socialist Appeal. It saw 
Trotskyism as undermining faith in the government by suggesting 
there was an Anglo-American conspiracy against the Soviets, (Notes 
and Comments, 9 July 1943). This conflicted with the communist 
view that Trotskyism sought to undermine Russia, and yet J. Mahon 
(Hitler's Agents Exposed, 1943) wrote 'so Hitler needs something 
more than a radio station. This is where the Trotskyists take up 
the work'. Mahon charged that Trotskyism and the radio station had 
identical views on the war and both called for a general strike. 
In fact Socialist Appeal did not once call for a general strike 
throughout the war. But WIL thought Mahon's pamphlet the first 
attempt by the C. P. G. B. to deal with the programme of Trotskyism, 
('A Letter from England', Fourth International, (June 1943), 190), 
though that did not stop him dubbing Trotskyism 'a special 
detachment of fascism', alleging that they were consciously playing 
Hitler's game and asking 'sooner or later we shall have to deal with 
them: why not now? '. Mahon also achieved a remarkable exegesis of 
Socialist Appeal: 
'There are somewhere about 22,000 words in each issue. In 
November one sentence of 24 words might be construed into a 
criticism of Hitler. The remaining 21,976 words were attacks 
on Hitler's enemies', (op. cit., 16). 
2 Electoral contests were the raison d'etre of Common Wealth: when 
the truce ended, it died. Its story is thoroughly told in 
A. Calder, 'The Common Wealth Party, 1942-1945', 2 Vols. (University 
of Sussex Ph. D. thesis, 1967). The remarkable sequence of wartime 
results is discussed in P. Addison, 'By-Elections of the Second 
World War', in C. Cook and J. Ramsden, op. cit., 165-90. It is 
remarkable that D. L. Prynn in 'Common Wealth -a British Third 
Party of the-1940s', (J. C. H., Vol. 7, no. 1-2, (1972)), 
apparently had not read Calder. 
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Of course, C. W. supported'the war -a fact differently interpreted by 
Trotskyism and communism. 
1 
The I. L. P. 's platform was a pacifist one 
but it came close during the war to winning seats in England for the 
last time in its life. WIL, the smallest of the three and the least 
known, also recognised the opportunity and gained support, not 
necessarily for its programme, but for its cheerful willingness to 
break the consensus. WIL recognised the possibilities early on, and 
its success in 1943 and 1944 arose from confidently following its own 
forecasts of industrial unrest and a social shift towards radicalism. 
2 
It forecast the turn of dissident parties to the Labour Party3 and that 
I The C. P. G. B. construed the rise of Common Wealth as a crack in 
national unity and the appearance of a potential fascist ally. It 
was forced to withdraw a hostile pamphlet, R. P. Arnot's What Is 
Common Wealth? (1943), which stated this thesis. WIL drew 
encouragement from the adoption of a common ownership platform by 
J. B. Priestley, (who was a precursor of C. W. ), and Sir Richard Acland, 
(WIL, Reply to the Political Statement, 2). The flavour of C. W. 's 
appeal, which had something in common with that of the Militant 
Socialist International in the less favourable environment of the 
1930s can be derived from Acland's belief early in the war that 
'only under common ownership can we abolish class distinction, 
unemployment, inequality and strife. Only under common ownership 
can we free ourselves from the system which positively encourages 
every man to seek his own personal advantage here on this earth. ' 
(Unser Kampf, (1940), 94 ). 
2 This was the substance of WIL's rejection of the R. S. L. argument. 
In 1942 it forecast 'more and more the workers will tend to break 
the bonds with which the Labour leaders have tied them to the 
fortunes of capital and advance on the road to independent action', 
(Preparing for Power, (Sept. 1942), 22-3). The next summer it 
noted 'within the ranks of the armed forces, among wide strata of 
the middle classes, a growing clash,, a growing ferment and a 
process of radicalisation has been taking place', (Reply of WIL 
to the R. S. L. criticism of Preparing for Power, 7 June 1943, 
H. P., D. J. H. 14B/15,15). 
3 WIL supported C. P. G. B. affiliation to the Labour Party on the 
grounds that the communists were not revolutionary and therefore 
not entitled to a separate existence, (Amendment to Stalinist 
Resolutions Proposing Affiliations To The Labour Party, [1943? J, 
H. P., D. J. H. 4/13,2). It preferred that the I. L. P. should also 
join and believed this would sift both Labour and the I. L. P. between 
reformists and revolutionaries. 
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that party would be the main beneficiary of social discontent. 
I From 
its position outside the Labour Party WIL maintained afraction within, 
in anticipation of a re-entry it never entirely ruled out. 
2 
* .****** 
WIL reached a pinnacle of industrial influence and national 
publicity in 1944. Its opportunity arose because this was the worst 
year for strikes since 1932.3 The months before D-Day saw 
simultaneous movements in engineering and the coalfields, Britain's 
first wartime experience of such a conjuncture. 
4 
There was a link 
between the two in the form of Bevin's programme for boosting manpower 
in the pits. But when Trotskyists became involved in the resisting 
this there seemed to be plenty of grounds for conspiracy theory. 
I Although independent, WIL always advanced the slogans, 'End the 
Truce' and 'Labour to Power', ('A New Stage in History', WIN Sept. 
1943,7). But it believed the moment of Labour coming to power 
would be the moment of 'its period of decline, of splitting and 
breaking up', (E. Grant, 'Our Tasks in the Coming Revolution', WIN, 
(Jan. 1944), 11). 
2 WIL noted 36 divisions calling for a break in the coalition on the 
1943 Labour Party Conference agenda. It claimed that there were 
two which put its own position, ('A Letter from England', Fourth 
International, (New York), June 1943,190). Although WIL sent no 
one into Common Wealth, there were ex-Trotskyists within its ranks, 
(A. Calder, 'The Common Wealth Party', Vol. 1,193 and Vol. 2, 
150-1). 
3 2,194 strikes took place during 1944, 
(E. Wigham, op. cit., 92). 
4 The coalfields were generally quiet during the 1914-18 war, though 
massive unrest occurred in the first years of peace. But in 
January - March 1944 850,000 days were lost in South Wales, and 
elsewhere, in strikes against a tribunal award. In March and April 
more than one million days were lost in strikes over the home coal 
allowance. Coal mining was responsible for more than two-thirds of 
the 3,714,000 days lost in the year, (ibid., 92). In these 
circumstances the inverse ratio noted by Mass Observation, between 
military crisis and industrial unrest broke down. R. P. Arnot, 
The Miners in Crisis and War, (1951) traces the accumulation of 
discontent in the pits but not the effect of dissident political 
opinion. 
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Measures to ensure voluntary topping up of the mines workforce proved 
insufficient, ' and when the ballot scheme was introduced2 it 
encountered more resistance than any other measure of industrial 
conscription. The 'Bevin Boys' were young but their names entered the 
ballot only when they reached national service age. One in ten was 
selected by ballot to work in the pits and no less than 40%. of them 
appealed. 
3 
There was political encouragement for those who sought to 
resist, 
4 
but the decisive factor in making this a national issue was 
the decision of engineering apprentices on the Tyne to organise 
collective resistance. A Tyneside Apprentices Guild founded in the 
second week of December 1943 gathered 15,000 members despite official 
union discouragement. Its purpose was to fight the ballot scheme as 
applied to shipyard apprentices. 
5 
Local WIL leaders were in contact with the apprentices from 
an early stage and established a rapport with the more political among 
them. 
6 
But the apprentices were able themselves to organise and spread 
I Bevin had registered all ex-miners, but only a quarter of them, 
(about 100,000) were fit and willing to return to the mines. 
2A Ministry committee advanced the idea of the ballot scheme in 1942 
and Bevin introduced it in December 1943. 
3 Five hundred Bevin Boys were actually imprisoned for refusing to do 
pit work, (A. Bullock, op. cit., 260). 
4 As early as 29 May 1943 Tom Stephenson of the Cumberland area of the 
M. F. G. B. had asked New Leader readers if the coercion of young 
surface miners underground should be permitted, and on 31 July - 
1 August the National Administrative Council of the I. L. P. opposed 
conscription of sixteen year olds to the mines. 
5 Anti-Labour Laws Victims Defence Campaign Circular, 5 May 1944, 
(Warwick M. S. S. ). 
6 In January 1944 Bill Davy, a lapsed Y. C. L. member and leader of the 
apprentices, visited London with another apprentice. There he met 
Haston and Tearse. 
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an impressive strike movement. They were very far from being the 
Trotskyist tools of popular legend, though in a friendless world they 
had to find allies where they could. They were willing to listen to 
advice but did not always to take it, particularly when it was cautious. 
' 
The strike itself was caused by discontent at the apprentices' 
inability to prevent conscription to the pits entering the shipyards. 
2 
March, the first month of the strike, was relatively quiet in 
publicity, though it was the month when the Tr. otskyists with splendid 
timing fused to form the Revolutionary Communist Party! April was 
different as Tory papers vied with The Daily Worker in a hunt for the 
'hidden hand' of Trotskyism behind. the apprentices movement. 
3 
It was 
I Their January 1944 statement 'We refuse to carry the burden imposed 
on the industry by the lust for profit and inefficiency of the coal 
owners. Since they are directly responsible for the coal crisis, 
it is against them that compulsion must be directed' may have been 
influenced by the Trotskyists. And yet the Guild officials 
resolved on 7 February 1944, having heard Tearse's advice, to break 
off relations with the M. W. F. (J. B. Stuart, 'A Brief Report on 
England', Fourth International, (June 1944), 170). The Trotskyists 
were to be accused of fomenting a strike but Tearse's advice had 
been to explore first all legal channels, enter the unions, and 
send a deputation to London. 
2 In February 1944 an apprentice was actually conscripted. On 10-11 
February a deputation of apprentices from six centres visited Bevin 
in London but he refused to see them. They then gave three weeks 
notice of a strike to begin on 7 March and in the absence of any 
word from Whitehall came out a week early on 28 February 1944. 
There were 6,000 strikers on the Tyne, 5,000 on the Clyde and 1,000 
in Huddersfield. 
3 The Daily Worker reported on 4 April 1944 that a Tyneside apprentice 
had 'exposed the Trotskyists', that Davy, Tearse and Haston had met 
and that wild rumours about the ballot were circulating in 
Newcastle. The next day the paper added to its plea for an end to 
the strike, a call for miners, currently on strike against the 
Porter award, also to return to work. After the apprentices called 
their strike off The Daily Worker for 10 April ran J. R. Campbell's 
pamphlet These Trotskyist Saboteurs as an article. Frustration 
boiled over when the B. B. C. reported R. P. C. activities without 
explaining the difference between the parties. All of this was a 
kind of tribute, (R. Black, Stalinism, in Britain, (1970), 171). 
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the Labour Left and the I. L. P. who scorned the idea that Trotskyists 
could lead the apprentices by the nose. 
1 
Government concern at the 
unrest among miners led the Lord President's Committee of the War 
Cabinet to discuss subversive influences on 5 April 1944 and what 
powers of prosecution were available to stem them. Memoranda drawn 
up following this meeting show the Home Secretary and Minister for 
Home Security was sceptical. 
2 
Gwilym Lloyd George, the Minister of 
Fuel and Power was more alarmist. He had noted the attacks made by 
Socialist Appeal and Militant Scottish Miner on trade union leaders. 
3 
The T. U. C. gave public expression to its concern the day the Lord 
President's Committee met. 
4 
A second meeting of the Committee 
concluded that some legislative action should be taken. 
5 
I For the reactions of M. P. s, see below. The New Leader was 
sympathetic to the apprentices and on 8 April ridiculed the notion 
that 'one or two "mystery men" could impose their will upon 26,000 
intelligent young workers'. 
2 'There is little evidence before me to show that their activities 
have resulted in the starting of a strike or contributed to any 
material extent in prolonging a strike. ' (Memorandum by the Home 
Secretary, Use of Regulation 18B against fomenters of strikes, 
12 April 1944, Cabinet Papers, CAB71 16, LP (44) 67,1. ) 
3 'My task would, I think, be made easier by the imposition of a 
check on inflammatory propaganda, which, although it may not cause 
strikes, engenders feeling hostile to the Government, the coal- 
owners and the trade union leaders alike, and encourages the 
prolongation of strikes once they have begun. ' (Memorandum by the 
Minister of Fuel and Power, Distribution of Subversive Propaganda 
in the Coalfields, 13 April 1944, Cabinet Papers, CAB71 16, LP (44) 
68,2 ) 
4 Ebby Edwards, T. U. C. Chairman, and Sir Walter Citrine, T. U. C. 
Secretary, issued a statement about 'persons and organisations who 
have been active in fomenting disturbances', (The Times, 6 April 
1944).. 
5 The Lord President's Committee met to discuss subversion for a 
second time on 14 April 1944. For its conclusion, see CAB71/15. 
The Legislation Committee approved a draft regulation, to be 
published as 1A(a), on 17 April 1944. 
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Meanwhile the Government decided to charge four R. C. P. 
leaders with conspiracy and acts in furtherance of a strike in 
contravention of existing legislation: the Trades Disputes Act 
(1927). 1 This was a step of gross political insensitivity, 
2 
which 
added spice to the reaction. By an extraordinary conjuncture the 
I. L. P. annual conference was meeting in Newcastle, the storm centre, 
on the weekend of the arrests. James Maxton M. P. supported by 
John McGovern M. P., proposed an emergency motion to the conference 
denouncing the prosecutions as a frame up, a diversion from 
incompetent control of the mines and a product of communist influence, 
3 
I On 5 April 1944, the Harrow Road premises of the R. C. P. were raided 
by the Special Branch, who took away copies of the Socialist 
Appeal's latest issue. Simultaneously, there was a raid on the home 
of Ann Keen and Heaton Lee in Newcastle and documents relating to 
the strike were confiscated. There were other raids in Nottingham 
and Glasgow, (The Times, 6 April 1944). On the next day Heaton Lee 
and Ann Keen were arrested. They appeared on a conspiracy charge 
on 8 April and were remanded until 26 April (The Times 10 April). 
In the early hours of 11 April Roy Tearse was arrested in Glasgow 
and charged with the same offence (The Times 12 April). Haston 
had been sent by the party central committee to organise affairs in 
the North-East. He had travelled on from there. to Edinburgh but, 
on learning that the police were also seeking him, he gave himself 
up (Interviews with J. Haston, E. Grant, July, Jan. 1973). These 
dates were contradicted by A. L. L. V. D. C., op. cit. 
2 The Trades Disputes Act was regarded by the labour movement as Tory 
revenge for the General Strike. The Labour Party was pledged to 
repeal it. Lee, Keen, Tearse and Haston were the first people to 
be charged under its provisions and a mighty propaganda lever was 
thereby handed to the R. C. P. It is remarkable that Sir Alan Bullock 
did not comment in his biography of Bevin on the paradox of a Labour 
Minister of Labour being the only one in whose term of office there 
was a prosecution under this Act, yet wrote that Bevin sought 
repeal of the Act, (op. cit., 244). 
3 In his peroration, Maxton declared: 
I say this to Ernest Bevin and to the Prime Minister. 
If they really believe that the I. L. P. and the 
Trotskyists are associating together in a plot to 
stir up industrial trouble, don't let them go after 
the boys. I am the Parliamentary leader of the I. L. P. 
Let them haul me into the Courts and, if I get there 
before any judge who is fair-minded, the verdict will 
be "not guilty". 
(The New Leader, 15 April 1944-) 
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and conference unanimously condemned the arrests and in camera 
hearings of Newcastle Crown Court. The I. L. P. reaction was an 
important factor in spreading protest against the prosecutions, while 
the R. C. P. noted that an act aimed against the trade union movement 
was being used against Trotskyism. 
'This attack is a complete vindication of our whole 
perspective. It is a positive demonstration that we 
are in the van of the Labour movement; that the 
next period is ours. 
" 
After nearly five years of war, the sort of state action 
pre-war Trotskyism had forseen came about. The R. C. P. took the arrests 
as a signal to canvass vigorously for support. 
2 
When the War Cabinet 
came to discuss the industrial influence of Trotskyism it was 
surprisingly well-informed. 
3 Advice given to the Cabinet leant against 
I R. C. P. Circular, Following the Arrests, 12 April 1944, n. p. H. P. 
2 This had been the intention behind the despatch of Haston to the 
North. There seems to have been no dissent from the party leaders' 
decision to meet the challenge head-on, though E. L. Davis ceased 
his activities around this time. 
3 The War Cabinet met on 19 April 1944 and took note of a four page 
memorandum by Morrison, concise and largely accurate, with which an 
appendix, giving personal details of seven R. C. P. leaders, was 
printed. Morrison coolly analysed the situation which had permitted 
increasing R. C. P. activity and influence and concluded: 
These advantages are temporary and, unless the Trotskyists 
can exploit them much more rapidly than at present, it 
seems unlikely that they will ever rise to a greater 
position than that of sparring partners to the communists, 
who would very much like to see the Trotskyists and their 
small paper suppressed. 
(Memorandum by the Home Secretary, The Trotskyist Movement 
in Great Britain, 13 April 1944, Cabinet Papers, CAB66 49, 
folios 7-9A, W. P. (44) 202,4. ) See Appendix H. 
371. 
attributing great importance to Trotskyism, 
' but on 17 April Bevin 
outflanked his earlier critics by introducing in the House of Commons 
an addition to the Defence Regulations, Order in Council IA(a). 
IA(a) gave the government powers, additional to those it already 
possessed, to act on disputes in essential industries by imposing a 
fine of £500 or a prison sentence of up to five years. Bevin had 
taken new powers without exhausting the old, 
2 
and he had done it by 
extra-Parliamentary consultation rather than by vote. 
3 
He had 
travelled some way in the decade since his proud declaration to the 
Labour conference: 
'I do not like emergency powers, even when they are 
operated by my friends'. 
4 
I Morrison knew that WIL sent speakers to locations of industrial 
strife, 'but hitherto their influence has been almost negligible'. 
He argued against the use of 18B since it would be difficult to 
employ it against Trotskyists without also clobbering local strike 
leaders not opposed to the war. If a miner were to be the subject 
of an action under 18B, he argued, a widespread strike might result. 
Morrison was not complacent but felt the great majority of people 
had no desire to hinder prosecution of the war, (Use of Regulation 
18B against fomenters of strikes, 3. )" 
2 In addition to the Trades Disputes Act there was available Order 
1305, (introduced by Bevin in 1941), which banned strikes and lock- 
outs and bound parties to disputes to accept the rulings of 
arbitration courts. 
3 It emerged in the Commons debate of 28 April 1944 that Bevin had 
secured the prior approval of IA(a) of the General Council of the 
T. U. C. as well as that of employers' representatives. Will Lawther, 
the M. F. G. B. president had insisted in a speech that the Trotskyists 
be taken seriously and called for IA(a), (Tribune, 14 April 1944). 
4 This was a riposte to the legalistic revolutionary proposals of the 
Socialist League, (L. P. C. R. 1933,161). 
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The strong government line in April may have been a compound 
of anxiety to placate loyal T. U. C. leaders who felt threatened, 
I 
pre-D-Day nerves, and sensitivity to the situation in the pits, 
currently wracked with discontent. 
2 
Bevin's own case for the arrests 
was that he was faced with acts in furtherance of strikes, i. e. 
political acts. 
3 
The R. C. P. struggled to evaluate what his measures 
meant: there might be no more, there might be further arrests, or 
there might be outright suppression. 
4 
Whatever happened maximum open 
activity must be maintained, its members were told. 
5 This was the 
only sensible conclusion open to the Trotskyist movement, now offered 
the opportunity to escape from years of obscurity and isolation: 
'Far from going underground the capitalist class have put us 
on the map, and we must seize this favourable opportunity to 
conduct the widest possible forms of propaganda and recruiting'. 
6 
I Psychologically Bevin himself would have to be numbered among them. 
Some in the press had attributed his bitterness at Farnworth to 
injured pride at a loss of influence with the unions, (A. Bullock, 
op. cit., 269-70). 
2 M. Foot, (Aneurin Bevan, 1, (1966), 386-8), traces Bevin's public 
statements of concern against the mining background. 
3 Strikers had been arrested on a number of occasions earlier in the 
war, and nearly 2,000 of them had been convicted on various charges. 
The April arrests were unique, however, in covering those not on 
strike but assisting one. 
4 These three possibilities were discussed at a central committee of 
16/17 April 1944. 
5 The Central Committee took a number of decisions: to prepare a 
second line leadership, to appoint a special committee of three to 
review problems on a day by day basis, and to conduct the forth- 
coming trial politically, despite the risk of heavier sentences. 
They had a lawyer, Ajit Roy, (an Indian Trotskyist), available, 
but they resolved to hire a barrister for the trial 'and check his 
background for Stalinist sympathies', (C. C. Report, 19 April 1944, 
H. P., D. J. H. 15A/21,1). 
6 ibid., 2. 
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On 24 April 1944, a provisional defence coumaittee was formed 
in LondonI with a remit to provide legal aid for those arrested and 
others who might be, to support them and their dependants, and to pick 
out the class character of the measures. Two days. later the committee 
was strengthened with the addition of a number of M. P. s and others who 
had been associated with Trotskyism. 
2 After it gained further 
adherents the defence committee renamed itself the Anti-Labour Laws 
Victims Defence Committee, 3 and held its inaugural meeting on 9 May 
with Reg. Groves in the chair. An enthusiastic campaign was pushed 
into all corners of the country, usually by means of public meetings 
where prominent politicians were balanced with an R. C. P. member: 
On the Defence Committee, the British Trotskyists, for 
the first time, have a platform together with the 
established left reformist and centrist leaders of the 
Labour Movement. This fact has the effect of positively 
integrating Trotskyism as part of the Labour Movement in 
the eyes of the advanced workers. 
4 
I Initial members of the committee were Brockway, G. Pittock-Buss, 
Padley, Bob Turner, M. Kavanagh of the Freedom Association, Grant, 
and McGregor. V. Sastry of the Federation of Indian Associations 
was made provisional secretary. 
2 Sydney Silverman, Rhys Davies, McGovern, R. Blake and Sorenson were 
M. P. s who joined. Maxton was made chairman and W. G. Cove M. P. 
treasurer. John McNair, Dick Beech, Arthur Ballard and 
D. Ballantine were added as well. At a meeting in the House of 
Commons, only George Harney M. P. declined to join his fellow members 
on the committee, (A. L. L. V. D. C., Circular ,5 May 1944, Warwick 
M. S. Sý. John McNair mistakes the dates of Maxton's interest and that 
of the I. L. P. as 1943, (James Maxton, the beloved rebel, (1955), 
324). 
3 Early in May 1944, the most obvious ap in personnel was put right 
by the adherence of Aneurin Bevan. 
LA. 
L. L. V. D. C ] The Facts of the 
Case [June? 19441 reports that two more M. P. s, Alex Sloan and 
S. O. Davies, also joined. 
4 [R. C. P. ] Political Bureau, Political Letter, 24 May 1944,1. The 
R. C. P. discovered however that while I. L. P. M. P. s were wholeheartedly 
committed to the campaign, the more orthodox Labour M. P. s were more 
uneasy at association with Trotskyists. The R. C. P. believed that 
whereas Maxton always addressed a meeting if he could Aneurin Bevan, 
for example, was less determined. All local groups of the 
Continued with footnotes on following page. 
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The R. C. P. spoke of a 'limited united front', though 
invitations by Sastry to the Labour and Communist Parties to join the 
Committee were unsurprisingly rejected. No communists took part, and 
all Labour M. P. s acted in a personal capacity. As for the trade 
unions, a limited success was scored through support gained from local 
branches1 though there was strong national opposition to IA(a). 
2 
Given a new opportunity the R. C. P. reorientated itself to speak to a 
larger audience and called on its members to adopt a more positive 
attitude towards the Labour left. 
3 
Yet however flexible the R. C. P. 
might be, there could never be a bridge between its aims in the 
campaign and those of M. P. s They could not be expected to justify the 
party's political beliefs and were motivated either by a desire to 
defend the accused or to fight the attack on trade union rights. 
4 Continued from previous page. 
A. L. L. V. D. C. were established on R. C. P. initiative, ([R. C. P 
Political Bureau, Perspective of the Party Work on the A. L. L. V. D. C., 
(Sept. 1944), 1). 
1 Resolutions against the arrests were passed by Southall N. U. R., 
Trades Council and G. M. W. U.,; from Paddington N. U. R.; Newcastle 
Trades Council; Slough E. T. U. and Trades Council; Edmonton Trades 
Council; Camberwell National Society of Painters; Newark A. S. L. E. F.; 
A. E. U. branches in Mitcham, Thornton Heath and the Glasgow district 
committee, [A. L. L. V. D. C. ], The Facts of the Case, early June? 1944 
This list indicates that it required a Trotskyist presence to mount 
a trade union campaign in a locality. 
2 See below. 
3 [Some workers] 'are openly hostile to the right wing of the Labour 
and Trade Union movement. But to destroy their illusions in the 
"lefts" it is notsufficient that we denounce Bevan as we have done 
in the past. It. is necessary to be explanatory; to go through 
their experiences with them, calling on Bevan to match his words 
and gestures with deeds ' (Political Letter issued by the Political 
Bureau, (24 May 1944), H. P.; D. J. H. 12/3 ). 
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The Order came before the House of Commons on 28 April. 
Bevan moved a prayer that it be annulled and thus initiated the only 
occasion when the House debated the impact of Trotskyism. 
I Bevan 
ridiculed the suggestion that miners were brought out on strike by 
Trotskyists2 and accused Bevin of whipping up a scare in order to 
achieve easy passage of the Order. He defended the rights of the 
House and railed against imprisonment without trial. 
3 
Kirkwood, 
Bevan's seconder, followed him in scorn for the idea that Trotskyists 
could cause stoppages, and defended strikes as safety valves of 
society. 
4 
No supporters of the government took the floor and 
John McGovern and Sir Richard Acland had the chance to follow the main 
argument of the critics. 
5 
D. N. Pritt also spoke, and in the course of 
I There had been minor exchanges about WIL, inter alia, on 16 and 21 
July 1942, at the time of earlier miners' strikes, (see above). 
2 'Are we seriously asked to believe that these solid Yorkshire miners 
came out on strike because of a number of evilly-disposed 
Trotskyists? ' (H. C. Debs, Vol. 399, Col. 1065,28 April 1944). 
3 Holding the Trotskyists without trial and hearing their case in 
camera was, he charged, 'disgraceful, and shows the extent to which 
public morale had degenerated under the leadership we have at the 
present time'. (H. C. Debs, Vol. 399, Col. 1068,28 April 1944). 
Perhaps the strongest outcry over Bevan's biting speech was 
stimulated by his attacks on what he claimed was an unrepresentative 
T. U. C. For this and the debate, see M. Foot, op. cit., 390-402. 
4 Kirkwood focussed on Bevin's refusal to meet the apprentices and 
told that when he had been warned there would be a strike Bevin had 
retorted, 'we are ready for them'. 'The Minister of Labour', 
Kirkwood declared, 'is a man who has lost his soul', (H. C. Debs, 
Vol. 399, Col. 1076,28 April 1944). 
5 McGovern followed the R. C. P. argument that repression would establish 
it, not because of its policy but because of the heroism of some of 
its members, (ibid., Cols. 1086-92). Acland, amused by the way 
Pritt and Bevin played up the importance of Trotskyism, told the 
House the party had 500 members, total weekly expenses of £10 and a 
fortnightly press circulation of 5,000. 'This', he taunted, 'is 
the size of the organisation which, it is suggested, can bring 
130,000'miners out on strike', (ibid. 1092). 
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a remarkable contribution argued that Bevin should not have brought in 
a new Order when he already had adequate statutory powers. 
1 
Neil MacLean put perhaps the most pertinent question to the Minister: 
if there were so many instigators of unrest, why had the House heard 
only of four arrests and not hundreds? 
2 
But logic and oratorical 
skills were impotent against a well-drilled government majority, and 
the annulment fell with only twenty three votes behind it. 
3 
Outside 
parliament as well as inside there was a disposition to ridicule the 
government's action by the labour movement4 though not by the 
communists. 
5 
Supporters of the Order justified it by the claim that 
Is it really suggested that'the whole machinery of the law is 
powerless? ........ The whole law as it stands at present is not 
strong enough to deal with this Trotskyist instigation, say the 
Government. As I have said, I do not minimise this Trotskyist 
instigation; I think it is serious, and I think it has grown up 
partly because of the persistent refusal of the Home Secretary to 
do anything about it. The Home Secretary has two fiddles to play: 
Mr. E. Bevin: The hon. and learned member wants 18B? 
Mr. Pritt: Not only 18B but also 2D. 
The Government, instead of supplying paper for Socialist Appeal, 
should stop the paper itself. 
(H. C. Debs, Vol. 399, Col. 1107,28 April 1944. ) 
Bevin told Pritt that he had considered introducing Order IA(a) 
earlier in the war for use against the C. P. G. B., but had been fore- 
stalled when it ceased to believe that the war was imperialist. 
'The Trotskyists', he ruminated, 'were the "wee frees" who did not 
accept that'. Pritt, in his autobiography, made no reference to 
the case. 
2 ibid., Cols. 1138-9. 
3 All I. L. P. and C. W. members voted for the annulment. The noes 
totalled 314, which suggests that a bare majority of M. P. s were 
present to vote on this prime parliamentary occasion. 
4 See P. L. E. B., 'A Socialist's War Diary', The Plebs, (May 1944), 65; 
R. S. W. Pollard, 'Strikes and IAA', The Plebs (Aug. 1944), 98; 
D. G. MacRae, 'Organised Labour in War Time', Fabian Quarterly, 
(Jan. 1945), 74. 
5 The Daily Worker line on IA(a) evolved during April 1944 and by 
27 April it was reporting widespread opposition. Unlike other 
labour movement papers, however, it supported government action 
under existing powers: 
'For example, the Socialist Appeal could have been closed 
down under Regulation 2D and all matter published by the 
Trotskyists could have been stopped under Regulation 2C. 
There is also Regulation 18B, under which a number of 
Continued with footnotes on following page. 
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the Minister's present powers made it impossible for him to act against 
deliberate provocation. 
I 
The R. C. P. leaders understood this attack and 
adjusted to meet it. 
2 The four R. C. P. members were detained in 
Newcastle from the time of their arrest in early April until the 
hearing at Newcastle on 18-22 May, 
3 
when they were given bail. The 
court heard solicitors for the prosecution and the defence and also 
testimony from Bill Davy and other apprentices. Dr. Charlesworth, 
for the prosecution, disclaimed any intention to try the accused for 
their political opinions but still quoted from the apprentices' 
literature, yet his account of Trotskyist assistance seemed to concede 
5 Continued from previous page. 
Fascists, blood-brothers of the Trotskyists, are still 
held in detention. ' 
('Government already has power to deal with Trotskyists', 
The Daily Worker, 13 April 1944. ) 
WIL had protested against suppression of The Daily Worker: see 
Lift the Daily Worker ban, [1941? J , H. P., D. J. H. 14E/6. Socialist 
Appeal was at last beginning to suffer paper difficulties. In 1943 
it appeared for a time on narrower sheets than hitherto. The 
Cabinet in its 1944 discussion noted the paper's lack of difficulty 
with newsprint supply, (The Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain, 2). 
1 The Times, 19 April 1944. 
2 To the R. C. P. it seemed clear that IA(a) was intended to prevent 
those activities which were the raison d'etre of the M. W. F.: the 
coordination of policy, action and finance, and the exchange of 
information. Carrying on as before would be 'the worst sort of 
adventurism'. The central committee therefore switched the 
direction of the M. W. F. to activity through the trade union 
machinery and presented the change to the membership as a retreat 
in good order, (Political Letter issued by the Political Bureau, 
(24 May 1944), 4, H. P., D. J. H. 12/3) " 
3 They had been remanded again on 28 April, the day of the Commons 
debate. The proceedings were held in camera, a fact referred to in 
the debate by Bevan. 
4 Charlesworth presented to the Court three pamphlets, Appeal from the 
Tyneside Apprentices to the whole Organised Working Class, 
Apprentices fight the Pit Compulsion Ballot, and Appeal from the 
Tyneside Apprentices to the Miners. He argued that the apprentices' 
advocacy of resistance to the ballot and mines nationalisation was 
introduced from outside and suggested the leaflets were composed 
by Lee with Davy's assistance at Lee's Newcastle house, (Socialist 
Appeal, June 1944). 
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part of the defence's case. 
1 
'ý, 
Rutledge, for the defence, stuck closely 
to his brief and the witnesses - with one exception - backed him in 
blaming Bevin for the strike. 
2 This was a dress-rehearsal for the 
trial itself, held at Newcastle Crown Court on 13 June before 
Judge Cassels. 
3 The R. C. P. defendants had to face two charges under 
the Trades Disputes Act and had engaged Derek Curtis-Bennett K. C. to 
appear on their behalf. 
4 
Davy was again put in the box as were other 
apprentices, and their evidence was to force acquittal on the 
conspiracy charge. 
5 
The defendants used their chance to the full to 
1 After he had explained the sub-committees established to run the 
strike, Charlesworth continued, 
'Without them to develop such a scheme, it is very doubtful 
if the movement among the apprentices would have remained 
more than a budding movement, or that any strike at all 
would have occurred, or if it had occurred, would have 
assumed even such proportions as it did assume. ' 
(Socialist Appeal, June 1944. ) 
2 Davy testified that he had only met Lee and Keen late in December 
1943, and declared 'there would have been a strike if I had never 
met any of the accused'. The apprentices had already concluded that 
nationalisation of the mines would render conscription unnecessary, 
the provenance of which political idea was an important feature of 
the prosecution case. The exception was the Blyth apprentice 
Donnachie, the informant of The Daily Worker. Yet while Donnachie's 
evidence differed from that of the other seven apprentices called 
to the box, he was not opposed to a strike against the scheme, but 
to making mines nationalisation the issue on which they would come 
out, (ibid. ). 
3 There is no transcript of this trial, although shorthand writers 
attended. Socialist Appeal reported verbatim many speeches and 
exchanges and gave a generally full coverage. The Times published 
brief reports on each day's proceedings with few quotations. This 
account rests on the two papers' reports. Socialist Appeal claimed 
that the capitalist press was deliberately playing the trial down 
in its issue for June 1944. 
4 Curtis-Bennett was to prove unsatisfactory through his failure to 
cooperate with the party aim of treating the trial politically. 
The party also concluded that he did not even put forward the legal 
arguments as well as the defendants themselves might have done, 
(Statement to Members from the Political Bureau, (22 June 1944) 
H. P., D. J. H 12/4,1). He was not dismissed because it was felt 
that this would cause 'a sensation throughout the country'. 
5 See footnotes on following page. 
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explain their general interest in working class problems, not just in 
strikes. Heaton Lee argued that a conspiracy was impossible. 
Roy Tearse explained that the M. W. F. had a policy of coordinating 
struggles. Lee"added that Davy had not been a Trotskyist at the time 
of the strike, only becoming convinced later. Haston's advice to the 
apprentices, as told to the Court, was skilful but at times ingenuous. 
' 
The defence case concluded with the appearance of Tom Trewartha, 
chairman of the Barrow Strike Committee, who corroborated Tearse's 
presentation of M. W. F. activity, 
2 
and the summoning of Ernest Bevin 
himself, who testified about the application of the ballot scheme to 
5 From previous page. 
Paley Scott, the prosecuting counsel, warned the jury before Davy 
went into the witness box that he was a reluctant witness. Davy 
was emphatic as to the role of the accused: 
'Our object was to prevent apprentices being conscripted 
for the mines at any price. That was our view without 
the intervention of the four accused. None of the 
defendants ever addressed any public meeting advocating 
a strike. None of the four even advocated a strike 
privately. ' (Socialist Appeal, July 1944) 
In April, Morrison had written of the R. C. P., 'the party's slogan 
is not "Strike! ", but "Break the coalition : Labour to power"', 
(The Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain, 3). 
1 Haston told that he had advised against lobbying M. P. s until the 
apprentices realised how ineffective it would be. Once they saw 
through such activities they should undertake them for propaganda 
gains. Haston also told the Court that he had urged the apprentices 
to declare that they would observe the ballot if the mines were 
nationalised, but his advice was rejected in both cases, (Socialist 
Appeal, July 1944). 
2 Trewartha appeared for the defence by unanimous decision of his 
district committee of the A. E. U., (Interview with R. Tearse, Nov. 
1973). Trewartha compared Tearse's role on the Tyne with that he 
had played at Barrow, an important parallel, for the prosecution 
had projected him as the apprentices' eminence grise. Socialist 
Appeal commented on the improbability of this since Tearse, at 
twenty-five years of age, was only three years older than some of 
the apprentices. Trewartha, it transpired, had been approached by 
the police some weeks earlier, to testify for the prosecution, 
(ibid. ). 
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the apprentices. 
' Judge Cassels summed up for more than three hours 
and, in a passage which was to draw the attention of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, virtually directed the jury to bring in a guilty 
verdict on the charge that the accused had acted in furtherance of an 
illegal strike. 
2 This they did, but acquitted all four on the various 
conspiracy charges. 
3 
Cassels sentenced Lee and Tearse to twelve 
months apiece, Haston to six and directed that Ann Keen be released 
at once. 
4 
Inconsistencies were to be picked out by the Court of 
Appeal and must be traceable in part to this beinga unique prosecution 
I Bevin denied that his conversation with Kirkwood had ever taken 
place: he had not known the apprentices were waiting on him but 
would not, in any case, have received them. He claimed his job was 
to meet with official bodies only, whereas the T. A. G. was unofficial. 
While he had once given exemption from the scheme to the Tyneside 
lads, changing circumstances of war meant that he had to withdraw 
it. Millie Lee reported he was 'shaking like a leaf' while in the 
box, (Socialist Appeal, July 1944). His appearance there was a 
singular omission from Lord Bullock's biography. 
2 'It is not necessary that the act in furtherance of an illegal 
strike should be during the actual time of the strike; it may be 
an act which could reasonably be regarded, upon the evidence, as an 
act in preparation for the strike and that the strike was an 
illegal one, (The Times Law Reports, Vol. 171,11 Nov. 1944, 
288-9). 
3 Socialist Appeal for July 1944 damned the jury as middle class types 
with not one worker among them. 
4 There was little evidence against Keen, amounting chiefly to the 
charge that she had typed out a letter and pamphlet under Lee's 
and Davy's direction. She was sentenced to thirteen days, which 
she had of course already served. Though Haston received a shorter 
sentence, he had not of course been active on Tyneside. Ebullient 
to the end, Haston told the judge he hoped to serve his class as 
well as he (the judge) had served his, (Socialist Appeal, July 1944). 
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under the 1927 Act. 
1 Cassels' interpretation of the 'in furtherance' 
formula had established a precedent which might have wide application. 
2 
Under the circumstances it is remarkable that the National Council of 
Civil Liberties took no serious interest in the case. 
3 
Wide potential application of the 'in furtherance' 
provision of the 1927 Act, under Cassels' precedent, boosted the 
A. L. L. V. D. C. 's activities. Old Trotskyists rallied round4 and meetings 
were held around the country to demand the release of the incarcerated 
1 The word illegal effectively meant political under the Act, and the 
apprentices' action qualified by being aimed at coal industry 
nationalisation. 
2 This may have been an extra thrust behind eventual removal. Yet it 
is surely misleading to project the 1946 repeal by Labour as a 
linear development and to shake out the contradictions in Bevin's 
role: 
As things turned out the unions had to wait for another 
fifteen years by which time not only did they have a Labour 
Government with a majority large enough to make easy the 
fulfillment of the party's programme, but they had as its 
most poweful member a man who had been at the centre of the 
General Strike, Ernest Bevin. 
(D. F. MacDonald, The State and the Trade Unions (1960), 
109-110. ) 
3 H. Pelling, (Britain and the Second World War (1970), 316) alleges 
that the Council simply did not take up the case of those of whose 
politics it disapproved. The R. C. P. was convinced the N. C. C. L. 
was under communist influence. Ewart A. Prince, 'Civil Liberty 
in Great Britain', (University of London Ph. D. thesis, 1950) makes 
no mention of the case. The Anarchists were another non-communist 
group to experience N. C. C. L. indifference, (G. Woodcock, The 
Crystal Spirit, (1970), 20-3). After the appeal R. C. P. members 
were urged to keep local committees in being and work for 'a real 
Labour Defence organisation'. 
4 Sara made himself available as speaker (H. Pratt, (acting secretary, 
A. L. L. V. D. C. ) to Sara; H. Sara to Pratt, 17 June 1944, (Warwick 
M. S. S. ) ). Groves chaired meetings in Birmingham and South-West 
London. 
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three. 
1 An important trade union campaign built up over 1A(a) and a 
powerful challenge was posed to T. U. C. endorsement. 
2 
The 1927 Act 
was a symbol and it had been used against the R. C. P. Order IA(a) was 
an unspecific threat. Yet IA(a) was never used and even the 
apprentices were not charged. 
3 
The decision to act against the 
Trotskyists was certainly not motivated by wild government misjudgment 
I Ann Keen was much in demand as the only one of the accused at 
liberty. She and Millie Lee were offered space from which to run 
the campaign at the I. L. P. head office, when the. R. C. P. centre at 
Harrow Road was menaced by flying bombs (interview with Ann Finkel 
(Keen), July 1974). At a6 August 1944 meeting, chaired by 
Dick Beech, Ernest Silverman, one of the speakers, told of how he 
had warned Haston that an appeal might double his sentence and that 
Haston had replied this did not matter if trade union rights were 
asserted, (The New Leader, 12 Aug. 1944). 
2 N. U. D. A. W. at its annual conference demanded the withdrawal of IA(a) 
after hearing its acting general secretary Alfred Burrows ridicule 
the idea that the Trotskyists might be responsible for the 
apprentices' movement. The Scottish T. U. C. and S. W. M. F. added their 
condemnation of IA(a). In the autumn, the Trades Union Congress 
accepted an invitation to approve of IA(a) and the conduct of the 
General Council at the time of its introduction by 3,686,000 to 
2,802,000. One surprising convert to opposition, in view of his 
wartime record, was A. E. U. president Jack Tanner. 
3 At the May hearing, Bill Davy had told of three consecutive days 
interrogation he had undergone at Wallsend Police Station. It was 
suggested to him at the time that he could go to prison, but nothing 
came of it.. 
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of R. C. P. strength. 
I Among the communists there was considerably more 
concern. 
2 Lee, Tearse and Haston remained in Durham Jail for two and 
a half months. On 24 August 1944 Judge Wrottesley of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal-, ruled that their acts could not have been in further- 
ance of a strike since they had preceded it. 
3 
They were set at 
liberty but had been removed from activity for a crucial phase of the 
war. Cassels' controversial ruling still stood however. 
4 
******* 
I Morrison knew the exact London membership, (though he exaggerated 
the national figure). He could make a shrewd evaluation of the 
R. S. L., 'stultified by internal strife' and devastatingly predicted 
that the R. C. P. under present leadership was unlikely to submit to 
dictatorship from the Fourth International. He had seen the 1943 
accounts of WIL, and could make a subtle comparison of the communists 
and the Trotskyists. The strongest probability is that there was an 
informant within WIL who, by providing documents and knowledgeable 
opinions, gave Morrison the data from which to draw his perspicacious 
conclusion: 
'These advantages are temporary and, unless the Trotskyists 
can exploit them much more rapidly than at present, it seems 
unlikely that they will ever rise to a greater position than 
that of sparring partners to the communists, who would very 
much like to see the Trotskyists and their small paper 
suppressed. ' (The Trotskyist Movement in Great Britain, 1. ) 
This memorandum is produced in full as Appendix H. 
2 In the wake of the trial, the C. P. G. B. brought out the last of its 
wartime attacks on the Trotskyists, J. R. Campbell's Trotskyist 
Saboteurs (1944). Campbell's pamphlet was full of knockabout 
stuff: all Grant knew of the British working class movement might 
have been picked up 'on back veldt'; Haston's contribution to the 
workers' cause in Edinburgh might be written on the back of a Id 
stamp; Roy Tearse was a third rate inefficient shop steward. Yet 
there was some nervousness in Campbell's deployment of a quote 
from 'a working woman' who had heard the R. C. P. defence: 'what 
kind of communists are these? They are even against Stalin'. 
Campbell's plea for publicity to bring the Trotskyists into the 
light of day did not compel conviction. At the end of the war, the 
C. P. G. B. called for removal of the 1927 Act and IA(a) from the 
statute book, (Britain for the People, [1945], 17). 
3 Key guidance for the Appeal Court came from a House of Lords ruling 
that a strike could only be furthered during its course, Conway v. 
Wade, 1909. Cassels had ignored this in a three hour summing up. 
But this ruling was inconsistent with acquittal of the four on the 
conspiracy charge so Wrottesley upheld the Appeal. (The Weekly 
Notes, 14 Oct. 1944,200; The Law Times, 11 Nov. 1944,287-9). 
The Daily Worker, which had not closely followed the trial did not 
report the successful Appeal. 
4 A. L. L. V. D. C., A Victory for Labour! (1944). 
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The International was euphoric about R. C. P. success during 
the apprentices' dispute. 
I The R. C. P. itself was more balanced yet 
optimistic between the Trial and the Appeal. 
2 
After the Appeal there 
was a period of-victory rallies. 
3 
But the Defence Committee had been 
the party's main field of work for some months4 and with the 
successful Appeal this phase of activity came to an end. The M. W. F., 
which had since the arrests operated with restraint, did not take off, 
and in the end the anticipated wave of industrial unrest failed to 
materialise. The arrests and the introduction of,! A(a) played their 
part in straining relations both within the Labour Party and the 
T. U. C. however. They contributed to bringing nearer that moment when 
there would be a rupture in the wartime coalition: that fact in itself 
meant a change, as Morrison foresaw, in the circumstances which had 
I J. B. Stuart's belief that the Welsh miners had 'seen through Bevan 
and the communists' was quite mad,. ('A Brief Report on England', 
Fourth International, June 1944,168). 
2 The fact that they were found not guilty on the conspiracy and 
incitement charges is a victory for us, particularly in the light 
of the vicious press campaign directly or indirectly accusing the 
comrades of instigating and inciting the Tyne Apprentices and other 
strikes. It completely vindicates our contention that we do not 
incite or conspire to bring workers out on strike as the capitalist 
press and the Labour and Stalinist leaders were charging, but that 
the workers come out on strike only when they have a genuine and 
legitimate grievance. (Statement to Members from the Political 
Bureau, 22 June 1944,1 ). 
3A large rally was held in Glasgow with some communist stewards on 
the platform, (interview with R. Tearse, Nov. 1973). The R. C. P. 
could also consider its decision to rely as much as possible on 
legal and open activity vindicated. 
4 Socialist Appeal claimed that soldiers abroad were following the 
case and quoted a headline from an Eighth Army paper, 'Right to 
Strike is one of the freedoms we are fighting for'. 
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allowed the Trotskyists to gain ground. In 1943, before the trial, 
Grant claimed that WIL had ceased to be 'an entirely insignificant 
sect' because of its role in industry. WIL and the R. C. P. played their 
hand to the full, 
1 but their opportunities were limited and ended with 
the war. As for the Trades Disputes Act and Order IA(a), the one was 
repealed by the Attlee government in 1946 without ever being used again 
as a basis for prosecution, and the other was never used at all and 
lapsed, of necessity, when the war ended. 
2 
'But the remarkable feature of industrial relations in the Second 
World War, as compared with twenty five years earlier, is the 
relatively small proportion of trouble due to strikes, and the almost 
entire absence of political motivation in the strikes that did take 
place', (H. Pelling, Britain and the Second World War, (1970), 
250). 
2 'Our Party was the instrument through which the ruling class 
suffered a defeat on this issue. For the first time the limits 
within which legal work can be conducted have been fixed by the 
precedent of this trial .... ' (R. C. P. Political Bureau, 
Perspective of the Party Work On The A. L. L. V. D. C., LJuly 1944i3, 
H. P., D. J. H. 15B/5, I ). 
'ý. 
PART THREE 
(1944 - 1949) 
386. 
XII THE R. C. P. AND THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL 
(1944 - 1947) 
At the end of the war the structure of international 
Trotskyism was rebuilt. As in the 1930s, its chief presence was in 
Europe, where the British were the only Trotskyists who had maintained 
unbroken legal activity throughout the war. In 1944-7 it was the 
British who proved the most flexible Trotskyist interpreters of post- 
war political and economic phenomena in Europe, many of which had not 
been anticipated in the seminal Transitional Programme of 1938. 
However, international leadership remained in the hands of thinkers 
unable to break with pre-war ideological categories, and against whom 
neither the R. C. P. nor other critics were able to assemble a majority. 
This was the case before and after the return of the World Trotskyist 
Centre to Paris. For its part, the R. C. P. during these three years 
failed to compile a rounded alternative analysis to the official 
viewpoint of the Fourth International. 
War destroyed the fragile structure of European Trotskyism. 
Some national sections were underground or in exile even before 1939. 
The outbreak of hostilities led to transference of the international 
centre to the United States. By 1940 the only Trotskyists in Europe 
operating legally were, to their initial surprise, the British. This 
is not to argue that activity did not take place in Occupied Europe. 
The fissiparous French, working at first under exceptionally difficult 
conditions, 
I 
maintained publication of journals2 and were prime movers 
I When the Germans occupied France Trotsky's books, unlike Stalin's 
were banned. (G. Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution, 
(1961), 199-200. ) 
2 From August 1940 the French published seventy three issues of 
La Verite: nineteen duplicated and fifty four printed. 
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in convening the international gatherings of August 1943 and February 
1944. Across Europe, there were other groups working in clandestinity 
but until these gatherings met they were isolated. 
1 
The August 1943 
meeting brought representatives from five countries to Paris and 
established a provisional European Secretariat. 
2 
That of February 
1944, again in Paris, had a similarly broad base and elected an 
executive as well as a secretariat. 
3 
This was the European structure 
of Trotskyism at D-Day, which was to bring in its train renewed 
legality. The I. E. C. elected at the Emergency World Conference of May 
1940 barely functioned during the war. It was isolated from the heart 
of the world movement, which was Europe, and suffered from being 
dominated by the Socialist Workers Party although, technically, that 
body could not take part. 
4 
Its only functioning limb was an 
I They were also, 'for the most part .... changed from top to bottom, 
and their leaderships almost wholly replenished by youthful 
elements', (P. Frank, op. cit., 62). 
2 French, Belgian, Greek, Spanish and German delegates attended in 
the hope or organising a conference of European sections. Following 
this meeting two duplicated issues of Quatrieme Internationale were 
published and the journal appeared in printed format from January 
1944.1 (R. J. Alexander, Trotskyism in Latin America (Stanford, 
U. S. A., 1973), 13. ). 
3 Delegates from five countries attended, including representatives 
of three French sections, two Spanish factions and a Greek emigre 
living in Paris. 
4 The Voorhuis Act (1940) forbade labour organisations in the United 
States to affiliate to an international. The S. W. P. formally 
withdrew from the F. I. and appeared henceforth as the 'New Zealand' 
section in internal documents. 
388. 
International Secretariat divided within itself1 and regarded, by the 
R. C. P. at least, as an outpost of the S. W. P. 
2 
WIL and the R. S. L. had 
both been in contact with the International Secretariat through 
correspondence and occasional visits. 
3 After the R. C. P. was launched 
there was a sharp clash with the I. S. over recognition for the new 
Manifesto Group in Italy which was broadly, but not precisely, 
identified with the current Trotskyist programme. 
4 
The R. C. P., with 
I The I. S. was reorganised on several occasions between 1943 and 1946. 
From March 1944 its effective members were E. R. _Frank and Daniel Logan, an S. W. P. member and political ally of Felix Morrow. 
Frank was a supporter of Cannon's leadership of the S. W. P., of 
which regime Logan, like Morrow, was increasingly a critic. Three 
years later Natalia Trotsky, George Munis and Benjamin Peret 
deplored the wartime record: 
The I. S. and the I. E. C., which had been designated at 
the emergency conference of 1940 had only a vegetative 
political existence and led an almost non-existent 
organic activity during the whole war, the functioning 
of these bodies having been paralysed by personal and 
political struggles in the atmosphere of the American 
section. 
(The Fourth International in Danger, 27 June 1947,7, 
H. P., D. J. H. 12/79 ) 
2 R. C. P. leaders also saw their own Minority as a fraction of the S. W. P. 
in Britain, (C. C. Minutes, I Sept. 1945). There was a parallel poli- 
tical development by van Gelderen, a supporter of the economic view 
of the British majority and Felix Morrow: see van Gelderen's 
letter of 22,23 March 1945 to the R. C. P. and his 15 March 1945 
letter to the S. W. P. complaining of the 'third periodism' of an 
article in Fourth International. For the emergence within the R. C. P. 
of a Minority convinced of the need to enter the Labour Party, see 
Chapter XIII. 
3 WIL was in touch with the I. S. throughout the war and of course had 
been visited by J. B. Stuart, Lou Cooper and others of the S. W. P. 
Grant visited the S. W. P. in December 1943, (A. M. Wald, James T. 
Farrell : the revolutionary socialist years, (New York, 1978), 
photo facing p. 84). 
4 The Manifesto Group applied for affiliation to the F. I. after being 
contacted by van Gelderen, among others. On 2 January 1944 the I. S. 
rejected the Group on the grounds that it disagreed with Trotsky's 
tentative position on Russia and stood for the F. I., (implying 
such a body did not yet exist). In 'Trotskyism and the European 
Revolution', (Militant, N. Y., 13 May 1944) the I. S. sharply 
criticised the Group and, in the view of one Italian leader, invited 
other sections to break off relations with it. 
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other sections, argued for friendliness as well as firmness with 
emergent European sections. 
' I. S. handling of the Italians fuelled 
general discontent with it. 
2 
The R. C. P. called for the transference 
of the World Centre back to Europe while harbouring some misgivings 
about what the sections on the Continent represented. 
3 
It also 
voiced disquiet about the involvement of the I. S. in party affairs 
via the backing it provided for the British Minority. 
4 
In the last 
months of 1945 the I. S. seems to have disintegrated from within5 and 
I The R. C. P. wrote that the Group represented 'the first concrete 
signs of an internationalist Trotskyist tendency in Italy'. 
(To the I. S. from the R. C. P., 20 May 1944; see also From the I. S. 
. to the R. C. P., 20 May 1944, 
H. P. ). The Spanish Trotskyists, 
currently in Mexican exile projected the I. S. as an S. W. P. front 
and reminded it that the Russian question was not closed. 
Correspondence between the I. S. and the Spaniards, as well as the 
Italians' letters of adherence are in For the Information of the 
Members, (May 1945), H. P., D. J. H. 12/23. 
2 The exclusion of the Italians had occasioned a clash between Frank, 
who favoured it, and Logan. The Spaniards thought I. S. 
intransigence likely to lead to the Italians lining up with 
Shachtman and called for a World Congress to be convened before any 
further exclusions took place. 
3 The R. C. P. political bureau called for a European Bureau, with a 
decisive vote to the British in view of the Europeans' lack of 
basis, to be established in London. The party's central committee 
endorsed this call on 11 November 1944 with Betty Hamilton and 
David James abstaining. News of the European conference must have 
been known at least as early as the April-May 1944 issue of 
Quatrieme Internationale. The R. C. P. call met with no success. 
4 The R. C. P. claimed that the I. S. did not always deal with its 
leaders but maintained contact with 'selected members in the Party', 
and also complained of the circulation in the International Bulletin 
of a misleading account of the Fusion Conference. In autumn 1945 
the R. C. P. central committee resolved, after an angry discussion, 
to raise the whole matter of informal contacts at the highest level, 
(C. C. Minutes, I Sept. 1945). 
5 Following a row over the disposal of funds Logan wrote to the I. E. C. 
and E. E. C. calling for the latter to assume the duties of an 
international centre. He remarked that the R. C. P., 'is not 
represented on either committee although it is one of our strongest 
sections', (D. Logan, To the I. E. C. and the E. E. C., 20 Oct. 1945, 
Internal Bulletin, 1945? , H. P. ). 
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and lost much standing outside. 
' The body elected by the 1946 
conference of the Fourth International - the first representative 
gathering since 1946 - was quite different in personnel. 
The European Executive Committee became a more solid body 
during 1945,2 though it did not have to defend its ideas at an 
international conference until the following year. Like the S. W. P. it 
nurtured expectations of extreme and immediate crisis: there would be 
a 'relatively rapid' movement to workers' power or a turn to fascism, 
a January 1945 resolution of the E. E. C. declared. 
3 
Even the slightest 
demand would, in its view, put a strain on the regimes of Europe. 
R. C. P. distaste for the American-based I. S. did not imply any great 
confidence in the leaders of European Trotskyism. Pierre Frank, who 
had passed much of the war in Britain, was one of those who did not 
enjoy good relations with the British, but was a leading member of the 
Executive Committee. In 1945 he clashed with the R. C. P. several times 
I Munis backed Logan's proposal, (G. Munis, To the I. E. C. and the E. E. C., 
9 Nov. 1945, ibid. ). The R. C. P. political bureau informed its 
Central Committee in December 1945 that a 'grave situation' existed 
in the I. S. and the committee resolved to support the proposed 
transfer: 
'Europe today is the centre of political life, and ... 
the E. E. C. is the most representative body in the 
International. ' 
(P. B. report to R. C. P. C. C., 1/2 Dec. 1945; J. Haston 
to Logan, 10 Dec. 1945, H. P. ) 
2 It held four plenums during 1945. By the end of the year represent- 
ation had built up to eight sections and the European Secretariat 
was in touch with Italians, Irish and Danes. 
3 'An "interim" era of a relatively prolonged duration up to the 
decisive triumph, either of the socialist revolution or once again 
that of fascism is proving to be impossible. ' 
(Fourth International, N. Y., June 1945,172. ) 
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over French and European matters, and was one of those who argued that 
pre-war statements of the Fourth International had a timeless value. 
1 
The R. C. P. felt that he and others avoided specifics in the guiding 
resolutions they produced and relied too greatly on attitudes struck 
in a different era. When the European Secretariat produced its key 
resolution in anticipation of the imminent conference of the 
International, the R. C. P. central committee determined in February 1946 
to seek a lengthy series of changes. 
2 
Their drift was that 
stabilisation and not crisis was the immediate character of affairs in 
Europe3 and that democracy would be maintained; 
4 
that there should be 
self-criticism of earlier Trotskyist statements on European diplomatic 
threats5 and that there should be an unequivocal call for the withdrawal 
of the Red Army as well as other occupying forces. 
6 
The Central 
I In challenging an assessment of the political character of the 
French government by Grant, Frank countered by arguing that 
Bolshevik-Leninists had since 6 February 1934 declared the French 
regime to be 'bonapartist' in character, (P. Frank, 'Father 
Loriquet', History of P. C. I. and P. O. I. 1940-44, Internal Bulletin, 
1 Dec. 1945, H. P. ). 
2 Harold Atkinson's criticism that the E. S. resolution was defective 
in generalisation and economic anlysis was upheld with only James 
abstaining, (Special C. C. 9/10 Feb. 1946, H. P. ). 
3 Tearse proposed the inclusion of a passage on partial stabilisation, 
while Haston argued stabilisation was already taking place, albeit 
within a general framework of decline. James added that the chief 
factor for stabilisation was U. S. loans. Haston's view was adopted 
with Healy and Goffe abstaining, (ibid. ). 
4 It was Lawrence who abstained support for an amendment claiming that 
the U. S. A. was compelled to rely, in Europe, on bourgeois-democratic 
methods. 
5 Harber's rejection of any possibility that the U. S. S. R. might 
collapse this way was resoundingly carried. 
6 There was some Minority confusion over this matter. Lawrence moved 
the need for a clear position on the Red Army. In the division, 
Goffe voted against but Healy voted with the Majority to help carry 
Lawrence's proposal eleven to one, (ibid., 5). 
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Committee also put itself on record that the European Secretariat had 
no revolutionary perspectives for China and underestimated that 
country's ability to win national independence. When the Minority 
moved a resolution condemning Morrow it was voted down nine to two. 
The Founding Congress of the Fourth International had given 
certain international responsibilities to the British. C. L. R. James 
had a strong interest in colonial questions and had secured agreement 
that his country should devise a colonial programme and an international 
colonial bureau. 
' 
Nothing seems to have come of this and James was, 
in any case, removed from the I. E. C. within two years. But Workers 
International League took a special interest in the fate of. other 
sections, notably the Indians2 and the Irish. 
3 
Both WIL and R. S. L. 
members in the armed forces used the opportunity to make contact in 
foreign lands. 
4 
In 1944, before D-Day, the most impressive Trotskyist 
organisation in Europe was surely the R. C. P. although it could 
obviously take no part in the elementary rebuilding taking place on the 
mainland. The R. C. P., like the WIL before it, had played a role in 
holding together the semblance of an international network and it was, 
of course, at a peak of influence in its own country. Its absence from 
the deliberations of the Trotskyists on the mainland contributed to 
their incomprehension. of changes which followed the Allied invasion of 
Europe. The political thought of the R. C. P. and the Europeans never 
converged. 
1 Documents, 302. 
2 Discussion documents on India prepared by WIL and the Bolshevik- 
Leninists of India were published in WIN in 1942 and 1943. Ajit Roy, 
a lawyer from Bombay, was a member of WIL's central committee. 
3 The Irish section was established by WIL early in the war at the 
time of the attempt to set up an alternative centre in exile. 
4 Most assiduous in this respect was van Gelderen who contacted 
Trotskyists in Italy. 
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While war continued in Europe, Trotskyist thinking stayed 
close to the forecasts of the Transitional Programme. The Italian 
Revolution was interpreted by the British and the infant European 
Secretariat as the harbinger of great events. WIL predicted instability 
and the impossibility of a democractic era following the war. 
I 
The 
Europeans went further and anticipated a rapid collapse of Stalin's 
regime either as the result of world revolution or military 
intervention by the west. 
2 
The S. W. P., to increasing disquiet within 
its own ranks, predicted more or less immediate revolution. 
3 
As the 
months passed however, it emerged that there was a different emphasis 
in these predictions of crisis. The British anticipated progress for 
the workers' movement while the Europeans and the S. W. P. emphasised 
'A victory for British and American imperialism cannot herald a new 
blossoming of bourgeois democracy on the Continent of Europe', 
(E. Grant, 'Italian Revolution - and the tasks of the British 
Workers', WIN, Aug. 1943,3). Grant argued that there would however 
be no army - except the Americans at first - which would be prepared 
to suppress revolutionary movements. The WIL Central Committee 
told its 1943 conference of its belief that the social basis for 
reaction had evaporated, but that Trotskyist weakness would allow 
social democracy and Stalinism to be the first beneficiaries of a 
shift to the left, ('A New Stage in History and the Tasks of the 
Working Class', WIN (Sept. 1943), 4). 
2 'The Transformation of the Imperialist War into Civil War', 
Fourth International, (March 1945), 82. Here it was claimed that 
the Fourth International constituted 'the essential base of the 
European Revolution'. The other key factors weighed by the 
Europeans were the advance of the Red Army, and the prospect of 
revolution in Germany. 
3 The S. W. P. scorned 'shallow observers and would-be Marxists (who) 
had predicted a new organic era of capitalist stabilisation and 
development, and a new flowering of bourgeois democracy', 
('The Eleventh Convention of the American Trotskyist Movement', 
Fourth International, (N. Y. ) Dec. 1944,358). By this was meant 
the views of Felix Morrow and others who had from October 1943 
challenged, cautiously at first, the party's simple-minded applica- 
tion of the Transitional Programme to post-war developments in 
Europe. 
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the power of the state and the military and forecast repression. 
1 
The R. C. P. grew restive at the failure of the I. S. to provide 
theses which would guide the European Trotskyists as Nazi hegemony 
crumbled. At the time of the Normandy invasion it advanced its own 
view of the likely course of events. 
2 When the next few months brought 
forth no guidance from the United States, it went further and took up a 
position on the'national question. 
3 
This entailed criticism of 
liberation movements, a perspective of democracy in Europe and 
reaffirmation of resistance to the ideas of the I. K. D., a German emigre 
group resident in London. 
4 
Both the R. C. P. 's'D-Day view and its thesis 
I Thus the S. W. P. resolved fifty one to five at its November 1944 
convention, against Morrowite opposition, that the 'allied 
imperialists do not desire the revival of European economy to a 
competitive level', that post-war socialist or communist governments 
would be 'unstable, shortlived and transitional in character', 
('Revolutionary Perspectives', ibid., 367-9). Morrow's argument was 
that transitional slogans could not be abandoned, that fascism may 
have planted illusions in bourgeois democracy, that the rival 
imperialisms at war in Europe were not equally predatory. 
(Peter Jenkins gives a useful summary of Morrow's developing views 
in Where Trotskyism Got Lost (1977). See also the criticisms made 
by D. Logan, Morrow's ally, (Fourth International (N. Y. ) Feb. 1945, 
63) of a draft resolution before the S. W. P. national committee. 
Logan and Morrow argued that ultra-left formulations must be 
corrected if the theses drawn up in America were to be of any value 
to European Trotskyists). 
2 This was a political bureau resolution, 'Second Front and the Tasks 
of the Working Class', (Socialist Appeal, June 1944). 
3 Resolution on the National Question in Europe, 11 Nov. 1944, H. P., 
D. J. H. 12/10a. The resolution was later published in WIN, (July - 
Aug. 1945), 6-7. 
4 Walter Held, an I. K. D. leader killed by the Nazis in 1941, first 
sketched out their ideas in Europe under the Iron Heel (Sept. 1940). 
'The National Question - Three Theses' (WIN, April 1943,9-11) 
advanced the view that fascism in Europe was a new social epoch and 
that the Fourth International would not struggle for a Socialist 
United States of Europe, but for democratic liberties. WIL 
published the theses with firm criticism. 
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on the national question were criticised by minorities within. By 
the end of 1944 the R. C. P. position was that there should be 
independent workers' formations within the resistance, that they could 
not be absorbed'since history had not been rolled back to the point 
where only democratic tasks lay ahead. The basic slogans of the 
Transitional Programme were, the party held, still valid, but there 
was also a place-for 'transitional democratic slogans' to arouse the 
masses. 
2 
The proletariat would not aim at bourgeois democracy in post- 
war Europe but bourgeois democracy was what it would get, at least for 
a time. The R. C. P. predicted counter-revolution in a democratic form, 
3 
but like other European sections4 was militantly opposed to making a 
democratic orientation the main emphasis of Fourth International 
I Arthur Cooper opposed any apparent concession to the view that 
genuine liberation was taking place: the French masses, he believed, 
were unwitting tools of American imperialism, ('Opposition Minority 
Position at the Central Committee, July 1944', H. P.,. D. J. H. 12/7,2c, 
2). Cooper abstained when the Political Bureau's resolution came 
before the Central Committee in November. But the Central Committee 
decision was criticised also from the right, by 'W. G. ', who thought 
it analysed national oppression insufficiently deeply, (Internal 
Bulletin, (Jan. [19451), H. P., D. J. H. 8B/8). 
2 Resolution on the National Question in Europe, (WIN, July-Aug. 1945, 
6-7). 
3 It was this belief which separated it from Morrow who did not see 
democracy in Europe as a cloak for counter-revolution. Compare 
E. Grant, 'The Character of the European Revolution', WIN (Oct. 1945), 
8-17 with Morrow's formulations in 'The First Phase of the Coming 
European Revolution', Fourth International (N. Y., Dec. 1944), 
369-77. 
4 1944 had brought renewed activity by the I. K. D. The European sections 
rejected its views as 'the conception of those for whom at night 
all cats are grey' and imbued with a popular front spirit, 
('Against a Revisionist Tendency', Internal Bulletin, (July 1944) ). 
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propaganda. 
I 
But while there was fairly general agreement that fascism 
had not levelled all differences, there were distinct emphases in the 
British and European presentations. The R. C. P. was convinced that 
the bourgeoisie would lean on 'Stalino-reformist agents'and that this 
would constitute not a democratic revolution but a preventitive 
democratic counter-revolution. 
2A 
swing to the left was impending: 
3 
popular indignation at Nazism would bubble over, it thought, into a 
struggle for economic and social rights. There was little basis on 
which reaction might develop, but since the proletariat did not yet 
support revolutionary parties it could not realise its full strength. 
A period of ideological confusion must follow with 'Kerensky' or 
popular front governments pushed to the fore. That was why the 
tactical orientation of the Trotskyist forces was of vital importance 
in the period opening up. 
4 
I Assistance given by WIL and the R. C. P. to the German emigres of the 
I. K. D. and other former German communists who moved to Trotskyism 
following the dissolution of the Comintern did not imply political 
support. Peter Nicholls, one R. C. P. member, did back the I. K. D., 
('On the National Question in Europe', Internal Bulletin, (1945), 
H. P. ). The official view, however, was that of Grant, that the 
I. K. D. had 'succumbed to the pressure of the petit-bourgeois 
reaction'. The European sections appealed to the I. S. to take a 
stand on the I. K. D. but stopped short of calling for expulsion, 
('Against_a Revisionist Tendency', loc. cit., 5). 
2 E. Grant, 'The Character of the European Revolution', WIN, (Oct. 
1945), 8-17. In a draft of the resolution on the national question 
discussed above, it had been written 'the fact that the revolution 
which is approaching in Europe can only be the proletarian 
revolution does not exclude the possibility that the Allied 
European bourgeoisie in their struggle against the revolution may 
not adopt the methods of bourgeois democracy' ('National Question', 
(n. d. ), H. P. D. J. H. 12/10,5). 
3 There was widespread expectation in the F. I. that the collapse of 
Nazism would precipitate revolution in Germany. But Germany was 
also thought likely to be the only exception to strong communist 
influence within post-war European labour movements. 
4 [R. C. P. ], European Revolution and the British Working Class, n. d., 
H. P., D. J. H. 12/18 .A March 1945 central committee meeting 
demanded that the I. S. issue documents on a number of world 
developments on which it had not pronounced, (Minutes of the C. C., 
17 March 1945,3, H. P. ). 
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As in the West, so in the East. Trotsky had predicted that 
Stalinist Russia could not survive the war. 
I Not only did this prove 
false but the Soviet borders effectively expanded to embrace half of 
Europe , courtesy of the Red Army. WIL, whose perspectives were to 
dominate the R. C. P., had shared this perspective. 
2 
The R. C. P. 
attempted to explain Soviet survival and military success with 
conditional formulae. The Red Army crushed Nazism but also delayed 
workers' revolution. ' Its troops were, however, open to fraternal 
appeals. The fate of the Soviet bureaucracy remained undecided. One 
workers' victory in an important European country would, it believed, 
'sound the death knell of the Soviet bureaucracy'. Even before that 
there might be internal conflicts in Russia and it was on these, rather 
than military intervention, that imperialism relied. The R. C. P. 
believed therefore that the position of the Soviets was strong, that 
they were a beneficiary from the shift in the relationship of 
European social forces in favour of the working class. 
3 
Soviet power 
was, for the moment, unchallengeable and the Allies would be 'forced 
to tolerate a deal with it'. 
******* 
I See below. 
2 The WIL central committee resolved, in the middle of the war, that: 
'The fate of the Soviet Union rests directly on the fate 
of the new wave of revolutions. Further defeats and a new 
epoch of reaction would inevitably usher in the bourgeois 
counter-revolution in Russia. ' (WIN, Sept. 1943,4. ) 
3 See the 1945 conference resolution, 'The Changed Relationship of 
Forces in Europe and the Role of the Fourth International' (WIN, 
Sept. 1945,1-14). When this resolution was proposed by Grant at 
the R. C. P. central committee, there were three abstentions: by 
Cooper who was in general opposition, by Deane who had differences 
over the assessment of Russia, and by Betty Hamilton who had had 
insufficient time to study it. Deane and Lawrence failed to obtain 
a separate vote on the passage dealing with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe (Minutes of the C. C,, 17 March 1945). 
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A dozen national sections attended the international 
conference of April 1946, convened in Paris. 
1 
The conference had 
before it the key resolution, 'The New Imperialist Peace and the 
Building of the", Parties of the Fourth International', discussed by the 
R. C. P. central committee two months earlier. 
2 
It declared the 'last 
possibilities of a relatively stable equilibrium' in the economy 
destroyed. A third world war loomed, it argued, given unprecedentedly 
united bourgeois opposition to the U. S. S. R., which only the intervention 
of workers' revolution could now save. There was no self-criticism 
in the resolution, 
3 
nor any serious explanation of why given the 
alleged character of the epoch the F. I. was so small. 
4 
The nearest 
attempt was the argument that defeatism and failure to grasp the phase 
politics were passing through inhibited growth. 
5 
Faced with this, and 
mindful of the central committee discussion, R. C. P. delegates 
I The conference was in the nature of a holding operation, convened by 
the International Secretariat and the European Secretariat, to draw 
together the world's Trotskyists after the war and cast those who 
had deviated into outer darkness. A full World Congress was not to 
gather for another two years, although it had been intended to meet 
earlier. Though sometimes referred to as an international pre- 
conference, this gathering did all the things a meeting of full 
status would have done. It was also taken seriously by the police, 
who raided it and arrested many delegates. 
2 The resolution was published in WIN for November-December 1946. 
3 The text declared that there had been no mistake in early assessments 
by the F. I. of the character of the epoch, only in guessing the 
tempo of events. 'Only the superficial and cowardly petty-bourgeois 
mind' could think otherwise. 
4 Potential was believed to be greater than before the war, with 
Trotskyists in countries like England and South Africa, where the 
communists were not strong, having the best chance of all. 
5 See WIN, (Nov. - Dec. 1946), 306-7. 
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concentrated on projecting three theses: that relative recovery 
within general decline was taking place; that recognition of counter- 
revolution within a democratic form should govern tactics of the 
sections; that, Soviet defence, backing for the revolution in Europe 
against Stalinism, and a clear call for the withdrawal of all 
occupying armies were essential. 
I 
They drew up a resolution expressing 
these reservations and abstained in the vote which approved the main 
resolution. 
2 
They stood out for tolerance of minorities within the 
F. I. with whom they did not necessarily agree and were themselves the 
most persistent critics of the International's leaders. 
3 
A crucial 
election for the International Executive, that was in the end to split 
the R. C. P., returned the British delegates Grant and Haston, but there 
was no British member of the new I. S. 
4 
A fairly sharp division set in 
I There were no official minutes of the 1946 conference though Goffe 
was appointed to take a transcription. The text of this resolution 
is taken from the report of the international conference given in 
Report of the National Council Meeting held on 6 April 1946. The 
abstentions were criticised by Healy who argued that the return of 
stability was a myth. 
2 The resolution, while critical, was intended also to demarcate the 
R. C. P. from the I. K. D. The R. C. P. had moved an amendment to a 
European Secretariat resolution on the I. K. D., which would have 
allowed that body to stay within the Fourth International. 
3 The Morrowite minority of the S. W. P., and the P. C. I. minority, voted 
against a separate resolution criticising the 1944 European 
conference theses as 'mistakes in the evaluation of tempo' and 
therefore not fundamental, but the R. C. P. again abstained. British 
delegates were however disturbed at the amalgamation in many 
speeches delivered by international leaders, of their own views 
with those of Morrow, the P. C. I. minority and the I. K. D. 
'4 The new I. E. C. had two British, two French, one German, one South 
African and the secretary of the F. I. (Conference of the Fourth 
International, April 1946, H. P., D. J. H. 11/22,3. ) Later in 1946, 
Grant withdrew 'for technical reasons' to be replaced by Deane. In 
January 1947 it was asked that Deane himself be withdrawn because it 
was felt his industrial experience was needed during the road 
hauliers strike in Britain, (R. C. P. to I. E. C., 11 Jan. 1947). 
National sections were expected to provide top level members for the 
I. E. C., and to finance their presence in Paris. In October 1947, 
when the I. E. C. divided the R. C. P., Deane was finally withdrawn 
because the party could no longer maintain him in Paris. 
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within this I. E. C. from its first meeting of June 1946 onwards. The 
World Congress did not meet until June 1948, by which time the 
pattern of the post-war Fourth International was set. 
The political differences separating the R. C. P. from the new 
I. S. and I. E. C. and which dominated their relations over the eighteen 
months separating the international conference from the British split, 
may be conveniently grouped into three: the stage reached by the 
European economy, the strength or weakness of Western European 
governments, and the ability of the Soviets to survive. The 1946 
R. C. P. conference adjusted the party's economic outlook for Europe to 
embrace an indefinite period of stability ahead. 
I 
There was no meeting 
of minds with the International which, the R. C. P. believed, saw it as 
sharing Morrow's views on this subject. 
2 
The party argued that 
generalised statements about crisis were of little practical value in 
the short term, disputed that Europe was suffering a classic crisis of 
overproduction and denied that there would be a spontaneous collapse. 
3 
In late 1946 the R. C. P. developed the thesis of economic revival: 
first (in a curiously Keynesian passage) capitalism would not allow 
Eastern Europe to outstrip the West; second, since the crisis had been 
one of under not over production, a cyclical upswing must follow. 
4 
If 
I J. B. Stuart, the I. S. delegate to the conference, claimed that the 
R. C. P. foresaw three or four years of stability in Europe. This 
Haston denied in his addendum to J. B. Stuart 'Report on R. C. P. 
National Conference, 1946', Internal Bulletin, [1946]. 
2A claim made by Grant, who later withdrew. 
3 'No matter how devastating the slump, if'the workers fail, capitalism 
will always find a way out of its economic impasse at the cost of 
the toilers and the preparation of new contradictions. ' 
(R. C. P. amendment to The New Imperialist Peace, WIN, (Nov. - Dec. 
1946), 324. ) 
4 The R. C. P. suggested at this point that pre-war output might be 
surpassed, except in Germany where division and occupation would 
prevent it. 
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the F. I. refused to acknowledge the facts it would be discredited. 
Nor, in the R. C. P. view, was an upswing necessarily to be feared by 
revolutionaries. It boosted confidence and combativity within the 
working class. 
I, 
One of the countries on which the R. C. P. /I. S. dispute tended 
to focus was France, the world centre of Trotskyist operations after 
April 1946. Grant and Frank had clashed in 1945 over the 
constitutional referendum held in the autumn of that. year. 
2 
Frank 
could abide no attempts to undermine the pre-war characterization of 
the French government as a bonapartist regime and continued to believe 
in 1946 that the changes which had occurred had not altered its 
fundamental character. 
3 
Frank's general view was that there were no 
I The party wrote of 'the harnessing and knitting together of the 
masses in industry' which might prepare new struggles, (ibid., 326). 
2 See Grant's article in Socialist Appeal for mid-November 1945 - nd, 
for the referendum, D. Thomson, Democracy in France since/1970 
7 
(1969), 232-3.96.4% of votes effectively rejected the hi 
Republic for a constituent assembly. The P. C. I. had called in 
La Verite for a yes vote. The R. C. P. backed it, arguing that this 
was not recognition of a specific bourgeois constitution, but of a 
living conflict between bourgeois and workers' parties. Since no 
form of workers' rule presented itself it was, argued the R. C. P., 
permissible to favour a democratic republic. ('Statement of the 
Political Bureau on the French Referendum', On The French Referendum, 
(May 1946), 7-8, D. J. H. 15B/54b. ) Pierre Frank had favoured a boycott 
and though defeated on the P. C. I. central committee, received the 
backing of the I. S., which branded the call in La Verite a 'typical 
opportunist deviation of the P. C. I. ' See P. Frank, 'Father 
Loriquet', (a soubriquet for Grant), (1 Dec. 1945), Internal 
Bulletin. 
3 Frank allowed that post-war bonapartism leaned towards the workers, 
but insisted that it still possessed 'an apparent strength': 
'In the October 21 elections the end of the democratic 
regime was incontestably demonstrated by the inglorious 
foundering of the principal formation of the Third 
Republic, the Radical Party'. 
(P. Frank, 'Democracy or Bonapartism in Europe? ', WIN, 
(June-July 1946), 215. ) 
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democratic regimes in Europe. Grant countered that Frank's 
identification of political and economic developments was crude. 
' 
Repressive apparatus was retained by all regimes and its existence, 
therefore, proved nothing. In 1940, the I. S. had identified Petain 
and de Gaulle, but the analogy had been palpably false for some time. 
2 
Reaction might occur, but there was no mass support for it and one did 
not throw in the towel before the bout. 
3 
The 1946 R. C. P. conference upheld the view expounded by 
Grant, that what were being manifested in Europe were 'unstable 
bourgeois democratic regimes' where capitalism was obliged by the 
strength of the workers' parties to rule through them and not by 
decree. 4 But the economic and political perspectives of the leading 
bodies of the Fourth International were effectively one. In 1946 and 
1947 the I. S. insisted that in France there was a ceiling on production 
which it would be impossible to exceed. 
5 
It denied that the failure of 
1 'It is a vulgarisation of Marxism - vulgar materialism of the 
worst sort - to argue that the superstructure of a society is 
determined immediately by the development of its economy', 
(E. Grant, 'Democracy or Bonapartism in Europe? (A Reply to Pierre 
Frank)', WIN, Aug. 1946,241-56). 
2 Grant allowed that WIL had shared this belief at the time, but 
claimed that it had been known to be erroneous from 1943. 
3 'De Gaulle may yet be a French Franco, but one does not declare the 
enemy victorious before the decisive battle has begun. ' (ibid., 252). 
4 'Resolution of the R. C. P. conference on the Nature of the Regimes 
in Europe', WIN, (Sept. - Oct. 1946), 269-70. 
5 The R. C. P. claimed this idea had been advanced at the October 1946 
plenum, (Political Bureau, 'The Real Situation in Britain -A Reply 
to the I. S. ', Internal Bulletin, March 1947,18). O'Daniel 
challenged this, and made the counter-claim that 'Jerome' of the 
I. S. had suggested that France on her own would take twenty years to 
renew her capital equipment, (P. O'Daniel, 'A Note on Discussion 
Methods', 22 April 1947, Internal Bulletin, (12 July 1947), 3-6). 
Yet later in the same document O'Daniel wrote: 
'It is, in fact, quite conceivable that French production 
will never, again, in twenty three or any other number of 
years, break through the level of 100 per cent of 
comparatively stagnant 1938. ' (ibid., 6) 
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revolution to follow hard*on the heels of war meant that stabilisation 
was taking place1 and its confidence was not dented by the arrival of 
U. S. loans. The March 1947 plenum of the I. E. C. complacently reviewed 
earlier documents and the unwillingness of F. I. leaders to acknowledge 
their past errors angered the British. 
2 
That autumn the guiding 
resolution for the coming World Congress affirmed the theses of 1946. 
Capitalism was 'incapable of restoring the world market and a balanced 
development of world trade'. 'Increased disequilibrium' would extend 
the period, (largely imaginary) of convulsions and crises. 
3 
******* 
I O'Daniel quoted gloomy forecasts by Ramadier and Lippmann and 
contrasted them to: 
impressionistic conclusions drawn from the greater 
appearance of "normalcy" in 1947 Paris over the grim 
winter of 1944-45 (or) a sectarian schematism whereby, 
if the imperialist war were not immediately followed 
by the successful German revolution, the conclusion 
must automatically be: stabilisation of the European 
bourgeoisie. 
(P. O'Daniel, 'The Limits of French Economic Revival', 
Fourth International, (N. Y. ), (Oct. 1947), 252. ) 
This same document gives sectoral ceilings on output 
from 1938. 
2 Germain (Ernest Mandel), a Belgian economist and member of the I. S., 
insisted that a revival had always been forseen but that the 
secretariat differed from the R. C. P. by not expecting stabilisation 
to follow it. Even 1938 production, he argued, would only represent 
a stagnant plateau. (Mandel's views were quoted in full (from I. E. C. 
minutes) by O'Daniel, (Mangan) in 'A Note on Discussion Methods', 
12 July 1947, H. P., D. J. H. 15a/36. ) For the R. C. P. reply to all 
this see the fierce polemic, J. Haston, In Reply to the Discussion 
Method of Comrade O'Daniel, (July 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 36. 
3 Taken from the draft resolution, 'World Situation and the Tasks of 
the Fourth International', Fourth International, (N. Y. ), (Nov. - 
Dec. 1947), 274-81. 
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Perhaps the most difficult phenomenon for post-war 
Trotskyism'to comprehend was that of Russia and Eastern Europe. It 
was a monster with three heads. What attitude should be adopted to 
the advance of-the Red Army? What were the implications of post-war 
Soviet survival? What was the social character of the new states of 
Eastern Europe? Healy, the R. C. P. Minority leader, had in February 
1946 supported the call for Red Army withdrawal from occupied 
territories; 
1 
two months later he reversed this position. 
2 R. C. P. 
leaders suspected the International of equivocation on this issue and 
a clear call for withdrawal was made only in June 1946.3 
But responding to the Red Army was only a minor feature of a 
larger problem. Writing in 1936 Trotsky had declared that failing 
socialist revolution elsewhere in Europe, Stalin's regime must be 
deposed in a war. 
4 Alongside this prediction rested Trotsky's 
description of the Soviets as a transitional regime, where planning and 
the state monopoly of foreign trade had survived but the country was in 
the grip of a bureaucratic apparatus. On this analysis rested the 
willingness of most Trotskyists to call for Soviet defence during the 
war. Soviet survival ought to have called for a full appraisal by the 
Trotskyists. There were in fact three reactions to it: the supporters 
of Shachtman continued to believe that capitalism had been restored in 
Russia; a few sections, and most notably the R. C. P., belatedly undertook 
I See above. f 
19 1 
2 At an R. C. P. national council of 6 April 1946 Healy criticised his 
vote at the Central Committee of 9/10 February and urged that a 
distinction must be made between the Red Army and imperialist armies, 
(Report of the National Council Meeting held on 6 April 1946,6 ). 
3 This occurred at the first meeting of the new I. E. C. 
4 'If the war should remain only a war, the defeat of the Soviet Union 
would be inevitable. In a technical, economic and military sense, 
imperialism is incomparably more strong. If it is not paralysed by 
revolution in the West, imperialism will sweep away the regime which 
issued from the October revolution. ' (L. Trotsky, The Revolution 
Betrayed, (1967), 227 ). 
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a lengthy examination of economic and political processes there; - the 
majority, led by the I. S. and supported by the British minority, took 
refuge from reality by trying to stay as near as they could to Trotsky's 
predictions. 
The views of Shachtman et. al. had provoked a major crisis 
in the International and especially in the Socialist Workers Party. 
After the 1940 defection of the I. E. C. to Shachtman's Workers Party, 
most Trotskyists remained firm behind Trotsky's holding formula. By 
1946 however, there was a small state capitalist group in the R. C. P., 
and that same year Morrow and Jeffries were led by their frustration 
in the S. W. P. to join Shachtman's party. The British believed that 
the law of value still prevailed in Russia, and that once the 
country's output had saturated the home market it would start to suffer 
crises of overproduction. 
2 
At the 1946 R. C. P. conference the Majority 
and Minority put up a joint spokesman to answer the only Shachtmanite 
among the delegates. But while Shachtman's position was consistent, 
I Among its members were Ann Keen, the business manager of Socialist 
Appeal, Bob Armstrong (who had moved from Belfast to London), 
Ann Walker, Rose Carson and David James. Their emergence reflected, 
in part, contact with the exiled I. K. D. They seem to have made no 
strenuous effort to capture the R. C. P. though they may have been 
urged to do so by Shachtman, who visited them occasionally from 
1947. They argued that a new war would be one of plunder on both 
sides and suffered none of the Minority's agonies over the role of 
the Red Army since they did not stand for Soviet Defence. 
Henry Sara, a non-aligned Labour Party member by the end of the war, 
waq approached in 1945 by Albert Gates of the Workers Party to act 
as its British correspondent. 
2 B. Armstrong and M. Merrigan, 'In Defence of "Revisionism! ", 
(4 Sept. 1946), Internal Bulletin, (20 Dec. 1946), 6-15. 
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the R. C. P. was fluid, aware that it could not rest content on pre-war 
formulae. ' In July 1946 the Central Committee declared that theory 
must now be measured against social conditions in Russia! After 
hesitation the-party affirmed that capitalism had not been restored 
there but began to talk of the country heading towards capitalism. 
The. 1946 party conference somewhat uneasily asserted that in Russia 
the capitalist state existed without a capitalist class, but continued 
to see a positive side in state planning. 
2 
The R. C. P. also insisted 
that Russia had emerged from the war stronger not weaker, a view the 
I. S. felt quite unable to accept. 
3 
The R. C. P. minority projected Russia as caught in an economic 
impasse: 4 faced with a capitalist world and under bureaucratic manage- 
ment it would not fulfil the terms of its own five year plan. But the 
Minority also rested largely on the pre-war analysis. 
5 
To the I. S. 
Russia was economically weakened by the destruction of its Western 
industrial regions and faced the prospect of war since 'the 
imperialists have posed the settling of accounts with the U. S. S. R. as 
6 
their most pressing task'. 
I C. C. Resolution on the Nature of the Soviet Union, [July? 19461, H. P., 
D. J. H. 12/58. This was substantially the resolution upheld at the 
annual conference of the party a few weeks later. 
2 This opinion was advanced in a self-critical resolution which also 
called for an international discussion on the character of the 
Eastern European states, ('Resolution of the R. C. P. Conference on 
the Soviet Union', WIN, Sept. - Oct. 1946,267-8. ) 
3 'Proposed Amendments to the Foregoing Text', WIN, Nov. - Dec. 1946, 
316. 
4 See H. Finch, In Defence of the Soviet Union, (17 Aug. 1946), 
H. P., D. J. H. 11/24. 
5 Finch drew a distinction between 'proletarian nationalisation' and 
'bourgeois nationalisation' and thus made it impossible for himself 
to explain events in Eastern Europe. A French Trotskyist who agreed 
with the R. C. P. that Soviet collapse was unlikely, argued similar 
categories of 'statification'. (B. Thomas, 'Remarks on the 
Discussion on Russia in the British Party', (19 Aug. 1946), 
Internal Bulletin, 11-17, H. P., D. J. H. 11/26). 
6 The New Imperialist Peace (April 1946), H. P., D. J. H. 11/22. 
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But it was the 'glacis' of Eastern European states which 
provided the greatest conundrum. It was all very well to repeat, as 
Finch had, the arguments of The Revolution Betrayed, but were the 
nationalisations in Eastern Europe bourgeois or proletarian? If 
bourgeois, where was the capitalist class which benefited? And did 
this permit Marxists to call for them to be defended as they called 
for Soviet nationalisation to be defended? If these were 'proletarian' 
nationalisations how was it that a degenerate bureaucracy in Russia 
had, through invasion, destroyed capitalism? Could capitalism be 
overthrown other than through the agency of the Fourth International, 
which considered itself the only party of world revolution? The 
leaders of the Fourth International retreated from these insistent 
questions behind a wall of repetitious slogans and arid dogma. The 
R. C. P. conceded that the East European states were 'new and amazingly 
complicated social phenomena', 
1 but did not regard this as an excuse 
for evasiveness. It called on the I. S. to initiate a discussion 
throughout the International on*the new regimes and began a discussion 
in Britain. Meanwhile, the R. C. P. position was that public ownership 
2 
(statification) had to be defended, and at least one Minority writer 
conceded the principle. 
3 
But when the I. S. attempted to meet the 
challenge it equivocated. The nationalisation in the East was 
quantitatively, but not qualitatively different from that in the West, 
I C. C. Resolution on the Nature of the Soviet Union, [July? 19461. 
2 The example the R. C. P. gave was of Czechoslovakia, where it would 
also be necessary to support the breaking up of large estates, 
(C. C. Resolution, [July? 19461,21). 
3 H. Finch, op. cit., 12. 
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it suggested. 
' 
Capitalism still ruled in these states: the Soviet 
bureaucracy could not achieve the revolution. Its aim was assimilation 
into the U. S. S. R. 
2 
The only possible resolution of the dilemma - 
declaring the 'glacis' to be deformed from the outset - was not faced. 
But the more ideologically vulnerable the I. S. became the more strictly 
it dealt with those who differed from it. The R. C. P. found itself in 
the always unsatisfactory position of defending the place within the 
Fourth International of those with whom it disagreed, 
3 
particularly as 
it was in 1946 and 1947 perhaps the most trenchant critic of those 
ideas in whose name discipline was being imposed. 
4 
The R. C. P. did not, 
I Germain argued that public ownership in Eastern Europe did not 
affect property relations: 
The objects are the same: compensation is to be anticipated; 
the nationalised enterprises continue to be managed like 
capatalist enterprises, with administrators nominated by the 
state as the board of directors (and the Shareholders being 
sure of drawing each year the same dividend, that is to say 
never making any losses! ); workers' control exists only 
here and there. 
(Germain, 'On the Question of the Countries Occupied By The 
Red Army', an extract from theses he wrote for the I. S. 
under the title The U. S. S. R. on the Morrow of the War, 
1946?, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/68,3. ) 
2 ibid., 9. 
3 At the I. E. C. of June 1946 a resolution on the projected unity in 
the United States of the S. W. P. and W. P., which backed Cannon's 
distaste for it, was passed against the votes of the British delegates 
and a French Minority. A resolution condemning the P. C. I. stance 
on the French referendum was opposed by the R. C. P. and the French 
Majority. A general resolution on entry into social-democratic 
parties at the same I. E. C. revealed the R. C. P. to be in ominous 
isolation. 
4 The R. C. P. 's rivals as chief critic were Morrow and Jeffries of the 
S. W. P. When they were expelled from the S. W. P. the British 
condemned the expulsion but also attacked their subsequent decision 
to defy an I. E. C. ruling and join the Workers Party. This attitude 
was struck on van Gelderen's proposal which was upheld by twelve 
votes against those of Goffe and Healy (Report of C. C. Meeting held 
on 16/17 Feb. 1947, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/76). 
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however, back the sharp challenge of 1947 to the proposed constitutional 
arrangements for the World Congress intended for the following year. 
1 
The R. C. P. cannot survive an examination of its theoretical 
record in 1944-47 without facing criticism. It failed to be bold 
enough in casting ideological baggage overboard. But this would have 
required a very radical critique and perhaps a willingness to break 
with the Fourth International. The leaders of that body were 
intellectually ill-equipped2 to deal with a post-war political and 
economic environment so much at variance with their expectations. To 
consummate a full and radical inquiry in their company was scarcely 
possible, but breaking with them would have been a large step the 
R. C. P. was not ready to take. 
I This was posed by Shachtmanites within the Fourth International: 
N. Trotsky, G. Munis, B. Peret, The Fourth International in Danger, 
(27 June 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 12/79. The R. C. P. delegates were part 
of the majority which rejected this view at the September 1947 
International Executive Committee. 
2 Trotsky's perspective was regarded by them as 'a literal prediction 
of the actual course of events', (P. Jenkins, Where Trotskyism Got 
Lost, (1977), 1). The alternative argument is that Trotskyists 
were ideologically ill-equipped and this is the line taken by 
K. Coates with the argument that Trotsky's catastrophist prognosis 
caused the 'prolonged atrophy' of the Fourth International, 
('Socialists and the Labour Party', R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds. ), 
Socialist Register 1973,162 ). 
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XIII TROTSKYISM IN PRACTICE 
(THE R. C. P. 1944 - 1947) 
The Revolutionary Communist Party was born chiefly out of 
WIL's wartime success. It was launched on a wave of optimism that was 
confounded by the disintegration of the coalition and the political 
consequences of Labour's election victory in 1945. The R. C. P. 
resisted Labour's centripetal attraction longer than other parties 
which had flourished in the war. It remained in independence, 
intervening wherever it could in industrial disputes. By 1947 it was 
faced with a period of economic growth which would make further progress 
difficult; that same year the International Executive split it in two 
to facilitate the passage of an entrist Minority into the Labour. Party. 
The R. C. P. expected big things to occur at the end of the 
war. In the early 1940s WIL had predicted that fascism would follow 
a British victory. 
1 It was certain that peace, as in 1919, would bring 
with it an economic catastrophe. 'A terrible crisis of unemployment' 
was inevitable. 
2 
So, every gain the workers could make in wartime 
against this day would be a bonus. 
3 
The general belief of the R. C. P. 
'Victory for British imperialism would not lead to an overthrow of 
fascism (even in Germany) but to the establishment ultimately of 
fascism in Britain as well', (WIL, Military Policy - or Confusion?, 
20 March 1941, H. P., D. J. H. 5a, 8). 'The inevitable tendency of 
British Capitalism after the war will be toward not any high- 
minded war against disease, poverty, want or anything of the sort, 
but towards fascism. Nothing else is open to them if they are to 
live', (A. Scott, 'Anglo American Relations', WIN, (Jan. 1943), 5). 
2 Socialist Appeal, (Mid. -Sept. 1943). 
3 R. C. P. leaders even cautioned their members against expecting 
favourable wartime conditions to carry on, ('Statement of the 
Political Bureau on Redundancy', Internal Bulletin, 14 Dec. 1944, 
H. P. ). 
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was that militancy would increase in response to economic decline and 
an employers' offensive. There was a question mark over how far the 
M. W. F. would play a pivotal role, 
' 
and how far the national shop 
stewards movement would come to lead it. Socialist Appeal advanced 
propaganda for a strong trade union movement and warned against 
breakaways. 2 Unions must be 'fighting organs of the working class', 
the front line of resistance as Britain moved from being a creditor 
to a debtor nation and the impetus of arms production died. 
3 
Maintaining union organisation would, argued the party, be a priority. 
There was a tremor of redundancies late in 1944 which the party 
thought was the beginning of a slump. It precipitated internal 
controversy over what slogans were appropriate to the phase the 
economy was passing through. In October 1944 Socialist Appeal called 
for 'no one to be sacked until work is found'. 
4 
This view was taken 
up by a minority in the party which had first crystallized around a 
belief that it should join the I. L. P. The party leaders however 
preferred a policy of non-trade unionists being first to lose their 
I At the Fusion Conference the Left Fraction argued unsuccessfully 
against using the M. W. F. Trotskyists should, it argued, work 
within the shop stewards movement until expelled. Only then would 
a separate movement be justified, ('A Policy for Industry', 
[March? ]1944 
, H. P., D. J. H. 14c/8m). In November 1944 however the 
R. C. P. affirmed its industrial perspectives. At the conference its 
main fear had been that events would overtake the M. W. F. before it 
was ready. One central committee member, 'A. R. ' (Reilly? ) moved an 
amendment to a resolution before the November central committee 
doubting the future importance of the Federation, (Central Committee 
Report Issued By The General Secretary [of its 10/11 November 1944 
meeting), H. P., D. J. H. 12/8). 
2 The next year it warned the dockers that breakaways 'would play into 
the hands of the Donovans and Deakins', (Socialist Appeal, Nov. 1945). 
3 Socialist Appeal (mid-July 1944). 
4 In an article by Bob Allen. Vic. Simms developed an 
industrial programme a few weeks later when he suggested that trans- 
fers should be controlled by shop stewards' committees, and that 
there should be a forty hour week and a guaranteed minimum, not dole, 
for those without work, (Socialist Appeal, Nov. 1944). 
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jobs in a period of mass redundancy. 
I A sharp discussion was closed 
by the R. C. E. central committee at its first meeting-after the 1945 
annual conference. 
2 Even then there was a strong belief that 
unemployment of-, three million was inevitable. The M. W. F. declared its 
intention to transcend functioning as a coordinating unit and become 
'a mighty delegates movement embracing factory committees across the 
land'. 3 Economic revival was to blight the expectations expressed in 
a conference resolution: 
'The problem of reducing costs and wages to "competitive" 
levels will immediately present itself for urgent solution to 
the ruling class. In addition, the problem will involve 
dislocations of industry, mass "redundancy" and transfers of 
labour. '4 
I The Minority argued that a 'nons first' policy reinforced a division 
between trade unionists and others when the working class as a whole 
was faced with a political fight, (F. Emmett and G. Healy, 'The 
Party's Policy on Redundancy', [1944? ), Internal Bulletin, H. P., 
D. J. H. 11/66). If sackings were inevitable that did not force the 
party to participate in putting people on the streets, (F. Emmett 
and G. Healy, 'The Transitional Programme and Redundancy', Internal 
Bulletin, Feb. 1945, H. P., D. J. H. 15/B/20). The Majority case was 
that some redundancy was inevitable and that 'nons first' was not a 
solution but a tactical response to them. In a period of retreats 
vital positions had to be held. The closed shop gave power over 
hiring which could also be extended to firing, ('Statement of the 
Political Bureau on Redundancy', Internal Bulletin, H. P., 14 Dec., 
1944). The Majority also insisted that there was no contradiction 
between a perspective of trade union advance and minimal demands for 
trade union defence, (H. Atkinson, 'The Discussion on Redundancy. 
Defence of Marxism against Infantile Leftism', Internal Bulletin, 
April 1945). 
2 'Redundancy, the beginning of mass unemployment, has reared its head 
on an ever increasing scale. Employers celebrated VE Day by sacking 
thousands of workers', (The Aims and Objects of the Militant 
Workers' Federation, [19-4-5j-, H. P., D. J. H. 4/46). 
3 The discussion on 'Nons' and redundancy was a major internal 
preoccupation of the R. C. P. between the annual conference of 1944 
and 1945. See the bound volume of Internal Bulletins in the Haston 
Papers: I. B. 's 1945 Nons and redundancy. 
4 The Perspectives in Britain, 6 June 1945, H. P., D. J. H 12/26b, 3. 
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The year between the Fusion and 1945 conferences saw no major 
industrial unrest to follow the movements in engineering and the pits 
of the first half of 1944. This left the M. W. F. in a vacuum. But 
expectation of industrial developments was the strongest argument for 
keeping the R. C. P. out of the Labour Party, and the 1945 conference 
appointed a National Industrial Committee of Tearse and nine others. 
The dockers' strikes, when they began in the autumn of 1945, seemed to 
the party to be the start of the much-heralded industrial wave. 
' They 
occurred almost every year until the end of the decade, with that of 
autumn 1945 the most serious - and therefore the most misleading - from 
which to extrapolate to other industries. 
2 
The docks strikes came not 
only at the right time, but also in a form which suited the R. C. P.: 
unofficial committees rapidly flowered and looked for support. 
3 
This 
was felt to be the result of the trend marked by the party in wartime: 
when leaders fused with the state, as they did in peace under Labour, 
every dispute threw up a new industrial leadership. 
4 
The party was 
I See Socialist Appeal (Mid-Oct. 1945). But the paper part explained 
the strikes as 'the aftermath of the strain and privation suffered 
by the workers'. 
2 1,100,000 working days were lost in a six week stoppage that spread 
from Birkenhead to all major ports. Large strikes on the docks now 
became the rule rather than the exception. 
3 'Wherever a strike occurred in a port in the post-war period the 
ephemeral or semi-permanent unofficial port-workers' committee which 
organised it would despatch envoys to other ports to appeal for 
support. The envoys became accomplished in the art of strike spread- 
ing and rarely failed to secure an extension of the strike', 
(V. L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, (1957), 198). 
A link between R. C. P. industrial and political independence was 
forged in October 1945 when C. (Mazo) Martinson, a party docker, 
stood for the Mersey Ward Bootle in a council election and polled 
148 votes, just over 10% of those polled, (Socialist Appeal, Nov. 
1944). But Martinson was the occasion of an attack by the Liverpool 
strike committee on the R. C. P. when he was accused of representing 
himself as a delegate from his native city at a London dockers' 
meeting. For the text of the telegram of complaint sent from the 
Liverpool committee, see The Times, 12 Oct. 1945. 
4 See footnotes of following page. 
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disturbed to find a lack of sympathy for the dockersI among the other 
groups of workers and was in two minds as to what the strike meant. 
2 
It also found itself the subject of denunciation which recalled its 
experiences of April 1944 on the part of elected dockers' leaders3 as 
well as union officials. 
4 
The 1945 conference revealed a twenty per 
4 From previous page. 
Dockers had fiercely criticised the leaders of the T. G. W. U. and the 
party concluded that 'the labour and trade union bureaucrats' had 
been exposed in the eyes of the vanguard (WIN, Nov. 1945,36-8). 
The dockers, it thought, were 'on the road to building a leadership 
conscious of its tasks': a permanent rank and file movement to 
struggle from within against the leadership was needed (Socialist 
Appeal, Nov. 1945). The R. C. P. also believed there had been 
resignations from C. P. G. B. members among the dockers during the 
Daily Worker's original coolness towards their cause. 
1 In 1945 and subsequently, the Emergency Powers Act and troops were 
used during docks strikes without rousing any great indignation. 
The R. C. P. 's special alarm was due to discovery of hostility among 
those miners with whom it was in contact. 
2 R. C. P. ers in Liverpool thought that the docks strike meant the new era 
had actually arrived: it criticised the London organisation for 
the way it had intervened (Liverpool District Committee, 'The 
R. C. P. and the Dockers' Struggle', 22 Nov. 1945, H. P., D. J. H. 12/41. 
See also J. Deane, 'Reply to the Liverpool Document on the Docks 
Strike', H. P., D. J. H. 12/41). V. L. Allen found the strike 'an 
excellent example of the inscrutability of dockets' behaviour' 
since the rank and file Dockers Charter stated aims already 
essentially present in union claims to the employers (op. cit., 195). 
The 1947 national docks scheme provided a fall-back wage and thus 
offered a step away from casualised labour. This seems to have had 
the effect of tilting the occasion of docks disputes away from pay 
issues (E. Wigham, op. cit., 103). 
3 The National Docks Group Committee drew attention to the activity of 
'unofficial elements' in the T. G. W. U. and declared: 
There is definite evidence that the present stoppage has 
been seized upon by people connected with certain 
political organisations who had ready-prepared machinery 
at their disposal for encouraging and maintaining strike 
action. We think our members should know this and discard 
these people and make up our minds to use the 
constitutional machinery at their disposal. 
(The Times, 13 Oct. 1944) 
4 Arthur Deakin, who was about to succeed Bevin as General Secretary 
of the T. G. W. U., elaborated Trotskyist preparations for the strike, 
instancing the hiring of loud-speakers, vans and halls. 
415. 
'ý. 
cent increase in membership, 
1 
which was sizeable but not in accord with 
the expectations of the previous year. Yet this conference also marked 
the last moment at which the Majority and. Minority, as well as the 
leaders of the International, were unanimously optimistic about R. C. P. 
prospects. 
2 
But 1945-6 revealed that the dockers' strikes, while they 
were to continue until 1950, were the end rather than the beginning of 
large-scale industrial action. The 1946 R. C. P. conference was told 
that the National Industrial Committee had been unable to meet 
regularly due to lack of finance. 
3 
It seems improbable that this would 
have happened had there been more industrial unrest. The nearest 
thing to an exception was the movement which developed among building 
workers between 1945 and 1947. In 1945 the R. C. P. had two builders 
among its members; a year later builders were 'the most mature and 
strongest industrial faction in the party', among their number the 
chairmen of the Glasgow and London campaign committees. 
4 
Trotskyists - 
not all of them R. C. P. members - were in the van of rank and file 
I At this second annual conference, held on 4/5/6 August 1945, there 
were thirty six delegates. Representation was on the basis of one 
delegate for ten members, with small branches combining to elect 
their delegates. It was believed that membership was around 300, 
with the increase largely comprised of those formerly in the 
C. P. G. B. or in no party, though gains were still being made from 
the I. L. P. (Socialist Appeal, (Mid-Aug. 1945). 
2 R. C. P. leaders spoke at this time of 'by-passing the Popular Front 
stage' and of a critical mood on which Trotskyism might build. 
Socialist Appeal sales, at 12,000 were said to be restrained only 
by paper controls and not by the market. 
3 Party Organiser, (Sept. 1946), 8. 
4 ibid., 8. 
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agitation which convened impressive London demonstrations. 
1 
Yet by 
1947, with the original aim of the agitation unfulfilled, 
2 
there were 
strong internal pressures for dissolution of the Builders Campaign 
Committee which the party had established. 
3 
Other disputes in which 
the R. C. P. involved itself in the post-war years were those of the 
London Transport workers, 
4 
Glasgow binmen, 
5 
and at the Savoy Hotel. 
I Up to 1946, the Glasgow Building Workers Campaign Committee 
published a small duplicated sheet, The Builders Bulletin. In 1946 
the party launched a supplement, The Builders Appeal, which 
sustained a circulation of 700 in its seven issues between the 1946 
and 1947 party conferences) ('Organisational Report of the R. C. P. ', 
R. C. P. Conference Documents (1947), 4 ). The London and Glasgow 
committees made a strong intervention at the large building workers' 
demonstration in Hyde Park on 31 August 1946. On the platform were 
Jock Milligan, a party member, and Alf Loughton, a comrade of the 
group of Wicks and Dewar in the I. L. P. The Trotskyist platform was 
3/- an hour for craftsmen and 2/9 for labourers; a guaranteed 
40 hours at the 44 hour rate; two weeks paid holiday and pay for 
bank holidays; a national building workers' ballot for one union; 
all building by direct labour; opposition to P. B. R. or the 
attuning of wages to production; and the nationalisation of the 
building industry and land without compensation, (Mass Meeting 
Broadsheet, H. P., D. J. H. 11/2 ). 
2 Brothers! Stand Firm For 3/- Per Hour, [1947], H. P., D. J. H. 11/3. 
3 R. B. 'Appraisal of Struggle in the Past Period', (5 Jan. 1947), 
H. P., D. J. H. 12/74. 
4 In the London Transport Strike the party considered it had made a 
strong intervention, which received press coverage. It produced a 
Socialist Appeal Transport Strike Bulletin : Unity is strength, 
[Jan. 19473, H. P., D. J. H. E/16. 
5 The party had 'excellent. relations' with the strike committee of 
the Glasgow binmen, for whom they provided typing and duplicating 
assistance. In return the committee reproduced a Socialist Appeal 
article as a strike leaflet) ('Organisational Report of the 
R. C. P. ', R. C. P. Conference Documents, (1947), 4 ), 
6 The Savoy Hotel staff sought recognition for their union, the 
G. M. W. U. The R. C. P. had a member, Marion Lunt, working there and 
its coverage of the dispute led to a libel action against Socialist 
Appeal. On 14 April 1948, the Master in Chambers found against the 
paper. 
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In 1945 the party had set itself the target of 1,000 members 
by its next conference, but it failed even to maintain membership. In 
1946 the party was, however, reported to be 'overwhelmingly proletarian 
in composition'-. 
' But this could not disguise the collapse of 
expectations. Not only had there been fewer disputes, but where these 
had occurred party influence tended to outstrip recruitment. Part of 
the reason was that a group of workers which was engaged in a strike, 
while it threw up rank and file committees, did not turn to the M. W. F. 
This was true of the dockers' and builders' movements, and the M. W. F. 
was by autumn 1946, reduced to keeping in touch with those engineers, 
formerly its backbone, now dispersed throughout industry. 
2 
By 1947 
3 
the M. W. F. had only a nominal existence. As for the party, it 
retained a strong cadre of industrial militants, but the high 
percentage of engineers among them indicates how far this rested upon 
the wartime successes of WIL. 
4 
Strikes had been more localised and 
shorter than expected. Employers, thought the party, were on the 
defensive and prepared to grant concessions. What was more, strikes 
had involved not the heavy battalions but 'backward and formerly inert 
5 
sections of the workers'. There was not a general disposition on the 
1 75% of those eligible to join were in trade unions, 220 out of about 
270. But 10% of the party's members were housewives and it had 
sixty members in the forces, (Membership Report, 1946 ). 
2 Party Organiser, (Sept. 1946), 9. 
3 R. Tearse, 'Reply to R. B. ', (5 Jan. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 12/74. 
4 In 1947, on the eve of the split, the party reported eight 
convenors, fifty seven branch officials or committee members, nine 
district committee members, three area committee members and thirty 
six shop stewards. There were sixty trades council delegates 
serving on thirty five trades councils. In each case there was a 
strong presence of A. E. U. members ('Organisational Report of the 
R. C. P. ', loc. cit., 4 ). 
5 This was not accurate. While the number of strikes in 1950 at 
1,339, was just over half that in 1945 and the number of working days 
less than half, the number of strikes in coal mining was large, 
(E. Wigham, op. cit., 102). 
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part of the working class to support embattled groups. 
' 
On the eve of 
the split at the 1947 conference, the R. C. P. claimed to have 
intervened in every important industrial dispute in the year, but its 
expectation of-large scale clashes failed to materialise. 
2 
For 
Trotskyism to survive at all in industry by 1947 required great 
flexibility. Even then success was not guaranteed. The R. C. P. was 
capable of manoevring with skill: it put a favourable construction on 
the vigilance committees which emerged during the Fuel Crisis, 
3 
and 
detected the new wine in the old bottle of Joint Production Committees 
demand by the A. E. U. 
4 
But there was, unmistakeably, a ceiling to 
industrial unrest which no amount of drive could transcend. 
******* 
As the British Section of the Fourth International, the 
R. C. P. was the official representative of Trotskyism in the country. 
It ran a campaign at the time of the Nuremburg Trials of Nazi War 
Criminals intended to explode the allegations of links with Trotsky 
I The government's ability to break the London Transport strike with- 
out causing an outcry was the subject of a dispute between the 
International Secretariat and the R. C. P. (Pablo, 'A Turn Towards 
the Labour Party Masses is Becoming ever more Urgent', Jan. 1947 
postcript, H. P., D. J. H. 12/75; C. van Gelderen, 'Why I Now 
Oppose Entry', Internal Bulletin, March 1947, H. P., I ). 
2 There were 10,000 stoppages in January 1945 - autumn 1950, nearly 
all of them illegal, but not a single striker was ever prosecuted 
under Order 1305 although it was in force throughout, (E. Wigham, 
op. cit., 104). 
3 Vigilance Committees appeared in 1947 as a check on employers who 
squandered fuel. The R. C. P. held that they reflected high class 
consciousness, 'Soviet forms of organisation based on the factories' 
and called on its members to participate, (Emergency Resolution on 
the Fuel Crisis, [1947? ] , H. P. ). 
4 See also P. Sedgwick, 'The Fight for Workers' Control', International 
Socialism, no. 3, (1960), 22; R. C. P. Conference Documents, 1947, H. P. 
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made in Moscow between 1936 and 1938.1 A good deal of the energy and 
unity of purpose so lacking at that time in Britain was in evidence2 
but no tangible reward resulted. Haston's view that Stalinism was now, 
unlike the 1930s on the defensive, may have been sanguine3 but the R. C. P. 
did manage to assemble a useful paper committee behind its objectives. 
4 
The need to attend to affairs within the C. P. G. B. was a secondary 
argument deployed by R. C. P. leaders for continued independence, but no 
great impact on the communists was achieved during these immediate 
post-war years. 
5 
More scope was provided by the National Council of 
Labour Colleges which had provided a non-Stalinist platform for WIL 
in wartime. 
6 
After the war the attention paid to the N. C. L. C. by the 
I Haston requested of Attlee that the British Prosecutor probe the 
alleged Nazi-Sedov link and that the R. C. P. be allowed a watching 
brief and the right to question some of the accused. He also wrote 
to Shawcross, and directly demanded that Vyshinsky, the Soviet 
prosecutor who had also prosecuted in Moscow, prove Trotsky's 
connection with the Nazis, (J. Haston to Attlee, 23 Dec. 1945; to 
Shawcross and to the Russian prosecutor, 4 Jan. 1946, H. P., D. J. H. 
15A/21). A copy of the Vyshinsky letter went to the Daily Worker. 
2A model resolution was drawn up for labour movement meetings, (H. P., 
D. J. H. 15B/53), 50,000 leaflets distributed, a pamphlet written, 
(but not published), and much space given over in Socialist Appeal, 
(Report for Three Months, Feb. - April 1946). 
3 Unlike the R. C. P., the Socialist Workers Party was reluctant to act 
and the main thrust of a half-hearted campaign in America was 
provided by the Workers Party with whom Al. Goldman, Trotsky's 
attorney, and Natalya Trotsky had links. Haston told J. P. Cannon 
on 1 June 1946 that an offensive campaign by the R. C. P. had 
'completely silenced the British Stalinists'. For Haston's 
correspondence with the S. W. P. and other Americans see H. P., D. J. H. 
15A/21. 
4 The most prominent name on the list of intellectuals who lent their 
name was H. G. Wells, who had withheld his support at the time of the 
Moscow Trials. 
5 The party issued the broadsheets Back to Lenin (Nov. 1945), An Open 
Letter to all Communist Party members (Feb. 1947), Cominform is not 
a workers international (Oct. 1947), and Open letter to members of 
the Communist Party and Y. C. L. (Nov. 1947), H. P. 9 D. J. H. 15E/10 17, 
19,21). 
6 In 1942 WIL ran N. C. L. C. classes in Shepherds Bush and Coventry and 
moved its speakers onto the programme elsewhere. Trotskyist 
infiltration of the N. C. L. C. was denounced by the communists, 
(W. Wainwright, Clear Out Hitler's Agents! (1942), 15). 
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R. C. P. and Trotskyists outside its ranks increased. 
1 
The key R. C. P. branches carrying the frenetic activity of 
the party in these years were often less than a dozen strong. The 
Tyneside branch-, had thirteen members at the time of the 1944 crisis 
and was not significantly larger later. 
2 
The Southall branch, which 
enjoyed good relations with the I. L. P. and numbered among its members 
a leading railway militant, Sydney Bidwell, had about nine members. 
3 
Liverpool in 1946 had three locals and its own district committee. 
4 
Yet nearby Manchester had no branch until that year. When the new 
branch was established in the city it grew to one of the largest in 
the party, with a strong industrial base. But, as a microcosm of the 
I Sara had become Southern London Area Organiser for the N. C. L. C. and 
lectured against Vansittartism in January 1944. He and Maitland 
contributed to The Plebs in 1944 and 1945. Some N. C. L. C. officials 
including J. P. M. Millar and George Phippen may have looked to 
Trotskyists to offset communist influence. Phippen certainly 
created a congenial political environment in Southall, where the 
Trotskyists were strong, ('George Phippen', in J. Bellamy and 
J. Saville, (eds. ), Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol. 5, (1979), 
179-81). After he broke with Trotskyism, Haston obtained a full- 
time position with the N. C. L. C. 
2 In 1946 Tyneside suffered a major crisis with the resignation of 
Minority supporters T. Dan Smith, Jack Jones and George Benn. 
Tearse led a Central Commission investigation into the way the 
branch, under the leadership of Dave Binah, was run. His report 
proved yet another occasion of Majority/Minority disagreement, 
(H. P., D. J. H. 15B/82, July 1947). 
3 Interview with S. Bidwell, (Jan. 1973). Southall was one of the 
branches which undertook fraternisation with German Prisoners of 
War, a key feature in the R. C. P. 's international programme. 
Bill Clemitson, another party member., was arrested in 1946 for 
distributing literature to German prisoners at a P. O. W. camp. 
4 The party Control Commission had to investigate a case in Liverpool 
as well, (Statement of the Control Commission on the Liverpool case 
and related correspondence, July 1947, D. J. H. 15B/82). 
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party as a whole it fell apart by 1948 through factionalism and the 
impression created by Labour's progress. 
1 It was clear at the 1946 
conference that the R. C. P. was marking time. Membership, at 360-70 had 
fallen. 2 The party had retained a national framework, and in London 
membership and sales of Socialist Appeal were rising. 
3 
At a peak the 
party had twelve professionals, 
4 
but after the 1946 conference the 
apparatus started to be pruned under pressure of the need to economise. 
5 
Mid-monthly supplements to Socialist Appeal began to appear irregularly 
and WIN, which had almost always been published monthly, became 
bi-monthly. The May 1947 issue of this journal appeared two months 
late and duplicated. There were further symptoms of decline as 1947 
wore on. 
The Tyneside arrests of April 1944, coming less than a month 
after the Fusion Conference, helped to bind the party together and 
confirm a sense of destiny. But though the old factionalism between 
the R. S. L. and WIL was conscientiously set aside new internal 
differences were present from the outset. An 'entrist faction' was 
formed at once6 with the aim of steering the R. C. P. into the Labour 
Party. It was a mixture of different Trotskyist experiences which at 
I Publishing correspondence (New York), 2, special supplement, 
(27 Nov. 1954). 
2 Membership losses were 112 between August 1945 and September 1946. 
('Against the Politics of Stagnation', Internal Bulletin, 1947 
Conference Number, I ). 
3 36 voting members at the 1946 conference represented 29 branches: 
ten in London, thirteen in the provinces, four in Scotland and two 
in Wales. Membership in London, the centre of the factional struggle 
had risen by 30% and paper sales by 70%. 
4 There were twelve full-time and one part-time worker in November 
1944. 
5 See below. 
6 Interview with J. Goffe (July 1974). 
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first gathered only a small following. 
1 For a time some of its 
followers proposed that greater emphasis should be placed on fraction 
work within the I. L. P. 
2 Party leaders still judged that anticipated 
revolutionary upheavals would bring a great accession of strength to 
the I. L. P. but pleaded that their forces for work within it were few. 
3 
The R. C. P. attitude towards reaffiliation of the I. L. P. to the Labour 
Party was identical with the view taken by the WIL during the earlier 
discussions of 1938-9. I. L. P. separation from the Labour Party, in 
the R. C. P. view, was sectarian: revolutionaries in the I. L. P. ought to 
support reaffiliation whatever the terms the Labour Party might demand. 
4 
Reaffiliation would break the I. L. P. between revolutionaries and others 
and be the quickest way to remove a false revolutionary alternative. 
I The core of the Minority was Healy, already estranged from the old x 
WIL leadership which now dominated the Political Bureau of the 
R. C. P.; Goffe, variously of the Centre or the Right (Trotskyist) 
Opposition of the R. S. L.; and (later) Lawrence, himself leader of 
the Right. They had the support of Sherry Mangan, a Time Life 
journalist based first in London and later in Paris. Mangan, who 
functioned in Europe under the names 'Phelan' or 'Patrick O'Daniel' 
was a member of the S. W. P. and later of the International Secretariat. 
Other followers of the entrist faction were Fred Emmett, an A. E. U. 
member who taught crafts in Stockwell, Sam Goldberg, Ben Elsbury 
and Hilda Pratt, (Interview with J. Goffe; A. Richardson, op. cit. ). 
2 D. Finch and B. Shaw, 'Our Perspectives in the I. L. P. ', 9 Aug. 1944, 
H. P., D. J. H. 15A/3. Finch and Shaw rejected entry into the I. L. P. 
but they believed fraction work there was of greatest importance 
after industrial work. They charged that I. L. P. work was being 
downgraded, notably by the taking out of Bill Hunter, its convenor, 
to supervise trade union activities. Paradoxically they also 
forecast the rapid disappearance of the I. L. P. 
3 But the I. L. P. remains an important obstacle in the path of the 
Fourth International. Events will not resolve themselves as simply 
as the comrades imagine. Far from the I. L. P. disappearing at the 
"first breath of revolution', even the beginning of mass radicalis- 
ation will see an enormous increase and influence in the membership 
for this organisation. (Political Bureau, Perspectives in the 
I. L. P., [1944? ], H. P., D. J. H. 15A/3). 
4 However, even if-the terms are harsh, they 
would in any case be 
accepted by the I. L. P. leadership. The I. L. P. leaders are preparing 
to repeat on a new historical scale the experience of 1920-23. The 
lefts should analyse carefully this experience. But from the point 
of view of building the left wing, they should support the re-entry, 
however onerous the terms. The revolutionary wing will enter the 
Labour Party with a different aim than the leadership. (Political 
Bureau, The I. L. P. Fraction and Affiliation to the Labour Party, 
[late 1944? ), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/17). 
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This was not the view of Wicks, Dewar and the others who had persisted 
with the I. L. P. in wartime: Trotskyism, now as in 1938-9, split two 
ways. Reaffiliation was carried by the I. L. P. but to general surprise 
the Labour Party rebuffed it. 
I Simultaneously with its discussions with 
the Labour Party however, the I. L. P. leadership acted against the 
R. C. P. supporters within its North-East region and elsewhere. 
2 
Interest in the I. L. P. within the R. C. P. was maintained at least until 
June 1945.3 It seems possible that the I. S. entertained hopes of a 
united Trotskyist faction in the I. L. P. 
4 
This never materialised and 
the Wicks-Dewar faction persisted with the I. L. P. during its rapid 
I R. C. P. members in the I. L. P. continued, as in 1944, to back 
reaffiliation. See also P. Thwaites, op. cit., 38. 
2 T. Dan Smith, North-East divisional representative on the I. L. P. 
National Administrative Council, was expelled in May 1945 along 
with two other members of the R. C. P. fraction. Herbie Bell, another 
Trotskyist, resigned in sympathy with them. In-London Betty Russell 
was also expelled. The open adherence of the North-Eastern faction 
was reported in Socialist Appeal for June 1945. See also P. Thwaites, 
op. cit., 139-40. 
3 Grant argued that the I. L. P. was in no position to make conditions 
about the Labour Party breaking the coalition. If it decided to 
reaffiliate then continued coalition was irrelevant, ('The I. L. P. at 
the Crossroads', WIN, April 1945,5). J. B. Stuart, (the political 
name of Sam Gordon, who had become administrative secretary of the 
I. E. C. when it underwent its 1940 reorganisation), sought a way to 
reconcile 'the good sides' of the two parties. An approach by the 
R. C. P. to the I. L. P. would dispel illusions: 
'That is why the next task of the R. C. P. is a main 
orientation to the I. L. P. That is why fusion with the 
Left Wing in the I. L. P. is the main tactic in the 
immediate period. ' 
(J. B. Stuart, 'The R. C. P. and the I. L. P. Left Wing', 
Internal Bulletin, June 1945,1 ) 
4 The R. C. P. was criticised for making reaffiliation the benchmark of 
its approach to the I. L. P. (ibid. ). Some kind of contact between 
Dewar and the I. S. existed until at least 1946: Dewar told the 
I. L. P. 's 1946 conference that he had discussed with it the R. C. P. 
view of the I. L. P. and the Nuremburg Trial. After R. C. P. complaints, 
the I. S. denied that any official contact had taken place. (Political 
Bureau to the I. S., 9 May 1946; I. S. to the Political Bureau, 
20 May 1946, H. P. ) 
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peacetime decline. 
1 R. C. P. attention to the I. L. P. fell away sharply 
after the 1945 election, 
2 
though the Minority who expounded the need 
for Labour Party entry continued for a time to be interested in the 
I. L. P. as part'of their tactical proposition. 
******* 
During 1944 pressures mounted within the Labour Party against 
the coalition which culminated in a December call for a break. 
3 
Yet 
the Churchill government survived until after V. E. Day, so when a by- 
election was declared in Neath in January 1945 the electoral truce 
still prevailed. The R. C. P. resolved to challenge it as the I. L. P. and 
Common Wealth had been doing for some years, 
3A 
The party ran a 
vigorous and well-received campaign. Jock Haston, its candidate, 
addressed large meetings in the town and was given a sympathetic 
hearing at the pithead. 
4 
Six full time organisers were moved in, under 
I In 1946 Wicks and Dewar combined with pacifists in the I. L. P. to 
defeat reaffiliation at the party's annual conference. When a by- 
election was called for 25 June at Battersea North, the London 
divisional I. L. P., with little encouragement from national level, 
put Dewar up as candidate. Dewar polled only 1.5% of the vote. 
This was a traumatic blow for the London I. L. P., (Interview with 
H. Wicks Nov. 1979). After this Dewar mainly devoted himself to 
writing. He wrote Assassins at Large (1951) and Communist Politics 
in Britain (1976) as well as a pamphlet at the time of the Hungarian 
crisis of 1957 and various articles. Wicks continued as an 
antagonist of the C. P. G. B. on the Battersea and London trades 
councils. 
2 The last R. C. P. polemic with the I. L. P. was published in early 1946 
when Hunter argued that it was at a dead end and called on all 
revolutionaries to rally to Trotskyism, (W. Hunter, 'The I. L. P. and 
the Revolutionary Party', WIN, Feb. - March 1946,141-5n). In 
April 1946 the R. C. P. recorded that it still had severe differences 
with the I. L. P. left. 
3 Reg. Groves was part of the Victory for Socialism movement which 
helped to crystallize discontent. He was co-organiser of the 
conference of anti-coalition local parties and trades councils 
organised in Birmingham on 9/10 September 1944. 
3A See Socialist Appeal for January 1945. 
4 The R. C. P. held seventy meetings up to polling day, ranging from 
impromptu pithead gatherings to open air rallies in Neath with 
audiences between 300 and 500 and finally to two indoor forums at 
Gwyn Hall with 750 and 1500 in attendance, the last for an eve-of- 
poll debate with the C. P. G. B., (J. Lawrence, Report on the Neath 
Campaign, 13 June 1945, H. P., D. J. H. 15A/21,3). 
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the direction of John Lawrence and Heaton Lee and paper sales were 
high. ' The R. C. P. had a memorable clash with the local communists, 
who were supporting the Labour candidate, N. C. L. C. organiser 
D. J. Williams. 
2. 
" But the decision of the nationalists to stand a 
candidate blurred the issue and, more significantly, polling day was 
delayed and fell a week after the end of the war in Europe. 
3 
Haston 
came a poor third4 though the R. C. P. considered the success of its 
intervention should be measured more broadly than by votes alone. 
5 
I Thirty other party members took their holidays in Neath though this 
was in part an admission of local weakness. 7,500 special election 
issues of Socialist Appeal were sold and 2,000 of each fortnightly 
issue of the campaign. 30,000 leaflets were distributed, 
(J. Lawrence, ibid. ). 
2 Williams, the author of Capitalist Combination in the Coal Industry 
(1924), had once had some sympathy for Trotsky, if not Trotskyism. 
3 Voting was on 15 May 1945, eight days before Labour actually pulled 
out of the coalition. 
4 Haston polled 1,781 votes against more than 6,000 for the Nationalist 
and 30,847 for Williams. On a turnout of 58% Haston amassed 4.6% of 
the poll. Work on the Neath by-election by Mr. B. J. Ripley and 
Mr. J. McHugh of Manchester Polytechnic is-currently, (Sept. 1980), 
in progress. 
5 From no members in Neath before the election, the R. C. P. built a 
branch of six in the town and one of ten nearby. Sales of 
Socialist Appeal were reported, rather soon, to have 'stabilised' at 
1,000, (J. Lawrence, Report on the Neath Campaign, 3 ). 
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1,781 votes, even for revolutionary socialism, were a douche 
for the more ambitious spirits. 
1 A year earlier the R. C. P. had planned 
to put up many candidates in the forthcoming general election. 
2 
It now 
found that sympathy for its policies would not easily be transformed 
into votes. When the coalition broke the R. C. P. could only welcome 
it: as soon as Neath was out of the way it campaigned on a policy of 
'Labour to Power': 
3 
a few weeks after fighting him, party members 
campaigned for D. J. Williams in the General Election. In 1944 it had 
no expectation of a Labour landslide, 
4 
though as the months passed 
Socialist Appeal sounded confident. The massive Labour victory declared 
on 26 July 1945 effectively spelled ruin for all parties which had 
benefited from the electoral truce. 
5 
Even before that discussion had 
I John Lawrence in his report noted that a Save the Deposit campaign 
had not been a success and advised caution in future ventures. 
R. C. P. canvassers also encountered many Neath people who sympathised 
with-them but were determined to vote Labour, (Interview with 
E. Grant, Jan. 1973). 
2 'Where possible we will put our own candidates as against those of 
the Labour Party, as well as of other parties', (Electoral Policy, 
adopted by the Central Committee, July 1944,3, H. P., D. J. H. 12/6). 
3 The R. C. P. also called, in an unreal passage, for a united front of 
working class parties, including Common Wealth. Its argument was 
the old entrist one of sharing the experience of putting Labour in 
Power, (Labour to Power in the General Election, statement of the 
R. C. P. Political Bureau, printed in Socialist Appeal for June 1945). 
4 See Electoral Policy. At this point, before the coalition was 
broken, the party speculated on writing 'End the Coalition' across 
the ballot paper or even urging abstention, except where there was 
an I. L. P. candidate to vote for. It also considered the possibility 
of a snap jingo election which would lead to a short-lived Tory 
government. 
5 There is a discussion of the common fate of Common Wealth, the 
I. L. P. and the R. C. P. in D. L. Prynn, 'Common Wealth -A British 
'Third Party' of the 1940s', J. C. H., Vol. 7, no. 1-2, (1972), 
178-9. Prynn's suggestion of common work between the three parties 
seems fanciful however. See also A. Calder, 'The Common Wealth 
Party, 1942-45', Vol. 1, -186-95, -315-17 and P. Thwaites, op. cit., 185. 
C. A. Smith was a physical link between the I. L. P's reaffiliation 
discussions of 1938-9 and the crisis within Common Wealth, of which 
he was now a leader, provoked by the approach of the 1945 General 
Election. 
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boiled up within the R. C. P. about possible entry into' the Labour Party. 
The Entrist Faction, (or Minority as it was commonly known), argued 
that the 'open tactic' could be justified only by the special 
circumstances of'the war. It had plenty of evidence to argue from with 
the collapse of third parties and the recovery of Labour Party member- 
ship. Healy called for entry into the Labour Party in June 1945.2 
R. C. P. leaders resisted the entrist proposal. Not only a rupture of 
the coalition, but a definite swing to the radical left through the 
Labour Party would, in their view, have to be in evidence. It seemed 
that whereas there was a popular radical mood, the Labour Party was 
moving rightward. The R. C. P., they insisted, must expect for the 
immediate future to recruit/ from the vanguard of the working class, 
and these people had 'by-passed the Labour Party stage'. They had 
3 
some proof for their case in the stagnation of the party's Labour 
Party fraction. 4 Finally they argued powerfully that the sacrifice of 
I From 1943 there was a rise in the total individual membership of the 
party. 1945 membership was practically double that of the previous 
year, (L. P. C. R. ). The C. P. G. B., which could not be bracketed with 
with the anti-truce parties, also felt Labour's gravitational pull, 
and had sought affiliation as early as 1943 even though its 
membership total was booming. 
2 'On Our Tasks and Perspectives', Internal Bulletin, (30 June 1945). 
The Glasgow branch had found there was a response for attacks on 
Churchill from a soapbox but less interest in meetings organised 
under the auspices of the R. C. P., (Interview with J. Goffe, July 
1974). J. Walters, ('Some Notes on British Trotskyist History', 
Marxist Studies, 2,3,1962-3,45), dates the dispute over entry 
from the 1945 election, but Healy's contribution preceded the 
declaration of results. 
3 "'Entry" and the Revolutionary Party', Political Bureau reply to the 
discussion, 1945 Conference Discussion, (20 July 1945). The R. C. P. 
leaders argued that the emergence of a 'healthy' centrist current 
would compel the attention of all revolutionaries, but whatever the 
value of entrism in the past, this moment had not arrived. 
4 In the eighteen months to July 1945 the R. C. P. 's Labour Party 
members had failed to make even one recruit, (ibid., 31). 
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independence could be made only in exchange for concrete gains. 
I 
The 
1945 R. C. P. conference upheld their views. 
2 
Later that year the 
R. C. P. put up two of its own candidates in municipal elections. 
3 
The party was not completely preoccupied with factional 
disputes over entry into the Labour Party, but-its preoccupation with 
this debate tended to grow. 
4 
There was an unsuccessful attempt to 
close the discussion following the rejection by the 1945 Congress of 
the views of Healy and Coffe, 
5 
which itself was an endorsement of the 
I This argument was in 1945 more powerful than it had been a decade 
earlier in view of the fame of Socialist Appeal relative to that 
of pre-war Trotskyist journals. Trotsky had even in 1936 considered 
the retention of an independent press while urging entry into the 
Labour Party. 
2 Just after the conference, in September 1945, the Left Fraction, a 
reluctant partner to the 1944 fusion was expelled for indiscipline. 
It had refused to surrender control of Militant Miner but its 
other infraction was refusal to pull out two Labour Party members 
for open work. An appeal by the Fraction to the I. S. received no 
reply, (Left Fraction, Brief Notes on the History of the Left 
Fraction, 1960,3). It continued within the Labour Party, 
publishing a duplicated paper Voice of Labour, (ARichardson, Some 
Notes for a Biblography of British Trotskyism, D; 793,20). See 
also 1945 R. C. P. Conference resolution on the Left Fraction, 4 Aug. 
1945, W. D., T. M., J. L. R., Open letter to the membership 5 Aug. 
1945? 1, and Left Fraction, A reply to the letter of the Secretary 
of the R. C. P. to members of the Left Fraction, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/30b, 
31,34a. 
3 C. Martinson stood in the Mersey Ward of Bootle, (see above), and 
H. Bell, formerly an I. L. P. official, stood in the Buddle Ward of 
Wallsend on a Revolutionary Communist Ticket. 
4 The internal documents of the party contained many contributions on 
the subject but this can be misleading. Party members had the right 
to have documents reproduced within twenty one days, (interview with 
J. Haston, July 1973); and the Minority levelled criticisms a good 
deal more often than the Majority answered them. 
5 The Minority protested against closure, and it was recognised that 
circumstances, notably the arrival of Labour in government, were 
changing. The discussion was therefore extended to the end of 1945. 
This would only have barred formal contributions to the Internal 
Bulletin and could not of itself reverse deeply held convictions; in 
1946 even this restriction proved ineffective. 
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view taken in March 1944.1 Former protagonists of entry - major figures 
from the defunct R. S. L. - did not, for the most part, pursue the idea. 
2 
Harber, still a member of the Central Committee, insisted now that no 
principles were involved and that the short term and long term 
perspectives should not be telescoped. 
3 
In view of the history of the 
discussion, this view was significant. The Minority however had behind 
it an International Secretariat which was strongly convinced that entry 
was vital, 
4 
and the discussion continued without interruption into 
1946. Party leaders pointed to inconsistent Minority views, 
5 but built 
I The Labour Party question has been the subject of discussion within 
the British Trotskyist movement for more than ten years. That is a 
long time even to discuss so important a tactical. question as entry 
into the Labour Party. The subject was one of the principal 
questions in dispute between the R. S. L. and the WIL prior to the 
Fusion Conference of 1944. That conference decided the issue. 
(M. Lee, 'On the Limitation of the Discussion on "Entry" 
[Dec. 1945/Jan. 1946? ), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/45,2). 
2 Leigh Davis ceased activity in 1944, (see above). Margaret Johns 
had become inactive while living in Glasgow in the middle of the 
war. After the war she was persuaded to rejoin the party and was 
'for a time a member of its Thames Valley branch, (Interview with 
M. Johns, Nov. 1973). Van Gelderen, another former R. S. L. leader, 
opposed entry after initial hesitation. 
3 Harber shared with Lee, Grant and Haston the insistence that entry 
demanded a centrist current, participation in which, (on a short 
term basis), would make surrender of an established open press 
worthwhile. Faced by Minority interest in the I. L. P., Harber wrote 
pseudonymously: 
'.... granting (as they know I do) the assumption that we 
shall eventually have to enter the Labour Party, how can 
we in the meantime best build up our forces for entry ... 
(P. Dixon, The 1945 Congress of the R. C. P. -A Reply to 
Comrades Goffe and Healy, 23 Nov. 1945, H. P., D. J. H. 
15B/40,9. ) 
4 See below. 
5 They charged it with advocating liquidation of the I. L. P. as the 
priority task, then preparation for entry and then total entry, 
(C. C. Majority, Reply to the Minority Statement, 9 Feb. 1946, 
H. P., D. J. H. 15B 48,2). 
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up the strength of the party fraction within the Labour Party. 
1 
Minority writers now projected their argument more sharply. 
2 
They 
called for complete entry into the Labour Party, which they presented 
as 'mass work'-. "Their thesis was powerfully backed by the 
International. At its 1946 conference the International determined 
on an independent presence for its sections in Continental Europe$3 
but this was not intended to apply to Britain. 
4 
It became difficult to 
distinguish the arguments of the Minority from those of the 
International since the Minority defended not only its view of entry 
but its economic analysis too. There was little originality in the 
case of the Minority which derived from Trotsky what it did not take 
from its comrades abroad. 
5 Its economic belief, like that of the 
I Militant a duplicated paper around which the faction was intended to 
operate was made into a printed publication in mid-1946, a bold step 
for the R. C. P. which was beginning to experience difficulties in the 
production of Socialist Appeal. R. C. P. leaders charged that the 
Minority had failed to contribute any articles to Militant up to 
Febraury 1946, (ibid. ). No copies of this Militant have been located, 
but see A. Penn, op. cit., 163 for an issue with an Edinburgh 
imprint. She also discovered a publication Workers Weekly issued 
from the same city in the party's name on 9 December 1944. 
2 The establishment of a definite Minority dedicated to winning the 
R. C. P. for total entry was declared in Minority Statement to the 
Central Committee of 9/10 Feb. 1946, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/48,1. 
3 'In a general way, the road for the construction of our parties, 
particularly in Continental Europe, leads at present through the 
combination of our independent work, guaranteed by our organisational 
and political autonomy, with patient, systematic and sustained 
fraction work in reformist, centrist and Stalinist organisations' 
('The New Imperialist Peace', (I. S. document of the April 1946 pre- 
conference of the Fourth International), WIN, (Nov. - Dec. 1946), 
307). The R. C. P. attempted to amend this resolution, arguing that 
entry could not be rejected a priori for Europe 'in the coming 
period'.,. (WIN, Nov. - Dec. 1946,328). 
4 At the first plenum of the new International Executive Committee in 
June 1946, the main resolution on entry was carried with only the 
British opposed. They put a counter resolution which fell with five 
votes in support, including that of the French majority and the 
Spanish delegate. 
5 See footnotes of following page. 
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International, was that asevere crisis was imminent. It was this 
aspect of its thought that was rejected by Harber and also by 
van Gelderen, who initially supported entrism on his return to Britain 
that year. 
' The R. C. P. leaders, now forced to recognise that they were 
a 'Majority', and therefore a faction, in their own party, agreed that 
if economic disaster did loom the case for entry would be 
'immeasurably strengthened'. 
2 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the 
Minority could have held on and become a permanent feature of the 
R. C. P. if that party as a whole had not been stagnating. But the 
organisational report to the 1946 R. C. P. conference indicated that it 
5 From previous page. 
This is exemplified by Minority warnings about communist penetration: 
'If we fail to rally our forces to wage this struggle, 
(that within the Labour Party), we are merely handing 
over the leadership in the next immediate period to the 
Stalinists, who are undoubtedly our strongest opponents'. 
(Finch, Goffe, Healy, Lawrence, 'The Turn to Mass Work', 
R. C. P. Internal Bulletin, 17 July 1946, H. P., D. J. H. 
15B/59,9. ) 
I Van Gelderen backed entry on individual grounds. He believed that 
contemporary industrial movements would later be reflected in the 
Labour Party and that an authoritative presence there had to be 
established in anticipation. The actual moment of entry, he 
suggested, could only be determined empirically and he implied a 
longer period within the Labour Party than the R. C. P. leaders, with 
their short term concept of entry, had envisaged, (C. van Gelderen, 
'Towards Entry -A Contribution towards the pre-conference 
discussion', R. C. P. Internal Bulletin, [August? 1946, H. P., 10). 
2 W. Hunter, 'British Perspectives - The Economics of the Discussion', 
R. C. P. Internal Bulletin, [August? 1946], H. P. Hunter disputed that 
any sort of capitalist offensive was taking place and charged that 
the Minority depicted 'a harassed and desperate ruling class with no 
room for manoevres, no room for retreats or compromises'. 
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was at best marking time. When the Majority explained this by 
reference to economic conditions, which were not such as to create a 
radical mood, the Minority saw that explanation as fatalism and 
renewed its case'for entry in order to break free of isolation. 
I 
Nevertheless, the R. C. P. conference, in August, reaffirmed a principal 
emphasis on open work. 
2 
The R. C. P. leaders had not ceased to believe in the approach 
of a crisis, but they considered its arrival would be delayed. 
3 
The 
results of war, they argued, had been disastrous, but were screened by 
the fusion of finance capital with the state and American loans. The 
party clung to a long term perspective of decline but had to diagnose 
accurately the immediate conjuncture: it now began to recognise that 
it had previously telescoped not only its political but also its 
I The R. C. P. 's Labour Party members had grown in number from forty four 
to sixty six during the year between conferences, a 50% increase 
which compared very favourably with the overall position, (Labour 
Party Fraction Report [Sept.? 1946], H. P., D. J. H. 15B/63). However 
it emerged the following year that this fraction itself supported a 
majority of the R. C. P. staying out, and that a number of them 
preferred to sell Socialist Appeal rather than Militant. The 
Thames Valley branch of the R. C. P., a thriving Labour Party branch 
sold more copies of the open paper. Monthly sales of Militant 
were reported in September 1946 to be 118. In late 1946 the party 
was speaking of 'increased attention' to the Labour Party though it 
had the Labour League of Youth chiefly in mind, ('Editorial Notes', 
WIN, Sept. - Oct. 1946,261). 
2 J. B. Stuart, 'Report on R. C. P. National Conference, 1946', Internal 
Bulletin, 1946 , H. P. Stuart, a supporter of the Minority, 
judged the class composition of the two sides to be similar, thus 
pre-empting. an accusation it would level against the leading bodies 
the following year. 
3 'Because mass unemployment will only begin towards the end of 
Labour's term in office ........ it is quite likely that not only 
will the Labour Government see through its term of office, but that 
we may see a second Labour Government. ' 
('Perspectives and Orientation of the R. C. P. ', R. C. P. Conference 
Documents (1946), H. P., 7. ) 
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economic perspective, 
I 
and insisted that small 
unofficial industrial disputes offered it the best chance for growth 
in membership. But while the R. C. P. adjusted to a world quite 
different from expectation, the Paris-based International now 
intervened to challenge its interpretation of the whole British 
environment. It found the R. C. P. distinction between long-term crisis 
and immediate revival 'rather schematic', predicted a crisis of 
overproduction and declared that if a revival occurred it would be 
unstable. 
2 But the I. S. also believed it detected incipient mass 
radicalisation, 'a deep movement of opposition to the reactionary 
policy of the Labour Government', and put its full weight behind entry 
as the mean whereby'the R. C. P. might capitalise upon it. 
3 
In responding the R. C. P. was inhibited by the forecasts of 
the Transitional Programme. It had to cover its flank against 
accusations of belief in a capitalist future, 
4 but it felt able to 
'The inevitable crisis, however, will not be immediate. It will be 
delayed for a time. The orientation and strategy of the Revolutionary 
Communist Party is firmly based on the long-term perspective of 
crisis and decline but its eyes are also wide open to the immediate 
conjunctural upswing ..... ' 
('Editorial Notes', WIN, Sept. - Oct. 1946,260. ) 
2 I. S., A Turn Towards the Labour Part Masses Is Becoming Ever More 
Urgent, (Jan. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 12/75. In March 1947 the I. E. C. 
discussed and approved this letter to the R. C. P. by a narrow 
majority of seven to five, 
(one Italian, one Spanish, one French 
Majority, two British). 
3 The I. S. quoted Labour Party success in local polls and by-elections 
and the resolutions being sent into Transport House in opposition 
to Bevin's foreign policy, but did not face the contradiction 
between electoral support and its belief that the government's 
policy was reactionary, (ibid., 5-6). The opposition within the 
Labour Party to government policy with its emphasis on a critique 
of foreign policy is discussed by D. Rubinstein, 'Socialism and 
the Labour Party : The Labour Left and Domestic Policy, 1945-1950', 
in D. E. Martin and D. Rubinstein, (eds. ), Ideology and the Labour 
Movement (1979), 227-57. 
4 'Every capitalist boom in the imperialist epoch is without 
perspective of achieving real stability', ('The Real Situation in 
Britain -A Reply to the I. S. ', Internal Bulletin, (March 1947), 
H. P. ). 
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insist that Britain's economic difficulties were attributable to under- 
production. There was, it insisted, an upswing: trade was growing, 
unemployment was low, consumption was at a peacetime peak. 
I 
It would 
last 'not longer than a few years at most' since antiquated British 
capitalism would prove unable to take advantage of its opportunities, 
but while it did there would be no polarisation of class forces. The 
I. S. might insist that there was a 'furious offensive' against living 
standards but 'there is, in fact, more purchasing power in the pockets 
of the workers and the capitalists alike than ever before'. 
2 
It is 
noticeable that both sides felt the need to underpin political prognosis 
with evidence of economic recovery or decline. 
From a clash in economic prognosis, the British and the I. S. 
built an extension of their different views on tactics. The 
International saw the rapid expansion of Labour Party membership and 
insisted that this indicated the direction of the masses. Entry would 
not immediately bring gains: first there would be a period of shared 
political experiences during which the R. C. P., in the Labour Party, 
would advance and gain support for the Transitional Programme of 1938. 
Outside the Labour Party the R. C. P. was isolated. Resisting the sweep 
of the masses towards the Labour Party was placing its future in 
jeopardy. 3 'The fate of the party as a whole is at stake. '4 The 
I The R. C. P. 's detailed account of the revival is in loc. cit., 19-23. 
2 The British people were far from starving', writes David Marquand, 
'although a casual newspaper reader might have been forgiven for 
doubting the fact', ('Sir Stafford Cripps', in M. Sissons and 
P. French (eds. ), Age of Austerity, 1945-1951, (1964), 186). 
3 'Under these conditions, it is obviously bound to be much more 
difficult to recruit members from the Labour Party directly to the 
revolutionary party, than to organise them inside for Trotskyism. ' 
(I. S., A Turn Towards the Labour Party Masses, 8. ) 
4 ibid., 12. 
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R. C. P. leaders, argued the International, were far too deeply embedded 
in their own interpretation of what Trotsky had said about entrism 
before the war. 
I It advised them to fix their sights upon a different 
objective: 
'the present situation sets new objects for entry: the 
setting into motion of the entire awakened British working 
class along the path of revolutionary action, this time 
within the framework of the Labour Party itself. 12 
The R. C. P. reply to this was sharp in tone3 and broad in 
content. Having challenged the economic outlook of international 
leaders the party turned to their Labour Party views and concluded 
'innovations on entry reveal pressure of reformism'. The R. C. P. 
would adhere to independence. It was not it believed, cut off from 
the Labour Party in view of that party's loose structure. Nor did it 
follow that all political activity on the part of workers was 
expressed through the party. Acknowledgment of proletarian loyalty to 
I The R. C. P. Political Bureau referred often to the need for entry to 
be preceded by the emergence of a centrist current within social 
democracy, moving towards the left and in a period of high political 
life. They also insisted that entry could be for the short-term 
only. While they could quote Trotsky in this respect they were on 
less firm ground with their conditions for entry. The I. S. argued 
that 'entry of revolutionary organisations has taken place, at 
different-periods that vary greatly in political character and for 
different purposes', and gave the example of groups seeking 
protection against terror and groups seeking their first recruits) 
(ibid., 9 
2 The Real Situation in Britain, 11. 
3 'It was with no pleasure that we read your letter addressed to the 
Central Committee of the R. C. P. but with growing apprehension. ' 
Following this opening sentence the R. C. P. declared the I. S. 
orientation, polemical method and conclusions 'patently false' and 
informed it, 'we concluded a study of your letter with considerable 
alarm', (The Real Situation in Britain, 1). 
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the Labour Party did not suffice as a complete tactical guide. 
I 
Labour's revival itself was felt to be only superficially impressive, 
a fact not readily appreciated from Paris. 
2 
The R. C. P. firmly 
believed that radicalisation in Britain would first inevitably create 
a centrist current, that no tactical dexterity would avoid this, and 
that it would in any case occur through a deterioration in economic 
circumstances. 
3 
When this materialised there would be stirrings not 
over foreign policy but over bread and butter issues. Before then any 
Trotskyist current within the Labour Party, once it gathered strength, 
would be suppressed by the official apparatus. 
4 
The Minority in 
Britain which supported the I. S. view was 'a tendency moving to the 
right and reflecting the pressure of reformism in the R. C. P. '. The 
Minority, charged party leaders, sought a short cut to reverse the huge 
disparity, between the R. C. P. and the Labour Party. But no long-term 
entry tactic could in fact resolve Trotskyism's British problem. A 
'In that event, the Communist Party should never have been formed in 
Britain nor should the Trotskyist Party. The Trotskyists should 
have entered the L. P. and remained there until the masses had 
completed their experience', (ibid., 30). The example of the dockers 
was proferred: they were Labour supporters but had not sought to 
use the Labour Party during their recent strike. The R. C. P. however 
had found it possible to approach the dockers openly as a 
representative of the Fourth International. 
2 Thus the R. C. P. argued that while paper membership of the Labour 
Party had risen, activity in many localities had declined as soon as 
the General Election was over. In traditional areas there had been 
scarcely any revival. The League of Youth now barely existed and 
Labour Party publications showed a swing to the right. 
3 'The setting into motion of the entire awakened working class will 
not be achieved by a few hundred (or even a few thousand Trotskyists) 
no matter how determined, or how well we plan, or how much we might 
work or wish to achieve this aim - albeit propped up by the 
inspired directions of the I. S. ' 
(ibid., 41) 
4 This point is specifically applied in the text to the Labour Party 
faction paper Militant. 
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propaganda presence would have to be retained until the workers were no 
longer prepared to extend to Labour the benefit of the doubt. There was 
a hint in the document of doubt about whether the traditional split 
perspective still held' but the R. C. P. rested mainly on a balance 
sheet of entrism derived from the WIL. 
2 
In 1947 the Internal Bulletin of the R. C. P. reflected the 
Majority case more fully than before. Van Gelderen now reversed his 
view of the previous year and even outdistanced longstanding 
protagonists of independence. 
3 
The Minority in the R. C. P4 were unable 
to break new ground 
5 
but the debilitating effect of this internal 
The very-fact that the Labour Party is-in power with such a huge 
majority, and that the local organisations are not nearly as active 
as they were even before the outbreak of the war, is one of the 
factors that makes us hesitant to conclude that the workers will 
pour into the Labour Party in active masses as a result of the next 
wave of radicalisation. (ibid., 50) 
2 This entailed two conclusions: that Trotskyism could grow when 
there was healthy life and internal struggle in the reformist or 
centrist organisation it had entered; that when the movement was 
quiet Trotskyism stagnated, especially if struggles found an outlet 
outside the Labour Party, (ibid., 40). 
3 Van Gelderen was editor of Militant and representative of the Labour 
Party fraction's steering committee on the Political Bureau. He 
announced that his years abroad had left him out of touch and that 
British workers currently looked to unions and factory organisations 
as 'organs of struggle'. Going into the Labour Party, he suggested, 
'means that for a long time ahead, we transform ourselves into a 
propaganda group for the sake of winning over the comparatively rare 
workers who do attend local L. P. meetings - and these by no means 
the most advanced', ('Why I Now Oppose Entry', Internal Bulletin, 
(March 1947), 2 ), 
4 Van Gelderen had observed that the R. C. P. members in the Labour Party 
were succumbing in some cases 'to the reformist and petty-bourgeois 
atmosphere and opportunist tendencies are creeping in their articles 
and activities', (ibid., 2). J. King, a Labour Party fraction leader 
recruited during the A. L. L. V. D. C. campaign of 1944, delineated the 
case for placing the major emphasis on independence, from Labour 
Party structure. 
5 C. C. Minority, Some Comments on the P. B. reply to the I. S. letter', 
Internal Bulletin, (April 1947), H. P. 0 D. J. H. 11/29. 
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conflict began to be evident in the views of those who were not 
protagonists. 
' Majority thinking was not hidebound. Both Hunter and 
Grant acknowledged that politics since 1945 had followed an unforseen 
path. Hunter recognised that Labour was implementing its programme. 
This, he believed was because it corresponded to capitalism's 
contemporary needs -a coincidence which explained the lack of 
resistance from capitalism to nationalisation. 
2 
Grant, later in the 
year, contrasted the Opposition to its home policy suffered by the 
1929-31 Labour government to that on foreign policy experienced by 
Attlee. 3 Hunter predicted that nationalisation would not reach beyond 
iron and steel; 
4 
Grant foresaw a passive experience of Labour in 
Power, that there would be 'relatively stable economic and political 
I See A. Walker, 'The Task of the Party in the Present Period', 
Internal Bulletin, (April 1947), sep. pag., 1-3, H. P., D. J. H. 11/29. 
Walker was a follower of Shachtman. Bob Condon, a Welsh miner 
Trotskyist, went even further than Shachtman by arguing that 
technocracy and not capitalism would be the next historic stage 
after capitalism, ('The New Order', Internal Bulletin, (March 1947), 
H. P., D. J. H. 11/17 ). 
2 'Today the Labour Government nationalises industries which form the 
basis of capitalist economy, and it is undeniable that there has so 
far been no fundamental opposition from its bourgeoisie', 
(B. Hunter, 'The Nationalisation of British Industry', WIN, May 
1947,1). 
3 'Two Years of Labour in Power', WIN, (Oct. 1947), 1-11. 
D. Rubinstein discusses the role of the Labour Left, urging the 
government faster along the same road rather than along a different 
one in 'Socialism and the Labour Party', loc. cit., 236. 
4 Hunter's argument was that the Labour Government was acting as the 
most conscious section of the ruling class thus far, so that state 
interventions could not be interpreted in a progressive light. 
Nevertheless, he suggested, workers did interpret them that way, 
('The Nationalisation of British Industry', loc. cit., 4-6). 
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relations', and that there would be no mass revolt until the next slump. 
Even before this, R. C. P. leaders were preparing their members for 
political lull and little progress in building the party. 
I 
* . '* ***** 
With the 1947 party conference approaching all contributions 
to the debate were winched up. 
2 
The R. C. P. was in opposition to the 
policies of the leaders of World Trotskyism on virtually all points 
where they had developed their own views rather than having relied on 
Trotsky's pre-war writings. 
3 
The gulf was reflected within the British 
party, where the Minority defended all views of the International 
Secretariat and was establishing a discrete existence. 
4 
There was no 
... we anticipated a development of events at a far more rapid 
tempo than has taken place. On this basis we overestimated the 
possibilities of growth. This error must be corrected, or it can 
have serious consequences for the Party by causing a sense of 
frustration among the cadres in face of a slower tempo of events. 
The Party must be prepared to face a period, not of rapid and- 
spectacular gains but of slow growth and entrenchment in the 
propaganda field and in the trade unions and in the industrial arena, 
('Editorial Notes', WIN, (Sept. - Oct. 1946), 261). 
2 Patrick O'Daniel (Sherry Mangan) invited the British to moderate 
their polemical tone in his pompous 'A Note on Discussion Methods', 
(Internal Bulletin, 12 July 1947, H. P., D. J. H. 11/34). Haston wrote 
a devastating reply, with a witty appendage, 'In Reply to the 
Discussion Method of Comrade O'Daniel', (Internal Bulletin, [July 
1947? ], H. P., D. J. H. 11/36). 
3 See Chapter XII. 
4 On 14-15 June 1947, the Minority held its own conference and 
formally constituted itself as the 'Entrist Faction'. An 
International representative attended. Haston complained of poor 
attendance by Minority members at aggregates and public meetings, 
and also of a lack of interest in Militant. 'The atmosphere of a 
split already exists', he complained, (J. Haston to I. S. 15 July 
1947, For Information, H. P., D. J. H. 12/82,6). He also charged 
that the Minority, despite its interest in the Labour Party would 
take no responsibility for the operation of the fraction within it. 
Van Gelderen, he charged, had 'on several occasions' written the 
entire Militant himself, (Internal Bulletin, July 1947). To a 
charge of being opposed to the decision to print Militant, Healy 
replied that he and Goffe felt the fraction's narrow base did not 
justify it and that low Majority interest in Labour Party work 
inhibited the development of it in any case. In the pre-conference 
period Minority contributions started to be styled, 'E. C. Entrist 
Faction'. For separate Minority interventionsin industry, see 
R. Tearse and T. Reilly, The Adrema Strike - The Real Issues, (Sept. 1947), D. J. H. 12/90,4. 
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doubt that the R. C. P. was failing to progress, let alone fulfil the 
heady expectations of 1944. Both protagonists had explanations to 
hand: the Majority in factionalism; the Minority in refusal to enter 
the Labour Party. 
2 
Interventions by Pablo, the International Secretary, 
from 1947 assumed a threatening tone, calling on an authority their 
author lacked in Britain. 
3 
In the July Internal Bulletin, Haston 
published in full his correspondence with the I. S., a step which 
served to reveal the distance between the sides. Pablo's contribution 
effectively threatened that if the R. C. P. did not take the right 
decision the International Secretariat would split the party, 
4 
and 
countered the British leaders' presentation of requirements for entry 
with some of his own which read as if composed a posteriori. His 
formulation compounded the differences over entrism and economic 
analysis. 
s 
I Between September 1946 and July 1947, the party had a net loss of 
forty two members, (E. C. Entrist Faction, 'Against the Politics 
of Stagnation', Internal Bulletin, (1947 Conference Number), 1, 
H. P., D. J. H. 11/32,1). 
2 ibid. 
3 Pablo (Michel Raptis), 'It is High Time to Find a Solution', 
Internal Bulletin, [July 19471, H. P. 
4 'Let the next Conference of our British comrades solve the problem 
in this direction and let each of the two tendencies in our British 
movement make its own experience', (ibid., 12). 
5 Pablo's conditions were: 
a) The existence of a party based on the working class enjoying 
the confidence of its overwhelming majority and which allows 
within its ranks a legal or semi-legal revolutionary 
tendency. 
b) The economic and political conditions of the country, which 
far from forseeing a capitalist stabilisation, determine an 
equilibrium more and more unstable of the bourgeoisie, which 
will accentuate the opposition of the masses to the 
reformist leadership of the Labour Party and will drive them 
to seek a more revolutionary situation. (ibid., 11. ) 
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The Minority was faced with its own failure to convince the 
party membership: seemingly it was confined in perpetuity to 20% of 
conference delegates. 
] 
This was the context in which, like the 
International, it threatened to split the British party. 
2 
Now as in 
1933 there was a constitutional case for arguing that democratic 
centralism had world not national parameters, but the prestige and 
achievement of the R. C. P. was far above that of the Communist League, 
whereas the standing of international bodies was much reduced. 
Undaunted, the Minority now began to drive the argument back in time, 
explaining the clash by reference to long standing differences between 
the former WIL and international leaders, 
3 
and even to the social 
composition of the R. C. P. leadership. 
4 
Had the charges carried 
conviction it would still have been necessary to explain why these 
I In 1946 and 1947 it could muster only seven delegates for total 
immediate entry against twenty eight for the Majority. It did, 
however, question the accuracy of representation at R. C. P. 
conferences, claiming the split among active members was 149: 73. 
This complaint, first made after the annual conference of 1947, 
lacked moral force. 
2 .... we shall suggest to the I. E. C. that it allows temporarily a 
division of the British section into an open and an entrist group. 
Such a division would take place within the Fourth International 
and there would therefore be no return to the pre-1944 division of 
forces in which one group was inside the F. I. and the other (the 
WIL) was outside, (E. C. Entrist Faction, Open Letter to the Political 
Bureau. The crisis in the Revolutionary Communist Party, Internal 
Bulletin, (Speical 1947 Conference Number), H. P., D. J. H. 15A 39 
1-2). 
3 Healy, the Minority leader had been a founder-member of WIL, but 
in this presentation to the 1947 conference, his Entrist Faction 
looked back on wartime activities which had been 'valuable' but 
fostered illusions that independent activity 'could, of itself, 
build the revolutionary party', (ibid., 4). 
4 The suggestion was that two thirds of the Majority representatives 
on the Political Bureau and the Central Committee were 'either petty- 
bourgeois or intellectuals with no experience of work in the mass 
movement', (ibid., 7). This assertion conflicted with the 
observations of Stuart the previous year, as shown on p. 432M. 
above. It was not uncommon in the Fourth International to level 
this kind of charge, but in the 1939-40 separation of the S. W. P., 
considered a model guide to conduct during factional disputes, 
Trotsky, a participant, had been careful to avoid it before Shachtman 
et. al. took a definite splitting course. 
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middle class types had behind them an essentially proletarian party. 
1 
The industrial perspective these leaders held out to the 1947 annual 
conference was 'a continued process of considerable ebb and flow'. 
They warned especially of the penetration of factories by the 
C. P. G. B., but hoped that the similarity of communist and Labour ideas 
would discredit the former. 
2 
Best prospects for the party were still 
felt to be in industry and in the C. P. G. B. 
3 
There was no doubt, 
however, that the party was now in decline. 
4 
The conference itself, meeting on the August Bank Holiday of 
1947, broke no new ground on the Labour Party question. How could it 
when one part of, if not the whole, British Trotskyist movement had 
been arguing over entry for a decade and a half? The arguments were 
wearily rehearsed: the outcome predictable. What made the 1947 
conference different from those of previous years was the clear warning 
I In 1947,79% of the R. C. P. membership, excluding forces members, 
was in unions. The rest were divided equally between those 
ineligible to join and housewives. 35.3% were in basic industrial 
unions; 18.9% in industrial service, transport or general unions; 
25.2% in white collar or professional unions. Blue collar member- 
ship predominated in the provinces; white collar in London, 
('Organisational Report of the R. C. P. ', R. C. P. Conference Documents, 
1947, H. P., 1-2). 
2 R. C. P. Conference Documents, 6. 
3 The R. C. P. still expected a mass communist movement to emerge. It 
noted that the C. P. G. B. was giving publicity to Labour Party members 
leaving to join it and regarded this as a hint that the danger of a 
large Stalinist faction within the Labour Party was less than it 
seemed from Paris, (The Real Situation in Britain, 34). 
4 The bulk of the membership, at 332, had been held, perhaps by the 
lowering of expectations. But they now supported only eight 
professionals. The failure of WIN to appear for five months after 
May 1947 may be attributable to the intense factional conflict: 
there were abundant internal documents during this time. 
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that it would not be allowed the last word. 
I 
In view of the political 
composition of the I. E. C. this could mean only one thing. The stand 
of the Minority and the I. S. indicated that they would not recognise a 
national majority vote. 
2 
This might be justified by the belief that 
the I. S. urgently needed to see its convictions converted into reality: 
yet it was denying that very right to the R. C. P. Majority. 
3 
It was 
left effectively with the alternative of walking out of the Fourth 
International or acquiescing in a split. As it was led by founder 
members of WIL, it had to suffer more than its share of splitting 
I The I. S. brought to conference a resolution which stated, 
'This Conference accepts the decision of the next I. E. C. 
on the British Question. ' 
Against Minority and International protests, the R. C. P. leaders' 
view that this should not be put to the vote was upheld. Both the 
International Secretariat and the Minority had accused Haston and 
Grant of canvassing a possible split from the International. No 
documentary proof of this has been located. That same month Haston 
claimed that he had appealed to the I. S. in June to throw its 
weight against a split and that the Minority had been asked to 
acquiesce in the decision of the 1947 conference, (Majority Central 
Committee, To the International Executive Committee , 19 Aug. 1947, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/86). 
2 This also conflicted with Trotsky's advice to J. P. Cannon during the 
S. W. P. debate of 1939-40, where the American had been advised while 
in a minority to work patiently for a majority, (In Defence of 
Marxism, (1966) fOAok,, 
3 'The tactic of the Majority bases itself on the orientation of the 
indpendent party, but an integral part of that orientation is the 
operation of a faction inside the Labour Party', (To the International 
Executive Committee, 5). This document also made the claim that 
about half of the Labour Party faction supported the Majority view. 
If the R. C. P. was separated, these members were likely to fall under 
the sway of the Minority. 
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accusations though these reached the point of provoking many others. 
1 
But to the I. S., whatever the feelings of the British, the R. C. P. was 
now a living reproach. The I. S. would retie the historical knot. 
'False prestige'"sof the R. C. P. leaders was coming before anything 
else, declared Pablo. It was a relic of the old WIL contempt for the 
International, he added. Clearly, it still rankled that the wrong 
horse had been backed in 1938.2 
I The Minority proposed, on the eve of the 1947 annual conference, to 
re-open discussion about WIL's abstention from the Peace and Unity 
conference of July 1938. This had been closed at the 1944 Fusion 
Conference. The move was clearly intended to subvert the key ex- 
WIL figures who led the R. C. P. But they countered most effectively 
with a protest from the R. C. P. central committee against singling 
out one only of the many splits which pockmarked the history of the 
Fourth International. This protest, circulated at the annual 
conference derived its force from being issued over the names of all 
central committee members who had not been in WIL in 1938, a 
surprising fifteen out of twenty. Grant, Haston, Healy, Heaton Lee 
and Millie Lee had been in WIL in 1938. The signatories to the 
protest, (with their 1938 organisation in brackets), were: 
K. Westwood (R. S. L. ) F. Ward (R. S. L. ) 
D. James (")S. Bidwell ( If ) 
D. D. Harber ( It ) B. Hunter (I. L. P. ) 
C. van Gelderen ( of ) H. Atkinson ( if ) 
J. Deane ( If ) T. Reilly (") 
R. Tearse ( None ) (Co-opted members) 
J. Dowd ( it ) A. Roy (R. S. L. ) 
D. Binah ( it ) A. Rosen ( of ) 
The remarkable spectrum of support for this declaration confirmed 
how conscientiously the R. S. L. leaders had put ancient quarrels 
behind them in 1944, (R. C. P. to the I. E. C. : An Appeal, 19 Aug. 1947, 
H. P., D. J. H. 15B/87). 
2 Pablo charged that the R. C. P. leaders sought to gather round 
themselves all the malcontents within the international and, 
undeterred by the central committee declaration, quoted the 
Resolution of the Founding Congress of the International on the Lee 
Group. He also charged the R. C. P. with preparing a split while 
accusing others of doing the same, (Reply to Comrade Haston : 
certain reflections are now necessary, (Aug. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 
15B/88). 
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Despite accusations of considering a split, the R. C. P. 
leaders did not break discipline. All they could do in the face of 
certain defeat was protest at the use of an organisational club to 
resolve a political dispute. Haston was unable to head off a 
resolution at the September 1947 plenum of the I. E. C. for separating 
the British party, and had to acquiesce in the least odious of the 
alternatives before him. 
' A special conference of the R. C. P. was 
convened on 11 October for the purpose of implementing the I. E. C. 
decision in favour of entry into the Labour Party by the Minority. A 
Majority declaration urged, for the record, reconsideration of the 
I. E. C. decision. 
2 
While this was upheld, the conference had then to 
distribute R. C. P. property between the factions. Most of it fell to 
the Majority, though the Minority had on 1 October acquired Militant. 
3 
From 1 November there were again two Trotskyist organisations in 
Britain. 
I Initially, the I. E. C. declared itself eight to five in favour of 
the entry of the Minority of the R. C. P. into the Labour Party'. 
Supporting the two British delegates in opposition were one Indian, 
one French Majority and one Indo-Chinese. Haston had avoided a 
harder reolution than this but now sought the best deal he could 
get. With 'Jerome' and 'Robert' he made a Special Commission 
which produced a compromise resolution. Under its terms both 
factions received official recognition and would separately pursue 
their courses, under the guidance of the I. S. which would convene 
monthly meetings. The I. E. C. upheld this resolution eleven to one 
with one abstention) (Resolutions and motions of the Fourth Plenum 
of the I. E. C., (Sept. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/90 ). 
2 Declaration of the majority .... for the special conference, 
(11 Oct. 
1947), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/93b. 
3 Central Committee resolution to go before the Special Conference, 
(Oct. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/93a. Militant was allowed by the 
Minority to die, though the 1947 annual conference had been told that 
it had a print run of 1,000 of which 450 were sold. More than a year 
later, in December 1948, it launched a new paper, Socialist Outlook. 
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The R. C. P. was split by the International Secretariat at the 
very moment when hardening communist policy created the possibility of 
growing industrial unrest, usually seen as an argument for independence. 
3 
It has been argued that the communist turn away from the Labour Party 
left a vacuum which the Minority filled with Socialist Outlook. 
2 But 
the Minority/I. S. argument had been that entry was needed to pre-empt 
Stalinist penetration. The Minority was accused by the Majority of 
entering the Labour Party with no perspective. 
3 
The official historian 
of the Fourth International frankly allows that the tactic was 
consciously intended to be different from the raiding parties of the 
1930s. 4 The I. S. action can be understood only within the broad 
context of general R. C. P. criticisms of it. By splitting the R. C. P. 
the I. S. emasculated a firm and powerful critic whose arguments it had 
failed to shake. No great compensation materialised in the shape of _ 
I In Bevanism : Labour's High Tide, (1979), M. Jenkins places the end 
of conditional C. P. G. B. support for the Labour government at 
October 1947, the very month of the R. C. P. split. Jenkins follows 
Pelling in attributing the docks strikes of 1948 and 1949 to 
communist attempts to disrupt European recovery, (op. cit., 15). 
D. N. Pritt, in The Labour Government, 1945-51, (1963), dated strong 
developments on the left from 1948. 
2 M. Jenkins, op. cit., 91. Jenkins wrongly presents the 1947 and 
1949 entries of the R. C. P. into the Labour Party as one and makes 
no comment on the presence of Trotskyists in the Labour Party from 
1945, (op. cit., 58n, 92-3). 
3 Declaration of the majority ... H. P. 
4 P. Frank, The Fourth International, (1979), 85. Frank unconvincingly 
motivates I. S. advice by Labour's 'close links' with the unions and 
the emergence of Bevanism. But the 'close links' were not new and 
were in any case an argument for permanent entry. Bevanism moreover 
should only accurately be dated from the 1950s. For the contemporary 
left, see M. Jenkins, op. cit.; D. Rubinstein, loc. cit. 
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rapid progress by the Minority. 
1 In 1933 Trotsky and the entire 
leadership of the International Left Opposition urged the tiny and 
unknown Communist League into the I. L. P. as a matter of urgency. Yet 
they discouraged a split and condemned the Minority, (whom they 
supported politically), for ca rying one out. 
2 
Matters stood quite 
differently in 1947. Although it had largely stood still since 1945, 
the R. C. P. was well known to active militants in Britain and had a 
reputation won by WIL's wartime industrial interventions. Its 
leadership had proved its ability over a period of time and could 
point to almost a decade of well organised Trotskyist activity in 
Britain. Who of the International Secretariat could make a comparable 
claim? Under the circumstances it might be considered remarkable that 
the I. S. was able to secure its objective. This can be explained only 
by the distaste of the R. C. P. for walking out of the Fourth International 
despite the low esteem in which it held that body's leaders, and the 
existence within the British party of a Minority faction which acted as 
an uncritical outpost of the I. S. and, increasingly, embroiled the 
whole party in an internal war. Finally it must be said that none of 
this could have come to pass if the R. C. P. had been forging ahead in 
the years after 1945.3 As it was, unforseen economic expansion and the 
I The subsequent history of the Minority falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. Some of their activity can be followed in M. Jenkins, 
op. cit., D. Rubinstein, loc. cit., and L. P. C. R., 1947-9. 
2 See above, p. g\ . 
3 This thesis, which was acknowledged by the Majority itself was 
challenged by the state capitalists within the R. C. P. ranks, who 
argued that it should be an exception to the general decline of 
all parties outside the Labour Party. They urged the maintenance 
of independence and the advancement of a practical alternative to 
the programme of the Labour government, (B. Evans and R. Carson, 
'Must the R. C. P. Collapse? ', Internal Bulletin, (Aug. 1947), 
H. P., D. J. H. 11/38). 
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radical programme of the Labour government in its first two years 
confounded all forecasts. No tactical adjustments could set right 
objective conditions which were quite unfavourable to progress for 
Trotskyism in Britain. 
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XIV LAST RITES 
(THE R. C. P. 1947 - 1949) 
'ý. 
The R. C. P. continued in being after the October 1947 split 
though the apparatus of the party was gradually reduced. 1948 was a 
year of stagnation: party leaders concentrated on theoretical 
explanation of dynamic world and national political changes, but there 
was declining activity by the membership. The difficulty of 
maintaining progress and disillusionment with ideologically bankrupt 
international leaders led to most R. C. P. leaders advocating entry into 
the Labour Party early in 1949. After a short fierce battle, a 
majority of the party supported them and the R. C. P. was dissolved. 
The majority retained the name and most of the apparatus of 
the R. C. P. But from this point the party press began to run down and 
it seems that there was a decline in membership and in the activity of 
those who remained during the fifteen months to the opening of the 
final debate in January 1949.2 Internal life, so frenetic in 1947, 
also subsided. 
3 1948 was the first year the WIL/R. C. P. had failed to 
convene its annual conference since 1941. Polemics began to be directed, 
not against internal critics but against the I. S. and the Cominform. 
I The October 1947 issue was the only Workers International News 
between May 1947 and June 1948, though it appeared two monthly there- 
after. 800 copies of the last (Jan. - Feb. 1949) were published. 
Socialist Appeal already a monthly was hit by the decision to break 
the long standing arrangement with the printers C. A. Brock, who, it 
had been discovered, were undertaking work for Mosley. No issues of 
Party Organiser post-dating the split have been located. 
2 The Haston papers provide little evidence of activity in 1948 though 
most members now expected a political recession and were prepared for 
it. Some of the moneyed backers of the party were however starting 
to lose interest, (Interview with E. Grant, Jan. 1973). In 1948 
some professionals began to be removed from the employment roll. 
3 See footnotes on following page. 
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The strongest plank in the platform of explanation offered 
by the R. C. P. for the post-war political lull was the non-appearance 
of slump. It was this which would expose Labour's reformism. 
I 
R. C. P. 
leaders had rejected any suggestion that a slump was already taking 
place. They did not doubt, however, that it would soon be upon them. 
Signs abounded in the re-emergence of Mosley, an electoral swing to 
the right2 and the words of Labour leaders. 
3 
But continued British 
insistence that the lull would be ended for fundamentally economic 
reasons still left it divided from the I. S., which continued to believe 
European. politics was occurring within 'unstable equilibrium', that 
1938 output levels in the nations of the Continent were exceeded 'only 
3 From previous page. 
The internal'dispute over entry and economic perspectives ceased 
with the split. 1948 was a vital year in the development of 
Trotskyist ideas in Britain and important documents were written, 
but the Internal Bulletin in its usual form virtually ceased to 
appear. These documents were the work of a handful of leading 
party members. In February 1949 it was alleged that the Political 
Bureau had failed to issue a single directive for the previous 
twelve months, (Bill Cleminson, Criticism of the entr statement of 
J. H., H. A., R. T., V. C., Feb? 1949 , H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101). 
D. D. Harber, a supporter of the leadership, ceased activity circa. 
1948. He continued to combine W. E. A. work with his C. I. S. job in 
Eastbourne. In later years his main creative work was in 
ornithology, though he kept his Marxist views and gift for languages. 
1 E. Grant, 'Two Years of Labour in Power', loc. cit., 11. 
2 E. Grant, in The Menace of Fascism (1948), repeated the wartime 
argument about the irrelevance of Fascism to British capitalists as 
long as they could achieve their ends by other means. The 
reappearance of Mosley and rising Tory votes at by-elections were 
linked by him to Labour 'tinkering' with capitalism. Disaffection 
in a boom threatened dire things for the slump. 
3 Grant argued that 'the exhaustion of the sellers' market looms in 
sight' and that in the speeches of Cripps were to be perceived, 
'the symptoms of decline, of impending economic slump, of over- 
production', (ibid., 51). 
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in exceptional cases'. 
' 
The absurd 'ceilings' argument was applied in 
detail to Britain by the I. S. economist Mandel, who warned the R. C. P.: 
.... it is necessary to abandon right now any juggling 
with a boom that has not existed and that British capitalism 
will never experience again. '2 
By 1947 key sectors of industry had been taken into public 
ownership in all the buffer states of Eastern Europe. In 1948, a 
domestic crisis over acceptance of Marshall Aid precipitated a full 
communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. That year also witnessed the 
Tito-Stalin split, the first serious and open rift between communist 
governments. The next year a generation of communist struggle in 
China was crowned with success when the Red Army, long in control of 
the countryside, finally entered the country's cities. These events 
created an unprecedented, albeit largely unrecognised, ideological 
crisis within the Fourth International, whose leaders had already 
proved unable to comprehend the survival of Soviet Russia after the war. 
To the R. C. P. there was a need for enquiry into the worldwide 
enhanced role of the state in the economy. Some R. C. P. leaders3 had 
begun to consider that Trotsky's analysis of Russia might be outmoded 
I The I. S. also discerned evidence of a rightward swing of the petty- 
bourgeoisie in election results, but perceived an imminent clash 
between the two wings of the Labour Party, ('World Situation and 
the Tasks of the Fourth International', Fourth International (N. Y., 
Nov. - Dec. 1947), 275). 
2 E. Mandel, 'From the A. B. C. to Current Reading : Boom, Revival or 
Crisis? ', Internal Bulletin, (Sept. 1947), H. P., D. J. H. 11/40,9. 
Mandel focussed especially on the shortages of manpower and of coal, 
both of which rendered the transformation of the economic revival 
into a boom 'impossible', and on the refusal of 'an enormous mass 
of capital ... to converge towards industry'. Mandel's paper was 
circulated to party members with a reply by Cliff. 
3 Notably Haston and Grant, (Interviews, 1973). 
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and that a form of 'state capitalism' flourished there. Some of these 
speculations found expression within a document of autumn 1947 which 
implied that 'state capitalism' was a form of society which might 
emerge from contemporary economy. 
' 
It was after this debate was 
opened that Tony Cliff, an Israeli exile, 
2 drew an emphatic conclusion 
from the hypothesis and applied it to Russia. 
3 
A year after raising 
the matter the R. C. P. leaders had concluded that the theory was not 
coherent: if the state took over all the means of production, they 
reasoned, capitalism had ceased to exist. Their analysis rested 
mainly on the introduction of planning where industry was mainly in 
the hands of the state, a step which allowed crises to be transcended 
and the contradiction between production and the market gradually 
ironed out. In the capitalist countries, statification (nationalisa- 
tion) could proceed only up to a certain point. The use of state 
ownership was a device of capitalism to mitigate the effects of its 
decline. It would not peacefully evolve into its opposite. 
4 
The 
I Capitalist Statification. This internal document has not been 
located. 
2 Cliff (Yigal Gluckstein) had come to England in 1946 and 
contributed occasional articles to Workers International News and 
Internal Bulletin. 
3 The Nature of Stalinism in Russia, trans. C. Dallas, (June 1948), 
H. P., D. J. H. 15A/43. A harbinger of this critique was Cliff's 
article 'What is Happening in Stalinist Russia? ', (Socialist 
Appeal, Feb. 1947). 
4 The analysis can be followed in 'The Tendency Towards Statification - 
A Necessary Correction', WIN., (Nov. - Dec. 1948), 8-18. The 
decision to make the correction arose from a Central Committee 
meeting of September 4/5 1948. 
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more negative features of Soviet rule were given greater emphasis in 
a contemporary contribution from Hunter. 
1 
In 1949, with the R. C. P. 
already doomed, the crystallized views of Cliff on Russian economy 
and society received weighty refutation from Grant. 
2 
Before the political shocks that 1948 brought to Eastern 
Europe, the I. S. saw the buffer states 'retaining their basic capitalist 
structure' and moving towards western influence. 
3 The 1948 World 
, 
Congress, meeting in the month of the Prague coup, endorsed this view, 
seeing in these states, 
'.... an attempt to exploit the resources of the "buffer 
zone" and to ensure its strategic control, while at the 
same time maintaining capitalist production relations and 
a bourgeois state structure in its traditional form. '4 
Removal of capitalism from Eastern Europe was envisaged by 
the I. S. only within the context of structural assimilation into the 
U. S. S. R. Underlying its reasoning was the assumption that national 
I Hunter contrasted the reality of state power in Russia,. with 
Engels' prediction that it would wither away, and argued that 
bourgeois rights there were strengthening, not weakening, as 
expected by Marx, ('Is Russia Moving to Communism? ', WIN, Jan. - 
Feb. 1949,8-23). 
2 T. Cliff, Marxism and the theory of bureaucratic collectivism, [1949? ], H. P., D. J. H. 15B/109; E. Grant, The Marxist Theory of the 
state as a lied to the Stalinist states: reply to Cliff Aug. 1949), 
D. J. H. /15B/109. This debate on the state extends beyond the R. C. P. 
to take in a faction fight within 'the Club' (the former Entrist 
Minority led by Healy), and the formation of a discrete state 
capitalist group. It is not therefore dealt with here. See 
D. Hallas (ed. ) The Fourth International : Stalinism and the Origins 
of the International Socialists, (1971). 
3 In a resolution which speaks of their 'need to trade with the West 
and imports of American capital and industrial products' and suggests 
that their population is moving in favour of socialist parties. 
('World Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International', 
Fourth International, (Nov. - Dec. 1947), 275). Six months later 
the I. S. called on Trotskyists in Eastern Europe to enter Social 
Democratic parties, ('The U. S. S. R. and Stalinism', Fourth 
International, (June 1948), 110-28). 
4 ibid., 118. 
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social change could occur only through a mass uprising, following the 
Russian model of 1917. The corollary was that only two social alter- 
natives lay before Eastern European states: capitalism or a healthy 
socialist system. The I. S. was forced to believe this, for the 
alternative was that some agency other than the Fourth International 
could achieve social change. 
' 
By 1949 its views were at such variance 
with reality that some stalwart supporters began to crack. 
2 
Impatience grew in Britain. The R. C. P. argued that the 
existence of the bourgeoisie in the buffer states was more apparent 
than real, but kept in insubstantial being for reasons of realpolitik. 
3 
The new society, Hunter reasoned in an important article, emerged that 
much more easily because of the existence of a model degenerated 
workers' state in Russia. 
4 
I Unaccountably, T. Ali in The Coming British Revolution (1971), '' 
attributes this folly not to the I. S., but to its British critics. 
But the R. C. P. stood opposed to the fantastic call in the 1948 
World Congress theses for the expropriation of the big bourgeoisie 
of Eastern Europe who had been expropriated long before, ('The 
U. S. S. R. and Stalinism', loc. cit., 121). 
2 The argument that structural assimilation into the U. S. S. R. was 
not in prospect and that the East European states were 
sociologically similar to Russia, was rehearsed by E. R. Frank, 
(Memorandum on Resolution on "The Evolution of the Buffer 
Countries", (31 March 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/103). The Evolution 
of the Buffer Countries was an I. E. C. resolution of March 1949 
which still did not clarify the social character of these countries. 
3 Hunter argued that the Czech communists kept a National Block in 
being when it wasjnot needed: 
'the coalition with the shadow of the bourgeoisie was 
intended to placate western imperialism in line with 
the alliances then existing, and to facilitate western 
economic aid. ' 
(B. Hunter, 'Stalinism in Czechoslovakia', WIN, June 1948. ) 
4 ibid. ' 
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But the I. S. now accomplished an astonishing volte-face. 
When the split between Russian and Yugoslav communists broke into the 
open in June 1948, the I. S. responded with a naive open letter to the 
Central Committee of the Yugoslav party which betrayed great illusions 
about what was taking place, and principally the belief that Tito and 
his colleagues were repudiating the past. 
' 
The IS. made no criticisms 
of Tito and urged him further along 'the road of the socialist 
revolution and its programme'. The R. C. P. was unimpressed however. 
2 
It also supported Tito against Stalin but interpreted the split as a 
struggle for independence by one section of Soviet bureaucracy. The 
Titoites were Stalinist still, claimed the R. C. P., and they shared 
with the Russians some responsibility for the crimes of the past. But 
the I. S. had landed itself in a hopeless ideological muddle, 
3 
and the 
I 'Now you are in a position to understand, in the light of the 
infamous campaign of which you are the victims, the real meaning of 
the Moscow Trials and of the whole Stalinist struggle against 
Trotskyism', ('Open Letter to Yugoslav C. P. ', WIN, Aug. 1948,16). 
A further letter developed this friendly theme and offered Tito the 
assistance of the Fourth International. 
2 'We cannot lend credence, by silence on aspects of Y. C. P. policy 
and regime, to any impression that Tito or the leaders of the C. P. Y. 
(sic) are Trotskyist ....... ' (Letter on Yugoslavia sent to the 
I. E. C. by the R. C. P. (Britain), (Oct. 1948), H. P., D. J. H. -1-5B7100). 
UP- letter, toned down from earlier drafts, called on the I. E. C. to 
repudiate the open letters. I. H. Birchall, Workers Against the 
Monolith (1974) reports the later rejection by the Cliff Group of 
the official F. I. line but omits any reference to the R. C. P. leaders' 
contemporary rebuttal. 
3 In June 1948, the month of the split, the World Congress had 
declared all the East European states to be capitalist. Now it was 
supporting a 'capitalist' country (Yugoslavia) against a ! workers' 
state' (Russia). There was, as Haston the R. C. P., signatory pointed 
out, no call for the overthrow of Yugoslav capitalism in the open 
letters. 
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British paid no attention'to its views in the literature they put out 
for public consumption. 
' 
1949 brought final success for the Chinese communists which 
compounded the bewilderment of the I. S. It reacted in the same myopic 
way as it had to the new Eastern European states, which is to say that 
it pretended, in effect, that a revolution had not taken place. 
2 
To 
the R. C. P., this brought final disillusionment. David James took the 
views of the I. S. itself to their logical conclusion that the Fourth 
International was irrelevant. 
3 
Nor was he satisfied with the R. C. P. 
attempt to handle the apparent contradictions in Trotskyist theory, 
thrown up by Yugoslavia and China by backing a deformed workers' state. 
See the pamphlet, E. Grant and J. Haston, The Tito-Stalin Split, 
(1948). The official Trotskyist reaction was no passing fancy. Two 
years later, in its official American journal, Gerard Bloch wrote 
that 'the Yugoslav revolution can very well become the springboard 
from which the Fourth International will launch out to win over the 
masses', ('The Test of Yugoslavia', Fourth International, (July - 
Aug. 1950), 121). For an interesting first-hand account of the 
course of events before and during the Tito-Stalin quarrel see 
F. Claudin, The Communist Movement, (1975), 486-548. The enthusiasm 
of the Fourth International leaders for Tito found a mirror image in 
James Klugmann's From Trotsky to Tito (1951) which constructed a 
farrago of links between the two movements. 
2 In April 1948, before the Nationalists were routed, a Chinese 
Trotskyist dismissed Mao's programme as 'an embellishment of 
bourgeois power' and predicted he would use the national bourgeoisie 
as an ally against imperialism, (H. Yueh, 'Mao Tse-tung's 
"Revolution"', Fourth International (N. Y. Dec. 1949), 328-32). 
Later it was suggested that 'the Stalinist programme itself is 
dedicated to the protection and preservation of capitalist property 
relations', (C. L. Liu, 'China : An Aborted Revolution', Fourth 
International, (N. Y. Jan. - Feb. 1950), 3-7). 
3 'Objectively, it is Tito (and Gomulka and tomorrow perhaps Mao 
Tse-tung) who express the programme of Trotskyism, unconsciously, 
in a distorted form. The Fourth International has been by-passed. ' 
(Some Remarks on the Question of Stalinism, (Feb. 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 
15B/102,10). 
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Stalinism, he concluded, was the only real alternative to capitalism. 
Grant's refutation of this rested on the variety of political forms 
available either to proletarian or to bourgeois rule, and the argument 
that like economic forms did not preclude conflicts between states. 
R. C. P. support for Tito was dictated not by the form of Yugoslav 
society but by the right of nations to self-determination, which had 
been threatened by Stalin. As for China, Mao might prove 'a new and 
more formidable Tito' but this did not mean that his revolution would 
not also be deformed from the start. 
' 
Support for this argument came 
also from Hunter, who noted in his analysis the close economic 
similarity of Russia to all the buffer states, yet echoed Grant's 
warning of future Maoist opposition. 
2 
The ideological incapacity of the I. S. as well as the general 
lack of progress by the Fourth International was the background to the 
disintegration of the R. C. P. which took place in 1949. Grant and 
others had cobbled together a strong alternative analysis to that of 
the I. S., but they had not provided a definite programme to guide the 
activity of Fourth Internationalists in the present. Internationally 
and nationally the thrust of their argument was that no initiatives 
I Grant predicted bonapartist rule in China. The working class had 
not played a leading role there and the bourgeoisie would only be 
allowed a fragile existence while Mao played for time, (In Reply 
to David James, (1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/102,15). 
2 W. Hunter, The I. S. and Eastern Europe, (May 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 
12/106,3. Grant had welcomed the passage of power to the Chinese 
communists with the remarkable prediction that 'it is quite likely 
that Stalin will have a new Tito on his hands. Mao will have a 
powerful base in China with its 450-500 million population, and its 
potential resources, and the undoubted mass support that his regime 
will possess in the early stages', (Socialist Appeal, Jan. 1949). 
C 
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were available, that matters were in the hands of objective economic 
and political forces. The malaise might have been offset by R. C. P. 
progress but this did not take place. In Britain Labour was, 
apparently, carrying out its programme. The extension of Soviet rule 
in Eastern Europe made it improbable that any great numbers would 
defect from the C. P. G. B. After a period of confusion induced by the 
Tito-Stalin split, the C. P. G. B. rallied to Russia. Party membership 
fell, but Trotskyism did not benefit thereby. 
The crisis of Trotskyist leadership may have been long 
gathering. 
' It broke into the open in January 1949 when Haston, Tearse, 
Atkinson and Vic Charles, a majority of the Political Bureau, called 
for entry into the Labour Party. 
2 They had not revised their views on 
how things stood within the Labour Party, but recognised that the 
industrial field had been, contrary to expectations, 'exceptionally 
quiescent', and that communists were now more confident than before and 
thus more difficult to move. Haston et. al. made no claim that the 
'conditions' for entry existed in the Britain of 1949. They suggested 
instead that the problem be approached from a new angle: that it would 
be impossible to build a third party except from a recognition that 
workers had first to complete their experiences of social democracy and 
I Haston had been surprised at the leniency of his treatment in Durham 
Jail in 1944. Three years later he had argued against extending 
support to a miners' strike, (Interview with J. Haston, July 1973). 
It is believed that he had attempted to resign several times before 
1949, but been dissuaded by other party leaders who also suppressed 
the news, (Interview with S. Bornstein and S. Levy, 30 Nov. 1973). 
2 J. Haston et. al., Statement on the perspective of the R. C. P. (Jan. 
1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101. The discussion was officially opened 
on 9 January and it was then agreed that it would last fourteen 
weeks. In fact written contributions continued to arrive until the 
special R. C. P. conference in mid-June 1949. 
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communism. Without enthusiasm, 
I 
they proposed a long period of 
Labour Party work. 
2 Since it was an expression of a mood the proposal, 
if it was to be defeated, had to be instantly suppressed. But other 
party leaders were not sufficiently resolute or willing to take such 
rapid steps. Grant and two other Political Bureau members consciously 
avoided the issue by declining to engage in a struggle over entrism. 
In their view the die was already cast3 and unity took precedence over 
a sterile discussion within the party. 
4 
They put great value on the 
agreement by all that there was a need to maintain a theoretical 
journal and a tight organisation. This was to turn out to be self- 
deception. The debate ceased to be confined to R. C. P. leaders as the 
party received a missive from the I. S. and polemics from members who 
sought to retain an independent party. The I. S. letter was animated 
I (The Labour Party), 'despite the limitations which it will impose on 
revolutionary agitation is the only field from which a mass 
Trotskyist tendency can arise in the period ahead', (ibid. ). 
2 'Several years' were specified, another departure from previous 
beliefs. The authors rejected another earlier view by talking of 
going in to organise the left wing. Their detailed proposal was for 
a period of preparation for entry, an open approach to the Labour 
Party for terms, and coordination with the former Minority once they 
were'inside. 
3 'The overwhelming majority of the leadership and trained cadres, and 
a substantial section of the rank and file' were in favour of 
dissolving the R. C. P., they claimed, (T. Grant, J. Deane, G. Hanson, 
Letter to the Members, [Jan.? 19491, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101). 
4 Grant et. al. argued that if a principle had been at stake then there 
would have to be a struggle regardless of the consequences. But 
since Trotskyism was barred from growth for the present whatever it 
did, a debate would be futile. 
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by an unforgiving spirit. 
l 
Haston et al. had not adopted the entrist 
proposals of the I. S. two years late; they had devised their own. 
Nor had they revised their economic perspectives. They were proposing 
to enter the Labour Party without any definite end in view. 
2 
The I. S. 
called for delay and regretted that no votes had been taken in the 
discussions held so far by the R. C. P. This document had the 
predictable effect of solidifying the British leaders. None of them 
shared the views of the I. S. on the economy or in the controversies 
over Russia and Eastern Europe. The I. S. had so little standing with 
the R. C. P. that its demand to be involved in the debate had negligible 
impact. A rapid reply from the Political Bureau rejected the 
liquidationist charge and all I. S. proposals for conduct of the debate. 
3 
It also pointed out the R. C. P. leaders were now repudiating the very 
concept of entrism the International itself had criticised two years 
'This document is the expression of liquidationist tendencies', 
(Open letter from the I. S. to all members of the R. C. P., (8 Feb. 
1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101,1). 
2 There is great danger because the policy of the comrades 
depends on nothing. Nothing is to be done because reformism is 
transforming the working class, nothing is to be done because 
Stalinism is achieving victories for the working class. They 
have not much hope to build the Trotskyist organisation, they have 
no hope in the development of the Fourth International. The 
proposal of entry looks like the act of a desperate man drowning 
himself in deep water, (ibid. ). 
3 To the I. S. from the Political Bureau of the R. C. P., (21 Feb. 1949), 
H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101. The authors declared their hope, on entering 
the Labour Party, to fuse with the old Minority. 
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before. ' The I. S. could derive no comfort at all from other 
contributions to the debate. 
2 
Most significantly there was a rank and 
file revolt which centred on restating original R. C. P. views against a 
leadership which it believed to be demoralised. These members, centred 
on the London district committee, had first looked to Grant to resist 
the drift into the Labour Party. When disappointed, they took up 
cudgels themselves. They agreed with the I. S. only in their belief 
that Haston et. al. were aiming at destruction of the party. In every 
other respect they opposed it. Entry could be efficacious only under 
conditions of economic recession which were absent. R. C. P. leaders 
were privately in despair at the ability of the party to maintain 
itself and this was driving them on. 
3 
The Open Party Faction had only 
a limited impact though it made considerable effort. 
4 
Late in the 
I Although the Political Bureau now believed there would be no great 
gains inside or outside the Labour Party, they did also concede that 
they had to attempt to influence processes at work within it. It 
may have been this concession to the I. S. which caused Grant to 
abstain over its statement, (ibid. ). 
2 B. Cleminson, Criticisms of the entry statement of J. H., H. A., R. T., 
V. C., Gran. /Feb. 1949? 7, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101. Cleminson believed 
that criticism of the Labour Government was growing but was not 
expressed through the Labour Party. He asserted that the R. C. P. had 
never been more than a propaganda group and that if the ability to 
agitate successfully was the criterion of open work, Trotskyists 
should never have left the Labour Party. He branded the Haston 
document as a screen for inactivity and remoteness on the part of 
the leadership, and proposed a purge of those who suggested, 'let's 
drown ourselves in the most stagnant pool in British politics - 
The Labour Party'. 
3 Open Party Faction, Some Comments on the I. S. Letter and the P. B. 
Reply, (March 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101. 
4 Sam Levy, author of Some Comments, and Alf Snobel, another faction 
leader, visited several party branches but failed to convince them 
of the need to hold the traditional line. They themselves lacked 
the aura of front rank leaders, and their perspective of more of 
the same did not inspire confidence, (Interview with S. Bornstein 
and S. Levy, Nov. 1973). 
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debate its leaders did attempt to broaden the issues. They rejected 
the classical conditions of entry, formerly much beloved. 
I 
They came 
close to suggesting that successful Trotskyist activity within the 
Labour Party was impossible. 
2 
Lack of activity there would, they 
predicted, lead to an over emphasis on theory and to factionalism. 
3 
When the Political Bureau next addressed the party it was in 
more radical mood. It repudiated its own policy of independence since 
1945,4 conceded the charge of fatalism levelled in the past by the I. S. 
5 
and predicted that the beneficiaries of a mass movement would be no 
independent force but Bevan and other left wing Labour leaders. The 
R. C. P., it now believed, would never be able to step in and take 
I Once again - the real situation in Britain; document of the Open 
Party Faction, (May 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101,12. 
2 The Faction claimed that those R. C. P. members still in the Labour 
Party wished to be withdrawn, and that the former Minority was 
placing increasing emphasis on the support of left parliamentarians 
through its paper the Socialist Outlook, (ibid., 15). 
3 They charged the R. C. P. leadership with neglecting the ideological 
education of members. This seems harsh in view of the output of 
Grant and Hunter from 1947 onwards, and yet Grant is the subject of 
particularly scathing remarks in the text of the Faction's May 
document. 
4 Maintenance of an open party had been wrong, 'ever since the Labour 
Party was elected and began to carry out its programme', (Political 
Bureau, Statement on Entry, '(March 1949), H. P., D. J. H. 15B/101). 
5 The Political Bureau acknowledged that together with the Open Party 
Faction it had been guilty of waiting for events to come its way in 
an 'ivory tower'. 
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control of an established current: it would have to earn support. 
I 
Appearing monolithic before the members, and having allowed a lengthy 
discussion, the Political Bureau's victory was assured. The Open 
Party Faction had failed to gain ground and other alternatives did not 
attract support. 
2 
There was no split before the special R. C. P. Congress 
of 4-6 June, which gave most of its agenda over to the problem of 
entry. 
3 At the Congress the biggest faction, with around 50% of the 
thirty delegates was that behind Grant which meant a vote to enter the 
Labour Party was certain. The supporters of Haston and of the Open 
4 Party Faction registered about equal strength. Speeches by Levy and 
I Specific points of activity would be persuading disillusioned 
militants not to despair of the Labour Party, and the N. C. L. C., 
(considered a form of Labour Party work). The danger of 
degenerating into left opportunism was rejected: 'the mere 
existence of an open party and seclusion from real trends in no 
answer to incipient ideological capitulation', (ibid. ). 
2 One of these was advanced by Frank Ward, a central committee member, 
who favoured entry for most of the R. C. P. with a small group out- 
side to publish a new theoretical journal and undertake industrial 
work, (British Perspectives and the International, [May? 1949], 
H. P., D. J. H. 15B/107). The F. I. leaders were predictably as 
horrified by the views of Ward on the Fourth International as they 
were by those of James, and considered the party had failed to 
convincingly refute either, (I. S., To The Conference of the R. C. P., 
2 June 1949, H. P., D. J. H. 12/108). Another R. C. P. leader, 
Tommy Reilly, drew even further conclusions from the failure of the 
Fourth International and joined the C. P. G. B., (See Central Committee, 
R. C. P., To the I. S., 25 June 1949, H. P., D. J. H. 12/108). 
3 There was however a discussion on attitudes to the Fourth International 
which revealed that Ward alone advocated the slogan 'For the Fourth' 
which Trotsky had rejected before the Founding Congress. 
4 No minutes of this Congress have been located. These figures are 
based on an interview with S. Bornstein and S. Levy, (Nov. 1973). 
The Congress met in the presence of an I. S. delegate and Goldberg 
from the old Minority. 
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Snobel gained them no ground and the decision to dissolve was taken. 
Haston was appointed to head a Committee of Dissolution. 
The last issue of Socialist Appeal was published in July 
1949. It ran a"declaration of dissolution: 
'The perspective for Socialists must therefore be to join 
the ranks of the politically conscious workers inside the 
Labour Party and try to orientate its policy along truly 
socialist lines. 12 
It was openly stated that dissolution was forced on the 
R. C. P. by a 1946 decision of Labour Party conference on affiliations. 
It claimed to take this step in order to help Labour fashion an 
anti-capitalist programme in the face of the coming world slump. In 
the end the R. C. P. had succumbed to the same hostile environment which 
had induced the collapse of the I. L. P. and Common Wealth. Ideologically 
and organisationally it was tougher (though much smaller) than either, 
and so its fate was delayed. To its credit it tried honestly to 
explain post-war developments in the economy and politics at home and 
abroad. Its efforts shine when compared with those of its international 
leadership? But events were so different to expectations that. the 
party itself was shattered by the reorientation expected of it. The 
argument between the I. S., the Majority and the Minority had been over 
when, not whether the slump would appear. By 1949 only the 
I In fact some Faction supporters were lost during the debate, 
(Interview with S. Bornstein and S. Levy, Nov. 1973). 
2 'Declaration on the dissolution of the Revolutionary Communist 
Party and the entry of its members into the Labour Party', 
Socialist Appeal, (special number), (July 1949). 
3 The R. C. F. leaders rapped I. S. knuckles one final time on the eve 
of dissolution when they attributed some of the democratisation to 
I. S. failure to distinguish the Fourth International from Stalinism, 
(Central Committee, R. C. P., To the I. S., 25 June 1949, H. P., D. J. H. 
12/108). 
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Majority had faced up to the probability of some years of expansion 
which its determinist Marxism suggested meant also a political lull. 
This greater clarity brought nearer its demise and an end to the 
struggle against history. 
l 
The subsequent fate of the R. C. P. is outside the scope of this 
thesis. The Open Party Faction had predicted that the I. S. would 
give control of the newly fused Trotskyist presence in the Labour 
Party to the Minority, now known as the Club. The idea of a fusion 
had been supported from the outset by Haston et al. Two different 
economic perspectives were at war within the Club and that of the 
I. S. and Healy prevailed following a number of expulsions. Within 
a short time the state capitalist group of Cliff departed. Others 
ceased activity. Haston formally left the Trotskyist movement on 
10 June 1950, leaving behind him a remarkable memoir in which he 
repudiated the activity of a lifetime, (H. P., D. J. H. 15B/111). At 
least one former R. C. P. leader, Deane, was expelled from the Club 
for refusing to break relations with Haston, (E. C. Statement on 
the conduct of J. D., 24 May 1950, H. P., D. J. H. 15B/110). Shortly, 
most R. C. P. leaders had either ceased activity or, like Grant and 
Cliff, were seeking to build anew outside the Club. The real 
meaning of the original proposal of Haston et. al. - physical 
exhaustion arising from a long struggle against adverse circumstances 
as well as arrival at an ideological impasse - was now apparent, 
(Interview with S. Bornstein and S. Levy, Nov. 1979; J. Walters, 
'Some Notes on British Trotskyist History', Marxist Studies, 
Vol. 2, no. 3,1962-3,45-8). 
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As assessment of the achievement of British Trotskyists to 
1949 may be undertaken by reference to their own objectives. The 
general strategic aim of Trotskyism in Britain as in other countries 
was the creation of a mass revolutionary party which could seize power. 
It would, however, be facile to conclude that their failure to approach 
this aim even remotely, and after two decades of endeavour, meant that 
their efforts were cancelled out. Several subordinate goals - rarely 
drawn up by the Trotskyists themselves - could be listed. They sought 
to establish a youth influence, to rebut Stalinist propaganda, to 
secure trade union support and rally the labour movement against war. 
At different times in the two decades they achieved some success under 
each of these headings. And yet it is quite clear that there was never 
a possibility at any time between the 1920s and the threshold of the 
1950s that Trotskyism might emerge as a significant current even within 
the labour movement. 
The first opportunity for Trotskyism in Britain occurred in 
the 1920s. The case however is negatively proved. No significant 
support for the platform of the Left Opposition was aroused within the 
C. P. G. B. at any time in the decade, yet at this very time leading 
communists in almost all metropolitan countries defected to Trotsky. 
The small size and inadequate grasp of theory of the C. P. G. B. must 
figure largely in explanations of this contrast, but there was no great 
understanding outside the party either of the full meaning of the 
debates in Russia and the Comintern. As a result Trotsky's defenders 
displayed no inclination to create a political movement, seeing in the 
disputes of the 1920s a confirmation of their belief that Marxism - 
with which they identified themselves - was not monolithic but 
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heterogeneous. Trotsky himself was in any case still .a recognised 
communist for most of this decade and his critique was advanced from 
within the Comintern. Of itself, this constructed a barrier to 
influence outside the C. P. G. B., even among those who had resigned from 
it early in the 1920s. The communist context of Where is Britain Going? 
reinforced this distance and the book could have become a principal 
text of the party. Instead Trotsky's position rapidly collapsed in the 
Comintern after 1926, the British party was hustled by Moscow to his 
left, and he had no support, only interest outside it. 
When a group of British communists did commit itself to 
Trotsky it was under most unfavourable circumstances. 1931 and 1932 
were not years of crisis for the C. P. G. B. in the sense that sharp 
political differences were widely articulated. Party leaders handled 
Trotskyism, whose arrival they had long anticipated, and the desertion 
of Murphy, with little noticeable difficulty. Nevertheless, a fear 
of Trotskyism was implanted in their political outlook and it 
continued to haunt them whether its substance waxed or waned. As for 
the Trotskyists they were hampered by being born into*a labour movement 
entering a decade of impotence following its industrial defeat of 1926 
and political defeat in 1931. It was unlikely that a brand new 
political movement could establish itself at such a juncture; there 
were, moreover, established competitors in the market. A firmer echo 
among those whom they could reach might have been received by a 
shrewder emphasis on the more popular aspects of the programme of the 
International Left Opposition. Advocacy of the United Front in 
Germany - though its application was more problematic in Britain - 
could have been a strong suit. But tactical questions and the selection 
of programmatic emphases could only have a secondary effect. The real 
problem for the Balham Group and then the Communist League was survival. 
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Here the infusion of I. L. P. members, and the powerful' personal 
influence of Trotsky, had a critical effect in tilting part of the new 
organisation towards the I. L. P. Though the manner of achieving this 
must be put down as a setback, I. L. P. entry made possible the first 
important swathe of recruits to Trotskyism in Britain. When all just 
criticism is made of its sojourn in the I. L. P., it has to be allowed 
that the very continued existence of the movement to the middle of the 
decade must rank as an achievement. 
It was in 1936-8, at the time of the Moscow Trials, that an 
opportunity might have presented itself, yet did not. British 
Trotskyists needed to have established a bridgehead before 1936 if they 
were to discredit the Moscow Trials, whose verdict was a mortal threat 
to their continued presence in the labour movement. Most crucially 
they needed a following among the intelligentsia where the critics of 
the Trials were almost entirely to be found. Lacking this before 1936 
they were unlikely to gain it later. It is true that scepticism about 
the conduct of participants in the Trials, as well as about their 
verdicts, was extensive. But scepticism is not the stuff of which 
political movements are made. There was in any case an issue of 
overriding concern to the Left, and that was the creation of a common 
crusade against fascism and war. Late in 1936 and in 1937 the Unity 
Campaign conjured up this mirage, and it was enough to still the doubts 
of, or at least to silence, many of those made queasy by the grotesque 
and medieval spectacle of the Old Bolsheviks being arraigned for 
treachery. The Trotskyists must be criticised for their failure to 
suspend their feuds in the face of such an assault as the Trials 
represented, but this cannot be brought forward as the major reason for 
the shallow impact of the Defence Committee. It remained largely 
unknown, the main debates about the Trials conducted without its 
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participation. And when scepticism about the Trials grew, as it did 
steadily to 1938, the effect within the intelligentsia was not to 
generate an enquiry into putative deviations from a communist ideal - 
this was not their lineage in any case - it was rather to inculcate 
what had always been there, a deep mistrust of communism per se. 
On the Trotskyist analysis, failure to achieve socialist 
revolution meant inevitable war, as inter-imperialist conflict was 
openly renewed. Trotskyists did play an important part in the anti- 
war movements of the last year of peace, but there was by 1939 no 
prospect of mass resistance to war, just as there was to be no 
repetition of the patriotic fervour of 1914. Trotskyists had launched 
the Fourth International in 1938 as a desperate throw to rally those 
they could influence and dramatise what they saw as the treachery of 
the L. S. I. and the Comintern. But how could a small, seriously 
divided and sometimes abstract movement in Britain galvanise a 
revolutionary opposition to war? When it came the principal opponents 
of war were the traditional ones - the uncomplicated pacifists of the 
I. L. P. That moment effectively marked the dissolution of whatever had 
been accomplished by Trotskyists in the 1920s. Yet the war brought 
revival in a novel way. When the C. P. G. B. followed Labour into the 
belief that the effective prosecution of the war overrode other 
objectives, a vacuum was created in industrial relations which matched 
the electoral truce which had prevailed from the outbreak of war. 
Trotskyism's single foray into parliamentary electioneering was not a 
great success but WIL, more than any other organisation, proved able to 
capitalise on the opportunity provided in industry. It was able to do 
this because it embodied a rupture with the British Trotskyist tradition 
in so far as the 1930s had seen one established. Above all it 
relegated tactics to their proper subordinate sphere, reacted flexibly 
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to shifting opportunities and aspired to build by recruitment outside 
the present ranks of Trotskyism. But it was. the wartime conjuncture 
and not the political programme of WIL (and later the R. C. P. ) which 
gained it support. There had not been a fundamental shift away from 
established labour organisations. 1945 indeed was to reveal that they 
were stronger than ever. Labour and the unions had acted as if war 
was not the continuation of politics by other means and when peace came 
they reverted to type. The R. C. P., which in 1944 had taken the name 
Party as a pledge to the future, speedily found that the premiss of its 
existence had been removed. 
Thus in post-war Britain there was a narrowing base from 
which to conduct 'independent' revolutionary activity and, after a 
timelag, this ledge had to be shared with the C. P. G. B. when the first 
breezes of the Cold War began to blow. The case for an open party had 
been an anticipation of industrial conflict and political disaffection 
brought on by economic collapse. None of these three expectations 
materialised and the R. C. P. 's hopes vanished with them. This is the 
fundamental reason why the party collapsed, yet what must be allowed is 
that its leaders made strenuous efforts to comprehend the meaning of the 
post-war world. They were hampered in this by their international 
leaders who simply failed to undertake the same intellectual struggle. 
The pre-war interventions of the Fourth International in Britain were for 
the most part salutary; from 1938 onwards the International intervened 
almost always to harmful effect, its blundering culminating in the crude 
split of-1947. The ultimate organisational sanction was applied when 
I. S. political prestige in Britain was lower than ever before. High 
weighting must be allowed to its behaviour in any assessment of the 
reasons for R. C. P. decline. 
Thus Trotskyism remained on the periphery at four potential 
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moments of growth in the 1920s and 1930s. The belief that factional 
existence had been transcended at the end of the war was a mirage. 
The nearest it came to a breakthrough was in 1942-4. Yet this partial 
success was achieved only during the war and it has to be said that 
even then the reputation of WIL outstripped its ability to recruit. 
Was there something in the Trotskyist movement itself which inhibited 
its ability to grow? The accusation of sectarianism was that most 
commonly levelled. This finds substance in the relations between the 
groups themselves, estranged by essentially secondary matters for most 
of the 1930s. Indictable also was a frequent inability to recognise 
positive steps when they were taken by leading figures in the labour 
movement. But much of the steam behind the sectarian charge was 
generated by communists, who in the 1930s and 1940s frequently levelled 
it against any who sought by reference to Marxist precept to criticise 
them from the ample space to their left. In many cases Trotskyists - 
and even those who were not Trotskyists - were expounding arguments 
similar to those advanced by the. Comintern itself in earlier years. 
But since there was no lack of ill-will towards them from communism, 
should the Trotskyists not have sublimated internal disputes in order 
to rise above a factional existence? These civil broils took their 
origin from a pre-existing isolation however. The whole Left in 
Britain felt the frustration in the mid-1930s of trying to shift the 
apparently immoveable Right-wing control of Labour and the T. U. C. 
Trotskyism faced not only this problem, but the equally intractable one 
of a C. P. G. B. which after 1934 grew steadily. Moreover communist growth 
meant wider diffusion of anti-Trotskyism of a peculiarly virulent strain. 
It was the communists who charged that Trotskyists were agents of 
fascism and allies of Franco and they did not relent: the language of 
Labour Monthly in the early 1930s and that of From Trotsky to Tito (1951) 
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is much the same and spans the period discussed by this thesis. It 
certainly took its toll. Factionalism and sectarianism rarely 
destroy a dynamic movement but they can flourish in a stagnant one. 
This must stand-in partial explanation of Trotskyist behaviour in the 
1930s. Reference must also be made to the persistence of entrism as an 
occasion of dispute throughout the period under consideration. It 
split the Communist League in 1933. It shivered the Marxist Group in 
1936. It kept all factions apart in 1937. Failure to resolve it was 
at the heart of the double failure of the Revolutionary Socialist 
League in 1938-9 and again in 1941-2. It was apparently resolved in 
1944 but returned in a different guise and with renewed vigour to 
paralyse partially the R. C. P. and contribute to its destruction. It 
was the occasion of the 1947 split and the 1949 dissolution. Effectively 
Trotskyism's own relationship with other parties remained permanently 
on the agenda to be sublimated only when one organisation, WIL, 
9 pursued successfully an inýendent policy while maintaining fractions 
in other parties. That entrism should continue to be so important is 
a dismal commentary on twenty years of struggle and it is ironic that 
the most successful organisation of all before 1949 built independently. 
Entrism was a penalty for numerical weakness. But 
Trotskyism in Britain had another vulnerable spot for most of the 
period under consideration here. This was a general inability inherited, 
it is arguable, from the anti-theoretical environment into which the 
C. P. G. B. was born, to deal with matters of theory. The discussion on 
tactics in the British Trotskyist movement was prolonged and, 
occasionally rich. But the movement's late appearance precluded it 
from contributing to the debates of the 1920s between the Opposition 
(in its various incarnations) and the Russian Party apparatus. In the 
1930s there were further disputes within the International Opposition - 
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over rejection of the Comintern, the nature of Russia and launching 
the Fourth International. The British played no part in these 
debates. In the same decade there was no major theoretical 
contribution by a British Trotskyist. The best achievement, 
World Revolution, was written by egrd temporarily in Britain. It 
was moreover a work of history, not theory, and seemed to Trotsky to 
be 'Anglo-Saxon' in its empiricism. Only in the 1940s was there a 
change, first with the dispute over Military Policy which educated 
WIL but sterilized the R. S. L., then with interesting R. C. P. discussions 
over industrial slogans and programme, and finally with the 
contributions of Hunter and above all Grant to the attempt to 
comprehend post-war economic and political developments within a 
Trotskyist framework. The major theoretical writing from Trotskyism 
in Britain came at the very end of the period covered by this thesis, 
but by its appearance indicates an inner vitality in the movement and 
contradicts the general view of WIL and the R. C. P. as empirics not 
overburdened with care about ideas. 
Yet the story is not one of unrelieved gloom. Despite the 
attentions of the C. P. G. B., Trotskyism did not become extinct. An 
alternative activist Marxism was kept in being in the 1930s and proved 
attractive to industrial militants in the 1940s. Whenever the C. P. G. B. 
undertook political fraction work in the 1930s it faced sniping from 
the Left. Trotskyism may not have grown to the point where it might 
have competed on equal terms, but it dented the communist claim to all 
Marxist authority. Members of the I. L. P. in 1934-6 or of the League of 
Youth in 1937-9 could be in no doubt that there was a choice of 
Marxisms on offer. The survival of an alternative tradition is not 
attributable only to the Trotskyists: there were many on the Left who 
derived, at least in part, their inspiration from Marx. Indeed 
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Trotskyism aspired to encompass the destruction of all other parties 
and groups confusing the choice between itself and reformism. 
Trotskyism was unique however in seeking to sustain a revolutionary 
Marxist movement, one which sought to rehabilitate not repudiate 
Lenin. In the years 1942-4 this endeavour reached its climax and 
before a growing audience though it derived its force from the 
extraordinary deviations of communist policy. But even after the war, 
when Trotskyism was in decline, the existence of a Left critique of 
communism was known to militants. 
The defensive argument that they kept a tradition in being 
may not be one which would have appealed to Trotskyists. More popular 
would be the other unequivocal credit - the industrial activities of 
WIL and the R. C. P. They undoubtedly played an important ancillary 
part in the dispute at Barrow in 1943, in the Tyneside apprentices' 
case and in the Docks strike of 1945. In a number of less publicised 
cases, they helped to sustain militant trade unionism, when it 
naturally revived after 1942. WIL achieved a far greater impact on 
industry than, for example, the I. L. P. which had many advantages over 
it. And both it and the R. C. P. had within their ranks a strong cadre 
of shop stewards and industrial militants, the fruits of resourceful 
factory interventions. It would therefore be wrong to place a zero 
against the British Trotskyists before 1949 for in two important 
respects their absence might seriously have disarmed the Left when it 
most needed those who would courageously swim against the stream. 
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APPENDIX A 
A NOTE ON BRITISH TROTSKYISTS AND SPAIN 0 
The Spanish Civil War dramatized the menace of Fascism for 
the Left in Britain. The Trotskyists had a distinctive critique, and 
their comrades were being brutally repressed in Spain. The communists 
had to engage in a limited polemic on their left. It might have been 
possible to avoid it had the Trotskyists been their only critics, 
(except perhaps in the League of Youth where the centre of gravity of 
the debate was further left than elsewhere). As it was there was some 
disquiet in the Labour Party about the communists' role in the war, 
though loyalty to the Republic generally overrode it. The I. L. P., 
however, was militantly critical and its opposition to the Spanish 
communists deepened after the Barcelona rising of May 1937 and the 
suppression of its sister party, the P. O. U. M. 
I 
The communists branded 
all their left critics as Trotskyists, though they eschewed a polemic 
with the Trotskyists themselves. 
2 Within the party there were 
differences over Spain, 
3 
though the Trotskyists only gained from them 
I Within the I. L. P. Trotskyists and others at annual conferences urged 
the inconsistency of I. L. P. -C. P. G. B. cooperation in the Unity 
Campaign, while the communists were suppressing the P. O. U. M. in 
Barcelona) (The New Leader, 2 April 1937 and 22 April 1938 ). 
2 J. R. Campbell, Spain's "Left" Critics (1937), 16p. The P. O. U. M. was 
not a Trotskyist party any more than the I. L. P. itself. But there 
were Trotskyists in the P. O. U. M. Two of them, Mary Low and 
Juan Brea published Red Spanish Notebook (with an introduction by 
C. L. R. James) in 1937. 
3 Discussion for 13 April 1937 did carry an article by Hugh Slater 
which argued that Daily Herald reports of fighting behind the lines 
might be untrue, but otherwise there was no public controversy 
between communists over Spain. Yet Wally Tapsell and others did 
bring back criticisms from the Brigades (H. McShane and J. Smith, 
Harry McShane, No Mean Fighter (1975), 223; F. Copeman, Reason in 
Revolt (1948), 119; H. Dewar, Assassins at Large (1951), 70. ). 
Emile Burns did feel it necessary to defend Stalin's early policy 
of neutrality, (Discussion, Nov. 1936). See also R. Black, Stalinism 
in Britain (1970), 113-4. 
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in a very minor way. 
In Spain the verdict of the Moscow Trials was steadily applied 
to critics of the communist line, and that was a matter not only for 
Trotskyists. Yet the response of the I. L. P., the party most at risk, 
was muffled for most of 1937 by its longing for a united front at home. 
All Trotskyists closely followed developments in Spain, 
especially after the events of May 1937 in Barcelona. To Militant the 
gains of the July 1936 revolution were steadily filched later in the 
year and in early 1937. Continual provocation by the Government led, 
, its view, to the Barcelona rising. Yet this 
insurrection would, it 
believed, have succeeded but for the vacillation of the P. O. U. M. and 
the anarchists. With its failure 'the Government felt more secure and 
the tempo of the counter-revolution increased'. The keynote criticism 
of the P. O. U. M. was probably the-extract from a Trotsky article with 
which Youth Militant led in June 1937 
The New Leader publicised the rolling back of the revolution 
from 1937.2 The death of Bob Smillie and the murder of Andres Nin 
drew particular attention. But, the I. L. P. apart, it was only the 
Trotskyists who thoroughly covered the revolution within the Civil War 
in Spain. What was more, Trotskyism denounced the I. L. P. for its 
willingness to unite with a communist movement which was executing 
revolutionaries in Spain: 
1 Bob Armstrong and four other communists who had served in Spain 
joined WIL in 1939. 
2 See The New Leader, passim, and also Brockway's pamphlet, The Truth 
About Barcelona (1937). Fight polemicised against this pamphlet 
in July 1937. 
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'Let Brockway and Mixton take this to heart. Their 
participation in the famous "unity" campaign helped 
the Stalinist murder gang to get away with this 
crime (the murder of Nin - M. U. ). 
" 
Trotskyism opposed the strategic thrust of the republicans 
and communists towards a democratic Spain. As Militant observed, Spain 
had been a democracy since 1931, but the advantages were not obvious. 
2 
A socialist programme could not await the end of the war: indeed the 
destruction of the revolution would prolong war and lead in the end to 
some sort of fascism. Militant therefore supported the P. O. U. M. and 
Anarchist belief that the war was indivisible. It differed in its 
insistence that workers and peasants power, mediated through Soviets, 
was the indispensible tool for translating belief into reality. Yet 
Trotskyists drew encouragement from the regroupment of revolutionary 
socialists through the Socialist Party and the Friends of Durrutti: 
a new party might be born out of this. Of all the Trotskyist papers 
I Militant (Sept. 1937). 
2 The advent of the Azana Government in Spain was hailed as a 
decisive defeat for Fascism, a victory for the working class. But 
the agrarian problem could not be solved, for this would have meant 
an attack upon the banks and the church. No political rights were 
given to the oppressed people of Morocco, with the result that they 
became a ready prey to Fascist demagogy. All the old instruments of 
repression - the army, the police - were maintained and were used by 
the reaction in the rising of July. We have seen the result in a 
civil war which has decimated Spain for over a year. 
(Militant, Oct. 1937. ) 
'It is for a third taste of a liberal bourgeois government that the 
leaders of the liberals, the socialists and the Stalinists say. the 
workers are fighting and dying. A slight knowledge of the history 
of Spain since the Republic shows how monstrous is the slogan "For 
Democracy" in Spain. ' 
(Fight, April 1937. ) 
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Fight most regularly carried the documents of the Spanish 'Bolshevik- 
Leninists' who were fighting for such a regroupment. 
Looking back over two years of the Spanish conflict, Fight1 
reflected that"a People's Front government was unable to prevent civil 
war breaking out and incapable of waging it either. 'Almost from the 
very beginning, the Spanish Government did not obtain a single lasting 
victory. ' Fight did not minimise the inferior arms supplies of the 
Republic, but it insisted that moral superiority could bring victory 
against a better equipped enemy. But the People's_ Front government 
had, in its view, destroyed morale by reintroducing Assault Guards into 
key military positions and deepening the divisions between officers and 
men through salary differentials. 
I S. Frost, 'Two Years of Civil War in Spain', (Aug. 1938). 
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APPENDIX B 
REG. GROVES AND THE AYLESBURY DIVISIONAL LABOUR PARTY, 
1937 - 1945. 
From 1936 the Communist Party and most of the Labour left 
moved by stages towards a popular front of all organisations and 
individuals opposed to fascism and war. This was a reversal of an 
earlier view held by the Labour left: their principal policy had been 
for a Labour government, with a majority to implement the full socialist 
programme. Alliances with those outside the working class movement 
were rejected in the earlier 1930s since they would involve watering 
the party's progranme down. 
' 
The C. P. G. B. had moved from its sectarian 
policy of the united front from below to advocacy of a united front 
without this qualification by 1934. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern, 
in July-August 1935, confirmed a change which had already occurred. In 
1936 the communists of France and. Spain were the most enthusiastic 
protagonists of popular front governments. These represented an 
alliance of working class parties with those outside the labour movement 
who, it was suggested, had a common interest with them. 
In Britain this argument took the form of the thesis that the 
widest possible unity was required to defeat a National Government which 
was soft on Hitler. 
2 Specifically it was denied that Labour could hope 
I When Lloyd George complained to the National Trade Union Club in 
1935 about doctrinaires in the labour movement who opposed a liberal 
alliance, Harold Laski rebuked him and argued for a firm Labour 
commitment to a socialist programme. He warned that in such an 
alliance 'you give up all that you have been fighting for to secure 
the victory of unity', ('The Siren Voice of Mr. Lloyd George', 
Forward, 24 Aug. 1935). 
2 'The workers are asked to let the present authority slip past', 
(J. R. Campbell, 'Next Steps for a United Front', Labour Monthly, 
(April 1937), 222). 
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to build a majority for its programme by the time the next general 
election was due in 1940.1 This argument was the motor force behind 
the Unity Campaign of the Socialist League, C. P. G. B. and I. L. P., which 
was launched with great optimism in January 1937, but had collapsed by 
the middle of the year. - The right wing of the Labour Party, led by those 
most likely to hold the leading ministerial positions if it was elected 
with a majority, people who had not made the running when the Socialist 
League's influence was at its peak in 1932-4, now presented themselves 
as the guardians of Labour's socialist integrity. 
2 
They rejected 
alliances and pacts, especially with the communists, and called for 
maximum effort to be placed behind putting Labour in with a majority for 
implementation of Labour's Immediate Programme. 
3 In the early 1930s 
the Left, (and principally the Socialist League) had urged that Labour 
should not take power except with a majority and should then carry out 
the most radical socialist measures to win popular support. This was in 
response to the MacDonald betrayal of 1931. But by 1937 many of the 
same people, before and after the May 1937 dissolution of the Socialist 
I G. D. H. Cole doubted Labour's ability even to equal its 1929 result. 
The extra 2,800 votes needed to get there would not be won on a 
socialist programme, he argued. Indeed, no government of the Left 
would be achieved 'if we merely wait for the Labour Party to win a 
majority in Parliament by continuing its present methods of appeal'. 
Labour, he concluded, was 'not even in sight of an independent 
majority', (The People's Front, (1937), 275). 
2 Attlee did not reject an alliance in the face of an imminent world 
crisis, (and indeed was to make one in 1940) but to the proposition 
that Labour should drop its nationalisation policy to gain Liberal 
support and a majority he replied, 'I am convinced that it would be 
fatal for the Labour Party to form a Popular Front on any such. terms', 
The Labour Party in Perspective, (1937), 130. 
3 The communists in Bethnal Green, near Herbert Morrison's base, had 
called for an anti-fascist alliance with the Liberals. Morrison 
rejected it, arguing that the C. P. G. B. favoured unity to its right 
but not to its left. 'Would Mr. Pollitt appear on a platform with 
Socialist Working-Class Trotsky? He would not', he declared and 
demanded: 
'Who says the communists are on the left? This Labour 
Party is more of a Left Party than the Communist Party'. 
(L. P. C. R., (1937), 161-4. ) 
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League, had lost faith in'Labour winning a majority and were prepared 
for an alliance across parties. The Right wing, including some who 
had served with MacDonald and even sought to follow him, 
' 
now had to 
hand the plausible argument of socialist fundamentalism with which to 
stem growing communist influence on the Labour Party. The convenient 
guise of single minded crusaders for the socialist commonwealth well 
suited their intention to remain in unchallenged control of the labour 
movement. 
2 
Trotskyists in Britain had always favoured a united front of 
working class organisations. 
3 
They derived their inspiration from 
Trotsky's speech to the E. C. C. I. on the subject in 19224 The United 
Front was a tactic for those countries where the working class was split 
in its allegiances. It was a limited agreement, openly concluded between 
I Attlee and Morrison had been junior ministers in 1929-31. Morrison 
entertained hopes of joining the National Government in August 1931 
but was dissuaded by MacDonald who had told him not to ruin his 
career, (B. Donaghue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison, portrait of a 
politician (1973), 162-70). 
2 C. F. Brand, The British Labour Party (1965). 
3 'To reach the wide masses of workers organised under the banner of 
reformism the Communist Party needs to apply correctly the tactic of 
the united front. It is only by the wise and determined use of the 
united front policy that the Party can break down its isolation and 
win a foothold in the trade unions and factories. ' 
(The Red Flag, June 1933) 
4 'On The United Front. (Material for a report on the question of 
French communism)', The First Five Years of the Communist International, 
Vol. 2, (1953), 91-109. 
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mass organisations. They retained their own separate programmes, and 
the right to criticise each other. 
' In 1932, when organised 
Trotskyism first emerged in public in Britain, its advocacy of the united 
front was criticised by the C. P. G. B. as a betrayal. By 1937, when 
Trotskyists of all factions opposed what they regarded as a bogus front 
of the Unity Campaign in the name of a genuine united front, they were 
attacked by the C. P. G. B. as splitters, disrupters and people with the 
same ends as the National Government. 
On 24 April 1937 the mid-Bucks. D. L. P. 
2 
selected Reg. Groves 
as its prospective parliamentary candidate. 
3 
By chance the 
Conservative member for the constituency resigned two months later, 
making a by-election certain. There was delay in moving the writ and 
polling day was only fixed for 19 May 1938. By this time the Aylesbury 
by-election and the presence of Groves, a Trotskyist, as the Labour 
candidate, had assumed considerable importance. The principal reason 
for this was enhanced fear of war following the Anschluss of March 1938 
I 'In the blind panic that followed the German catastrophe, the C. I. 
swept over to offering terms to the reformists which cannot be 
justified under any conditions. The offer to suspend criticism is 
in direct opposition to the united front policy laid down by Lenin 
in 1921. ' 
(The Red Flag, June 1933. ) 
2 Mid-Bucks. had been the base of leading Socialist Leaguer E. F. Wise 
who represented it at party conference. After his death his widow 
was nominated for the League national committee and also sent as 
delegate to party conference, (Socialist League, Second Annual 
Conference, Final Agenda [19351; L. P. C. R. ). 
3 Groves' political motives for taking up the position remain obscure. 
His selection occurred on the eve of the dissolution of the S. L. and 
some months after the Marxist League had failed to prevent it 
participating in the Unity Campaign. There is no evidence that it 
was a considered move by the League and Groves's handwritten notes 
of the time strongly convey his disenchantment with factional warfare, 
(Warwich M. S. S. 172/LP. A). He was also seeking in Aylesbury a closer 
contact with a genuine radical rural tradition, something not to be 
found in London, (Interview with R. Groves, April 1980). 
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whereby Austria was annexed to Germany, and the call for a 'united 
peace alliance' by Walter Elliott the editor of Reynold's News on 
19 March which revived the flagging forces of the popular front. 
Pressure mounted for the standing of the single candidate most likely 
to win at by-elections against National Government candidates. 
I 
In Mid-Bucks., where the Liberals had always held second 
place to the Conservatives, a Progressive Alliance Group was formed 
with the object of obtaining the strongest possible anti-government 
protest in the form of votes for the Liberal candidate, 
T. Atholl Robertson. Its founding resolution, which was signed by 
prominent local Labour members, including Christopher Addison, called 
on Groves to stand down. 
2 
The South Bucks. Unity Committee made the 
same demand. 
3 
To the positive desire for an alliance was added distaste 
for Groves as a Trotskyist. Groves himself had the chance to reach 
beyond propaganda and demonstrate in practice the fallacy of popular 
I Labour had lost in a straight fight against Conservatives at 
Ipswich on 16 February 1938 and against National Liberal at 
Lichfield on 5 May. Between these two there had been only a tiny 
Liberal vote at West Fulham on 6 April. 
(C. Cook and J. Ramsden, (eds. ), By-elections in British Politics, 
(1973), 371) 
2 'The greatest service he could render to the cause of democracy and 
peace would be to withdraw from the contest and lend his support to 
the candidate who has incomparably the better chance of defeating 
the representative of the National Government. ' (From a handbill, 
Progressive Alliance in Action, n. d. ) 
3 Members of the Labour and Liberal parties sat on this committee, 
which covered a neighbouring constituency. 
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front thinking. 
I 
He encountered opposition within the leading bodies 
of the constituency. 
2 
George Shepherd, Labour's national agent, also 
initially sought his withdrawal and a candidate more congenial to 
Transport House,. Support on the executive for Groves's candidature 
fell, but he continued to have a majority behind him. 
3 
Groves resisted these rumblings and began the campaign. By 
6 May he had held thirty meetings and other functions. 
4 
Liberal 
papers played down the campaign. 
5 
The Daily Herald loyally supported him. 
I W. G. Hanton, a former Communist Leaguer, arrived unbid in Aylesbury 
for the campaign. Groves was not pleased to see him, portraying 
him as dour and dogmatic in his private notes. No other Trotskyists 
are recorded as having visited Aylesbury. Fight, the journal of 
the R. S. L., of which most of Groves's former comrades from Marxist 
League days were members, reviewed his study of Chartism, But We 
Shall Rise Again, in May but did not mention his candidature. 
2 Groves suspected at least one E. C. member of being a covert 
communist. At one meeting, Kneeshaw, an opponent of his 
candidature protested 'how will Attlee feel on the same platform 
as Reg. Groves? ' Another delegate enquired 'how will Reg. Groves 
feel on the same platform as Attlee? '. 
3 On 23 April the E. C. backed him twenty one to eight. A week later, 
in Shepherd's presence, it stayed behind him but this time by 
fifteen to tens (NeusChronicle. 9 May 1938 
4 The Star, 6 May 1938. 
5 On 7 May The Star described Groves's campaign as 'hopeless' and 
called for a fourth condemnation of the government (following 
Ipswich, Fulham and Lichfield) behind a united opposition candidate. 
That same day the News Chronicle also recalled these earlier by- 
elections and advised, 'the lesson of Lichfield ought not to be lost 
on Aylesbury'. 
6 The Herald drew special comfort from the large audiences Groves was 
drawing to his meetings, (A. J. McWhinnie, 'Why Labour Will Fight 
Mid-Bucks. ', Daily Herald, 9 May 1938). 
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The Daily Worker followed the Peace Alliance argument but went further 
in its vituperation of Groves. 
' The first leaflet of local communists, 
while it called for unity, did not attack Groves and the Aylesbury 
party. When the Daily Herald made a pointed comparison between the 
Liberal Party platform and Labour's Immediate Programme the C. P. G. B. 
pressed a different argument. 
'It would, of course, be splendid if Labour had a chance of 
winning the seat, although even then it would need a 
candidate who would strengthen Labour's fight against reaction 
instead of a Trotskyist, the effect of whose policy would be 
the break up of the Labour movement from within. '2 
I Pollitt wrote, 'Aylesbury has become the testing ground of the 
struggle between the forces of reaction, backed by the Cliveden set 
and the Trotskyists'. He appealed to local Labour parties to 
protest against 'this cynical attempt to hand over a seat to 
Chamberlain and his Fascist friends', (Daily Worker, 9 May 1938). 
The next day the paper reported a call for withdrawal from the 
Taunton Left Book Club which stated 'peace and democracy anxiously 
await a decision', (viz. a withdrawal). 
2 The Daily Worker, 11 May 1938. The article concluded that Labour 
support for a Liberal who called for arms for Spain, 
defence of 
democratic liberties and the economic and social advance of the 
people would be a big step on the path to socialism. 
Another facet 
of communist interest, that Trotskyist progress would 
inhibit 
increasing C. P. G. B. penetration of the Labour Party did not surface 
here, but see R. P. Dutt, The Truth about Trotskyism quoted in 
B. Pearce, 'The British Stalinists and the Moscow Trials', in 
M. Woodhouse and B. Pearce (eds. ) Essays on the History of Communism 
in Britain (1975), 227; and the argument of J. R. Campbell that 
instead of waiting for the next Labour government trade unionists 
should unite around a policy of paying the political levy and giving 
themselves equal rights in the party,. ('Next Steps for a United 
Front', Labour Monthly, (April 1937), 217). The implication was 
that communists, like Arther Horner, who were disbarred from Labour 
Party conference, would be able to attend. 
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The more prestigious Manchester Guardian wondered on 12 May 
1938 'how small an increase in the Labour vote here will be held to 
have justified the decision' (to stand) and predicted that not only 
was a rise unlikely but that it was more probable Groves would lose his 
deposit. An important event on that same day was the announcement by 
the Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction that both Liberal 
and Labour candidates had answered its questions satisfactorily and 
that it would therefore play no part in the election. 
' This surprising 
eventuality was commented on by other Trotskyists after polling day. 
2 
From mid-May Groves mounted a strong offensive against 
Robertson. He challenged the Liberal to substantiate his claims of 
Labour support. 
3 
The Daily Worker, his bitterest enemy among the press, 
grew more abusive, 
4 but he had strong support from Labour papers. 
5 
One 
I Two of the questions asked, (and to which the Council expected a 
positive response) concerned support for action by the League of 
Nations. Groves's success was therefore puzzling (The Daily Worker, 
14 May 1938). In his manifesto Groves declared, 'a successful 
League of Nations is not possible until the people are able to 
express and enforce effectively their will to peace'. 
2 See below. A full appreciation of the campaign cannot be achieved 
without reading the close and often verbatim reports of speeches in 
the local press, The Bucks Herald, The Bucks Advertiser, and The 
Bucks Examiner. For comments on the campaign see H. Dewar, 
Communist Politics in Britain, (1976), 126,153. 
3 In reply to Robertson's claims of Labour Party backing, the Divisional 
Labour Party stated that all but four of its members were working 
loyally for Groves, (The Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1938). 
4 It insisted that only the defeat of Chamberlain mattered, accused 
Groves of 'sailing under the false colours of a Labour candidate' 
and of being 'a Trotskyist agent to carry out the same disruptive 
policy in Mid-Bucks. ', (as in. France, Spain, China and the U. S. S. R. ), 
(The Daily Worker, 13 May 1938). This article was circulated in 
Aylesbury as a communist leaflet. 
5 The Daily Record and Mail for 13 May must have raised eyebrows with 
its declaration that Groves had 'no more connection with Trotsky 
than Mr. Attlee or Mr. Herbert Morrison' but it was on strong ground 
in recalling earlier communist hostility to orthodox capitalist 
parties and Liberal hostility to socialism, which threatened a repeat 
of the 1929-31 experience. 
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of the remarkable features of the campaign was the appearance on 
Groves's platform of Harold Laski, Ellen Wilkinson and even D. N. Pritt, 
all of whom favoured a popular front. Even Reynolds News respected the 
decision of the'local party. It was a reward for standing firm. 
I 
New 
branches of the Labour Party were established in the division, the 
Attlee meeting was held, and support came from the I. L. P. 
2 
On the eve 
of poll his backers and opponents clashed in their expectations. 
3 
Aylesbury voted on 19 May 1938. The Tory candidate won with 
more than twice the vote of Robertson, who came second. Each had lost 
around 3,000 votes over their parties' polls in 1935. Groves was the 
first Labour candidate in Aylesbury not to lose his deposit and had 
raised his vote by 3,560.4 He was also the only candidate to raise his 
I Despite its misgivings Reynolds reports were accurate and fair. On 
15 May it wrote: 
'Mr. Reg. Groves, the Labour candidate, is putting up a 
splendid fight. 
He is appealing to the electors on a clear-cut 
Socialist platform, and declares that there can be nothing 
in common between Labour and Liberal policy. ' 
Pritt's behaviour could occasionally be quixotic. He had declined a 
Transport House suggestion to stand against Fenner Brockway at a 
Norwich by-election, (F. Brockway, Towards Tomorrow, (1977), 115). 
2 On 16 May Groves received a letter from Fenner Brockway pledging 
N. A. C. support and declaring, 'we need an alliance to oppose the 
National Government. But it must be an alliance, not of workers and 
capitalists, but of workers and workers', (The New Leader, 13 May 
1938). 
3 The Daily Herald, which had reported the establishment of new town 
branches of the party in the area predicted 'a greatly increased 
Labour vote' on 16 May. Two days later the Manchester Guardian 
forecast he would come third and complained, 
'He is preaching the entire Socialist doctrine, and that, 
in a short campaign, is more likely to confuse possible 
recruits than to convert them'. 
4 The result, with 1935 votes in brackets, was: 
Sir Stanley Reed (Con. ) 21,695 (24,728) 
T. Atholl Robertson (Lib. ) 10,751 (13,622) 
Reginald Groves (Lab. ) 7,666 ( 4,106) 
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share of the poll, which he did in spite of a reduced turnout. 
I 
The 
swing against the Tories was greater than the average of all pre-Munich 
by-election results. It also surpassed the anti-Tory swing of the 
Munich by-elections at Oxford and Bridgwater. 
2 
Groves was jubilant. 'We have delivered the death-blow to 
Liberalism in this division. '3 The Daily Herald echoed his delight on 
21 May. 
4 
The New Statesman and Nation was surprised5 though the News 
Chronicle affected not to be. 
6 
The Daily Worker was bitterest of all. 
7 
Groves argued that Labour was being built in Aylesbury against 
Liberalism as well as against Toryism: a pact, he suggested, would have 
led to loss of support. He thought backing for the popular front came 
from 'among the middle-class element; the university socialist; the 
"week-enders" who had never done a day's work for the local party, and 
1 The turnout fell from 70.2% to 63.1% between 1935 and 1938. Groves 
raised his share from 11% to 19.1% but the Tory's share fell by 
3.3% and the Liberal's by 4.8%, (C. Cook and J. Ramsden, op. cit., 
371) 
2 The swing against the Tories is put, by different measures, at 5.8%, 
10.1%, 5.3%,. (ibid., 371). The peak anti-government swing at the 
time of Munich was 4.1%, (I. McLean, 'Oxford and Bridgwater', 
C. Cook and J. Ramsden, op. cit., 140-64). 
3 The Manchester Guardian, 21 May 1938. 
4 'Congratulations, Mr. Groves and good-bye, Popular Front'. 
5 It favoured local electoral pacts and complained that all of Labour's 
counter arguments were aimed against national alliances. See its 
issues for 14 May and 11 June 1938. 
6 It believed Groves had attacked the Liberals more strongly than he 
had the Conservatives and concluded a victory for the latter was 
'inevitable in the circumstances'. 
7 It complained of 'the money that was poured out' against a Peace 
Alliance and spoke darkly of cheers in 'certain rooms' at Transport 
House, (The Daily Worker, 21 May 1938). 
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the social elite of the Left Book Club'. 
' Frederic Warburg, 
('Magnificent Work') congratulated him, 
2 
as did J. P. M. Millar who 
announced he had 'no faith whatever in the Popular Front'. 
3 
The New 
Leader was equally enthusiastic. 
4 
But pressure for an alliance against 
the government did not relent. Later in the year a reluctant 
Patrick Gordon Walker stood down as Labour candidate in favour of a 
progressive candidate, A. D. Lindsay, who still failed to win Oxford on 
27 October. United support did however permit Vernon Bartlett to win 
Bridgwater from the National Government candidate on 17 November. 
The Trotskyist movement had an ambivalent attitude towards 
the Aylesbury result. WIL thought it showed a revolutionary approach 
by the Labour Party would meet with success and that the campaign was 
part of the experience through which 'the broad masses became aware of 
the treachery' of the labour bureaucracy. It believed however that a 
truly Marxist programme would never have received the approval of the 
'reactionary' Councils of Action. 
5 
The R. S. L. congratulated him on 
1 'How We Fought the Liberal-Communist Alliance', Forward, 28 May 1938. 
The claims he made for socialist policy in this article were ruefully 
disputed by his agent who thought some of them attributable to 
organisation, (agent] to Groves, 27 June 1938, Warwick M. S. S. ). 
2 F. Warburg to Groves, 31 May 1938. 
3 J. P. M. Millar to Groves, 7 June 1938. 
4 Wilfred Wigham, who had acted as Groves's driver for the duration 
thought Groves had thrust the Labour Party back to socialism and put 
the case for turning out the whole ruling class: 
'Thanks to the Liberal-Communist challenge, he has 
been backed even by moderate Labour elements'. 
(The New Leader, 20 May 1938. ) 
5 'The Lesson of Aylesbury', WIN, (June 1938),, 5. 
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doubling the vote and taking a progressive stand against the popular 
front, but firmly declared that the Fourth International could not 
tolerate within its ranks anyone who, like Groves, could give the 
Council of Action replies indistinguishable from those offered by the 
Liberal Candidate. 
After the election Groves continued as a strong proponent of 
Labour independence and hammer of the communists. He publicly branded 
an attempt to send Communist Party members into local parties within 
his constituency as aimed at subverting his candidature. 
2 
In the first 
year of war Groves, while retaining his Aylesbury base sustained 
militant propaganda against the aims of the war. These activities 
brought him close to expulsion when Labour leaders moved against party 
dissidents in 1940. In September 1939, Groves told readers of Labour 
News that there was more to war than military conflict alone. Later 
that month he declared:. 
'The workers are losing the war: the British workers 
and the workers of all countries'. 
3 
A major interest of Groves was the escape of ruling circles 
from wartime sacrifices. This was a major theme of Home Front4 a 
monthly journal on civilian life in wartime in the establishment of 
which he was a prime mover. Home Front published his pamphlet It Is An 
Imperialist War in which he replied to Harold Laski and, in the view of 
I Fight (June 1938). However Stuart Purkis, who had left the Communist 
League in 1934 but had supported the Trotsky Defence Committee, 
examined Groves's submissions to the Council, (Fight, he claimed, had 
not), and declared them sound, (Fight, Aug. 1938). 
2 Forward (20 Nov. 1938). 
3 The Big Offensive on the Home Front, 27 Sept. 1939, (apparently a 
newsletter circulated in Aylesbury). 
4 Sub-titled, 'The Molnth-by-Month Inside Story of the War in Industry 
and Civil Life'. 
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the N. E. C., challenged party policy. Home Front continued as a 
propaganda vehicle until political truce was endorsed by party 
conference in May 1940. When the British Expeditionary Force returned 
home Groves used-the journal to address Attlee in an open letter. In 
this he called on Labour leaders entering the government to lift the 
suppression of conscientious objectors and left wing socialists and 
follow party conference demands for far-reaching changes in the structure 
of society. 'A Britain owned and ordered by its workers', was, he urged, 
'the only victory worth winning'. 
' 
Groves carefully recorded his acceptance of conference's 
endorsement of Labour's entry into the government, but officialdom 
pounced on him nonetheless. George Shepherd, who had visited Aylesbury 
in 1938 informed him that It Is An Imperialist War was a disguised 
attack on party policy, and was not pacified by Groves's explanation 
that it had been written before party conference approved the war and 
was therefore a legitimate exercise. 
2 Shepherd and other officials 
apparently recommended his exclusion from the Labour Party to the 
N. E. C., but the Committee delayed a decision to allow him time to clarify 
his views. It hoped he would decide 'that Labour Party policy is for 
this country that which is best suited'. 
3 
I 'An Open Letter To Major Attlee', Home Front, (June 1940), 1,13. 
2 G. Shepherd to Groves, (26 Sept. 1940); R. Groves to Shepherd, 
(30 Sept. 1940). 
3 G. Shepherd to Groves, (29 Sept. 1940). To the Organising Secretary 
of the Aylesbury Division Shepherd explained that the N. E. C. 
recognised that Groves's views had modified and that it wanted to 
give him a chance to modify party policy, (G. Shepherd to A. Newell, 
29 Nov. 1940). 
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Aylesbury sent Groves as its delegate to party conference 
throughout the war except for 1945 itself. His only intervention in 
debate during these years was in 1943 when he moved an amendment to 
George Dallas's-platform motion on post-war relief in Europe. The 
Aylesbury motion called for relief not to be used as a weapon-against 
socialist or democratic governments. To this argument Groves added an 
anti-Vanittartite gloss, which formed the principal passage of his 
speech. 
' 
During the war Groves wrote for a variety of journals, often 
on aspects of labour history. 
2 
He also became part of the documentary 
movement led by John Grierson. A principal script of his was Men of 
Rochdale, a film about Co-operative pioneers which used original 
techniques. 
3 
He became almost a weekly contributor to The New Leader, 
even providing a weekly film column in 1940. In the later years. of the 
war he wrote another weekly feature, 'Time to Kill', which reflected on 
issues not of immediate concern. 
Groves survived some murmurings against him among union 
branches affiliated to the Aylesbury division. 
4 
He received several 
a- 
offers of a new constituency, including one from Slough, a/ set he might 
hope to win. 
5 He resisted temptation, aware that local communists were 
1 L. P. C. R. (1943), 177. 
2 See for example 'The Plug Plot 1942' and 'Tommy Hepburn's Union', 
(London Post Dec. 1944 and May 1945). 
3 H. Sara to A. Gates (of the Workers Party, U. S. A. ), 2 Feb. 1945, 
Warwick M. S. S. 
4 Mrs. Gates (Acting agent of Aylesbury D. L. P. ) to Groves, 23 Oct. 
1944, and Groves to Mrs. Gates, 19 Oct. 1944. 
5 F. S. G. Room (of Slough Labour Party) to Groves, 22 Oct. 1944. 
Room had been a communist contemporary of Groves and also remembered 
The Call. He told Groves he wanted a socialist in Slough, not 'a 
good boy from Transport House'. On 26 October Groves wrote telling 
Room he had decided to stay in Aylesbury. He was not, he assured 
Room, 'a carpetbagger'. 
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eager for his departure from Aylesbury. The divisional executive may 
have known that he could have gone elsewhere, and thought him 'most 
loyal'. 
In the general election he seems to have fought a conventional 
campaign. Labour was in a radical mood, and he was certainly not the 
only candidate with a Marxist background. His election address was 
marked by attacks of equal vehemence on the Liberals and the Tories. 
His promise was to fight 'in our war against poverty, unemployment, 
slums and oppression'. The Liberal presence had been broken in 1938 
and he secured second place with a respectable vote. After 1945 he 
stood three times more in parliamentary contests. He came second each 
time at Eastbourne (1950), Saffron Walden (1951) and Ilford North 
(1955), always in safe Tory seats. 
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APPENDIX C 
ARTICLES IN WORKERS INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
WHILE IT WAS PUBLISHED BY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE 
JANUARY 1938 - FEBRUARY 1944 
Vol. 1, No. 1, (1 January 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'G. P. U. stalks abroad. Open letter to 
all working-class organisations. ' 1-3 
'Editorial' -- 4-5 
C. Sumner 'Stalin the Assassin' 6-12 
Vol. 1, No. 1, (sic) (February 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'The Beginning of the End' 1-4 
'Whither Japan? ' 5-6 
'The Robinson-Rubens Case' 6-7 
'American Revolutionary Party Formed' 8-9 
'The. Commission Reports' 10-11 
'Soviet Plebiscite' 12 
Vol. 1, No. 3, (March 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'Defend The Soviet Union' 1-4 
'Where is Erwin Wolf? ' 4 
'The Real Wreckers' 5-6 
'Another Moscow Frame-Up' 7,12 
'The Soviet Union in Danger' 8-9 
I. Reiss 'The G. P. U. from the Inside' 9-11 
Vol. 1, No. 4, (April 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'Comments on the New Trial' 1-4 
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'The Methods in Kremlin Madness' 
'More Arms? ' 
'A French C. P. Chief Resigns' 
L. Trotsky 'Trotsky Answers Toledano' 
Vol. 1, No. 5, (May 1938). 
M. Shachtman 'Comrade Trotsky's Life is Menaced. 
Murder Plot Exposed. ' 
L. Trotsky 'A Letter to Geneva' 
'Riots in Tunis' 
'Imperial Prelude to War' 
'Hacks of the G. P. U. ' 
'The Scapegoats' 
L. Trotsky 'The Priests of Half-Truth 
Vol. 1, No. 6, (June 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'Moscow's Diplomatic Plans in the 
Light of the Trials' 
'The Lesson of Aylesbury' 
'Trade Union Struggle in U. S. A. ' 
'Slump' 
'Palestine Communists Denounce Stalinism' 
'Who Hounds P. O. U. M.? ' 
Vol. 1, No. 7, (July 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'The Retreat From October. Does the 
Soviet Government still Adhere to the 
Principles of 20 years Ago? ' 
'Jingo-Communism' 
'A Century of Freedom' 
5-7 
8 
10 
11-12 
1-2 
3-4 
4-5 
5-6 
7 
8-9 
10-12 
1-3 
3-5 
6-7 
7-9 
9-10 
12 
1-4 
5-6 
6-7 
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'After Blum' 9-10 
'American Pacific Pre-Conference' 11-12 
Vol. 1, No. 8, (August 1938). 
'Comrade Klement Kidnapped' 1-2 
L. Trotsky 'Learn to Think' 3-5 
'Lenin on Disarmament' 7-8 
'After Evian' 9-10 
'Palestine the Pawn' 6-7 
'Stalin Murders Communist Refugees' 11-12 
Vol. 1, No. 9, (September 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'Leading Trotskyist Murdered by G. P. U. ' 1-5 
'Deadlock in France' 5-6 
'International Trade Crisis' 7-8 
T. Tun 'Race Riots in Burma' 8-10 
* 'Special Supplement War Crisis' 
L. Trotsky 'Leon Sedoff Murdered? A letter to 
the French Court' 10-12 
Vol. 1, No. 10, (October 1938). 
L. Trotsky 'The Coming World War' 1-5,10-12 
'Defend The Soviet Union' 6-7 
'The Social-Patriots face War' 8 
'Profit and Loss' 9' 
Vol. 1, No. 11, (November 1938). 
'The Soviet Union Must be Defended 
21 years after' 1-2 
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'The Shadow of Coming Events' 3-5 
'P. O. U. M. Leaders Sent Back to Prison' 5-6 
J. G. Wright 'Purged by the Million' 6-7 
'4th International Launched' 8-10 
'German Imperialism Burns its Bridges' 11-12 
Vol. 1, No. 12, (December 1938). 
'Voluntary Conscription' 1-3 
'Strike breakers in France' . 
3-4 
'A British Popular Front' 4-7 
'Soviet-Polish Pacts 7 
'The Bandits Quarrel' 8-9 
'War to the Knife' 10-11 
R. F. 'South African Landscape' 
_ 
11-12 
Vol. 2, No. 1, (January 1938 (sic)). 
L. Trotsky 'Labour And War, A Fresh Lesson' 1-7 
(Continued Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1939 
8,13-16. ) 
'Stalin Completes Hitler's Task' 8-10 
'Spain. The Third Winter' 10-11 
'Trade Crises' 12-13 
H. R. 'The French Betrayal' 14-16 
Vol. 2, No. 2, (February 1939). 
L. Trotsky 'The Decisive Hour In France' 1-5 
'Peace-Moves in China' 5-7 
'Barcelona Betrayed' 7-8 
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Vol. 2, No. 3, (March 1939). 
L. Trotsky 'The Tragedy of Spain' 1-2 
'Sir Stafford Cripps Stands Firm' 2-4 
'The Cost of Capitalism' 4-5 
'Smashing Fascism. American Trotskyists 
Lead Fight' 6 
'Why did They Confess? ' 7 
'Export or Die' 8-9 
'For Grynzspan : Against The Fascist 
Pogrom Gangs and Stalinist Scoundrels' 10-11 
'Counter Revolution in Spain' 11-12 
Vol. 2, No. 4, (April 1939). 
'Hitler will March Again - And Soon. ' 1-2 
'For The Irish Revolution' 3-4 
'After the Fall of Madrid' 4-5 
H. R. 'The Middle Class in France' 6-7 
L. T. 'A Moscow Berlin Axis? ' 8-9 
A Breton 'Towards an INDEPENDENT Revolutionary Art' 10-12 
'The Right to Work' 12 
SPECIAL ISSUE 
'The Death Agony of Capitalism. The 
Transitional Programme of the Fourth 
International' 1-20 
Vol. 2, No. 6, (June 1939). 
L. Trotsky 'Stalin Capitulates to Hitler' 1-2 
'What Next for the I. L. P. ' 3-4 
'France in Transition' 4-5 
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'Again, Sir Stafford Creeps' 
'International Crossroads' 
'The Jews Abandoned' 
'Conscription' 
L. Trotsky 'The Problem of the Ukraine' 
Vol. 2, No. 7, (July 1939). 
'Danzig And The Coming War' 
'Tsientsin' 
J. R. 'Whither the P. S. O. P.? ' 
'Slave Camps in Britain' 
A. Roy 'Ferment in India' 
D. MacDonald 'Kremlin Kultur' 
'Pre-war Empire Policy' 
Vol. 2, No. 8, (August 1939). 
'Diplomacy Hides War Plans' 
'The Irish Revolution has Begun' 
A. Roy 'Congress Socialism' 
H. R. 'P. S. O. P. in Conference' 
Vol. 2, No. 9, (September 1939). 
'For a New International' 
Vol. 2, No. 10, (October 1939). 
L. Trotsky 'The Soviet German Alliance' 
'Only Socialism Can Bring Peace' 
'The Communist Party Obeys' 
'The Problem of Poland' 
I 
6-7 
7-8 
8-9 
9 
10-12 
1-3 
3 
4 
5 
6-8 
9-12 
12 
1-2 
3-5 
5-8 
8-12 
1-4 
1-3 
3-4 
5-6 
8-10 
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Vol. 2, No. 11, (November, 1939). 
'Only Socialism Can Bring Peace' 1-4 
'Two Anniversaries' 4-5 
'Labour in Wartime' 6-8 
'Spotlight on Centrism' 8-10 
'Patriots Yesterday - Pacifists Today' 10-12 
Vol. 2, No. 12, (December 1939). 
'Finland - Stalinism or Socialism' 1-4 
'Labour's "Peace" Aims' 4-7 
'Will the Communist Party go Communist? ' 7-10 
'India and the War' 10-12 
'Stalinists go Anti-Semitic' 12-13 
Vol. 3, No. 1, (January 1940). 
'Chamberlain's Dilemma' 1-3 
'In Defence of October' 4-6 
'The Real Situation in India' 6-9 
'I. L. P. and C. P. at War' 9-12 
'Lenin-Liebknecht-Luxemburg' 12-14 
Vol. 3, No. 2, (February 1940). 
'Before the Spring Offensive' 1-3 
'Labour and Democracy' 3-5 
'Stalinists in Deep Water' 6-7 
'Singapore Strikes' 8-9 
'The Intervention in Finland' 10-11 
'The "New" Afrikanerdom' 12-14 
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Vol. 2, (sic), No. 3, (March 1940). 
'The Turning Point Approaches' 1-3 
'The Enemy at Home' 3-5 
'The Ballot Box Test' 6-8 
'Whither Japan? ' 9-14 
Vol. 3, No. 4, (April 1940). 
L. Trotsky 'The Soviet Regime. Again yet again on 
the nature of the U. S. S. R. ' 1-8 
'New Fronts' 8-10 
'I. L. P. Easter Parade' 11-13 
'Otto Kuusinen' 13-14 
'Mounting Crisis in India' 15-16 
Vol. 3, No. 5, (May 1940). 
'Norway's "Fifth Column" 1-4 
'Transport Housemaids' 4-7 
'Testing Time in France' 7-9 
'British Labour and India' 9-12 
'Belgian Comrades Under Fire' 12 
'4th International in Australia' 13 
'Repression In France. Revolutionists 
Break with P. S. O. P.; Join Forces with 
4th International. ' 14 
Vol. 3, No. 6, (June 1940). 
L. Trotsky 'Order Out of Chaos' 1-8 
'Workers' Fight' 8 
'Stalinturn? ' 9-10 
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'Total War! ' 11-12 
'G. P. U. in Mexico' 13-14 
Vol. 3, No. 7, '(July 1940). 
L. Trotsky 'Behind Stalin's Moves. The Balance 
Sheet of the Finnish Events. ' 1-8 
'Workers Power or - Hitler' 8-10 
'The Lesson of France' 10-12 
L. Trotsky 'Kremlin's Role in Europe's Catastrophe' 12-13 
'Congress Cannot Lead'- 13-15 
Vol. 3, No. 8, (August 1940). 
'Fourth International Holds World 
Conference on War' 1-4 
J. Weber 'Japan & America in The Pacific' 4-8 
'Stalin's Politics' 8-10 
'Labour to Power. I. L. P. Chairman 
supports the war. ' 10-13 
'Stalinists Confess Harte Murder' 14-16 
Vol. 3, No. 9, (September 1940). 
'Leon Trotsky Murdered by G. P. U. ' 1-5 
L. Trotsky 'G. P. U. Stalks Abroad' 6-10 
'Britain and the East' 11-12 
Vol. 3, No. 10, (October 1940). 
F. Dobbs 'American Labour And The Elections' 1-5 
'Britain Holds Out' 5-7 
'Cabinet Reshuffle' 8-9 
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G. Stern 'Changes in the Pacific' 10-14 
Vol. 3, No. 11, (November 1940). 
'Leading Mexican Stalinists Implicated 
in Trotsky Murder' 1-6 
J. G. Wright 'Stalin's New Labour Laws' 6-8 
Vol. 3, No. 12, (December 1940). 
'Leon Trotsky's Last Letter'_ 1-2 
'America's Growing Domination' 3-5 
'The "People's" Convention' 5-7 
J. G. Wright 'Trade Union Purges In The Soviet*Union' 7-10 
Vol. 4, No. 1, (January 1941). 
'Military Policy of the Proletariat, 
Speech by James P. Cannon at Chicago 
Conference of S. W. P. ' 1-8 
Vol. 4, No. 2, (February 1941). 
'Invasion : Arm the Workers! ' 1-5 
'People's Convention And Now ....? 
' 6-8 
L. Trotsky 'Leon Trotsky's Last Article' 8-12 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 1941). 
L. Trotsky 'Some Questions on American Problems' 1-7 
'S. W. P. Resolution on Proletarian 
Military Policy' 7-10 
J. P. Cannon 'Our Military Policy. James P. Cannon's 
Summary' 10-12 
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Vol. 4, No. 5, (May 1941). 
'Policy of Labour 'Lefts' Leads to Defeat' 1-5 
tI. L. P. Easter Conference. Observations 
and Lessons' 6-10 
'Lessons of the Balkans' 10-12 
L. Trotsky 'Trade Unions in the Epoch of 
Imperialist Decay' 13-16 
Vol. 4, No. 6, (June 1941) 
'The Communist Party And the War' 1-5 
F. Morrow 'Why Hitler's 'New Order' Won't Work' 5-7 
G. H. 'Trade Unions and the State' 8-10 
J. Wright 'Stalin Introduces Inflation' 11-12 
Vol. 4, No. 7, (July 1941). 
'Defend The Soviet Union! Manifesto 
of the Fourth International In Britain' 1-2 
G. Healy 'Tasks of the Left in the Labour Party' 3-7 
Vladimir Ivlev 'The Crisis in Soviet Industry' 8-12 
(with J. W., 'The Enigma of Soviet Production' and 'The Soviet 
"War Potential"'. ) 
Vol. 4, No. 8, (August 1941). 
E. Grant 'An Analysis of the Social Basis of the 
Soviet Union - AND WHY WE DEFEND IT' 1-4,8. 
'Leon Trotsky' 5-7 
'Behind the Arrests of the American 
Trotskyists' 9-10,16 
T. Phelan 'How Paris Fell' 11-16 
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Vol. 4, No. 9, (September 1941). 
J. G. Wright 'Class Relations In the Soviet Union' 1-6 
L. Trotsky 'The Lessons of the First Anglo-Russian 
Committee' 7-12 
Vol. 4, No. 9-10, (November 1941). 
L. Trotsky 'The Class, The Party, and The Leadership. 
Why was the Spanish Proletariat Defeated? 
(Questions of Marxist Theory)' 1-5 
A. Scott 'Britain's War Remains Imperialist. It is 
" not altered by the Alliance with the 
Soviet Union. ' 5-10 
J. G. Wright 'Monstrous Ukase Exiles Volga Germans' 
Exposes Farce of "Socialism in one 
Country"' 10-11 
L. Trotsky 'How Stalin's Purge Beheaded the Red Army' 11-12 
Vol. 4, No. 11, (December 1941). 
A. Scott 'Stalin's Diplomacy Leads to Defeat' 1-6 
L. Trotsky 'The I. L. P. And The Fourth International 
In the Middle of the Road' 6-11 
J. G. Wright 'Soviet Masses Are Kept In The Dark 
Regarding Defeats' 12 
Vol. 5 (Special), I&2. 
'Smash Fascism - End War. 'The Case for 
Socialist Revolution. An A. B. C. of 
Trotskyism. The Testimony of J. P. Cannon 
In the U. S. Labour Frame-Up Trial. ' 1-40 
506. 
Vol. 5, Nos. 3&4. 
E. Grant and 'The Road to India's Freedom' 1-23 
A. Scott 'Thesis of Indian Fourth Internationalists 24-36 
Vol. 5, No. 6, (September 1942). 
'Preparing For Power' 3-33 
Vol. 5, No. 7, (October-November 1942). 
M. Loris 'On Some Critics of Trotsky' 3-18 
L. Trotsky 'Archives of the Revolution. Extracts 
from Trotsky's Diary and Two Letters 
to Bukharin' 18-31 
Vol. 5, No. 8, (January 1943). 
A. Scott 'Anglo-American Relations' 1-6 
L. Trotsky 'Learn To Think' 6-8 
A. Roy "'Friends" of India' 8-9 
M. Loris 'The National Struggle in Europe. 
A Discussion Article' 10-14 
L. Trotsky 'Our Attitude To Conscription' 14-16 
Vol. 5, No. 9, (Mid-February - Mid-March 
[19433) 
A. Scott 'Fascism Or Socialism in Post-War Britain' 1-5 
M. Loris 'Our Tasks Under The Nazi Boot' 5-9 
T. Burns 'Labour's Opportunity in Southern Ireland' 10-13 
L. Trotsky 'The Permanent Revolution' [Theses3 14-15 
B. Armstrong 'Police Regime in Northern Ireland' 16 
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Vol. 5, No. 10 (April 1943). 
L. Trotsky 'What is National Socialism? ' 1-4 
C. Charles 'The Post-War Strategy of Food' 4-9 
A Group of 'The National Question - 
National Comrades Three Theses' 9-11 
F. Morrow 'Our Differences with the Three Theses' 11-12 
L. Trotsky 'Three Conceptions of the Revolution' 13-20 
Vol. 5, No. 11, (May 1943). 
T. Grant 'The I. L. P. in Transition' 1-4 
F. Morrow 'The Class Meaning of the Soviet Victories' 5-11 
A. Scott 'Imperialist Perspectives in Europe' 11-14 
R. Carson 'The Left Wing Zionists and the Fourth 
International' 14-17 
M. Morrison 'The National Question in Europe' 17-20 
Vo l. 5, No. 11, (June 1943). 
T. Grant 'The Rise and Fall of the Communist 
International' 1-5 
Editorial 'The Road is Clear For the Fourth 
International' 6-7,16. 
L. Trotsky 'A Graphic History of Bolshevism' 8-10,16. 
'Lenin's Last Letter to the Bolshevik 
Party. The Suppressed Testament' 11 
L. Trotsky 'Criticism of the Draft Programme 
adopted at the Sixth Congress of 
The Comintern 1928' 12-15 
M. Loris 'Reply to I. L. P. 16 
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Vol. 5, No. 12, (August 1943). 
T. Grant 'Italian Revolution - and the tasks of 
the British Workers' 1-5 
A. Roy 'India - The Role of Congress Leaders' 5-7 
'Trotsky Assassinated Three Years Ago' 7-10 
L. Trotsky 'Trade Unions in the Epoch of 
Imperialist Decay' 10-12 
Vol. 5, No. 13, (September 1943). 
'A New Stage In History and The Tasks of 
the Working Class' '1-9 
R. Carson 'Inside Germany' 10-12 
Vol. 5, No. 4 (sic), (October-November 1943). 
'News from Indian Fourth Internationalists' 1-3 
'WIL Theses on Indian Revolution' 3-5 
'Tasks of the Industrial Militants' 6-8,9. 
F. Morrow 'Italy : First Phase of the Revolution' 9-12 
Vol. 5, No. 5 (sic), (January 1944). 
F. Morrow 'The Anti-Fascist Movements in Italy' 1-8 
T. Grant 'Our Tasks in the Coming Revolution' 8-12 
L. Trotsky 'It Is Necessary To Build The Communist 
Parties and the International Anew' 13-15 
Vol. 5, No. 6, (February 1944). 
T. Grant 'Internationalism and Centrism. Ridley 
and Brockway Exponents of Confusion. ' 1-10 
H. Mirza 'After Thoughts on Dissolution of the 
Comintern' 10-13 
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L. Trotsky 'Report on the Comintern' 14-18,19 
'Lenin on Spontaneity and Leadership' 19 
************************************************************************* 
NOTES 
1. The first issue of Workers International News appeared on 
18 December 1937 with contents broadly similar-to that of 
I January 1938. 
2. This guide to articles was compiled from the Workers International 
News file at the Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull. This 
may explain some of the discrepancies in serial numbers, notably 
the absence of an issue for April 1941 and an issue numbered 
Vol. 5, No. 5 (1942). 
3. Numbering is erratic but is given in the list as printed. 
4. In early issues there are many anonymous articles. It seems likely 
that the chief contributor of these was Ralph Lee assisted by 
Ted Grant and Jock Haston. 
,., 
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APPENDIX D 
PEACE AND UNITY AGREEMENT, 1938. 
The undersigned' propose and recommend the following: 
1. All groups are to be united immediately into a single organ- 
isation with a single Executive Committee which supervises, directs 
and co-ordinates all work and activity of all members in all fields. 
2. The name of the organisation is to be the Revolutionary 
Socialist League. 
3. A central premises is to be engaged at once. All funds, 
property and equipment of the various groups are to become uncondit- 
ionally the property of the united organisation. 
4. The administrative work of the united organisation is to be 
placed in charge of a secretary devoting full time to the organisation. 
5. The main emphasis in the next period is to be placed on work 
within the Labour Party. All eligible for trade union membership are 
obliged to join and conduct active work therein. At the same time, 
general propaganda for the Fourth International and its program is 
to be conducted by every suitable means (press, propaganda, meetings, 
etc. ). Members at present devoting their full activity to propaganda 
work outside the Labour Party are not required to join it. 
6. Press: (a) The "Fight" is to be combined with the "Workers' 
International News" and the "Revolutionary Socialist" (Edinburgh) and 
published monthly as a political magazine with a new name which seeks 
to combine as far as possible the features of each. The primary 
purpose of this magazine will be to train cadres by dealing with 
national and international questions from the standpoint of the 
Fourth International without ambiguity. In order to facilitate the 
distribution and the sale of this magazine by all members of the 
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united organisation (including those working under certain legalistic 
restraints in the Labour Party), it shall be published, like the 
"New International" in America, under the formal auspices of a 
publishing association. 
(b) The "Militant" shall continue to be published as a 
monthly agitation paper under the formal auspices of the Militant 
Labour League. (The question of the Militant Labour League and its 
perspectives is to be dealt with in a special memorandum. ) 
(c) One of the papers is to be published on the first of 
the month; the other on the 15th, so that the comrades will always 
have a fresh paper for distribution and will, in effect, have a semi- 
monthly paper. 
(d) To aid further in training cadres, strengthening the 
Bolshevik ideology of the membership and welding it more firmly to 
the Fourth International, a regular internal bulletin is to be 
published (about every two months). This bulletin will regularly 
bring before the membership the discussion of the most important 
questions of the international movement. 
7. The Executive Committee of the united organisation is to 
consist of five members each from the present R. S. L. and Militant 
Groups plus two each from the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Edinburgh) 
and the Workers Internationai League. Each group is to select its own 
representatives. This Executive Committee is to serve as the leader- 
ship of the organisation for six months. At the end of that time a 
National Conference is to be held, where the experience will be 
reviewed and a new executive committee elected. - Any contemplated 
change of tactical line shall be finally adopted only after consultation 
with the Fourth International. 
8. The Executive Committee of the united organisation is to 
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consider the question of forming a special youth section our 
recommendation being in favour of this. 
9. Six Months Peace Agreement: Recognising the necessity of 
safeguarding and nursing the unity achieved after such prolonged and 
harmful division of forces, and of fairly testing out the possibilities 
to expand and develop our influence as a united organisation on a 
program herein laid down, the signers of this document mutually pledge 
themselves before the membership and before the Fourth International: 
(a) To consider all past conflicts liquidated by the 
adoption of this agreement. 
(b) To work together in harmonious collaboration, 
laying aside like principled Bolsheviks all personal 
animosities and antagonisms, and refraining from 
factionalism, and especially from any kind of 
factional organisation, during the six months period 
alloted to the new Executive Committee. 
(c) To combine all constructive forces against any 
individual or group violating this agreement, to 
impose the discipline of the Fourth International 
upon any such violations, and, if necessary, to expel 
them from their ranks. 
10. Upon the signing of this unity and peace agreement by the 
leading committees of the various groups, it is to be submitted to 
the respective memberships of each group for ratification and for 
the election of the group's representatives to the United Executive 
Committee. Immediately after such ratification a general aggregate 
meeting of all members of all groups shall be called to signalise the 
formal achievement of unity and the opening of a new stage in the 
development of the united British Section of the Fourth International. 
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This entire process is to be completed within one week. The 
delegation of the International Secretariat is to participate in all 
above scheduled meetings. 
H. The United Executive Committee is to elect the delegates of 
the United organisation of the World Congress of the Fourth 
International. 
Si ed: 
Executive of the R. S. L. Executive of the Militant Group. 
Delegation of the R. S. P. Executive of the W. I. L. 
'ý. 
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INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME OF WORKERS INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE 
From G. Healy 'Industrial Militants need a Programme', Socialist Appeal, 
(June 1942). 
"I. Withdrawal of Trade Union representatives from Capitalist state 
posts. Complete and unconditional independence of the trade 
unions in relation to the capitalist states. 
2. Democratization of the unions and the replacement of the top 
bureaucracy with militants from the ranks. 
3.100 per cent trade organisation in every factory. 
4. A factory committee for every plant. 
5. Union organisation to be based on industry instead of craft. 
6. Area and National Workers Councils to be formed from Trades 
Councils and factory committees. 
MOBILISATION OF ASSETS FOR MINIMUM DEMANDS 
1. Workers Control of Industry to end profiteering, mismanagement 
and chaos. 
2. Confiscation of all war profits - all company books to be open to 
trade union inspection. 
3. Nationalisation without compensation of arms industry, mines, 
railways and banks. 
4. Sliding scale of wages to meet the increased cost of living with 
a guaranteed minimum. 
5. Equal pay for equal work, no penalisation of women and youth in 
industry. 
6. Repeal of all anti-working class legislation. 
7. Equal distribution of food, clothes, etc. under control of price- 
fixing committees to be set up from representatives of distributive 
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employees, co-operatives, housewives and small shopkeepers. 
WORKERS TO CONTROL TRANSFER OF LABOUR 
1. No transfer of labour from Government factories to private 
enterprise: 
2. No transfer of labour to be carried out at financial loss to the 
workers. 
3. Transfers to be under the control of shop stewards and factory 
committees to avoid victimization. 
4. Trade Union control of hotel accommodation to house transferred 
workers. 
APPENDIX F 
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APPENDIX F 
TROTSKYISM AND THE I. L. P. 
In the I. L. P. Trotskyism's presence in 1938 was at a low ebb, 
virtually reduced to Patterson and others working from the Clapham 
I. L. P. bookshop. In the Guild of Youth there were some young members 
of WIL and they achieved a symbolic coup on 26 November 1938 when the. 
London Guild declared for the formation of the Fourth International. 
At the national conference of the Guild, however, the Fourth 
International was passed over for the London Bureau and the R. S. L. was 
condemned for failing to support an anti-war front the Bureau had 
summoned. 
2 
At the Party conference of 1939 reaffiliation was the key 
issue and now, as at the end of the war, Trotskyism split both ways. 
Harry Wicks and Hugo Dewar had moved to the I. L. P. as the most likely 
source, in their view, of labour movement revival. With their 
supporters they openly entered the I. L. P. and formed its Battersea and 
Wimbledon branches. 3 At conference they allied with C. A. Smith and 
Fred Jowett against reaffiliation. 
4 
Patterson, a long standing opponent 
I The decision had only an abstract meaning since the Guild also 
rejected cooperation with Youth for Socialism, at that time largely 
based on the League of Youth, (The New Leader, 2 Dec. 1938; Youth 
for Socialism, Nov. 1938). 
2 The conference also rejected a Stepney resolution advancing the 
Trotskyist view of Russia and passed one from Barking putting the 
I. L. P. view, (The New Leader, 24 Feb. 1939). 
3 Wicks and Dewar negotiated their entry with Brockway who welcomed 
them because they brought support, (Interview with H. Wicks). 
4 For this debate see P. Thwaites, 'The Independent Labour Party, 
1938-1950', (University of London Ph. D. thesis, 1976), 83; 
F. Brockway, Inside the Left, (1942); The New Leader, (14 April 
1939). In the winter of 1940-41, C. A. Smith shocked the I. L. P. by 
coming out in favour of the war and national defence. 
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of rejoining Labour had now reversed his view. 
' 
From its Labour Party 
position, Workers International League also supported reaffiliation. 
2 
The desire of the National Council was upheld and negotiations opened 
which might have been successful had not war intervened. Patterson 
attempted to take dissident I. L. P. -ers into the Labour Party and 
received support from the London Divisional Council. The attempt was 
crushed by I. L. P. head office. 
3 
War gave the I. L. P. a chance to return to the great 
simplicities. 
4 
The 1930s had revealed a lack of clarity as to what 
the party stood for, but it was definitely against war. This gave it a 
greater firmness of purpose between 1939 and 1945 than it had had for 
some years and even the fleeting promise of not being confined to 
electoral representation in Scotland. It also gathered to it other 
dissidents stifled by the electoral truce between the two main parties. 
Before June 1941 the C. P. G. B. was better placed to tap this potential. 
After that date the I. L. P., the new Common Wealth Party, and even 
WIL derived growth from defiance of the consensus. 
I Patterson was on the losing side in his attempts to subject the 
parliamentary group to the party following its behaviour during the 
Munich crisis, in his effort to strengthen the I. L. P. 's immediate 
policy on war and in his opposition, during the debate on the 
National Register, to any connection with A. R. P., (The New Leader, 
14 April 1939). 
2 Perhaps with Patterson in mind WIL wrote, 
'The militant members, who have vainly been striving to 
transform the I. L. P. into a revolutionary organisation, now 
completely disillusioned, are attempting to organise themselves 
with a view to entering the Labour Party apart from the I. L. P.. ' 
('What Next for the I. L. P.?, WIN, (June 1939), 3. ) 
3 The N. A. C. suspended Patterson for anti-party conduct but the London 
Divisional Council declined by one vote to operate the suspension. 
Thereupon the N. A. C. suspended the Council, convened a special 
conference of London branches, and put to it the motion that the 
I. L. P. could be made 'an effective revolutionary instrument' and 
should be strengthened. Resolutions for and against Patterson were 
ruled out of order on the grounds that he had a right of appeal, 
whereupon nine branches withdrew in protest. But twenty stayed to 
pass the resolution and it seems that both groups of delegates opted 
for staying in the I. L. P., (The New Leader, 21 July 1939). 
4 See footnotes of following page. 
518. 
In January 1940 The New Leader felt confident enough to treat 
the Trotskyists with disdain, listing five separate organisations of 
theirs which opposed the war. 
1 But while Patterson had left the I. L. P., 
Wicks. and Dewar'had come in. By 1942 two more Trotskyist groups had 
entered the party. The first group was the R. S. P., which had never 
really surrendered its independence at the time of the Peace and Unity 
agreement or later. In 1940 a split was evident within this tiny party. 
Maitland and the Taits were attracted by the idea of conscientious 
objection, but a number of their Edinburgh members. had drifted towards 
the perspectives of the WIL, which had sent Lee and Haston up to 
address the branch. 
2 
Maitland and the Taits expelled the pro-WIL 
faction. 3 In December 1941 they announced their decision to enter the 
I. L. P., then 'challenging the capitalist warmongers in the Central 
Edinburgh By-Election'. The I. L. P., they had concluded, was the only 
nationally organised socialist party in Britain, 
4 
and they set up a 
new branch of it in the city. 
4 From previous page. 
I. L. P. M. P. s opposed the Military Training Act, the Emergency Powers 
Act, the National Services (Armed Forces) Act, the Control of 
Employment Act, and the Declaration of War itself, (The I. L. P. in 
in War and Peace). 
I J. Jupp, op. cit., 237. 
2 Interview with E. Grant, (Jan. 1973). 
3 They adhered to the WIL, but because of local conditions peculiar 
to Edinburgh were allowed to continue with open work; (WIL, 'Reply 
of the E. C. to Comrade D. F. ', 12 Oct. 1940, Internal Bulletin, 
(n. d. ), H. P., 9). 
4 [R. S. P. ], Vote For A Socialist Britain, [Dec. 1941], H. P., D. J. H. 
8/1. In June 1942 WIL attempted unsuccessfully to recruit the rump 
of the R. S. P. When it failed it concluded W. Tait and others would 
line up with the 'right wing including Padley and Wicks against the 
WIL members in the I. L. P. ' (C. C., 20 June 1942, H. P., D. J. H. 
14B/19). 
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When the I. L. P. launched its Socialist Britain Now! 
campaign in late 1941 it rallied support from many with histories in 
the Trotskyist movement. Reg. Groves greeted it with the declaration 
that it would bring 'hope to the world'. 
' 
He and two comrades from 
S. A. W. F. days, W. T. Colyer and Will Morris, now wrote regularly for 
The New Leader. In February 1942 Dick Beech, an early British contact 
of the Opposition, applied to join the I. L. P. as the only party which 
had not shelved socialism for the duration. 
2 
Groves threw himself into 
the campaign in the spring of that year. 
3 
_ 
The premiss of the Socialist Britain Now! campaign was that 
the I. L. P. would be the prime instrument of socialist transformation. 
This view was diametrically opposed to that of WIL, which believed that 
the I. L. P. should join the Labour Party in order to strengthen its 
left. 
4 
Three Trotskyist factions were in evidence at the I. L. P. annual 
conference 
5 
of 1942. There W. Tait urged the sending of arms to Russia 
1 The New Leader, (10 Jan. 1942). 
2 He did not become a prominent member though The New Leader did publish 
some of his fiction in 1944. 
3 He spoke at a number of campaign meetings and in March 1942 seconded 
Brockway's main resolution at a Socialist Britain Now: conference in 
the I. L. P. Midland division, (Maitland-Sara Papers, M. S. S. 172/LPA/5). 
4 See WIL's open letter to the 1942 I. L. P. conference, (Socialist 
Appeal, April 1942). It had been sufficiently sensitive to I. L. P. 
affairs to publish Trotsky's 'The I. L. P. and the Fourth International', 
in WIN for December 1941. The C. P. G. B. was equally scornful of the 
proposition that the I. L. P. would rapidly become the instrument of 
socialist change. See the treatment of an analysis by 
John McGovern M. P. in J. R. Campbell, Socialism Through Victory, (1942), 
10-11. 
5 Groves also maintained relations with the I. L. P. but on an individual 
basis. From summer 1943, while still Labour candidate for Aylesbury 
he contributed a free-ranging column 'Time to Kill' to The New 
Leader. The R. S. L. executive broke its inflexibility on the Labour 
Party tactic on 16 March 1942 to allow that members might enter the 
I. L. P. where short term gains could be made. Nothing came of this, 
preventing the I. L. P. 's internal life becoming yet more complex. 
520. 
under worker' control and found a seconder in W. G. Hanton, the 
Communist League veteran. 
I 
Maitland moved a resolution on industrial 
unionism. 
2 WIL ran a baleful eye of the performance of Dewar and Wicks, 
who they thought had antagonised delegates with points of order and not 
forced the Russian issue. 
3 
For itself, it took great encouragement 
from the passage by chance, of its 'Labour to Power' policy, and the 
strong contact established with the Newcastle and Cardiff branches. 
4 
Interest in Trotsky, never absent from the I. L. P., increased 
in 1942 with polemical articles sustained subsequently by WIL. 
5 
Wicks 
and Dewar, with support from Maitland, took over the open forum Free 
Expression, and by 1943 had turned it into a Trotskyist vehicle. 
6 
I J. R. Campbell, Socialism Through Victory (1942), 6. 
2 S. Bornstein, interview with F. Maitland, (Aug. 1976), kindly lent 
to author. 
3 Their activity was 'distinguished only by its complete stupidity and 
political ineptitude', (E. C. Report, 22 April 1942, H. P., D. J. H. 
14B/11/1; National Organiser's Report, n. d., 2). The WIL National 
Organiser and Healy had attended the conference as observers. 
4 Conference had passed by an overwhelming majority a Cardiff-Tooting 
composite putting the Socialist Appeal programme. This 'most 
amazing fluke' gave WIL a legal platform for its activities, (E. C. 
Report, 22 April 1942, H. P., D. J. H. 14B/11/1). 
5 Marc Loris of the S. W. P., who was closely in touch with WIL, 
contributed a critique 'The I. L. P. : Words and Reality' of the 
Socialist Britain Now! campaign to Left (formerly Controversy) for 
October 1942. Walter Padley of the I. L. P. replied in December and 
Loris wrote again on the party the next year, ('The British I. L. P. ', 
Fourth International, Feb. 1943,63). See also WIN, passim. 
6 Wicks promised a limited attempt at changing Free Expression into 'a 
Marxist theoretical journal' in October 1942, and that month it 
c proclaimed itself 'a Revolutionary Socialist monthly'. (H. Wicks to 
Sara, 1 Oct. 1942, Warwick M. S. S. 15/3/1/66). From November it was 
a regular Trotskyist journal, publishing articles by Trotsky himself, 
former oppositionists and Hugo and Margaret Dewar. Free Expression 
articles were forceful, but weakened when they had to give 
practical advice. 
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Ironically it was WIL which effectively was operating the policy Wicks 
and Dewar had advocated for the Communist League a decade earlier: an 
independent Trotskyist organisation with an I. L. P. fraction. Its more 
effective I. L. P. work helped it to make recruits from Wicks and Dewar as 
well as directly from the I. L. P. 
1 
One thrust of WIL propaganda against the I. L. P. was to 
ridicule its leaders as poseurs with a taste for ultra-left adventures. 
Such, it believed, was the Socialist Britain Now. campaign which 
collapsed between the annual conferences of 1942 and 1943. WIL argued 
that if it were a revolutionary party reaffiliation to Labour would be 
a disaster, for I. L. P. leaders did not make principled criticisms of 
Labour leaders; precisely because it was not revolutionary I. L. P. 
reaffiliation would be a progressive step which would sort out not only 
its own members but those of the Labour Left as well. 
2 
By the time of 
the 1943 conference WIL was confident. The I. L. P. now had within it a 
sizeable group of genuine Marxists 'for the first time since the 
3 C. L. R. James walk-out and debacle'. 
I They were to win the support of Bill Hunter, a Tynesider who had 
formerly belonged to the Peace Pledge Union, and Betty Russell of the 
Tooting branch of the I. L. P. These WIL gains may have been 
facilitated by joint I. L. P. -Trotskyist fractions, (Interview with 
H. Wicks, 30 Nov. 1979). Against such gains WIL had to offset its 
problems with Healy, who in February 1943 told its Political Bureau 
that he was resigning to join the I. L. P. The Bureau recalled seven 
previous resignations that had been hushed up and this was no more 
permanent, (Statement of the P. B. On the Expulsion of G. Healy at the 
Central Committee Meeting of February 7th 1943,15 Feb. 1943, H. P., 
r D. J. H. 4 (15)). 
2 E. Grant, 'The I. L. P. in Transition', WIN (May 1943), 2. 
3 'A Letter from England', Fourth International (June 1943), 190. The 
most effective work of all was being done in the North-East. 
Roy Tearse, from that I. L. P. division was from 1942 organising WIL 
industrial work from London. Following the arrival of Heaton Lee 
and Ann Keen in Walker in 1943, a consolidated I. L. P. fraction 
included T. Dan Smith, Ken Skethaway, Dave Binah and 
Jack and Daisy Rawlings. This led in turn to an acquaintance with 
Bill Davy of the Y. C. L. who was to lead the engineering apprentices' 
movement of 1943-4, (Interview with A. -Finkel (Keen), 30 July 1974). 
As to the size of the factions, P. Thwaites (op. cit. ', 36) gives 
twelve for the WIL on entry into the I. L. P. and H. Wicks recalls 
twenty around Free Expression, (Interview, 30 Nov. 1979). 
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At this conference WIL influence contributed to the success 
of Ted Fletcher in defeating an N. A. C. proposal for an alliance with 
Common Wealth, though a discussion on the Fourth International was not 
allowed. There, was still a clash of policy between the Trotskyists. A 
Wallsend-Tooting amendment was tabled to the N. A. C. resolution on 
'Political Truce and Labour Unity' but its call for 'Labour to Power' 
was voted down. After this Wicks, the Battersea delegate, opposed the 
resolution itself on the grounds that it implied reaffiliation: 
l 
Nor 
was this the only clash. 
2 
In their journals the WIL and the Wicks- 
Dewar factions argued out the future of the I. L. P. from opposite 
corners. 
3 
Yet despite their programmatic differences both emphasised 
the importance of agaitation in the factories: there was a close 
similarity between their approach and that of the I. L. P. when at last 
it took up industrial work. 
4 
These similar approaches helped at least 
one of the I. L. P. 's impressive wartime performances at by-elections. 
5 
I Hugo Dewar believed that the basis of reformism had been eaten away by 
the war. 'The disappearance of this (Labour) party from the British 
political scene is inevitable', he concluded, ('The End of the Labour 
Party', Free Expression, (June 1943), n. p. ). For the clash between 
the Trotskyists see P. Thwaites, op. cit., 155. 
2 In the India debate Wicks backed an N. A. C. resolution while 
Betty Russell (Tooting) unsuccessfully moved a series of amendments 
disputing that Congress could be an instrument of workers' and 
peasants' struggles. There was, however, only one speaker, Wicks, 
who called for class unity as the best way to help Russia. 
3 Free Expression was open to opposed views. The annonymous author of 
'Socialists and the Labour Party', in its December 1943 issue argued 
the WIL case that the Fourth International which the journal called 
for would not begin from mere denunciation of Labour Party crimes. 
The opposite view was advanced by Maitland in 'The Meaning of Smith', 
Left, (March 1943), 66-70. Maitland wrote another article, 'The 
Political Struggle for Italy' for Left for October 1943. 
4 See Chapter XI. 
5 At a by-election in Acton in December 1943, Walter Padley, the party 
Industrial Organiser, fought an area where the I. L. P. and Trotskyism 
had factory support. He polled a respectable 28% of the votes. 
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January 1944 saw Trotskyist influence in the North-East reach 
a peak at the I. L. P. Divisional conference. There a resolution was 
accepted calling for discussions with 'the Fourth International and 
other groups who recognise the urgent necessity for the working class 
to be led by a Workers International based upon Marxism and embracing 
the Bolshevik form of organisation'. Conference also amended an 
official motion on 'War and the World Struggle' to include the 
Trotskyist demand for a united socialist states of Europe. 
' The 
division defeated a call for Labour Party affiliation, yet it also 
rejected an electoral alliance with Common Wealth. That same weekend 
saw the London and Southern Counties division turn down a Tooting 
resolution on the Common Wealth alliance and refuse permission to 
approach other revolutionary organisations including the Fourth 
International. 
National I. L. P. conference coincided in time and place with 
the arrests of Trotskyists for acting in furtherance of the Tyneside 
apprentices dispute. No party rallied more powerfully to the aid of 
the infant R. C. P. than the I. L. P., not least at ä parliamentary level. 
2 
This is remarkable since 1944 may justly be singled out as the year 
when, arguably, Trotskyist influence on the I. L. P. exceeded even that 
of 1935-6. Dave Binah, an R. C. P. member and Sunderland delegate urged 
on the 1944 conference the policy of Labour to Power. His call for the 
I. L. P. to help break the coalition and participate in exposing reformists 
was countered by Maitland who claimed Brockway and the Glasgow councillor 
Tom. Taylor were trying to lead the I. L. P. back by the nose into the 
Labour Party. It was being asked to mask new treachery. This time the 
1 There was some ambiguity in this since there were I. L. P. ers who 
backed this demand. 
2 The generous response of Maxton and the I. L. P. conference to the 
victimization of Jock Haston and the other arrested Trotskyists and 
the contribution of I. L. P. M. P. s to the debate on Order 1A(a) are 
discussed in Chapter XI. 
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R. C. P. was on the winning side: an N. A. C. resolution for socialist 
unity and the establishment of joint left groups fell by forty three to 
sixty one. 
' Two separate Trotskyist streams in the I. L. P. continued to 
flow their distinct ways. The R. C. P. 's fraction work culminated in 
expulsions the following year. 
2 
Dewar3 and Maitland4 remained within 
the I. L. P., firmly committed to the thesis that it might become the 
agent of revolutionary transformation. In the case of Dewar at least 
this was to mean commitment to a sinking ship. 
5 
I The New Leader, 7 April 1945. 
2 See Chapter XIII. 
3 See Dewar's defence of an I. L. P. separate from the Labour Party, 
'What Will the Labour Party Live For? ', Left (Dec. 1944), 271-3. 
4 Maitland wrote four articles for Left in 1945 including his brief 
polemic against Walter Padley, 'Lord Keynes and Walter Padley', 
(Jan. 1945,306). 
5 The post-war decline of the I. L. P. and the disastrous Battersea 
by-election are discussed in Chapter XIII. 
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APPENDIX G 
PROGRAMME OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY 
t 
An end to the coalition with the Bosses. Labour and Trade 
Union Leaders must break with the Capitalist Government and wage a 
campaign for power on the following programme: - 
Industrial and Economic Policy. 
1. Nationalisation of the land, mines, banks, transport and all 
big industry without compensation, as the prerequisite for a planned 
economy and the only means of ensuring full employment with adequate 
standards of living for the workers, and the operation of the means of 
production under control of workers' committees. 
2. Confiscation of all war profits, all company books to be open 
for trade union inspection, control of production through workers' 
committees to end the chaos and mismanagement. 
3. Distribution of food, clothes and other consumers' commodities 
under the control of committees of workers elected from the Co-ops, 
distributive trades, factories, housewives' committees, and small 
shopkeepers, and allocation of housing under the control of tenants' 
committees. 
4. A rising scale of wages to meet the increased cost of living 
with a guaranteed minimum; the rate for the job; and industrial rates 
for all members off the armed forces. 
Democratic Demands. 
5. Repeal of the Essential Works Order, 'the Emergency Powers Act 
and all other anti-working class and strike-breaking legislation. 
6. Full electoral and democratic rights for all persons from the 
age of 18 years. Full democratic and political rights for the men and 
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women in uniform. 
7. Immediate freedom and unconditional independence for India, 
Ireland and all the colonies of Britain; immediate withdrawal of 
British armed forces from these countries; full economic and military 
assistance to the Indian and colonial peoples to maintain their 
independence against all imperialist attack. 
Military Policy. 
8. Clear out the reactionary, pro-Fascist, and anti-Labour 
officer caste in the armed forces and Home Guard; election of officers 
by-the ranks. 
9. Establishment of military schools by the Trade Unions at the 
expense of the State for the training of worker-officers; arming of 
the workers under the control of workers' committees elected in the 
factories, unions and in the streets for the defence of the democratic 
rights of the workers from reactionary attacks by the enemies of the 
working class at home and abroad. 
International Policy. 
10. Against race hatred and discrimination öf all forms 
(Vansittartism, Anti-Semitism, and the Colour Bar); for the 
fraternisation and co-operation of workers and soldiers of all countries. 
11. Unconditional defence of the Soviet Union against all 
imperialist Powers; despatch of arms, food and essential materials to 
the Soviet Union under the control of the Trade Unions and factory 
committees. 
12. A Socialist appeal to the workers of Germany, Europe, Japan 
and the rest of the world, on the basis of this programme in-Britain, 
to join the Socialist struggle against Nazism, Fascism and all forms of 
capitalist oppression and for a Socialist United States of Europe and a 
Federation of Asiatic Soviet Socialist Republics. 
'ý. 
APPENDIX H 
527. '. 
'. 
APPRNnTY N 
13th April, 1944 
1% WAR CABINET. 
THE TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 
MEMORANDUM BY THE HOME SECRETARY. 
Doctrine. 
TROTSKYISM is a body of doctrine based on the teachings of 
Marx, as elaborated by Lenin and interpreted and applied to the 
conditions of the inter-war period by Trotsky. The cleavage from 
official Communism, or Stalinism, originated in the opposition between 
Trotsky's doctrinaire views and Stalin's realism. Trotsky denounced 
the supplanting of the "continuing world revolution" by Stalin's plan 
to establish Socialism in the Soviet Union as a prerequisite. He 
opposed the replacement of democratic discussion of party policy by the 
personal dictatorship of Stalin, the weakening of the influence of the 
Soviets (Councils) in the face of a rising bureaucracy, and the revival 
of economically and socially privileged classes. The Trotskyists do not 
regard the form of society which now exists in Russia as socialism - 
they believe that true socialism can be achieved only by more or less 
simultaneous revolution over the greater part of the globe; and they are 
bitterly hostile to the Stalinist regime because it has not only 
"betrayed the revolution" in Russia itself, but by using the national 
Communist parties as the instruments of its "reactionary" policy abroad 
has retarded the development of the working class towards world 
revolution. 
The ultimate aim of the Trotskyist is the establishment by 
means of uprisings all over the world of Workers' Governments which will 
introduce common ownership and workers' control of the means of 
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production. They believe that world revolution will once more become 
possible as a result of the war. Their immediate policy in the present 
"pre-revolutionary period of agitation, propaganda and organisation" is 
to prepare for'this revolutionary moment by fostering a militant spirit 
among the working class and establishing themselves as its leaders. 
This they seek to do, according to the directions of the late M. Trotsky, 
by campaigning alongside the workers on the issues which most closely 
concern them, such as wages, employment and social conditions. 
The Trotskyists, while hostile to "fascism" regard the war as 
a struggle between rival Imperialisms, a struggle which is being used by 
the capitalist class as an excuse more effectively to exploit and 
oppress the workers. The U. S. S. R., although degenerate, is still a 
workers' State and must be helped in its resistance to fascism; but 
the Trotskyist believes that capitalist Governments cannot by their 
nature effectively oppose fascism, and that he can therefore only help 
the U. S. S. R. if he first overthrows his own Government. 
Organisation. 
The Trotskyist movement has existed in Britain since 1929, the 
year of Trotsky's expulsion from the U. S. S. R. The movement originally 
consisted of several small groups, from which there emerged in 1937 the 
Revolutionary Socialist League (the official British Section of the 
Fourth International) and the Workers' International League. The 
Revolutionary Socialist League was stultified by internal strife and the 
Workers' International League outdistanced it in members and activity. 
The two parties have for some time been urged by the International 
Secretariat to unite, and on the 12th March, 1944, they at length did 
so. The new body has (to the annoyance of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain) taken the name "Revolutionary Communist Party" and has 
succeeded the Revolutionary Socialist League as the British Section of 
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the Fourth International. It is too early to say what the relations of 
the party with the International will be, but the International is 
loosely organised and is not likely to have the will or the means to do 
more than advise the party on broad issues; nor is the party under its 
present leadership likely to submit to any attempt at dictation. 
The leadership remains in the hands of the former leaders of 
the Workers' International League, James Haston, Mrs. Mildred Lee, 
Edward Grant, Roy Tearse and Harold Atkinson (see Appendix A). This 
group is in effective control of the organisation, which is strongly 
centralised. District Committees exist in London, Scotland, Tyneside, 
Merseyside, Yorkshire and the Midlands, but do not act without close 
consultation with Headquarters. No figures of the total membership are 
available, but in London, where the movement is strongest there are 152 
members, of whom thirty-two are in the forces. Outside London the party 
has about twenty branches. A branch rarely has more than twenty members 
and sometimes has less than ten, and the total number of members in the 
forces is unlikely to be more than a hundred. On this basis the total 
membership is probably well below a thousand. * Membership, however, is 
confined to those who have served six months' probation and proved 
themselves active workers, and sympathisers are probably more numerous 
than official members. Even allowing for people who are prepared to 
work for the movement from outside, the number of active Trotskyists in 
the country is very small. The party is strongest, outside London, on 
Clydeside, and weakest in the Midlands and South Wales. It hardly 
exists outside the larger industrial areas. 
The Trotskyists, like the Stalinists, attempt to increase their 
influence by penetrating other organisations. Attempts to penetrate 
Trade Unions have met with little success, but some progress has been 
* The newspapers report that Haston said the membership was 1,500, 
and that on the same day Mildred Lee said it was 2,000. 
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made in the I. L. P., which the Trotskyists regard as the party 
commanding the largest following of militant workers. This progress is 
most marked on Tyneside, where the divisional representative on the 
I. L. P. National'`Committee is also a member of the Central Committee of 
the Revolutionary Communist Party. 
In the Autumn of 1943 the Militant Workers' Federation was 
formed to co-ordinate the activity of militant groups which had arisen 
spontaneously among dissident Communists and members of the I. L. P. and 
the W. I. L. The Federation is directed by the Revolutionary Communist 
Party; its secretary is Roy Tearse, who claims that it now has nine 
regional Committees. The most important of these are the Clyde Workers' 
Committee and the London Militant Workers' Committee. There is a 
committee at Sheffield and possibly also at Huddersfield, Barrow and 
Rugby; and there are small groups of sympathisers on Tyneside, 
Merseyside and in Nottingham, which Tearse may count as committees. The 
Federation is not much more than a paper organisation, but it is useful 
to the Trotskyists as a source'of contacts and as an instrument of their 
industrial policy, particularly among engineering workers. 
The Revolutionary Communist Party has three papers, Socialist 
Appeal, a fortnightly publication of which 8,000 to 10,000 copies are 
printed, Workers' International News, a theoretical organ of which 2,000 
copies are printed at irregular intervals, and The Militant Miner, a 
small local sheet which has been taken over from an independent group in 
Lanarkshire on its fusion with the Workers' International League. The 
Ministry of Supply refused last October to continue to supply the 
Workers' International League with newsprint pending the production of 
satisfactory evidence of their pre-war consumption. This has not been 
forthcoming, and the party has been forced to reduce both the size and 
the circulation of Socialist Appeal. 
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Finance. 
There are no indications that Trotskyist organisations 
receive money from abroad. The members are expected to contribute 
liberally and are apparently prepared to do so. Haston is reported 
in the Daily Telegraph of the 10th April, 1944, as saying: "Most of 
our members pay 5s. a week when they can, and those who can afford it 
pay a 25 per cent. levy on their wages. " 
The Movement's income for 1943 was £2,654. Sales of Socialist 
Appeal brought in £781, and it is believed that Mildred Lee contributed 
most of her private income of £350. There were a few substantial 
subscriptions, including sums of £30-£50, believed to have come from 
a Cumberland mill-owner, but the greater part of the total was 
received from branches and anonymous individuals in amounts varying 
from a few shillings to £5. 
Policy and Methods. 
While the British Trotskyists follow the line of the sect in 
regarding the war as a struggle between rival Imperialisms, their policy 
is not directly aimed either at stopping the war or at procuring the 
defeat of their country. They point out that the suffering the war 
brings is the fruit of the greed and cruelty of the capitalist "boss"; 
but they do not agitate for peace, and their programme (see Appendix G) 
includes a pledge of full support for the Soviet Union. Their 
propaganda appears to be intended rather to stir up class feeling among 
the workers than to have any direct effect on the war. 
The main object of Trotskyist policy is to stimulate and focus 
discontent and to obtain the leadership of the group of militants thus 
formed. The party seeks not only to take the place vacated by the 
Communist Party as the leader of the normally discontented elements, but 
to attract to itself the larger body of workers who, while not yet ready 
to take up a militantly anti-Government attitude, are suspicious of their 
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employers, doubtful of the sincerity of the Government's promises of 
post-war reform, and tiring of the industrial truce and the leaders who 
seek to enforce it. The party's appeal to these groups is somewhat 
similar to thar/of the Communist Party before June 1941. There are the 
same bitter attacks on the callous, profiteering "boss, " on "anti- 
working-class legislation, " on the sacrifices demanded of the workers, 
and on the "imperialist war. " On the latter subject the Trotskyists 
are, however, less persistent and less defeatist than were the 
Communists. 
To carry out this policy they campaign on issues and in areas 
where there is already strong feeling among the workers. Although the 
party is always ready to exploit.. grievances in any factory or mine 
where it has contacts, it is too small and scattered to be able to start 
trouble on any considerable scale by itself, and it can make more 
progress by clinging to the fringes of a big strike than by leading a 
small one. It secures a wider field for its propaganda, a field 
already well prepared by the mere existence of a grievance strong enough 
to cause a strike; and in the bitter aftermath of a big dispute it may 
hope to start a new branch of the party or a committee of the Militant 
Workers' Federation. The party's technique is accordingly to fasten on 
an area where a strike is threatening or has broken out; one of the 
leaders, or the local group if there is one, makes contacts among the 
strikers and sells literature; the cause and course of the strike is 
reported in Socialist Appeal; and, whatever the outcome, the moral 
drawn is that only by militant activity under new leadership can the 
workers secure their rights. But the effect is small. 
Socialist Appeal devotes a good deal of its space, though by 
no means all, to discussing strikes and industrial grievances. It 
attempts to discredit the Government, the employers and the trade-union 
leaders; but, while it undoubtedly fans discontent and encourages 
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strikers, it seldom explicitly incites to strike and it makes no 
attempt to foment sympathetic strikes. The party's slogan is not 
"Strike! " but "Break the Coalition. Labour to power. " It desires the 
establishment of a Labour Government because it believes that any post- 
war Government must fail to fulfil the workers' expectations, and that 
the failure of a Labour Government will produce a disillusion strong 
enough to throw the working class into the arms of the extremists. 
Influence on Industry. 
The influence of the Trotskyists in industry is still slight. 
In connection with the recent strike of engineering apprentices, there 
is evidence that Roy Tearse and Heaton Lee, the party's organiser on 
Tyneside, advised and directed the boys' leaders and that on the Clyde 
the apprentices were working in conjunction with the Clyde Workers' 
Committee. At Barrow in September 1943 Trotskyists had some part in 
directing the strike committee during the early days of the strike, but 
the cause of the strike was a strongly felt industrial grievance and 
not Trotskyist agitation. Trotskyists also took some part in the 
strikes at the Rolls Royce aircraft works, Glasgow, in August 1941 and 
July 1943, in a strike at the Barnbow Royal Ordnance Factory in June 
1943 and in the Yorkshire Transport strike in May 1943, but their 
activity has*consisted in advising and encouraging the strike leaders 
rather than in provoking the strikes. 
Trotskyist influence in mining is considerably less than in 
engineering. There is no evidence that Trotskyists have ever started 
mining strikes or exercised any appreciable influence on their course. 
They are drawn to the coalfields by a desire to make converts and they 
are rarely in touch with strike leaders. In South Wales the Workers' 
International League had at the time of this recent strike two contacts, 
each of a fortnight's standing, and no organisation. The intervention 
of the leaders was confined to two visits by Haston, one on the 
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10th March, four days after the strike had begun, the other on the 
18th March, two days after the majority of men, including those in the 
area Haston visited, had returned to work. The mid-March issue of 
Socialist Appeal, the smallest that has yet appeared, was devoted 
entirely to the strike but was not out until it was almost over. 
In Yorkshire the Trotskyists have only two groups, at Leeds 
and Sheffield. Each has about twenty members, most of whom have no 
connection with mining. During the recent strike small-scale 
propaganda has been carried on in her spare time by a local leader 
(Betty Hamilton) with a handful of assistants. Five hundred copies of 
Socialist Appeal have been sent to the area and pamphlets have been 
distributed. No national leader has covered the strike, but 
Edward Grant, editor of Socialist Appeal, who is suffering from a 
break-down, interrupted a rest cure to address one meeting and do some 
canvassing. It was attended by fifty people, few of whom showed any 
enthusiasm. Victory Gavzey - aged 19 - the only other person of 
Trotskyist sympathies who is known to have addressed meetings, moved a 
resolution at one of them that the men should return to work and then 
ask for an increase in pay. The Trotskyists were certainly not 
responsible for starting the strike, and there is no evidence that they 
have been responsible for prolonging it. Considering their limited 
strength in the area and the small scale'of their activity, their 
influence on the situation must have been very small. 
The only Trotskyist mining group of any significance is that 
organised in Lanarkshire by Hugh Brannan, secretary of the national 
miners' group of the I. L. P. and a Trade Unionist of standing. The group 
is, however, very small and its influence is limited. 
The Trotskyists are attracting workers whose discontent and 
desire to hit out at the employer and the Government can find no other 
outlet. They have achieved a small and localised but recognisable 
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influence; and they are confident that the appeal of their militant 
programme will become stronger as the strain and friction inseparable 
from prolonged industrial effort increases. They have a closely knit 
core of energetic leaders and a membership which makes up in enthusiasm 
what it lacks in numbers. They are helped by the absence of competition, 
except from the I. L. P., which they hope to use as a conscious or 
unconscious ally, the lack of normal political and trade-union activity, 
and the sense of frustration which is alleged to be'produced by the 
absence of marked progress towards either victory in the field or 
reconstruction at home. These advantages are temporary and, unless 
the Trotskyist can exploit them much more rapidly than at present, it 
seems unlikely that they will ever rise to a greater position than that 
of sparring partners to the Communists, who would very much like to see 
the Trotskyists and their small paper suppressed. 
Home Office, Whitehall, H. M. 
13th April, 1944. 
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APPENDIX A. 
OFFICIALS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY. 
James''Ritchie Haston, National organiser, aged 32, describes 
himself variously as an aero engineer, a builder and a journalist. He 
has been an active Trotskyist since 1936, and from August 1941 until 
the amalgamation was employed as National organiser of the Workers' 
International League. He is in grade 4. Several attempts by the 
Ministry of Labour to place him in other employment have failed. 
Mildred Lee, Secretary, aged 31, is a South African and a 
milliner's buyer by trade. She came here in 1938 with her husband, the 
founder of the Workers' International League, and she remained as the 
League's Secretary when her husband returned to South Africa. She 
devotes most of an income of about £350 a year-received from South 
Africa to the cause. 
Edward Grant, Editor of Socialist Appeal, aged 30, is also 
South African and has been connected with the Workers' International 
League since its inception. He was posted to the'Pioneer Corps but 
fractured his skull before joining up and was discharged. It has proved 
impossible, owing to the effects of his injury, , to. find him alternative 
employment. 
Roy Tearse, Industrial organiser, is 25. He served for four 
years in the Royal Navy and was discharged in 1937 on medical grounds. 
He suffers from the effects of infantile paralysis. From 1941 to 1943 
he was employed as an aero engine tester at De Havillands, Edgware, but 
was again discharged on medical grounds and has been certified by the 
medical referee unfit for regular employment. He was for two years a 
secret member of the Workers' International League under an assumed 
name while acting openly as an energetic member of the I. L. P. but has 
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lately resigned from the latter and avowed his Trotskyist allegiance. 
He is secretary of the Militant Workers' Federation. 
Harold Atkinson, Chairman and Treasurer, aged 31, has been 
associated with' Trotskyism since 1938. He is employed as a draughtsman 
by Messrs. Griffin & Tatlock. He devotes most of his spare time to the 
business side of the organisation but does not often appear in public. 
Heaton Lee and Ann Keen, who have been associated with Tearse 
in the Tyneside apprentice strike, are trusted and experienced 
Trotskyists; both are believed to be members of the Central Committee. 
Lee was born in South Africa on the 19th January, 1916, and came to 
England in 1937 already a convinced Trotskyist. He is a civil engineer 
by profession and since 1938 has been employed by Messrs. Wimpey on 
works in London, Glasgow and Tyneside. He is reported to have met 
Mrs. Keen in the course of his voyage to England. She became converted 
to Trotskyism and has lived with Lee and collaborated in his Trotskyist 
activities ever since. While they were in Glasgow Lee acted as 
Workers' International League district organiser and Keen as 
literature secretary; when they moved to Newcastle they continued to 
work in these capacities. On account of his work Lee appears little 
in public, and confines himself to organisation, making and developing 
contacts, and lecturing on political subjects under the auspices of 
the National Council of Labour Colleges. Mrs. Keen regularly sells 
Socialist Appeal and other literature in the streets. (Heaton Lee is 
not believed to be any relation of Mrs. Mildred Lee's husband. ) 
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